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This thesis explores the impact of organisational restructuring upon the
work roles and work satisfaction experiences of local government
managers. Using Mintzberg's analytical framework, the thesis analyses
the ways in which middle managers' interpersonal, informational and
decisional roles change as a result of organisational change from
bureaucratic and professionally dominated forms of "administration" to
more flexible, customer orientated, private sector styles of
"management".
The research is based upon empirical research of middle managers in a
local authority selected as a "critical" case in terms of its adoption
of "new" public sector management systems, as outlined in the
literature.
The findings indicate that most managers made significant changes in
their work behaviour within each of Mintzberg's three role categories,
in accordance with the Authority's formally prescribed "new" management
systems. They were familiar with the Authority's new corporate culture,
and provided concrete evidence of application to their work behaviour.
Job satisfaction levels tended to increase, despite pressures from
continual change, and decreased job security. However, they also
identified various constraints which limited changes in their behaviour
- suggesting limits on the extent of the Authority's move from the
traditional "administration" to the new "management" model of service
provision. They experienced degrees of role tension and ambiguity,
arising particularly from the Authority's introduction of internal
market and devolved management systems.
The thesis concludes by considering factors which can inhibit full
adoption, within public sector organisations, of the "new" management
prescriptions C including structural, behavioural and change management
constraints), and comments on the need for organisational restructuring
to be strategically managed if job satisfaction and managerial
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AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
An increasing volume of public sector literature published during the
l980s and 1990s identifies the development of a "new" management model
within local government, involving essentially a move from bureaucratic
and professionally dominated "administration" to more flexible, customer
orientated, private sector style "management" of service provision.
However, the evidence suggesting that growing numbers of local
authorities are adopting at least some features of the "new" management
systems tends to be derived predominantly from "official" accounts of
such changes, provided by senior managers. Relatively little empirical
investigation has been undertaken into the extent to which these formal
changes in management systems and role prescriptions have resulted in
changes in work behaviour and job satisfaction experienced by managers.
Formally adopted changes introduced by senior managers may or may not be
manifested within the actual role behaviour adopted by middle managers.
If little or no real behaviour change takes place at this level in the
organisation, then, arguably, moves within local authorities towards the
"new" management model are largely cosmetic. It is thus essential, when
attempting to assess the impact of formally espoused changes within
local authorities, to examine the extent to which, and the way in which,
middle managers have adopted new forms of work behaviour in accordance
with the "new" managerial role prescriptions.
The objectives of this research, therefore, are to identify the extent
to which the formal managerial role prescriptions included in the "new"
management model are being translated into actual behaviour change by
middle managers. In addition to focusing on the extent to which the
"rhetoric" of the "new" management model is percolating down the
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organisational hierarchy to produce real" behavioural change, the
research is also concerned with the role of middle managers in
implementing change. As a number of studies suggest (Scase and Gof fee,
1989; Smith, 1990; Dopson and Stewart, 1990), middle managers play a key
role in change implementation. It can be argued that the effective
planning and management of change requires careful consideration of the
impact of structural change on middle managerial work roles and work
satisfaction levels - to minimise their resistance, and maximise their
commitment to the continuing and accelerating pace of change within
local authorities.
Mintzberg's models (1973, 1983, 1989) of organisationa]. design and
managerial roles are used throughout the research to provide theoretical
coherence for analysing the general trends, reported within the
literature, towards local government adoption of the new management
systems. The same models are also used for analysing the data obtained
from the empirical research, which utilises a case study approach. A
local authority (Barset County Council), which adopted as a matter of
policy most of the prescriptions and practices associated with the "new"
management model, was selected as a critical case for examination.
Documentary evidence and interviews with senior managers were used to
analyse the authority's progression during the 1980s and early 1990s
from the "traditional" to "new" forms of organisational structur and
management systems. This was followed by interviews held with middle
managers to identify the extent to which the Authority's formally
adopted "new" managerial policies and role prescriptions permeated and
changed their work behaviour. Semi-structured interviews were held with
48 middle managers located in four departments - two direct service
provision departments (Social Services and Highways), and two support
service departments - Finance and Commercial services.
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ORGANISATION OF THE RESEARCH
The thesis is divided into ten chapters. The first four review the
literature on changing patterns of organisation design and structure,
and the impact of these changes on the nature of managerial role
behaviour. Chapter one explores the main theoretical approaches to the
analysis of organisation design and structure, including the the
traditional hlclassicalH theories of Taylor (1947), Weber (1947) and
Fayol (1949), the human relations approaches, and the more recent open
systems and contingency approaches. Included within the latter approach,
Mintzberg's (1983, 1989) model of organisational configurations, design
parameters, and contingency factors is then outlined and used to
identify different forms of organisation structure, and current patterns
of organisation restructuring.
The second chapter identifies the impact of organisational restructuring
on managerial roles. After examining the concept of managerial roles and
the nature of managerial work activities, functions, effectiveness, and
styles, this chapter adopts a contingency model of managerial work to
analyse the impact of organisational restructuring on middle managers'
roles and work satisfaction levels. Mintzberg's (1973, 1989) contingency
model of three managerial role-sets - interpersonal, informational and
decisional - is used as a framework for analysing these changes in
managerial work; as with chapter one, the emphasis here is on changes
occurring within largely private sector organisations, on which most of
the literature is focused.
Chapters three and four use the sante (Mintzberg's) contingency approach
to organisational structure and managerial roles to identify and analyse
the patterns of change in local goverrmient structures and management
systems during the l980s and l990s. Chapter three explores the changes
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which took place during this period in the economic, institutional and
soda-political environment within which local government operates,
including a discussion of the key features which distinguish local
authority sector from private sector organisations. The impact of these
national developments,	 together with the part played by local
contingency factors (both external and internal to individual local
authorities) on local government structures is then explored, with a
particular focus on the nature and extent of moves from "traditional" to
"new" public sector management models. Chapter four examines the impact
of moves towards the "new" management model on the work behaviour and
work satisfaction of middle managers within local authorities.
Mintzberg's three managerial role-sets are used as an analytical
framework to explore the nature and extent of the progression outlined
in the literature from the traditional emphasis on administrative and
professional styles and competences towards the emphasis on the
"management" approach associated with local authority moves towards
divisionalised forms of structure. This analysis also focuses on the
differentiation of managerial roles, within new market forms of service
provision, into Purchaser and Provider functions.
Chapter 5 describes the research strategy and methodology, beginning
with the reasons for choosing a case-study approach and for selecting
Barset County Council as a critical case. This is followed by a
description of the methods used to collect the data - documentary
searches, semi-structured interviews with senior and middle managers,
plus a short self-administered questionnaire to assess job satisfaction
levels. The advantages and disadvantages of these methods are discussed,
and the interview schedules are reproduced in two exhibits appended to
the chapter.
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Chapters six, seven, eight, and nine analyse the data obtained from the
empirical research, using Mintzberg's models of organisational design
and managerial roles as an analytical framework. Chapter six provides a
detailed account of the extensive restructuring and changes in
managerial role prescriptions introduced within Barset County Council
(BCC) between the mid-1980s and early 1990s, which corresponded closely
with the key features of the "new" management model identified in the
local government literature. This account, based on the formal policies
and managerial roles prescriptions developed by elected members and
senior management, is then followed within the next three chapters, by
an analysis of the views of middle managers themselves about the impact
on their work-role behaviour of Barset's formally espoused "new"
management systems. The objective here is to assess the extent to which
the prescribed changes were realised throughout the organisatiori, as
manifested within the degree of real behaviour changes adopted by middle
managers - to assess the difference, if any, between the rhetoric and
the reality of the new management approach.
Chapter seven focuses on identifying the changes in managers'
interpersonal and informational roles, and chapter eight on changes in
their decisional roles. Both chapters adopt an approach of outlining the
key features of the changes described in the local government
literature, followed by a brief outline of Barset's own (a]most
identical in most cases) prescriptions, and then assesses the nature of
the behavioural changes, within these prescriptions, experienced by the
managers. The chapters explore the extent of the managers' adoption of
the new role prescriptions, and examine the various constraints which
operated within each of the three roles to limit the changes in their
work behaviour, and, hence, to limit the scope of the realisation within
Barset of the new management model. Chapter nine assesses the impact of
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the new managerial roles on the managers' work satisfaction levels,
focusing on both the intrinsic arid extrinsic rewards potentially
available to the managers from their work. Their experiences of, and
attitudes towards, change are also discussed in the context of Barset's
change management policies and practices.
Chapter ten, in conclusion, sumarises the major findings from the
research, which indicated that most of the managers had made significant
changes in their work behaviour within each of the three role categories
- in accordance with BCC's new managerial role prescriptions. However,
they also identified a number of constraints operating to limit the
extent of these behavioural changes - suggesting, in turn, limits on the
extent of Barset's transition from the "traditional" to the "new"
management model. Key issues for further research are identified,
concerned particularly with the various factors - behavioural,
structural and change management constraints - which can inhibit full
adoption by public sector organisations of the "new" management model.
The chapter also discusses the need for organisational restructuring to
be strategically managed if job satisfaction and managerial
effectiveness is to be enhanced.
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CHAPTER 1
Changing forms of organisation design
This chapter begins by examining the main theoretical approaches to the
analysis of organisation design and structure, including the traditional
classical theories of Taylor (1947), Weber (1947), and Fayol (1949), the
human relations approaches, and the more recent open systems and
contingency theories. From within the latter perspective, Mintzberg's
(1983, 1989) model of organisational configurations, design parameters,
and contingency factors is then used to identify different forms of
organisation structure, and current patterns of organisation
restructuring.
Child (1984, p4) defines the structure of an organisation as a11 the
tangible and regularly occurring features which help to shape its
members' behaviour. These structural features essentially represent
the way in which labour is divided into specialist or differentiated
tasks, which then require integration or coordination to enable the
organisation to achieve its objectives (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967;
Mintzberg. 1983; Drucker, 1974).. Characterised by different degrees of
complexity, behaviour formalisation and centralisation (Robbins 1990),
the structure of an organisation will thus represent the pattern of
individual roles and relationships which exist within it (Dawson, 1986).
Many organisational theorists point to the evidence of such basic
structural components within the very earliest organisatIons developed
by the Sumerians, the Egyptians, and the Chinese (Clutterbuck and
Cramer, 1990).
Reviewing the wide range of current approaches to organisation analysis,
Reed (1992, p14) identifies the very real differences of theoretical
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orientation, substantive focus and ideological preference which now
prevail." (p14) . Towards one end of this ideological continuum are the
"interpretive" or "subjectivist" approaches adopted by authors such as
Bittner (1965) and Zimmerman (1970). They emphasise that the social
world, including an organisation,	 is essentially a "subjective
construction" of individuals who use language and social interactions to
"create and sustain a social world of intersubjectively shared meaning.
The social world is thus of an essentially intangible nature... .Such a
view does not allow for the existence of 'organisations' in any hard and
concrete sense" (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p260). Towards the other end
of the ideological continuum are the "structural" or "objectivist"
approaches, adopted by organisational theorists such as Child and
Mintzberg, which emphasise the objective, tangible and concrete reality
of societal and organisation structures, and the way in which these
influence human behaviour. Thus, Child's definition of organisation
structure quoted above, clearly focuses on the "tangible" nature of
organisation structure; as Child explicitly states, his use of the term
"organisational structure" is synonymous with the term "organisation".
These approaches focus on the concept of organisations as concrete
entities or structures - as machines or organisms, assumed to be stable,
and assumed to be "rational, purposive, goal-seeking, adaptive
enterprises coping with the demands of an environment." (Burrell and
Morgan, p220). Within this approach to the analysis of organisational
structure, four key schools can be identified - (1) the so-called
"classical" authors (located within Morgan's (1986) "orgarxisation as
machine" model or "image" of organisation structures); (2) the
"post-Weberians" (concerned with the dysfunctions of bureaucratic
organisational forms); (3) the human relations theorists; and (4) the
systems/contingency theorists, (located within Morgan's "organisations
-8-
as organisms" model). Each, in turn, will now be considered.
Classical approaches
Within the classical school, Morgan and Lessem (1989) single out Taylor
(1947), Weber (1947) and Fayol (1949) as the key theorists who "tried to
impose organisational order and objective reason on institutional whim
and personal irrationality." (Lessem, p183). Each of these three
classical authors wrote from very different perspectives: Taylor was an
American industrial engineer, committed to improving organisational
productivity on the shop floor through more efficient job design and
reward systems; the German sociologist, Weber, developed his theory of
bureaucracy as an ideal type of the legal-rational authority which he
considered characterised contemporary capitalism; Fayol, a French
industrial engineer and administrator, produced a set of general
principles governing the effective design and management of
organisations. Yet, as Morgan points out, they all use the analogy or
metaphor of the organisation as a machine, involving the specification
of an ideal blueprint design as the most efficient means (formal
structure) for achieving predetermined ends (organisational goals).
Thus, as Weber states: "Experience tends universally to show that the
purely bureaucratic type of administration. . . . is, from a purely
technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of
efficiency ......it is superior to any other form in precision, in
stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability."
(Weber, 1991, p124)
Weber's well-known distinguishing features of the bureaucratic
organisation can be summarised briefly as follows: the sphere of
competence or specialism of each office or role is clearly defined, and
occupies a specific position in a hierarchy, with the incumbent
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answerable to a superior for performance; the office is full-time and
salaried with a career structure providing opportunities for advancement
through the hierarchy; appointments are made on the basis of merit,
preferably through qualifications: work activities are governed by a
prescribed system of rules and procedures, which ensures formal equality
of treatment for all individuals within the organisation and for members
of the public.	 Beethani (1991) emphasises two distinctions made by
Weber: firstly, between appointed officials and the corporate group - a
local authority council, or a board of directors - which employs the
bureaucratic officials to carry out their policies, and, secondly,
between the appointed officials, whose essential characteristic is the
exercise of authority, and office or production workers who do not
exercise authority. Beetham does, however, highlight the problematic
nature of this distinction, especially within public sector
bureaucracies where front line workers have authority over members of
the public.
These distinctive bureaucratic features are reflected within Taylor's
scientific management principles (which differ significantly from Weber
in only two respects - the absence of a career systems and fixed
salaries (Littler, 1978)), and within Fayol's fourteen administrative
principles.	 Fayol considered that all organisations should develop
systems providing for: the division of work into specialised tasks;, the
allocation of authority and responsibility; disciplinary agreements;
unity of command; unity of direction; the subordination of individual
interest to the general organisational interest: the remuneration of
personnel: the appropriate degree of centralisation; an hierarchical
chain of authority; order; equity (kindness and justice for all
employees); stability of tenure for employees; initiative (drawing up
plans and implementing them); an "Esprit de Corps" to ensure harmony and
-. 10 -
unity within the organisation. Individuals within the classical
"organisations as machines" approaches are perceived essentially as
depersonalised components of the machine, as demonstrated in: Taylor's
concept of "economic man" (Schein, 1965); Weber's "dominance of a spirit
of formalistic impersonality.. .without hatred or passion, and hence
without affection or enthusiasm." (Weber, 1968, p127) which
characterises the occupation by an individual of an official position or
depersonalised role within the bureaucracy; Fayol's well known list of
universal management roles or functions: "to forecast and to plan, to
organise, to command, to coordinate and to control" (1949, p5-G).
It can be argued that the work of these three authors (with further
clarification of their principles by tlrwick (1943), including his
well-known assertion about the optimum number of five or six
subordinates for a manager's span of control), continues to underpin
many current approaches to the analysis of organisational design and
structures.	 Recent examples include: Burns and Stalker's mechanistic
management system (1961); Handy's 	 role culture (1976); Deal and
Kennedy's process culture (1982); Hales' models of "rationalised" and
"bureaucratic" organisations (1993); Mintzberg's machine bureaucracy
(1983); and the machine metaphors of Watson (1986) and Morgan(l986)
However, unlike the classical theorists, these authors identify the
machine or bureaucratic model as just one of several different possible
approaches towards designing an effective organisation, rather than as a
universal prescription to be followed by all organisations - see the
discussion of contingency theory later in this chapter. However, before
discussing this theory, it is necessary to examine the work of two
groups of authors, who identify problems and "dysfunctions" which can
exist within bureaucratic forms of organisation, and which can interfere
with the potential of such structures for achieving "precision,
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reliability, efficiency" (Merton, 1968, p252)
Human Relations approaches
In contrast to the "organisations as machines" approach, where the
design of organisations and the control of organisational members'
behaviour was seen essentially as a "technical problem", the human
relations theorists focus on the idea that individuals working within
organisations are not just organisational "components", but: "are people
with complex needs that must be satisfied if they are to lead full and
healthy lives and to perform effectively in the workplace." (Morgan,
1986, p40).	 Thus, the seminal text, "Management and the Worker" by
Roethlisberger and Dickson (1939) highlighted the presence of "informal
structure - unofficial relationships within the work group " (Mintzberg,
1983, p8) . These and other human relations authors drew attention to
importance of ensuring that organisation structures met various
psychological needs of organisational members, using Schein's (1965)
"social man" and "self-actualising man" assumptions about employee
behaviour. The former sees individuals as being motivated essentially by
social needs, and as finding their identity through relationships with
others. This involves paying attention to the roles of groups and teams
within organisation structures and to adopting more consultative and
participative management styles which focused on guiding and supporting
staff rather than organising and controlling them (Likert, 1961;
McGregor, 1960). The "self-actualising man" assumption focuses on
organisational employees'	 "self-fulfilment" needs 	 (Maclow, 1943),
requiring organisation and job design structures which maximise the
opportunities for more challenging and demanding work, including greater
involvement in decision-making for staff at all organisational levels
(Hertzberg, 1966; Argyris, 1964)
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Post-Weberian approaches
The works of Merton (1968), Gouldner (1954), Selznik (1966), Blau
(1955), and Blau and Scott (1963) are concerned with the "dysfunctions"
to be found within bureaucracies. Merton argued that certain features
of bureaucratic structures result in dysfunctional behaviour - i.e.,
behaviour which can frustrate the achievement of organisational goals.
Employees are encouraged to adopt forms of behaviour prescribed by
bureaucratic rules and procedures, and discouraged from improvising or
innovating or being flexible, even when such behaviour could improve
goal achievement (for example, more effective service to customers)
Such rule-following behaviour can become and end in itself, resulting in
"a displacement of goals.. .an instrumental value becomes a terminal
value" (Merton, 1986, p253). Conscientious adherence to regulations may
actually result in employees losing sight of the end goals towards which
their behaviour should be directed. Failure to realise organisational
goals can result in yet more rules and regulations designed to overcome
problems and thus the situation deteriorates still further. Employees
may manifest symptoms of the "bureaucratic personality", with an "almost
compulsive adherence to institutional norms (in this case bureaucratic
rules and regulations)" (Eurrell and Morgan, 1979, p423).
Alternatively, employees can engage in "unofficial" or "informal" forms
of behaviour, which exists alongside or which may break or bend formal
rules and regulations. These can result in the more effective
achievement of end goals - or be directed towards the realisation of a
particular employee grouping's own sectional interests which may or may
not be aligned with formal organisational goal achievement; see
discussion below. Thus, following on from the conclusions reached by
Roethlisberger and Dickson in their seminal work quoted above, Blau and
Scott emphasise that the formal structure is only one aspect of
-	 -
organisational social structure and that organisational members interact
as whole persons and not merely in terms of the formal roles they
occupy" (Blau	 and Scott,1963,	 p35) . B].au's (1955)	 classic law
enforcement agency study illustrates clearly the way in which employees,
in this case, sought advice and guidance from each other in the handling
of cases despite regulations forbidding such practices; Blau concluded
that such informal joint information sharing and problem solving
actually improved operational efficiency. Similarly, Selznick (1966) and
Gouldrxer (1954, pp2l8-219) considered that the formal structure of a
rationally designed organisation was always subject to change and
modification by the informal human behaviour. For example, Gouldner
argues that effective organisational functioning depended on the extent
to which members felt that particular rules and procedures were
legitimate. He identifies three forms of bureaucracy: (1) "mock
bureaucracy's where rules are imposed by an outside agency and where
neither workers nor management accept theta, and which results in a
situation with little conflict between the two groups where "Joint
violation and evasion of rules is buttressed by the informal sentiments
of the participants"; (2) punishment-centred bureaucracy, where rules
are- initiated by management or workers, and where, under circumstances
of considerable tension and conflict, rules are "enforced by punishment
and support by informal sentiments of either workers or management"; (3)
representative bureaucracy, where rules are initiated by both groups,
with little overt conflict between the groups resulting in "Joint
support buttressed by informal sentiments, mutual participation,
initiation, and education. of workers and management".
As Burrell and Morgan suggest, the work of these theorists draw
attention to the fact that the "reality" of organisational life cannot
be seen purely in terms of a machine or a system (see discussion below)
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with a unitary goal; it is also an aggregate of individuals and groups
working towards various ends. These may be functional or dysfunctional
for the achievement of overall organisational goals - i.e. 	 pursuit of
such sectional interests may work with or against formal organisational
objectives. Such a view moves towards a pluralist perspective with its
emphasis on "the plural nature of the interests, conflicts and sources
of power that shape organisational life" (Morgan, 1986, p185), where the
concept of power becomes significant. Thus Crozier's study of two French
public bureaucracies examines the links between the formal hierarchical
structure and the networks of power relations which develop between
various groups of employees such as maintenance specialists, managers
and workers: "the behaviour and attitudes of people and groups within an
organisation cannot be explained without reference to the power
relations existing amongst them" (1964, plo7 ) . Increasingly, more recent
organisationa]. theorists place considerable emphasis on the importance
of power for understanding how formal organisational structures work in
practice, giving rise to Morgan's "organisation as political system"
model, and Mintzberg's (1989) "Political Organisation" form.
The term power in current organisational literature is commonly seen as
referring to a "relationship" where "the power of a person A over a
person B lies in the ability of A to get B to do something that he would
not have done otherwise" (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p214). Within the
"organisation as machine" model, power relations are seen as based on
the formal, official and legitimate authority vested in the particular
role occupied by individuals, and directed, essentially rationally and
neutrally, towards the achievement of commonly accepted organisational
goals. However, pluralist or political" models of organisations see
power as the medium through which conflicts of interest are ultimately
resolved" (Morgan, 1986, p158). Organisation structure is seen not just
-	 -
as a pregiven "machine", or a "system" (see below), with positions of
formal authority into which people are simply slotted, but as the
outcome of power relations between individuals and groups of
individuals, pursuing their own particular individual and sectional
interests which may or may not be congruent with the "official"
organisational goals set by senior management (Watson, 1980; Morgan;
Reed, 1985; Pfeffer, 1981). Thus Pfeffer's "political power"
organisational model sees the decision-making process as "Disorderly,
characterised by push and pull of interests" between "shifting
coalitions and interest groups", with "information used and withheld
strategically", and with decisions made as the result of bargaining and
trade-off s between these various interest groups (Pfeffer, p31)
Within this pluralist model, power struggles and conflicts between
organisational actors are seen as inevitable components of
organisational life, and as an intrinsic part of the structure of an
organisation. Systems and contingency theorists such as Mintzberg
acknowledge the inevitability of this "political" side of organisational
and managerial processes. However, they tend to differentiate clearly
between legally sanctioned power relations (based on the formally
defined authority vested in official role structures, exercised through
officially prescribed means to achieve officially prescribed
organisational ends), and illegitimate or "political" power
relationships (operating outside the official organisational structure,
using illegitimate means to achieve ends which may be legitimate or
illegitimate). In addition, the exercise of such political power tends
to be analysed in terms of its functional or dysfunctional consequences
for the effective and efficient operation of the organisational system:
"Politics has to do with power, not structure.. .politics can be viewed
as a form of organisational illness, working both against and for the
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system. On the one hand politics can undermine healthy processes,
infiltrating them to destroy them. But on the other, it can also work to
strengthen a system, acting like a fever to alert a system to a graver
danger, even evoking the system's own protective and adaptive
mechanisms" (Mintzberg, 1989, p236) . This system (represented in
Morgan's "organism") model of organisational structures, is considered
in the next section of this chapter.
Systems and Contingency Theories
In contrast to the "closed and somewhat static structure" of the machine
metaphor" (Morgan, 1991, p90), Roethlisberger and Dickson, in their
seminal text mentioned above, clearly perceived the organisation as
a complex open system of interrelated parts or subsystems, which
interact both within the organisation and with external environmental
systems to satisfy the organisation's needs and ensure its survival.
Subsequent systems theorists refined and developed this model,
including: Se].znick's natural systems model (1948); Trist and Bamforth's
socio-technical systems (1951); Burns and Stalker's (1961) organic
system of management; Rice 's (1958) concept of the firm as an open
system, interreacting with its environment; Katz and Kahn's social
systems model (1966). Katz and Kahn saw organisations as social rather
than biological systems, with a structure of events or relationships,
rather than physical parts, represented within five subsystems -
production or technical, supportive, maintenance, adaptive and
managerial subsystems. Their concept of role within the systems model,
emphasised, like Weber, the impersonal and rational behaviour model of
the person occupying it, and also served as a differentiation mechanism,
with organisation norms	 (standards of behaviour)	 and values
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(representing contemporary theorists' definitions of organisation
culture)	 providing integrative mechanisms. 	 These	 concepts	 of
organisationa]. differentiation and integration were central to Lawrence
and Lorsch's contingency theory approach, outlined in their seminal
work, "Organisation and Environment" (1967)
Drawing upon these approaches, Burrell and Morgan (p170) suinmarise the
open systems model of the organisation as "a process of mutual influence
and interaction between four functional imperatives or subsystems and
the environment in which they are located". They synthesise the
following key organisational subsystems from the systems theory
literature, each of which is conceptualised as a "functional imperative"
(pl68) because of its equal importance to the survival needs of the
organisation: (1) the strategic control subsystem, operated by senior
management, with the function of maintaining the balance between the
organisation and its external environment, and determining the goals and
direction of the	 organisation to ensure its	 survival; (2) the
operational or productive subsystem, including staff roles such as
personnel, sales etc., as well as line workers, which transforms inputs
into outputs of products or services for customers or clients; (3) the
human subsystem, which refers to the needs of the individuals occupying
the roles and functional specialisms within the organisation; (4) the
managerial subsystem, responsible for the function of internal control
and coordination of the organisation.
The open systems approach continues to provide a framework for analysing
organisation structure (Morgan, 1986, 1991). More sophisticated variants
of the basic systems approach have evolved in recent years, including
Morgan's cybernetic or "organisatioris as brains" metaphor with an
emphasis on the "amazing" capacity of the organisation (as a brain) to
uorganise and reorganise itself to deal with the contingencies it
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faces." (Morgan, 1986, p97). As represented in the concept of "the
learning organisation" (Argyris and Scion, 1978; Senge, 1990), this
model also involves a move towards social action and interpretive
approaches, with post-modernist style deconstructions of the meanings
underpinning individual actions to enable members of the organisation to
develop effective learning and innovative strategies. These ideas
correspond with recent developments in management training and
development (Boyatzis, 1982; Mumford, 1989), which also reflect current
perceptions about the changing roles of managers in contemporary
organisation structures (see chapter 2)
Contingency theory uses and develops the systems concept of organisation
structure in an attempt to identify the the "best fit" or most effective
organisation structure for an organisation's particular situation or set
of circumstances/contingency factors. Given that, within the contingency
approach, different functional specialisms or parts of the organisation
may well interact with different environments or use different
production processes, it is clear that this differentiation will require
different forms of structure for effective operation of these different
functional subunits. Integrative mechanisms are then required, to
coordinate all these different activities towards achieving the overall
organisational strategic goals (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). Thus,
different types of organisational structures or systems are required for
different situations or contingencies, both for the various subunits
within the organisation - different functional departments, for example
- and for the organisatiôn as a whole.
Hales (1993, pp152-l53) identifies five sets of contingency variables
which are most commonly seen by contingency theorists as influencing the
structural form of an organisation: (1) the size (usually in relation to
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numbers of employees) and age of an organisation; (2) an organisation's
technology, in terms of (a) the level of sophistication of the technical
system and the extent to which it controls work methods, and (b) the
nature of the "transformation process" (turning inputs into outputs),
including the degree of uniformity of inputs and predictability of
methods (summarised by Burrell and Morgan (p173) as representing a
continuum of degrees of "routine-ness" or "discretionary content" of the
work process; (3) the organisation's environment, which can include a
number of contextural variables such as markets, the economy, political
and legal systems, all of which are characterised by varying degrees of
"homogeneity (complexity/diversity), how rapidly it changes (stability)
and to what extent change is foreseeable (uncertainty)"; (4) the
different goals and activities of an organisation, including the
different forms of ownership (including the public/private distinction),
performance criteria, and the nature and range of its services/products;
(5) the characteristics of an organisation's employees, such as their
motivations, skills, knowledge base, and attitudes. In criticising what
were perceived to be over-deterministic elements within these
contingency variables, authors such as Child (1972) and Dawson (1986)
stress the need to take into account the part played by key
organisational actors in exercising choice over the contingency factors
they choose to respond to or use: "The 'objective facts' of the context
do not have an automatic effect on internal operations. They may be
noticed and interpreted by individuals, all of whom have their own
particular interests to safeguard and their own perceptions of the
appropriate strategies and tactics that should be followed.. . People not
only create the 'links' that exist between contingent factors and
structure, but they are also creators of the contingency factors
themselves." (Dawson, 1986, p128). 	 Thus, for example, managers can
choose to enter or leave a particular market; they can attempt to create
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demand for their products and to control and change (through using
various techniques such as mergers, joint ventures, lobbying governments
about legislation) their competitive environments. Managers' scope for
choice may be constrained by particular contingency factors, but such
constraints will not necessarily determine managers choices for action.
An early example of the use of open systems/contingency approaches to
identify particular forms of organisational design and structures,
suitable for particular situational or contingency contexts, is the
well-known study by Burns and Stalker (1961). They identified a
continuum along which types of organisational structures can be located
ranging from "mechanistic" at one end to "organic" at the other. The
mechanistic or bureaucratic system had very clearly defined levels of
responsibility and task allocation, with firm top-down systems of
control and coordination, and an emphasis on vertical as opposed to
horizontal communication systems. Strong adherence and conformity was
expected towards an extensive system of rules and procedures. The
organic system involved fluid definitions of roles and responsibilities,
centred around expertise rather than hierarchical positions, with
extensive horizontal and inter-departmental information flows, and
maximum flexibility of structure to encourage innovative and problem
solving behaviour by individuals. Bureaucratic structures were seen as
more appropriate for organisations operating in environment with a high
degree of stability and certainty,	 and where employees had low
expectations of discretion and autonomy. Conversely, organic structures
were more appropriate for firms operating within a complex and uncertain
environment, with highly qualified, trained and skilled staff (reflected
in Mintzberg's "adhocracy TM or innovative" models of organisational
structure discussed below).
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A number of subsequent studies focused on the systematic identification
of various structural components and contingency factors to develop
typologies of organisation structures, including the influential "Aston
Programme 1" studies (Pugh and Hickson, 1976). These authors used three
structural components - the nature of control over workf lows, the extent
to which employee behaviour was structured, and the degree of
concentration or dispersal of authority - to develop a seven fold
classification of structures. These range from the "full bureaucracy"
(corresponding closely to the traditional Weberian type described above)
to the "implicitly structured organisation" (reflecting the organic
form). Each type of structure was associated with a typical pattern of
contextual or contingency variables, suggesting that "bureaucracy takes
different forms in different settings" (Pugh and Hickson, ppl26-7).
The 1970s and 80s saw the proliferation of numerous structural
typologies, located towards one or other end of this mechanistic-organic
continuum. These include (moving from the bureaucratic to the organic):
Handy's "role" as opposed to "task" cultures (1976); the "old model
assumptions" compared with the "new model assumptions" (Kanter, 1984);
the role (classic) organisation compared with the intrapreneurial
organisation, which emphasises the importance of small autonomous and
entrepreneurial work-groups (Macrae, 1982): type A and type Z
organisations (Ouchi, 1981), focusing upon the need for American firms
to move from inflexible and hierarchical structural forms towards the
adoption of certain features of Japanese companies such as shared forms
of decision-making, an emphasis on team work and cooperation, and
life-time employment for key employee groups; modernist (Weberian) and
postmodernist organisations (Clegg, 1990) . In differentiating between
these two models, which reflect the ending of the post-war boom in
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western economies in the 1970s, Clegg (p181) sees the postmodernist
structural form as "a more organic, less differentiated enclave of
organisations than those dominated by the bureaucratic designs of
modernity.. . .Where post-modernist organisation was rigid, postmodern
organisation is flexible. Where modernist consumption was premised on
mass forms, postmodernist consumption is premised on niches .... .Where
modernist organisation and jobs were highly differentiated, demarcated
and deskilled, postmodernist organisation and jobs are highly
de-differentiated, de-demarcated and multi-skilled... •h1
Concentrating specifically upon human resource management strategies,
along the same bureaucratic/organic continuum, other theorists have
contrasted: control compared with commitment strategies (Walton, 1985);
personnel management as opposed to human resource management (Guest,
1991; Storey, 1992); type 3 and type 2 management development strategies
(Mumford, 1989) . Public sector organisations have also been influenced
by these largely private sector based typologies to produce similar
models, involving a contrast between "traditional" and "new" forms of
public sector management (Stewart, 1986; Pollit, 1990); see chapters 3
and 4 for a full discussion of such models.
Arguably, one of the most influential of these structural typologies was
developed by Peters and Waterman (1982). These authors advocated the
replacement of traditional rational/bureaucratic forms of structure by a
more flexible, decentralised and task-based (essentially organic)
approach, which was found to be associated with successful performance
in a number of "excellent" companies. Their approach, using the McKinsey
"seven S's" framework, emphasises the importance of processes -
values, staff, styles and skills - as well as structures, systems and
strategies.	 Subsequent texts by Peters (Peters and Austin, 1985:
Peters, 1988) emphasise particularly the importance of strong leadership
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and culture, customer responsiveness, and the orientation towards
continual improvement, innovation and change to ensure success within a
rapidly changing environment. The 1992 publication continues the theme
of going "beyond hierarchies" towards organic forms of "de-integrating"
network structures which transcend both intra- and inter-organisational
boundaries found within traditional bureaucratic approaches: "Most of
yesterday's highly integrated giants are working overtime at splitting
into more manageable, more energetic units - i.e., de-integrating. Then
they are turning round and re-integrating - not by new acquisitions, but
via alliances with all sorts of partners of all shapes and sizes."
(Peters, 1992, p303) .	 Clegg	 (1990, p181), too, emphasises the
development within his postmodernist organisation of "more complex and
fragmentary relational forms, such as subcontracting and networking".
Although these authors differ on details, their models include broadly
similar features (Dawson, 1986; Sisson, 1994), which can be summarised
under the following three headings:
BUREAUCRACY	 BUREAUCRACY IN
TRANsm0N
Traditional hierarchical structure 	 Flattened hierarchy with fewer
with many layers of command.	 layers and parallel organisational
structures eg. project teams.
Developed to respond to a slow
changing environment Emphasis	 Bureaucracy forced to change in
on permanency. 	 response to an icc'easingly
turbulent environment.
Vertical interaction and
information flows, no lateral	 Vertical and lateral
communication between	 cOmmunication between
departments.	 departments and between
Problems and tasks broken down hierarchy and parallel
organisatzons.
into speoalist roles. Preose
definition of operations, duties,	 Bureaucracy retained for
powers and responsibilities, 	 administration. Parallel
Large % of operators and clerical organisations developed to
workers,	
encourage innovation.
Fewer middle managers and
lower level operatives.
ADHOCRACY
A team is formed to work
towards a solution to specific
problem, then dismantled when
the task is completed.




Technologies such as networks
enable communications between
individuals. Importance of tight
connections and skills to be part
of the project team.
Jobs continually redefined
through interactive self
management, individual has to
be motivated to produce high
quality work.
Urge % of knowledge workers.
(Source: Watkins, Drury and Preddy (1992), From Evolution to Revolution;
The, pressures on professional life in the 1990s, Bristol, University of
Bristol, p30.)
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The advocates of moves towards these more organic/flexible adhocracy
forms of structures argue that the traditional bureaucratic model "is no
longer appropriate for effective organisation in much of the current
business environment. The structures and systems associated with such
organisational forms do not adapt readily to change, and are not
flexible enough to anticipate change. Bureaucratic, hierarchical
structures thrive on stability and certainty - a state which
characterised previous environments, but not the one in which most
organisations now operate. It is becoming widely recognised, therefore,
that alternatives are needed and are appearing." (Tiernan, Flood and
Wally, 1994, p4-5). Structural forms will undoubtedly continue to differ
according to each individual organisation's circumstances/contingency
situations, and the choices made by its senior managers (Baker, 1992;
Francis, 1994; Hales, 1993). However, increasingly, the literature
suggests that growing numbers of both public and private sector
organisations are adopting, albeit in a partial format, some of the
features associated with more flexible forms of structure.
Mintzberg (1979, 1983, 1989) used the open systems/contingency approach
to identify five key systems or parts of organisations, together with
four sub-systems or design parameter components. These combine together
in various ways, resulting in five main forms or configurations of
organisation structure found within particular situational or
contingency contexts. This model will be used for pulling together the
various contingency and systems theorists' approaches to provide a
framework for analysing current patterns of organisation structuring and
restructuring; this framework will also be used in Chapter 3 for
identifying recent changes in the structure and management systems of
local authorities.
Mintzberg focuses initially on the two fundamental requirements of all
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organisational structures - "the division of labour into distinct tasks,
and the achievement of coordination among those tasks", (1983, p3). Five
key mechanisms are used by different types of organisations, and at
different levels within organisations, to coordinate work. The simplest
mechanism is that of mutual ad-justment where control of the work rests
with the 'doers" as in very small organisations, or amongst highly
skilled and differentiated specialists in large organisations where the
complex nature of the task requires mutual sharing and adaptation. Once
organisations grow larger, the mechanism of direct supervision tends to
be used, where "one person takes responsibility for the work of others,
issuing instructions to them, and monitoring their actions." (l983,p4).
The remaining three methods rely on impersonal mechanisms of
standardisation. Where the nature of work processes can be highly
pre-specified or programmed, as on an assembly line, coordination is
achieved through standardisation of the work process itself, by
determining to a high degree how the work is to be performed.
Coordination through standardisation of outputs focuses not on the how
but the what of the work process - on the outcomes or results of work
activities, such as particular profit or output targets. When neither
the work process nor work outputs can be standardised, coordination is
achieved by standardising the worker - by standardising the skills and
knowledge required for effective job performance by, for example, highly
trained and skilled professional staff. Most organisations will use a
combination of all five, with particular concentrations of particular
coordinating methods used in particular parts of the organisation, in
relation to particular forms of work, and also in terms of decision made
about the nature of the control and decision-making systems considered
appropriate for a particular organisation (see below)
Conceptualisirig organisations as configurations of systems, Mintzberg
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(Source: Mintzerg (1989), Mintzberg on Management, New York, The Free
Press, p99.)
The operating cp consists of those members of the organisation who are
responsible for actually producing products/services; coordination
through one of the three standardisation mechanisms is likely to
dominate here, especially in larger organisations. All except very small
organisations also need four administrative and coordinating components.
The strategic apex is composed of senior managers who have overall
responsibility for running the organisation, including the formulation
of strategy in the context of carrying out the policies of those in
control - owners, and elected/appointed members in the case of public
sector organisations. Given that the nature of work at this level is
generally located at the low-routine, high-discretion end of Burrell and
Morgan's technical system continuum, coordination is likely to focus
around mutual adjustment. The middle line, of middle managers, joins the
strategic apex to the operating core, thus building up an organisational
hierarchy, which may be tall, as in the case of the traditional machine
bureaucracy, or flatter, as in other organisational forms (see below)
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All five forms of coordinating mechanisms may be found in the middle
line, although more senior managers' work is likely to be less detailed
and	 more aggregated	 than	 their	 juniors, moving	 toward
high-discretion/low routine forms of work.
As organisations become larger and more complex, a technostructure will
be developed, with staff located outside the middle line hierarchy -
such as finance, information technology and personnel specialists, and
planning and control analysts - who are responsible for developing
systems to plan and control the work of others in the organisation,
notably through designing standardisation systems.	 These include
systems to standardise work processes, outputs and skills/knowledge for
the operating core and middle line, and strategic planning and financial
control systems to enable control by the strategic apex over the goal
definition and attainment of major organisation units. Also located
outside the middle line, may be a support structure; staff here are not
involved in standardisation systems, but are responsible for providing a
number of support and/or advisory services, such as social facilities,
libraries,	 printing facilities,	 public relations, research and
development etc., to all the other parts of the organisation. The 1989
text adds a sixth system or part - organisation ideolocry or culture -
which reflects the increasing importance awarded to this concept during
the 1980s (Meek, 1992) . Mintzberg defines organisation culture as the
"traditions and beliefs of an organisation" (1989, p98); in common with
the emphasis on shared values within Peters and Waterman's seminal 1982
text, he stresses the key part increasingly played by the "rich system
of values and beliefs" which distinguish one organisation from another,
and which can provide an additional coordination mechanism - shared
norms and values - to replace or complement standards and procedures.
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These six organisational parts or systems, in conjunction with the
coordinating mechanisms, combine to form five main organisational
configurations or types of structure. Each configuration represents the
"best fit" to be achieved between the organisation and its particular
situational or contingency factors - age and size, technical system, the
environment and the nature of the organisation's external control
system. Thus, each configuration represents the type of structure which
is considered to be most effective for different sets of contingency
factors.
Mintzberg's five configurations (as listed in the 1983 text) reflect the
mechanistic/bureaucratic - organic, organisation continuum of Burns and
Stalker. Mintzberg's machine bureaucracy (renamed the machine
organisation in the 1989 text) corresponds fully with the mechanistic
form of organisation described above. The coordinating mechanisms of the
machine bureaucracy focus on standardisation of work processes; the key
part of the organisation is the technostructure, responsible for
designing the work standardisation systems. This configuration tends to
characterise larger, mature organisations with simple and stable
environments, and is commonly found in mass production, mass service,
and large government organisations. The organic end of Burns and
Stalker's continuum is represented most fully by the adhocracy
configuration (renamed the innovative organisation in the 1989 lext)
with its emphasis on: "expertise, organic structure, project teams, task
forces, decantralisation of power, matrix structure, sophisticated
technical systems, automation" (Mintzberg, 1989, p209) . Coordinating
mechanisms focus on mutual adjustment, and the configuration tends to
characterise young industries, with complex and dynamic environments
requiring frequent product changes, such as those found in creative,
media, and high technology organisations.
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Moving away from the bureaucratic towards the organic end of the
continuum towards the entrepreneurial and innovative organisations,
Mintzberg identifies two other configurations: the divisionalised form
(renamed the diversified organisation in the 1989 text) and the
professional bureaucracy (renamed the professional organisation in the
1989 text), each representing some dilution of the formal structures of
the machine bureaucracy. The divisionalised form consists of market
based divisions, loosely coupled together under a central headquarters,
where divisional managers run their businesses in a semi-autonomous
fashion, subjected to coordination mechanisms which focus on the
standardisation of outputs. The diversified organisation form is
characteristic of large and mature organisations, and increasingly of
public sector organisations, with diversified product/services markets.
The key part of the professional bureaucracy is the operating core
composed of highly qualified and skilled professional staff, carrying
out complex forms of work with coordination mechanisms focused around
the standardisation of skills and knowledge. This configuration is found
mainly within service sectors, including hospitals,	 social work
agencies,	 universities etc.	 The simple	 structure (renamed the
entrepreneurial organisation in the 1989 text) uses direct supervision
as its main coordinating mechanisms, and the key part of the
organisation is the strategic apex, reflecting the domination of the
chief executive who exercises strong personal control over activities.
This form is characteristic of smaller, and young organisations such as
small fully owned businesses, or "brand-new" autonomous departments or
divisions within larger organisations.
Mintzberg's work is generally considered to be representative of
"the more complex, more reflective contingency analyses" of organisation
design and structure (Dawson, 1986, p114). Thus it claims to go beyond
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purely predicting the occurrence of particular events - providing
grounds for expecting particular organisational design feature to occur
- by providing a causal explanation of why a particular event occurred
(Keat and Urry, 1982, p27), via the identification of a set of
"intermediate variables" (the nature of the work tasks carried out in an
organisation) through which the situational or contingency factors
(independent variables affect the nature of the organisation's structure
(dependent variables) (Mintzberg, 1983, ppl22-l23)
Yet, as Mintzberg himself acknowledges (1983, p122), his focus upon the
independent situational variables determining (through the intermediate
variables) the dependent organisational structure variables had to "be
dropped" when analysing the particular design features of the various
configurations outlined above - because of the complex interdependencies
which exist between the various structural parts of an organisation. In
addition, even in a predictive context, contingency theories suffer from
the problem that the search for single independent determinate
relationships between contingency factors and organisational structural
features "crucially ignores interactive and sometimes contradictory
effects among different contingency factors (e.g. stable routine
tecbnology but a turbulent environment)" (Hales, 1993, pl73). Hales
(p174) goes on to point out that even the more sophisticated contingency
theorists such as Mintzberg, who consider intervening variables, tend to
adopt an over-deterministic approach, with an over-reliance on
"abstract" structural forces or laws determining the systems and role
behaviour within organisations. They fail to consider the part played by
the people in organisations in constructing their own realities - making
their own identifications and interpretations of various possible
contingency factors, and exercising varying degrees of choice about what
(changes in) organisational structures and managerial role prescriptions
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to pursue. (See further discussion in chapters 3 and 4).
Similarly, Mintzberg's (1973) contingency theory of managerial roles
(see chapter 2) does not provide an explanation of how and why
managerial behaviour takes particular forms in particular structural
contexts, or changes over time. Relatively little attention is paid to
"how such behaviour is produced, as to how people deliberately and
self-consciously interpret external	 pressures,	 such as	 role
expectations. There is no analysis of the meaning-structures at the
level of each actor which produce the behavioural .responses. . .given
certain biological and psychological properties, expressed in terms of
particular general laws, each individual is seen as the combination of
the particular roles that he or she plays" (Keat and Urry, 1982, p94)
In this sense, Mintzberg's approach remains more wedded to developing
the predictive connections between variables, than to elaborating the
notion of underlying causal mechanisms or processes.	 (Causal
explanations involve going beyond the idea that the establishment of a
regular relationship between two phenomena necessarily means that they
are causally connected. In order to establish cause, it is necessary to
"commit ourselves to the presence of some intervening mechanism which
links them together" (Keat and Urry, p29).)
However, even given these problems with contingency theory, it remains a
powerful tool for use in attempting to gain insights into complex and
under-researched areas - providing, as it does, a clear and coherent
ordering framework for the categorisation and analysis of public sector
middle managerial role changes. Indeed, it can be argued that the
establishment of such an understanding is a vital prerequisite for the
development of an adequate causal analysis. In this sense, this thesis
sets itself the task of pursuing such an ordering descriptive analysis,
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and only suggests possible causal relations; the latter would form the
subject of further research.
Mintzberg's contingency analysis of organisational structures and
managerial roles is therefore used in the thesis to provide a clear and
systematic ordering framework - for identifying (a) the key structural
features of the various organisational models outlined above (positioned
along the bureaucratic/organic continuum), and (b) the key features of
the managerial role prescriptions associated with these different
structural forms (see chapter 2).	 Thus the distinctive design features
of these models can be clearly identified, and the extent of any
movement within organisational structures and managerial roles from one
model to another, both theoretically and empirically, can be clearly
assessed. In addition, the use of this contingency framework approach
also enables a systematic analysis to be made of the key differences
between private and public sector organisations in terms of their
situational, structural, and managerial role characteristics. Within
this analytical framework, the contributions of a wide range of other
organisational/managerial theorists are used to provide a comprehensive
analysis of the nature and extent of the formal organisational
restructuring and accompanying changes in formal managerial roles,
currently taking place in both private and pubic sector organisations.
Mintzberg's contingency theory was chosen mainly because the more recent
versions (1983, 1989) sunimarise and incorporate the work of other
contingency theorists, and because the 1983 text was specifically
designed to be used for empirical research purposes. The theory here is
presented in a form which can be readily applied to the analysis of
practice within organisations - as Hintzberg himself explains in his
1983 and 1989 texts, which are derived from the more purely lacademicN
analysis presented in the original 1973 and 1979 texts.
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Mintzberg's model is therefore used here as a framework for examining
current patterns of organisational restructuring, for analysing patterns
of change within local authority structures, and for identifying
structural change within the case study organisation. In the context of
the five coordinating mechanisms, the six parts of the organisation and
the five configurations, Mintzberg identifies four design parameters or
structural components. Each parameter will take different forms within
each of the five configurations. These parameters consist of: the design
of positions within the organisation, including behaviour formalisation
systems; unit/departmental groupings and size;	 lateral linkages,
including planning and control systems;	 decision-making systems,
including the degree of centralisation/decentralisation (1983, p27)
•	 Grot.jp	 Design Parameter	 Re'ated Concepts
Design of positions 	 Job spedalizatian	 Basic division of labor -
Behavior formalization Sb.ndaxdization of work
•	 ntent
Syite of regulated flows
Training and	 Sndaniization of skills
indocrtinadcn













Design of lateral linkages P1aming and contscl 	 Sndarriition of outpu
sy5tts	 Syeterit of regulated flows





Design of dedsiort-	 Vertil	 A4minisative division of












(Source: Mintzberg (1983), Structure in Fives: Designing Hffective
Organisatjons, l(ew Jersey, Prentice Hall, p27)
These design parameters are described fully below, one by one, and used
as a framework for identifying current patterns of organisational
restructuring.
Design parameter 1 - Design of positions, behaviour formalisation,
training and indoctrination systems
This first parameter refers to three key elements: the degree of
specialisation and discretion involved in the allocation of tasks and
responsibilities to individuals, or to the nature of the "roles"
occupied by the incumbents; the nature of the behaviour formalization
systems, (concerned with the regulation, coordination and control of
work processes and behaviour);	 the training and indoctrination
(acquisition of organisational norms and and values) systems. The term
role, in this sense, represents the crucial link between the person and
the structure of the organization (Pugh and Hickson), and is used by
Mintzberg to refer to the "organised sets of behaviours identified with
a position." (Mintzberg, 1989, p15).
Design of positions
At the bureaucratic end of the structural design continuum, individual
job roles and tasks are tightly prescribed, with a large number of very
sharply differentiated jobs and job grades, and extensive delineation of
job activities and processes, rather than outcomes. At the other end of
the continuum, tasks and job roles are characterized by high discretion
and low prescription, with more emphasis on the personal style and
discretion of the incumbent. Several authors suggest moves within a
growing number of organsations toward the organic end of the continuum.
Walton (1985), Storey (1992) and Macrae (1982) identify an emphasis on
teams, rather than individuals, as basic job design and accountability
units, with an emphasis on the Japanese style "collective" as opposed to
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individual worker, and the de-differentiation of individual skills in
favour of an emphasis on the overall skills of the work group (Clegg,
1992). Essentially, the multi-skilled, flexible and problem-focused
teams approach is considered to be more effective in developing the
adaptive, innovative and even risk-taking work approaches necessary for
responding quickly to changing requirements and circumstances. As Peters
(1987, pp302-3) comments: "performance will increasingly depend on
quality,	 service,	 constant innovation/employment,	 and enhanced
flexibility/responsiveness. 	 Committed,	 flexible,	 multi-skilled,
constantly retrained people, joined together in self-managing teams, are
the only possible implementers of this strategy". 	 In addition, the
development of computer aided design and manufacturing systems, together
with computerised information systems, is faciliating the adoption of
these new forms of work organisation (Drucker, 1992)
This move towards job design on the basis of work teams rather than
individuals also involves an emphasis on prescription of job outputs or
"ends" rather than of processes or "means". 	 Members of the largely
self-regulating work group are allocated the discretion, or "empowered,"
using Clegg's (1990) terminology, to define their own work methods -
to achieve the prescribed outputs levels. These changes can also result
in a lower degree of job demarcation with fewer grades, and a flatter
organisation structure and hierarchy (see discussion below) . Wickens
(1987) and Buchanan (1989) both identify trends towards a reduction in
the number of job classifications, often accompanied by the introduction
of person and/or team and output based payment systems, with gain-based
(linked to labour cost savings) and profit related pay systems to
encourage overall organisational efficiency (Mahoney, 1992). This trend
is evident both within public sector professional bureaucracies and
within private sector 	 machine bureaucracies and diversified
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organisations.
Buchanan (1994) considers that, 	 unlike the traditional focus on
individual job design: "Increasing team autonomy leads to changes in
management structures and styles, and to revised systems for reward,
appraisal and career progressions." (plO5). Thus he argues that job
redesign increasingly forms part of a more integrated approach towards
establishing more flexible and effective organisation configurations, in
the context of human resource management approaches where personnel
management is seen as an integral part of overall strategy formulation
and implementation. Reviewing recent studies on these more innovative
approaches to work design, Buchanan suggests that growing numbers of
manufacturing and, more recently, service sector organisations are
moving towards adoption of at least some elements of these new
approaches, although implementation may be only partial and full short
of the "ideals" prescribed in the literature. Storey (1992, p97), too,
in his analysis of changing human resource policies and practices in 15
major British organisations, comments that "even though most of the case
companies were taking some initiatives in this direction, these
endeavours often did not translate into a markedly changed employment
pattern.
The roles of professional staff are also moving away from, the
traditional focus on individual specialist roles located within
specialist departments: "more and more are expected to work as part of a
team either in a smaller centralised function which is advisory in
nature; in profit centres; in smaller business units; or on a contract
or fee basis. Their new roles demand... .greater business involvement,
high-level communications and negotiation skills for effective
networking within teams, and offer rewards based on measures of
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contribution." (Watkins, Drury and Preddy, 1992, p47). 	 Management job
roles are also becoming broader and less specialised (see discussion
below under "unit groupings", and in chapter 2).
Behaviour Fornialisation
Mintzberg defines three standardised methods of behaviour formalisation,
which refer to techniques for prescribing and coordinating work
behaviour: through work process/content (characteristic of the machine
bureaucracy); through output prescription (the divisionalised forms);
through skills and knowledge standardisation as represented most
typically in professional bureaucracies, with clear specifications of
the skills and knowledge required by role incumbents. The extent to
which any one or mixture of these formalising methods are present in an
organisation - operationalised by Pugh and Hickson (1976) in terms of
the existence or not of written job descriptions, work specifications
and general rules and procedures - will indicate the degree to which the
organisation represents a full bureaucracy. Thus, in the study quoted
above, Storey contrasts the full bureaucratic practices of precisely
delineated written contracts of employment, and clear procedural rules
with the more organic practices of "aiming to go beyond" the work
contract, a "can do" outlook and impatience with rules, and managerial
activities geared primarily to business needs rather than ensuring
adherence to procedural controls (Storey, 1992, p28). 	 Even a highly
formalised full bureaucracy, however, cannot regulate everything, and
will therefore include unwritten or informal behaviour forma].isation and
coordinating processes. (Crozier 1964; Blau and Scott, 1963) . Thus,
Mintzberg's two (non-standardised) mechanisms of behaviour formalisation
and coordination - mutual adjustment and direct supervision, which
characterise the adhocracy and simple forms respectively - will also be
represented in the three types of bureaucratic organisations.
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Many organisations will, in practice 	 use a mixture of all five
behaviour formalisation systems, with an emphasis towards one end or the
other of the bureaucratic/organic continuum. It is important to note
that the developments described above towards more flexible forms of
behaviour formalisation does not necessarily represent a move to an
adhocracy form of structure. These developments are more likely to take
place in the overall context of a shift in emphasis within the
standardised or bureaucratic system of behaviour formalisation - from
standardisation by work or skills, to staridardisation by output
prescription - not necessarily from bureaucratic to organic systems.
Moreover, different parts of the same organisation will be dominated by
different behaviour formalisation systems. Thus, standardisation of
behaviour - through the three methods outlined above - is more likely to
be found in the lower middle line and operating core of the
organisation, where both operating and managerial work is likely to be
relatively more precisely defined, stable, and repetitive (apart from
creative/high-technological industries and small entrepreneurial
organisations). Organic formalisation systems are more likely to be
found at the strategic apex of the organisation, where work is less
programmed, and roles more fluid, with less prescription and high levels
of discretion.
Training and Indoctrination Systems
Linked to the behaviour formalisation systems are the training and
indoctrination systems, which also help to standardise the skills,
knowledge and attitudes required for effective role performance. The
provision of training is clearly linked with the complexity of job
roles; tightly prescribed job roles with maximum task fragmentation and
deskilling - taken to its extreme in the traditional mass production
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assembly line - clearly require minimum training in the relatively low
level of skills and knowledge required f or effective role performance.
The less bureaucratic, more flexible and multi-skilled job roles,
mentioned above,	 require a more highly skilled "and constantly
reskillable" (Clegg, 1992, pl66) and adaptable work-force, for which the
provision of training is essential (Walton; Keep, 1989,1992; Peters and
Waterman) . Moreover, training is increasingly seen not as a separate
bolt-on activity, frequently provided in full bureaucracies by personnel
specialists, but rather as constituting an intrinsic and integral part
of effective role performance.	 Both individuals and teams, facilitated
and nurtured by line managers,	 are increasingly seen as taking
responsibility for improving their own performance, learning and skills,
notably through the development of productivity or quality circles
(Collard, 1992), through the concept of continuous professional and
managerial self-development, and through the development of the creative
and innovative, problem solving or "learning organisation" (Bate, 1992;
Storey, 1992; Senge, 1990). However, despite the growing levels of
rhetoric about the importance of training, the poor record of most
British firms in training provision has been well documented, and still
shows only limited improvement compared with other western and Japanese
organisations C Keep, 1992; Handy et al, 1988) . Many British firms
appear to be rooted in the "low skills equilibrium" dimension of the
full bureaucracy,	 at a	 time when increasing technological
sophistication, more specialised and discerning market demand, and
increased market competition on a global scale require the more highly
trained, educated and flexibly skilled workforce associated with the
less bureaucratised organisation.
Mintzberg suggests that formalised behaviour systems and training
systems are basically substitutes for each other - particularly in the
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case of professional bureaucracies, where professional workers are
initially trained and socialised into their job roles outside the
organization, through their professional qualifying courses. This can
result in a potential conflict between the 	 "professional" or
"cosmopolitan" and "employer" or "local" orientation of a professional
(Gouldner, 1957; Laf fin and Young, 1990). In an attempt to reduce the
purely professional commitment of a professional, organisations can
increase the provision of in-house training/socialisation programmes.
Organisations in the public sector are also increasingly adopting the
use of the standardised behaviour formalisation systems based on
performance appraisal and review (Stoker, 1989). The standardisation of
skills method is also being used to reduce the "professional" status of
some professional occupational segments, with some skill areas being
separated off into ancillary occupations which require a lower level of
training (Rogers, 1991).
For "training" programmes provided by organisations, one can often read
"indoctrination" programmes; Mintzberg and Smith (1990) both emphasise
the covert or overt ideological component of training programmes. 	 In
addition to providing skills and knowledge training, these in-house
programmes are often designed to socialize members into the behaviour
patters and the underpinning beliefs, values and attitudes (or
organisation culture) considered appropriate for ensuring effective role
performance (Williams, Dobson and Walters, 1989; Turner, 1992)). In its
popular 1980s/90s guise, a deliberately designed "organisation/corporate
culture" reflects a move from the traditional concept of the pluralist
organisation, with its institutionalisation of conflict and adversarial
labour relations, to a unitarist view of employment relations. This
development is sometimes accompanied by the localisation of collective
bargaining, or even derecognition of the trade union altogether
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(Jackson, 1991; Storey, 1992). It also emphasises the move away from the
bureaucratic procedural controls and coordination mentioned above to a
strategy of commitment, of "coordination and control based more on
shared goals values and traditions" (Walton, 1985, p81), together with
the desirability of a specific organisation mission or vision, redolent
of the mission statements of Japanese organisations such as Matsushita
(Quinn et al, 1988; Peters	 and Waterman). The disappearance of
traditional status differentials - such as specially reserved car parks
and executive dining suites for senior staff, and all the customary
blue-collar/white collar divisions over practices such as clocking in,
payment systems etc. - in favour of Tharmonisation" of conditions of
service for all ranks are all highlighted as significant cultural
symbols of the equal importance and value attached to all employees in
the unitary organisation (Price, 1989; Wickens, 1987)
This analysis of changes currently taking place within the first of
Mintzberg's four design parameters of organisational structure - the
design of positions - now moves on to examine patterns of change within
the second group of design parameters.
Design parameter 2 - Desi gn of the Superstructure: Unit Size and
Grouping
Unit grouping - the grouping together of individual positions into units
- and Unit size represent the second of Mintzberg's structural design
features. The size of the unit groupings, including the "span of
control" will depend largely on the nature of the coordinating and
behaviour formalisatioii mechanisms. Where coordination is achieved
through standardisation - of work processes, skills or outputs - unit
size will tend to become larger, except for work units where
considerable mutual adjustment is required between team members. Thus,
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an autonomous work group or a multi-disciplinary professional group, and
the strategic apex of the organisation, where the fluid senior
management roles involve extensive mutual adjustment, will require a
smaller unit size. Another important factor to consider when designing
unit groups, is the type of interdependencies between the work tasks.
Thompson (1967) identifies three types: reciprocal interdependencies,
where work flows backwards and forwards between the tasks, sequential
interdependencies, where work flows in a linear fashion from one task to
the next, and pooled interdependencies, where the tasks are independent,
requiring only the allocation amongst them of pooled resources.
The machine bureaucracy will typically group positions together on the
basis of function - by staff expertise and skills, or the work process
and function. The sequential and reciprocal interdependencies therefore
flow across departmental boundaries. 	 This causes difficulties in
identifying clear accountablity for performance outcomes for any one
unit, and also tends to result in inadequate lateral coordinating links
between the units and departments, which inhibits flexibility and
adaptation to changing envirorunental circumstances (Kanter, 1984;
Peters, 1987). Staff also tend to develop 	 strong sectional or
departmental interests and loyalties at the expense of the overall
corporate interest. The full bureaucracy does, however, have several
advantages. Grouping by function provides career paths for staff based
on their specialist expertise, which will also be strengthened and
enhanced by the close contact with similar specialist workers. Economies
of scale can result from grouping specialists together; the provision of
centralised specialist - "staff'1 functions 	 such as personnel, data
processing etc., can be more economical than dispersing such specialists
amongst each department.
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Large organisations moving away from the full bureaucracy model
typically move towards a market based structure, characteristic of the
divisionalised form (Mintzberg; Pugh and Hickson; Child). (The
professional bureaucracy and adhocracy will tend to use a combination of
both market and function bases.) It is important, however, to note,
particularly in large organisations with a market based structure, that
a degree of functional grouping is still likely to exist within the work
process at the lower levels of the operating core. Associated with the
market base of divisionalised forms are also the development of many
small quasi-autonomous strategic business units operating as profit or
cost centres (Purcell, 1992). Market based structures - based on
product, client or geographical area - have the advantage of containing
sequential and reciprocal interdependencies within one unit. This form
also facilitates lateral coordination or networking between all the work
functions (Burns and Stalker; Mueller, 1991), and can increase the
capacity for adaptation, innovation and flexibility by the
quasi-independent market based units (Peters and Waterman). Individual
units can more easily be made accountable for the achievement of
performance objectives. The major disadvantages with the market based
structure include a tendency for specialist staff to feel isolated from
their fellow specialists, thus possibly impeding their effectiveness and
restricting opportunities for continued professional development;
opportunities for specialist career progression within the organisation
are also reduced. The duplication of specialist staff functions, such as
personnel, marketing etc., at each of the market units, can also prove
expensive. For example, Goodhart (1992) reported an increase in the
number of personnel specialists, due largely to the decentralisation of
pay bargaining (involving duplication of industrial relations personnel)
to the market based units. Unproductive competition can occur between
units with the sante customer base (Solomons, 1965); this problem has
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been highlighted by critics of the British government's plans for
allowing schools to "opt out" of local authority control. Moreover,
mechanisms f or enabling lateral communication and information flows
between the various semi-autonomous units can also be inadequate (see
discussion below, under "lateral linkages").
The increased degree of dispersal of staff functions within the
operating unit - especially within the divisionalised form - reflect the
increased emphasis upon the primary importance of the production
managers, and upon the operational servicing and enabling rather than
the controlling role of specialist staff such as personnel officers
(Sisson, 1989; Storey, 1989, 1992; Armstrong and Cooke, 1992) . Kanter
(1989) also emphasises the	 importance of staff functions geared
specifically toward the needs of operating managers, and located close
to the line manager "customer" or recipient of the central staff
services. These developments include trends towards reducing the size of
the centralised functional specialist staff departments, associated with
the "simple form, lean structure" organisation structure advocated by
Peters and Waterman and Kanter (1989) . The distinctions between some
specialist staff and line managers are also becoming blurred -
corresponding more to the Marks and Spencer model of "every manager a
personnel manager" (Tse, 1985, p28) . The management role is becoming
less specialised, and more generalist, moving some way toward the
Japanese relatively non-specialised management roles and career paths
identified by Ouchi and Clegg.
The market-based or federated structure also possesses the advantage of
enabling a flat organisation hierarchy, as Mintzberg explains: "only a
few functional units can be grouped into a higher-order unit, whereas,
typically, many more market based units can be so grouped." (Mintzberg,
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1983, p71). Aided by the development of computerised management
information systems, which can render unnecessary some of the middle
management layers intervening between the centre and the operating core,
this move towards flat organisations is highlighted in a number of
studies of recent organisation restructuring, summarised by, amongst
others, Clegg, Smith, Kanter (1989), and Buchanan and MoCalman (1989)
As Tiernan, Flood and Wally (1994, p8) point out: "Reducing the layers
in the hierarchy reduces costs, frees up information flows, speeds up
communications, and allows more innovative ideas to flourish and to
filter though the structure - rather than blocked by communication
bottlenecks".	 However, as	 Jacques (1991)	 suggests, hierarchical
structures do continue to possess the advantages originally highlighted
by Weber and other traditional theorists, and are unlikely to disappear;
the trend is towards streamlining and improving the functioning of
hierarchies, rather than abolishing them.
This analysis - of changes currently taking place within Mintzberg's
four design parameters of organisational structure - now moves on to
examine patterns of change within the third group of design parameters.
Design parameters 3 - design of lateral linkages: planning and control
systems, and liaison devices
Planning and control systems are essential in all organisations' for
directly specifying and monitoring the nature, quantity and quality of
outputs, and are linked with the behaviour formalisation systems
outlined above for regulating behaviour. Mintzberg identifies two basic
forms of planning and control systems - performance control and action
planning - which are both found to varying degrees within most
organisations, although both these systems tend to exist at fairly
minimal levels within the professional bureaucracy, simple structure and
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the adhocracy. Action planning systems, operating basically from the
top-down in the organisation, tend to prevail within the full
bureaucracy, where strategic planning at the top is developed into
specific programmes which are in turn "elaborated and scheduled, and
eventually emerge as a set of specific operating specification which
evoke specific actions directly." (Mintzberg, 1983, p79). Great emphasis
is placed upon controlling every detail of the decision making and
actions to be taken within the work process, as well as specifying the
nature of the output produced, involving the extensive written
procedures and specifications outlined above as characterising the full
bureaucracy.
Performance control systems - imposing performance standards on outputs
(ends), but intended to devolve to operating units control of the work
processes or "means" - tend to characterise the market based structure
of the divisionalised form, and are increasingly being adopted within
public sector professional bureaucracies (see chapter 3) . Operating both
from top-down and bottom-up, as performance targets are negotiated
between superiors and subordinates, corporate objectives are refined
into more detailed performance standards down the hierarchy, and then
passed back to the top for monitoring and review and further strategic
planning. The much vaunted flexibility and autonomy apparently given to
work groups and decentralised business units or profit centres within
the divisionalised form tends, however, to take place within the context
of extensive performance controls on outputs - financial targets and the
like. These can actually constrain worker/manager actions and behaviour
as stringently as the traditional bureaucratic controls on process, and,
with the development of sophisticated computerised management
information systems, possibly even more rigorously (Fincham and Rhodes,
1992).	 Moreover, the adoption of quality assurance systems, such as
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BS5750, can involve detailed prescription of procedures, analogous to
the action planning systems found in machine bureaucracies. Similarly,
devolved responsibilities for resource management - for example through
devolved budgeting - can involve extensive prescriptions governing the
deployment of funds which limit the operating autonomy of business
units. Payment systems within the performance control systems tend to
move from job based to person and output based systems. Despite the
reservations expressed by a number of authors about the efficacy of
performance related pay - the difficulties of specifying precisely
defined outputs for certain work activities, achieving fair and
equitable systems for linking pay to achievement, and tendencies for
individually-based systems to erode team cooperation - these systems are
increasingly being adopted by growing numbers of both private and p.1blic
sector organisations (Kessler, 1994)
As outlined earlier, planning and control systems involve the use of
five basic mechanisms for coordinating and integrating organisationa].
activities: direct supervision, characterising the simple structure;
mutual adjustment in the adhocracy; the traditional bureaucratic methods
of standardisation - of work processes, skills and outputs - for the
machine bureaucracy, the professional bureaucracy and the divisiona].ised
form. Child (1984) and Mintzberg (1983) identify the requirement for
additional, structural forms of mutual adjustment to supplement
standardised coordinating mechanisms. These can include the use of
flexible work groups and multi-disciplinary professional teams in the
operating core, already noted above, and the adoption, at higher levels
in the organisation of liaison positions, task forces and committees,
and integrative managerial positions, each of which can overlay the
functional or market based structures. The ultimate liaison device is
the matrix, which breaks the traditional bureaucratic imperative of the
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unity of command. Matrices are designed to produce more flexible or
organic structures, which can innovate and adapt to dynamic and complex
environments through encouraging open lines of communication, and
enabling the grouping and regrouping of flexible mobile staff members to
carry out the required "uncertain, complex and interdependent tasks"
(Child, 1984, p101)
Manifested in its purest form as Mintzberg's adhocracy, Mintzberg
emphasises that, despite the currently fashionable nature of this matrix
or organic structure, it is most suitable for new, young, high tech and
creative	 industries, or	 sectors of	 industries, such as media
organisations, advertising, aerospace, electronics etc.. However, a
number of authors express doubts, even with these particular industrial
sectors, about the efficacy of the full-blown formal matrix structure
with its well documented problems of the extensive administrative and
consultative arrangements required, plus the difficulties of role
conflict and ambiguity for the participants (Child; Kanter, 1989; Peters
and Waterman). However, Francis (1994) points out that, in the wake of
increasingly complex and automated production technologies, more
sophisticated products and increasingly competitive markets, growing
numbers of firms are moving to matrix forms of organisation - partly in
response to recent studies of the world automobile industries, which
identified matrix organisation as one of the key causes of the superior
speed and efficiency with which Japanese car manufacturers developed new
models.
Certainly, a feature of all the organisation structures posed as
alternatives to machine bureaucracies is the increased importance
attached to developing both formal and informal horizontal communication
and coordination systems between parts of the organisation, and a great
increase in the fluidity of role positions within them: "we have gone
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way beyond matrix.....There are so many , lines of reporting that in some
ways it's like having none. As a manager there is a lot of uncertainty
that you have to take responsibility for. You have to negotiate for the
authority to act, or sometimes you act first and hope to work it out
later" (multinational corporation manager, quoted in Kolb et al, 1991,
p222). Mueller (p155) highlights the growth in "networking" systems,
both formal and informal, which, aided by the development of new
technology, can distribute "powers and responsibility along horizontal
or wavy lines (not the rigid, vertical lines found in burearcracies)".
Increasingly,	 organisations are introducing more sophisticated
computerised information systems for improving information and
communication	 flows at	 three levels	 -	 at	 work group,
intra-organisational and inter-organisational 	 levels (Tapscott and
Caston, 1993)
With the growth in outsourcing or subcontracting (which Peters and Clegg
call "de-integration") of certain organisational functions, and, in the
public sector, the requirements to subject increasing numbers of
services to compulsory competitive tendering (which splits the
specification from the provision of services)., organisations are
increasingly becoming seen as loose networks or federations of more or
less autonomous units (Francis). Here, hierarchies are being replaced
by internal markets as a method of regulating or coordinating
transactions between different units - increasingly such transactions
may be between units both within the organisation and external to it,
resulting in a blurring of inter-organisational boundaries. In turn,
market relationships, for regulating transactions between these units
are seen as being replaced by "network" relationships (Levacic, 1991).
Network relationships between these units (whether internal or external
to the organisation) require the longer-term development of mutual trust
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and cooperation - negotiation or mutual adjustment - between equals,
rather than reliance upon short-term, impersonal market mechanisms
(Peters, 1992; Lorenz, 1991)
This analysis of changes currently taking place within the third of
Mintzberg's four design parameters of organisational structure - the
design of lateral linkages - now moves on to examine patterns of change
within the fourth, and last, group of design parameters.
Design parameter 4 - Design of decision making systems: centralisation
and decentralisation
Decentralisation refers to a situation where "the authority to make
specified (usually operational) decisions is passed down to units and
people at lower levels in the organisation's hierarchy", in contrast to
centralisation, where the strategic apex at the top of the organisation
retains authority over most	 decision-making (Child, 1984, p146).
Mintzberg defines two types of formal decentralisation - vertical, when
power is dispersed or delegated vertically to others in the chain of
command down the organisation; horizontal, where power is allocated to
persons outside the line management hierarchy such as functional staff
specialists, and operators. The geographical dispersal of services
amongst different locations may or may not involve elements of
horizontal and/or vertical decentralisation.
At one end of the continuum, the simple structure and machine
bureaucracy is characterised by a large degree of vertical
centralisation at the strategic apex of the organisation, with, for the
bureaucracy, limited horizontal decentralisation to the functional staff
concerned with organising the standardised planning and control systems.
A certain degree of vertical decentralisation takes place within the
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divisionalised form, delegated from the centre to the quasi-autonomous
divisions. Some horizontal decentralisation to specialist functional
staff both at the centre and within the divisions may occur, with
further horizontal and vertical decentralisation within the divisions
and strategic business units. However, as noted above, a fairly high
degree of vertical centralisation is likely to be retained within the
divisions through the use standardised skill and work process behaviour
formalisation processes as well as through standardised performance
control systems.
The adhocracy is characterised by limited vertical and extensive
horizontal decentralisation represented through its extensive use of
flexible multi-disciplinary project work groups and teams. The greatest
degree of both horizontal and vertical decentralisation is found in the
professional bureaucracy, where power based on expert knowledge is
concentrated at the bottom of the organisation, although the trend
towards exercising control through the standardisation of outputs may be
weakening the professional power base here. What Johnson (1972) calls
the collegiate or professional method of occupational control, based on
extensive control of the practitioner/client relationship by the
professional, is increasingly being replaced by control exercised by the
powerful Nclientll or "purchaser" functions within private and public
sector organisations' internal market systems, which defines both the
service standard to be achieved, and, increasingly, the methods to be
used.
Essentially, both organisational centralisation 	 decentralisation
represent different strategies for maintaining organisational control.
In a relatively centralised organisation (such as	 the machine
bureaucracy), the emphasis tends towards detailed control through direct
supervision, through the standardisation of work processes, and through
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formal rules and procedures.	 In more decentralised organisations
(characteristic of more organic structural forms), the emphasis is more
on lower level managers and staff taking responsibility for controlling
their own, and their colleagues' performance - within a firm framework
of clearly specified corporate policies, coherently articulated sets of
organisational norms and values, and clearly formulated contractual
objectives or service specifications for each unit (Hales) . Control
systems tend to focus on performance measurement, using performance
targets based on both resource management and product/service delivery
criteria. In practice however, many organisations are reluctant to
reduce their reliance on relatively detailed and centralised control
systems - especially when faced by hostile and threatening external
environments -	 for reasons connected basically with senior management
fears of losing power and status, and with the practical difficultiers
of maintaining control over decentralised management units (Mintzberg;
Hales, 1993; Robbins, 1990) . Smith (1990) uses the term "coercive
autonomy" to describe the situation where managers' devolved powers are
so constrained by the imposition of such controls on the scope of their
activities, that, in reality, their authority to act is severely
retricted. Mintzberg's concept of the "pulls" which exist between the
six basic parts of the organisation - with the groups within each part
attempting to maximise their own power and influence - aptly illustrates
these ongoing tensions and conflicts pushing and pulling organisations
towards relative centralisation or decentralisation of decision-making
authority.
Conclusion
The discussion above outlined the key changes currently taking place
within each of Mintzberg's four organisational design parameters: the
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design of positions; the design of the superstructure; the design of
lateral linkages; the design of decision-making systems. The nature of
these changes suggests that growing numbers of organisations are moving
towards the adoption of structural features associated with the more
organic forms of structure, rather than those characteristic of the
mechanistic or bureaucratic end of Burns and Stalker's classic
structural continuum. However, as indicated above, it is difficult, in
this necessarily brief review of current developments, to distinguish
clearly between rhetoric and reality in terms of assessing the extent to
which the theoretical models in the literature actually represent
changing practices within organisations. A number of authors - such as
Walton, and Watkins et al. - identify intermediate or "transitional;
positions between the bureaucratic and organic extremes, and suggest
only partial adoption by most organisations of the new structural
features outlined above. In any case, as Mintzberg himself states, from
within the contingency theory perspective, the fullest expression of the
organic structural form - the adhocracy - is likely to be appropriate
only for firms operating in particular sectors.
Essentially, the adoption by many organisations of some of the new
design features is likely to take the form of an amendment to, rather
than a replacement for, more traditional bureaucratic structures, which,
as Jacques (1991) and Hales (1993) suggest, continue to form the basic
design pattern for most organisations. Nevertheless, it does appear, in
the context of increasingly dynamic socio-economic and technological
environments, that significant changes are occurring - albeit to
different degrees, and in different ways, within different organisations
- within the four design parameters. The following chapter examines the
impact of these developments on the roles of middle managers located
within these changing organisational structures.
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CHAPTER 2
Organisational restructuring and middle managerial roles
The concept of role represents the link or point of contact between the
individual manager and the structure of an organisation (Pugh and
Hickson, 1976; Salaman, 1980; Hales, 1986), and can thus be used to
"examine both the structural expectational determinants of behaviour and
the effects of individual projects and choices." (Hales, p108) . 	 The
structural organisational theorists discussed in Chapter 1 - the
classical, post-Weberian, human relations systems and contingency
theorists - all emphasise the structural constraints on an individual's
behaviour within the organisation, notably through the concept of a
specific organisational office, position or "role". These prescribe,
with varying degrees of specificity: "the organised sets of behaviour
associated with a position" (Mintzberg, 1989, p15), or "the bundles of
expectations directed at the incumbents of positions in a given society"
(Dahrendorf, 1968, p 36). After examining the concept of managerial
roles and the nature of managerial work activities, functions,
effectiveness and styles, this chapter adopts a contingency model of
managerial work to identify the impact of organisational restructuring
on middle managers' roles and work satisfaction levels. Mintzberg's
contingency model of managerial roles - interpersonal, informational and
decisional - is used as a framework for analysing these changes in
managerial work, with particular emphasis on changing middle management
work roles. As with Chapter 1, the emphasis here is on changes occurring
within mainly private sector organisations, on which most of the
literature is focused.
The concept of managerial roles
Whilst emphasising the potential usefulness of the concept of role for
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analysing managerial work and functions, 	 Hales emphasises the
requirement to distinguish clearly between: the "structurally given
demands (norms, expectations, taboos, responsibilities and the like)
associated with a given social position"; the way in which an individual
acts or behaves (with or without conscious intention); the individual's
own personal "orientation or conception of the part he is to play in the
organisation" (Levinson, 1966, p251).	 Using this approach, Stewart
(1989) distinguishes between organisational job prescriptions, the
individual manager's own constructs and agendas and the manager's
consequent actions or behaviour.
Focusing on the nature of the organisationally given role demands upon
an individual, Levinson identifies the importance of analysing the
varying degrees of explicitness, clarity and consensus about the
expectations and definitions of role requirements held by all the
participants. These range from relatively tightly defined low discretion
roles in the traditional bureaucracy to less specific, more ambiguous
roles in more organic structures, with higher levels of discretion which
require a greater degree of individual judgement and initiative
(Stewart, 1982,1989, 1991; Marshall and Stewart, 1981; Smith 1990;
Kanter, 1984, 1989; Snow et al, 1992). Organisations will place varying
levels of emphases and compulsion on the behaviour requirements of
managerial roles, through rewards and sanctions or control systems,
resulting in "must-, shall-, and can-expectations" indications to the
incumbent about the ranges of possible behaviour permissible within a
managerial position (Dahrendorf, 1968, p69; Stewart, 1989) . Sometimes
these prescriptions dan be inconsistent and contradictory. The
allocation of more discretion to managerial roles, and formal
requirements for more proactive and entrepreneurial role performance can
conflict with the reality of the tighter controls and restrictions on
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management autonomy, which frequently accompany organisational
retrenchment, causing severe role conflict and ambiguity for the middle
managers involved (Broussine, 1983; Smith, 1990).
In addition to constraining role behaviour, organisation control systems
also attempt to influence role attributes - the "appearance and
character" required of a role incumbent or "Organisation Man" (Whyte,
1957); contemporary management literature places considerable emphasis
on the importance of organisational commitment and involvement
strategies (Walton, 1985; Williams et al, 1989) . Specifically designed
organisational cultural and value systems become significant mechanisms
for stipulating the scope of more broadly defined, high discretion
managerial roles (Peters and Waterman, 1982; Schein, 1992) .	 Also
significant here, is the nature of the technology used within the
organisation; as Levinson (1966, p255), points out: "technological and
ecological facilities are not merely 'tools' by which norms are met;
they are often a crucial basis for the maintenance or change of an
organisation form". Thus the introduction of computerised technology for
both production and information systems has had considerable impact on
managerial role requirements (see below).
The impact of these various structural constraints on role performance,
however, can only be understood and analysed in the context df an
appreciation of the individual's own perception or conception of his/her
organisational role identity and the nature of the structural
constraints upon it: "a role is not simply an acting out of the rules
and constraints that operate on a particular hierarchic position, but a
constantly changing, negotiated product of the interactions of different
purposes and priorities within a framework of rules and constraints."
(Salaman, p130). 	 Thus, individuals, or actors, will behave or act on
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the basis of their own interpretations or definitions of organisational
role demands and expectations (Rose, 1975; Silverman, 1970) . They will
exercise a degree of choice in their role performance, made in the
context of structural constraints, which they personally perceive as
significant in the light of their own needs, abilities and perceptions
of their work-role identities and their "general personal philosophies
of behaviour (Marshall and Stewart, p187).
Also significant here is the information which individuals will derive
about expected role performance from their "role set" - the sources of
the individual's information and expectations about role behaviour
(Hales, 1986, plo8 ) . These sources will include the individual's work
group and both current and previous superiors, plus external sources
such as management education and training courses, the popular
management literature of the 1980s (Abrahamson, 1991), trade unions, and
professional associations and communities. Management literature from
Taylor onwards contains extensive reference to the potentially
problematic nature of such informal or "unofficial" organisational role
models which can operate as alternative and sometimes oppositional
sources of role expectations and behaviour patterns to those prescribed
by the "official" organisational specialisation, behaviour formalisation
and cultural systems (Salaman; Reed, 1985; Watson, 1980; Smith) . Social
work literature of the 1970s, for example, focused extensively or the
conflicts existing between the "reality", or organisational demands of
the social work job role in local authority bureaucracies, and the
perceptions of the individual social workers about what these job roles
should involve from their "professional" perspectives (Bamford, 1982;
Pritchard and Taylor, 1978). Staff appeared to experience conflicting
organisational, professional and client demands; for example, limits on
the resources made available by senior management can constrain social
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workers' autonomy in providing a particular form of service which is
considered, on professional grounds, to be necessary.
The formal managerial role, and the organisation structure within which
it is located, therefore provides a framework for influencing and
constraining the degree of "negotiable space" (Stewart, 1989, p4) or
"organisational opportunities and domains of action " (Smith, p26) which
individual managers perceive as available to, and negotiable by them.
This concept	 is reflected in Stewart's	 distinction between the
managerial job seen as the "flexible and negotiable part of a role set"
and as a "distinct and easily described entity", referring to the formal
job description and the organisational rules and procedures prescribing
behaviour (Stewart, 1989, p6).
The nature of managerial work - activities, functions, effectiveness,
styles
Before analysing recent changes in managerial roles and managers'
perceptions of them, it is necessary to consider the various approaches
to defining and determining what Harrow and Willcocks (1990, p283) term
the "social construct" of management, in the context of their
identification of "the widespread ambivalence and confusion as to the
nature of management work". 	 Firstly, Stewart (1989, p4) poses the
question, when reviewing studies of managerial jobs and behaviour, about
what is being studied - "managerial work, managerial jobs or mangerial
behaviour, or all of them together". Managerial work and behaviour are
not necessarily confined to managerial jobs, and the extent to which
non-managerial jobs also contain management work elements has not been
empirically investigated (Hales, 1986). Stewart overcomes this problem
by concentrating essentially on managerial jobs, although Hales points
out that this approach results in tautology: management is what managers
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do - what managers do is what management is. Moreover, this approach can
be problematic for studying management in the public sector. Here, as
Harrow and Willcocks point out, job titles less commonly include the
word "manager" than would jobs of similar or lower positions in private
sector organisational hierarchies; hence his idea of management as a
social construct because, particularly in the public sector, the
professional who has risen to a first line management position may or
may not perceive his/her job as "managerial" rather than "professional"
However, for the purposes of this study, anaylsis will focus on
management jobs, defined as "the jobs that companies call managerial and
which form part of the management hierarchy for selection, training and
promotion (Stewart, 1976, p4).
Secondly, in a comprehensive review of 29 empirical studies of
managerial work and behaviour, Hales (1986) outlines the confusion and
inconsistencies, both between and within these studies, found in the use
of terms and concepts such as managerial "behaviour, activity, task or
functions". To resolve these ambiguities, he suggests using a continuum
with "doing" at one end and "achieving" at the other. Thus, the
continuum ranges from "simple 'behaviour' stripped of context and
intention, and therefore of meaning, through 'activities' or complexes
of behaviour endowed with context and/or intention based meaning, to
'tasks', or the defined goals of activity and, finally, 'functioxs' -
the intended contribution of managerial tasks to the organisation as a
whole." (Hales, p106, my emphases).
Minztberg's definition of the role of the manager can therefore be seen
as the "organised sets of behaviour associated with a position" which
are comprised of activities designed to achieve goals to ensure the
effective functioning of the organisation. In this sense the "manager"
and "management" are synonymous. The job (behaviour and activities) of
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the individual manager is equated with the management functions or
subsystems of an organisation, as represented by many authors'
categories of management functions or roles of which the most famous is
Fayol's - to plan, organise, command, coordinate and control (1949)
This list was extended by Gulick in the 1930s, who invented the
well-known acronym "POSDCORB" standing for planning, organising,
staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting (Lessem,
1989) . The open systems theorists such as Katz and Kahn (1966), with
their emphasis on the importance of the interaction between the
organisation and its environment, specified additional management
functions concerned with change and adaptation. Their concept of "role"
was also more sophisticated, including the specification of management
role attributes - expected standards and styles of managerial behaviour
based on organisational norms and values - and an emphasis on the value
of coherent organisation cultures.
These concepts of the managerial role tended to emphasise the
depersonalised or impersonal and rational conduct of the incumbent, in
line with Weber's theory of bureaucracy, and tended to involve the
unproblematic assumption that managerial behaviour would be derived from
these functions.	 Reversing this procedure, a number of more recent
authors, writing from the 1950s onwards,	 carried out empirical
investigations into the nature of managerial work and derived implicit
or explicit categories of functions or roles from managerial behaviour
and activities, the most well-known of which are probably Sayles (1964)
and Mintzberg (1973,1979). These studies are interestingly redolent of
the 1970s "what is social work? - social work is what social workers do"
debates, which attempted to resolve the problematic Mvastness and
vagueness of the social work task" (Goldberg and Warburton, 1979, p6).
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Influenced by Sayles' work, Mintzberg used his own intensive observation
or "shadowing" of managers' activities plus analysis of their diaries
and records, as well as extensive analysis of other studies undertaken
on a wide range of managers, in different functions and levels in a
number of different organisations, to identify three types of roles with
subsets for each, in the context of his contingency theory of
management:	 interpersonal	 (figurehead,	 liaison and	 leader),
informational (monitor, disseminator and spokesperson), and decisional
(entrepreneur, disturbance-handler, resource allocator and negotiator).
These roles, and their location within Mintzberg's contingency theory of
management, are explained fully below.
Several authors point out that analysis of what constitutes "good"
practice or effectiveness in management roles and behaviour has been
largely absent from earlier management work analyses (Hales, 1986;
Stewart, 1989; Silver, 1991; Pye, 1991) . Hales states that "for me,
'effectiveness' denotes the extent to which managers actually do what
they are supposed to do " (Hales, p88, his emphases), and contends that
many definitions of managerial effectiveness do in fact reflect his
definition (for example: Campbell et al, 1970; Drucker, 1970; Morse and
Wagner, 1978; Reddin, 1970; Boyatzis, 1982) . The key problem, with this
approach, relates to identifying the performance standards of effective
management against which management behaviour and work can be judged;
basically: "effectiveness is a function of who defines it" (Lombardo and
McCall, 1982, p62). Performance standards, and hence definitions of
managerial effectiveness, will vary from person to person depending on
where they derive their standards. These may emerge from their
experiences and knowledge of prior performances by individuals who
previously held their jobs, and/or from the consequent ideas about
potential possible performances developed by their iixmiediate superiors:
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"Thus there is a fluidity and plasticity to the judgement" (Pye, p113)
More clearly articulated and formalised organisational value systems,
and performance measurement systems (as discussed in the previous
chapter), also act	 to clarify expectations about 	 the forms of
competences and effectiveness required from managerial staff; there may
well be differences here between different organisational departments or
sections, as weel as between different organisations.	 Definitions of
effective management behaviour and performance are therefore contingent
upon the particular individual and organisational context (as outlined
below in Mintzberg's contingency model of management) . For this reason,
Harrow and Willcocks conclude that it is not possible to make
satisfactory descriptions or prescriptions about management activities
and competences across the private sector - and certainly not across
private and public sector organisations.
British governmental and various employers' organisations, including the
British Institute of Management, became increasingly concerned during
the 1980s about the effectiveness of managerial performance in British
organisations, amid fears about the productivity of British industry
under increasingly competitive market conditions. Compared with other
countries, both the quantity and quality of management training and
development were shown to be inadequate for ensuring effective
managerial performance. 	 (Handy et al, 1988; Constable and McCornick,
1991; Silver, 1991).	 Following the publication of the Constable and
McCormick Report in 1987, an employer led organisation, the new
Management Charter Initiative (MCI), was launched in 1988 and worked
alongside the Training Agency's National Forum for Management Education
and Development (NFMED) to improve British management education and
training - through clarification of the purpose of management, and
identification of the behaviour required to achieve effective
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performance. Derived from ideas of "best practice" as identified by
employers in a wide range of sectors, and agreed by managers employed in
these organisations, four general managerial roles were identified -
managing operations, finance, people and information. These would form
the basis f or qualifying courses in management up to, but not, as yet,
including MBA level (MCI, 1994).	 Recognising a contingency theory of
management - that different sectors place different emphasis on
different managerial roles - industrial "lead bodies" are being set up
to use this framework to define the specific competences required for
particular sectors.
The MCI also include a requirement for developing the skills, knowledge,
attitudes and attributes which are necessary for the individual manager
to possess in order to achieve effective performance in carrying out
his/her role or function (personal competence model) . Studied by
numerous authors (Boyatzis, 1982; Mumford, 1989; Pedler et al, 1986;
Constable, 1988; Hirsh and Bevan, 1991), this concept of "personal
effectiveness" departs from the concept of management effectiveness or
competence expressed through role performance, and defines competence as
"an underlying characteristic of a manager which, if used effectively,
leads to effective behaviour." (Boyatzis, p21). Therefore effective
performance (however it is defined) will emerge from the manager's
competence in using appropriate skills, knowledge, and attributes
effectively (Silver). Constable identifies three areas of competences:
skills, for self-management, managing others, managing and controlling,
and for managing relationships outside the organisation; knowledge,
about relevant academic theories and the functional areas of management;
attributes, referring to less tangible personal 	 skills, styles,
characteristics, orientations and motivations. Managers have to be
competent in all of these areas to perform their roles effectively; a
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model based on this approach and drawn up by Sheffield metropolitan
district council is shown in exhibit 2.1. Similar clusters of skills,
knowledge and attributes occur in many other competence models, although
the precise nature of the competences required and the relative emphases
placed on them will be contingent on the context of the particular
management job and the àrganisation (Hirsh and Bevan; Boyatzis).
Related to, and included within, the concept of personal competence is
the concept of management style - the way in which all the various
management roles and functions outlined above are performed. Derived
originally from systems organisation theory, the term is usually used in
the context of the leadership function of management, referring to "the
general way a leader behaves toward subordinates in order to attain
objectives" (Mescon et al, 1981) - although the term is also used in
relation to learning styles to identify the different ways in which
individuals learn (Koib, 1984).	 The concept of role within the
traditional bureaucracy emphasised the depersonalised performance of
highly specified tasks, with low discretion, although the capacity for
discretion increased up the hierarchy of the middle line to the
strategic apex. However, the. systems approach, where organisations are
perceived essentially as systems held together by psychological forces
(Katz and Kahn, 1966), involved the concept of the social or human
subsystem, within the overall organisation system, with its own r,eeds
(Roethlisberger and Dickson; Trist and Bamforth; Burrell and Morgan).
The human relations theorists, with their focus on the psychological
needs of individual organisational members (see chapter 1), also focused
on the interactive nature of the relationship between the organisation
and the individual. Thus, managerial role performance was derived not
only from the organisatioxi's formal authority structure of roles, job
descriptions, budgetary control systems etc., but also through the
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personal styles adopted by managers according to the needs of the
individuals	 operating within	 their	 organisation or	 their
section/department of the organisation and according to their own
personal preferences and abilities. Focusing on management as a process,
rather than as a relatively static role, a cpntinuum of management
styles, ranging essentially from autocratic or authoritarian to
democratic/participative, has been identified by authors such as Reddin
(1970), Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1973), Fiedler (1967), and Handy (1976)
These authors adopted a contingency approach to management styles,
arguing that, to ensure effective management, a "best fit" was required
between management style and the structural variables of the particular
situation. Fiedler, for example identified these contingent variables as
comprising the nature of the leader/member relations, the degree of
structure in the task, and the degree of power and authority of the
manager's position; Handy added to these the type of organisation
culture, structure and technology, and the needs and expectations of
subordinates. The role of "leader" also appeared as a constituent part
of the effective management role, a development which presaged the
emphasis (initially developed by Zaleznick, 1977) placed on the leader
as distinct from the management role of effective managers in the
organisational literature of the 1980s (see discussion below)
Consideration of changes in the management role will therefore require
identification of the various formally prescribed role elements, plus
the particular management styles and competences (clusters of knowledge,
skills and attributes) required to ensure effective managerial
performance in particular orgarlisations.
Contingency Models of Managerial Roles
In the same way that contingency theory emphasises the importance of
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chapter 1. Iext to be considered is the management job itself - the
significant variables here have been summarised by Stewart (1991) as the
location of the job within "function; level in the hierarchy; general
management and functional jobs; and operational and staff management"
(p77), plus the characteristics and expectations of the people being
managed, organisational cultural differences, and different time
pressures. Then, Mintzberg considers the "person" occupying the role:
"The evidence shows that the incumbent's values, his personality and his
style, all contribute to the determination of the work he does."
(Mintzberg, 1979, p118) .	 Lastly, Mintzberg identifies situational
factors related to time: seasonal variations throughout the year:
patterns of change and/or stability in the organisation; organisational
crises, arising from internally or externally generated problems and/or
opportunities; new job patterns arising out of the experience acquired
in a job by the manager over the years; changes in societal norms and
values, which will have an effect on both the role expectations and work
performance of managers and their subordinates.
Thus, each of Mintzberg's five organisation structures or configurations
described in Chapter 1, with their different situational factors and
design parameters, will prescribe different management roles, requiring
different role expectations and behaviour patterns on the part of the
incumbents. Moreover these managerial roles will differ, within'each
configuration, according to their hierarchical position and their
location within particular functions (within the strategic apex, the
middle line, the operating core, the techostructure or the support
structure). Organisation restructuring, and moves from one configuration
to another, will clearly also require restructuring of managerial roles
and changes in managerial styles and behaviour.
A number of authors identify middle managers as an employee grouping who
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have been, and who are continuing to be particularly affected by the
patterns of organisational restructuring identified in the previous
chapter (Wheatley, 1992; Smith, 1990; Dopson and Stewart, 1989, 1990;
Kanter, 1984, 1989). Middle managers are located in the middle line of
Mintzberg's organisational model (see chapter 1); Dopson and Stewart
(1990) use the annual National Management Salary Survey model - which
allocates managers to different levels according to their main
responsibility zones - to define two levels of middle management. The
more senior middle managers will "usually have significant supervisory
responsibility but may include specialists with a strong professional
role, with some years of experience or seniority." The more junior
middle managers hold a position of "lesser importance" than those at the
more senior level, in terms of a lower degree of size and/or complexity
of responsibility: "They will have others reporting to them who may be
first-line managers or foremen, or professional section leaders in
specialist functions" (p6)
Traditionally, the hierarchical distinction between senior and middle
management roles has been made on the grounds that, essentially, senior
managers' work was concerned more with strategy formulation and
decision-making, while that of middle managers was concerned more with
operational activities: "there is considerable evidence that they differ
in orientation.	 Specifically, managers at lower levels appear to be
more concerned with the maintenance of work-flows .....for, example, we
find that the chief executives collected a wide variety of information
to be used in strategy-making of a broad nature; the lower-level
managers collected information to maintain the steady flow of work in
their organisational units" (Mintzberg, 1973, p110-111) . Similarly,
Fulop (1991) suggests that "in conventional text books on management and
organisations, one of the singularly most important distinctions often
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made between top and middle mangement is the extent to which the former
is involved in strategic or entrepreneurial activities, while the latter
is usually relegated to operational planning or implementation
functions" (p25-26)
As Wheatley (1992, p5) indicates: "a trawl of the academic literature on
the subject (of middle management) brings little contemporary research
to the surface. What does emerge is largely negative". Some of the
recent empirical studies on middle managers certainly suggest that
middle managers tend to hold primarily negative views about the impact
of changing organisational structures and cultures on their roles and
work satisfaction levels (see, for example, Goffee and Scase, 1986;
Scase and Gof fee, 1989) . Others present more positive middle management
experiences - for example, Wheatley's own survey, and Dopson and
Stewart's case study research (1988, 1990, 1990a) . Dopson and Stewart,
in surveying a number studies within both of these perspectives ) suggest
that different methodologies may, in part, be responsible for these
different findings; in addition these studies were held at different
times, and covered managers located in different public and private
sector organisational contexts. ALL of the studies, however, agree that
significant and extensive changes in all three of Mintzberg's middle
management roles have, and are continuing to take place. 	 /
The major factors contributing to these role changes derive from the
significant changes identified earlier as	 taking place within
organisation structures (see chapter 1).	 Thus, as Wheatley points out,
organisations were traditionally characterised more by "broad
bureaucratic pyramids rising upwards in a constant ratio of manager to
managed. Tiers of (middle) managers provided the only mechanism through
which information could flow upwards and decisions flow downwards. As an
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organisation grew.. .so did the need for layers of management... Join a
growing company and promotion was virtually assured" (p5). However, this
situation changed with the "delayering" or flattening of organisational
hierarchies, where the shorter middle line tends to affect middle
management numbers within organisations, with implications for job
security and career progression.
Thus, Dopson and Stewart (1990, p13) point out that a common response
(by their case study organisations to external pressures) was "the
reduction in the number of staff, and in the number of management
levels". Numerous other authors have drawn similar conclusions about the
reduction in numbers and levels of middle managers arising from this
flattening of organisational hierarchies (for example, Barham and
Rassam, 1989; Goffee, and Scase, 1992; Smith, 1990; Wheatley; Rock,
1990; Coulson-Thomas and Coe, 1991). The recession of the early 1990s,
is undoubtedly exacerbating the decline in the numbers of middle as well
as other levels of management jobs, to the point where one survey,
undertaken during the 1990/91 period, reported that "some individuals
feel they are 'fighting daily' for their jobs" (Coulson-Thomas and Coe,
p12). Similarly, Kanter (1989) draws attention to the need for managers
to accept the demise of the traditional corporate career in favour of
"hopping" between jobs - between project opportunities within the
organisation, and between working for organisations and working' for
themselves - based on the value and importance of their own
entrepreneurial and professional skills and ideas.
Changes in other elements of organisational design - such as the
development of semi-autonomous work-groups and cost/profit centres
within organisations; reductions in size of the strategic apex; control
and coordination systems focused on more rigorous control over outputs
(volume and quality); and the introduction of sophisticated computerised
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technology - in service/production and information systems - all require
significant changes in the functions, activities, style and competences
of middle managers. Line managers are acquiring new responsibilities for
a wider range of functions (including resource management), and are
becoming more "visible" and accountable for achieving results within
"high performance" cultures (Scase and Gof fee, 1989) . Similarly, middle
managers within specialist functional areas, such as Finance and
Personnel, are experiencing complementary changes; as line managers take
on additional responsibilities for, say, personnel management, the role
of personnel specialist staff and managers changes too. Thus, personnel
managers are becoming more concerned with the adoption of facilitating
and enabling roles - with assisting and training their middle line
manager "customers" to carry out their new people management
responsibilities, such as training and performance related pay
assessments, within a framework of clearly specified but more flexible
personnel policies designed to meet the business needs of
production/service line managers (Storey	 1992; Sisson, 1989) . In
addition, the focus on high performance and value-for-money standards
required from these specialist managers are also resulting in much
closer scrutiny of the effectiveness of their service provision;
increased attention is being paid to setting "bencbmarking" standards
against which to assess Personnel specialist contributions, and to
personnel audits (Holt, 1994; Storey and Sissons, 1993). Such pressures,
together with increases in the outsourcing of various personnel
activities, can threaten the job security and stability of these
specialist managers, as well as requiring increased levels of
accountability for results through the demonstration of "added value"
accruing to the organisation from their policies and practices.
Moreover, middle managers are increasingly expected to adopt more fluid
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entrepreneurial roles (in relation to the management of change); they
are seen, increasingly, as key "change agents" (Kanter, 1983) -
particularly within the network forms of organisation described in
chapter 1.	 Thus, from within the context of the network or
"boundaryless" organisations identified by Tapscott and Caston (1993),
Peters (1992) and Francis (1994), Snow et al outline three key roles
which managers should be prepared to adopt, where they are operating
essentially as brokers - operating "across rather than within
hierarchies, creating and assembling resources controlled by outside
parties" (Snow, 1992, p15).	 The three brokerage roles include: the
Architect, where managers design and facilitate the emergence of
operating networks both inside and outside the organisation concerned
with design manufacture and distribution; the Lead Operator, who builds
on the groundwork of the Architect to establish the networks; the
Caretaker who focuses on the maintenance and monitoring of the networks.
While design decisions by Architects will tend to be made at senior
management levels, middle managers will become increasingly involved in
the Lead Operator, and, particularly, the Caretaker roles.
The nature of these changes, and middle managerial perceptions about the
impact of the changes on their work roles, are considered in more detail
below, from within the framework of Mintzberg's three management roles -
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As indicated earlier, Mintzberg (1973:7) considered that the work of the
classic management theorists such as Fayol, which focused on the
objectives of managerial work, tended to produce "abstract generalities,
devoid of the hard data of empirical research", which generated little
knowledge or understanding of the complex reality of managerial work
content - what activities are carried out by managers, and why.
Mintzberg used his own intensive observation of managers' activities
plus analysis of their diaries and records, as well as extensive
analysis of other studies undertaken on a wide range of managers, to
identify the three roles and ten sub-roles represented above. Restated
in Mintzberg's 1989 text, and incorporated into his model of
organisational structure used in chapter 1 for identifying patterns of
organisation restructuring, his managerial role framework provides a
useful diagnostic tool for analysing what managers do, and why they do
it, and for examining the impact of organisational restructuring on this
role behaviour.
Mintzberg defines a manager as "that person in charge of an organisation
or one of its subunits" (1989, p15). All managers are vested with formal
authority over an organisational unit, and managers' three interpersonal
roles - figurehead, leader and liaison - derive directly from their
formal authority and status, and involve basic interpersonal
relationships.	 Through these interpersonal contacts, the manager
uemerges as the nerve centre of his or her organisational unit" (p17),
in the context of carrying out the three informational roles - monitor,
disseminator, and spokesperson. 	 Information is then used as the basic
input into activities arising from the manager's decision-making roles -
entrepreneur, disturbance-handler, resource allocator, negotiator. Each
of these roles is described fully below, together with an analysis of
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the changes currently taking place within them, within the context of
the structural organisational changes outlined in chapter 1.
Interpersonal Roles - Figurehead, Liaison and Leader Roles
The literature has little to say directly about the figurehead role -
the performance of "duties of a ceremonial nature", both inside and
outside the organisation, such as officiating at, say, a retirement
party, or attending a local function 	 (Mintzberg, 1989, piG). However,
given the changes in the extent and nature of middle management leader,
liaison, informational and decisional roles (outlined below), it can be
argued that, as part of the trend towards the general broadening out of
middle management functions, middle managers may be taking on more
responsibility for this role, traditionally seen as the preserve of more
senior managers.
Several significant changes have been identified in the nature of the
manager's second interpersonal role - that of the leader, which refers
essentially to the manager's responsibility "for the work of the people
of an organisational unit" (Mintzberg, l989,pi6). The development of
devolved management systems, and the greater emphasis on the roles of
the middle manager as a "change agent" (see discussion below under
decisional roles), has resulted in an increase in the extent of the
accountability or what Dopson and Stewart (1990) describe as / the
"visibility" of middle managers, through the use of very specific
performance targets which render highly visible the degree of success or
failure achieved by the manager and his/her unit. The rise of contract
management in the public sector, derived largely from compulsory
competitive tendering legislation, has also involved a greater degree of
"identification of individual 'local' managers" (Stoker, 1989, p34),
with clear individual accountablity for performance achievement against
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preset criteria. Given that the performance levels of managers' unit(s)
will depend at least in part on the performance levels of their
subordinates, the "managing people" management function is taking on
increasing importance. Moreover, a key feature of the move from
"personnel management" to human resource management strategies includes
an emphasis on the primary responsibility of the line manager as a
"personnel manager" for his/her staff, within a framework of corporate
personnel policies, and specialist support and advice provided from
devolved personnel staff (Storey, 1992).
The importance of the "leader" as opposed to the umanagementlu role of
the manager, together with the associated concept of entrepreneurialism
(see below), has dominated the popular management texts of the 1980s
(Peters and Waterman, 1982; Peters, 1987; Kanter, 1984) .	 Within the
tightly defined role structure of the traditional hierarchical
bureaucracy, the power and the authority of the manager is clearly
defined by his/her hierarchical position, with an emphasis on conformity
by both manager and subordinates to rules and procedures, and on the
processes rather than the substance of decision making. This equates
with the "management" role or. reactive behaviour identified by Zaleznik
(1977), and to the "transactional" leadership style identified by Bass
and Avolio (1991). While the personal style of the manager is clearly a
factor, the exercise of any degree of innovative or proactive behavjour,
or consultation with and involvement of subordinates in decision making
is limited by formal role constraints and the "role" culture pervading
bureacratic structures, especially for lower level managers (Handy,
1976)
However, the move towards more organic and loosely structured "task"
orientated organisations, with increased delegation of work process
control to semi-autonomous work groups, requires a different, less
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reactive and more proactive	 managerial style, corresponding to
Zaleznik's	 (1977)	 leadership"	 model, and	 Bass	 and Avolio's
(1991) "transformational" leadership style. 	 The manager's authority is
based less upon formal role prescriptions, and more upon personal
expertise and attributes, using innovative and proactive approaches
towards problems solving and decision making. The manager is expected to
inspire subordinates through the projection of personal enthusiasm and
commitment: "Every manager must motivate and encourage his or her
subordinates, somehow reconciling their individual needs with the goals
of the organisation" (Mintzberg, 1989, p16). Managers are encouraged to
adopt involvement and "empowerment" strategies which create an
environment in which new ways are valued' and in which people are
encouraged to try new ideas. Increased worker autonomy, together with
socio-economic changes and the the spread of white collar unionism, all
tend to undermine the traditional basis of managerial authority, and
result in the rejection of more directive or autocratic management
styles (Goffee and Scase, 1986, 1992)
With the exception of organisations facing a "crisis", which requires
adoption in the short term of directive and assertive "crisis"
management styles, this "leadership" model of the managerial leader role
is identified as necessary to ensure effective management in
contemporary and future organisations, by interviewees (directors and
top/senior managers) in the studies undertaken by Barham and Rassam
(1989) and Coulson-Thomas and Coe (1991). This model is also advocated
in several local authority management texts (see chapter 4). However,
middle managers' own perceptions about the impact of the "leadership"
model upon their own management styles can be less positive. Firstly,
"empowerment"	 strategies can make these managers feel "by-passed"
(Schlesinger and Oshry, 1984).	 Such strategies can, through their
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allocation of increased autonomy and discretion to the workforce,
perhaps through the use of productivity or quality circles, cause middle
managers to feel insecure from a perceived reduction in their formal
authority, and from fears that their position may eventually disappear
altogether (Collard, and Dale, 1989; Collard, 1992) . Managers may also
be reluctant to delegate control to subordinates when performance
control systems clearly hold the manager responsible for the achievement
or non-achievement of performance targets.
Secondly, many managers appear to prefer "directive" to "consultative"
management/leadership styles. As Buchanan (1992) points out in a study
of autonomous group working: "Some managers found it 'painful' to
relinquish their traditional directive management style and moved to
other parts of the company." (p148) . Scase and Goffee found that even
in loosely structured organisations, where consultative management
styles would be expected to predominate, only just over 50% of the
middle managers actually preferred this style, and in bureaucratic
organisations, the percentage dropped to only 36%. The reasons for this
reluctance to adopt consultative leadership styles appear to relate to
the generally directive styles pursued by senior managers, who will act
as role models of acceptable behaviour for more junior managers, and to
the managers' "doubts about their ability to manage through face-to-face
negotiation and to exercise more personal forms of leadership." (Scase
and Gof fee, 1989, p76). The managers in most of the studies quoted above
placed training in people management, and interpersonal and leadership
skills high on their lists of priorities for training; however, numerous
texts also highlight the failure by many companies to provide adequate
training in these and other areas to help managers adapt to new roles
(Silver; Handy et al; Constable and McCormick, 1987; Keep, 1989) . These
concerns reflect the well documented anxieties, insecurities and
I,
dislikes that many managers display, not only towards consultative
leadership styles but also towards the ambiguous roles, vague job
descriptions, absence of clearly formalised behavioural regulations, and
uncertain authority/power relations which can characterise more loosely
structured or organic organisations (Ellis and Child, 1977; Mintzberg;
Robbins, 1990; Scase and Gof fee, 1989; Hucynski and Buchanan, 1991).
In addition, the move to "transformational" leadership styles can be
inhibited by the increasingly widespread introduction of formal
performance review and performance related pay systems, which apply not
just to managers, but also to their subordinates. The difficulties
inherent for managers - both as appraisers and appraisees - in the
introduction and operation of performance appraisal and review systems
have been well documented. These problems include, amongst others, undue
emphases on quantitative at the expense of qualitative performance
criteria, a tendency towards short-termism at the expense of longer term
strategic issues, conflicts between the controlling or judgemental
objectives and the developmental or "coaching" objectives of the
process, unclear and/or contradictory performance targets and a
sometimes unproductive emphasis on individual at the expense of
collective or group performance targets. (Randell, 1989; Livy, 1988;
Fletcher and Williams, 1985). These difficulties are particularly
apparent in the public sector where performance measurement is in any
case a relatively new concept, and where clear performance criteria for
measuring effectiveness are extremely difficult to identify, given the
absence of a consensus both locally and nationally about the appropriate
objectives of many public services (Kelly, 1991; Lawton and Rose, 1991)
Moreover, within performance measurement systems which give primacy to
quantitative short-term financial and/or productivity targets, managers
may be reluctant to spend time on longer term personnel management
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activities, where realisation of benefits is longer term, and more
difficult to quantify (Purcell, 1989)
Mintzberg's third interpersonal role, the liaison role, refers to the
contacts which a manager makes outside the vertical chain of command;
Mintzberg found that managers spent as much time with peers and other
people outside their units as they did with their own subordinates, and
significantly more than with their own superiors. Moves from formalised
hierarchies to the more flexible, open and fluid structures of organic
organisations involve a significant increase in the volume of lateral
communications, described as "networking" by Mueller (1991), and as
"horizontal management" by Barham and Rassam (1989, plo9): "Managers in
the future will have to manage an increased and more diverse range of
lateral relationships, including those with managers from different
functional areas, other business units, project teams, team members,
customers, suppliers, joint venture partners etc.".
This increase in lateral communication activities reflects the changes
discussed above in the leadership role; managers need to acquire greater
knowledge and understanding across an increased range of specialist
areas, both inside and outside the organisations; moreover, managers
will be unable to rely on formal status and authority in many of these
encounters, which will require extensive negotiating and influencing
skills, similar to those needed for effective consultative leadership
styles (Kanter, 1984). 	 Freed, to an extent, from the traditional
organisational communication barriers (where an individual's access to
information is specifically defined and constrained by hierarchical
position, specialist role and formal managerial authority (Megginson et
al, 1983)), the manager will need to use a high degree of initiative to
both actively seek out information, and to operate effectively within an
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informal communication network which is likely to be highly political:
"Easy and unlimited access to information is not always welcome; it
challenges authority, undermines power structures and opens to view the
daily corporate disasters, most of which are usually kept under wraps"
(Barham and Rassam, p108) . Moreover, in the context of the increase in
inter-disciplinary and cross-functional project and group working
associated with moves towards matrix or 	 "network" forms of
organisational structure with less functionally specialised management
roles, managers are increasingly involved in liaison with staff from
other disciplines, from other functions, and from other organisations
(Watkins, Drury and Preddy, 1992; Wheatley, 1992). The increasing levels
of frequency and significance of such liaison activities constitute an
integral part of the development of Snow's three "brokerage" roles
outlined earlier - the Architect, Lead Operator and Caretaker.
Informational Roles - Monitor, Disseminator, Spokesperson
Through the contacts developed within the liaison role, the manager will
collect, process and distribute a large volume of information, much of
which takes oral rather than written form, "often as gossip, hearsay and
speculation." (Mintzberg, p18). Numerous popular management texts point
to the increasing significance of the informational role of the manager,
due to a nu.nther of developments.	 Firstly, the pace and speed of change
in the external environment requires managers to be more sensitive to
and aware of the potential and actual effects of these political,
social,	 economic,	 and,	 more recently,	 ecological/environmental
developments (Wilson and Rosenfeld, 1990)
Secondly, in addition to increases in lateral information flows,
outlined above within the context of "horizontal management", increased
emphasis is being placed upon the importance of vertical communication
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both up and down the organisation (Walton, 1985; Wickens, 1987). The
move from control to involvement and commitment strategies for
motivating and managing the workforce, including the development of more
flexible and autonomous work roles, requires the manager to disseminate
a much wider range of information about more general company issues,
using more sophisticated communication channels and a much more open
leadership style, as discussed above, with an emphasis on facilitating
rather than directing, especially at first line/supervisory levels
(Townley, 1989)
Thirdly, the development of computerised production and information
systems is changing the nature of the manager's informational role.
Surveying fifteen studies assessing the impact of new technolgy on
managerial roles, Dopson and Stewart (1990) identify essentially two
perspectives. The first perspective identifies a largely negative impact
on the managerial role. It is argued that computers will, in effect,
replace the middle manager as an information gatherer and disseminator:
"the computer provides most of the information flow to top management
that was once provided by middle management and can accomplish this task
with greater speed, accuracy and selectivity" 	 (p5). The middle
management role may disappear altogether, as first-line and senior
managers use computers to communicate and make decisions without the
relaying role of the middle manager. Alternatively, it will become
deskilled and routinised, degenerating into a kind of usuper clerical"
function servicing the demands of a computerised information system,
with close monitoring by senior managers of performance which will
reduce scope for middle management discretion and autonomy. The more
optimistic view argues that computers will urelease managers from their
traditional coordinating functions to take on new challenges." (Dopson
and Stewart, 1990, p8). Freed from the burden of spending considerable
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amounts of time obtaining information, sometimes of questionable
reliability and from unwilling sources, managers can concentrate on
developing their data selection and processing skills to enhance the
quality and certainty of their decision-making, and to focus on more
strategic, longer term planning issues.
Scase and Goffee's managers produced similarly polarised views, with
just over a third of the women and half of the men located towards the
"agreement" (with claims that new technology is increasing stress
levels) end of the "agree/disagree" continuum. Clearly, new technology
can be used to either free-up", or to restrict and even remove
managerial roles, depending on the culture and structure of the
organisation, and the nature of the strategic context within which new
technology systems are introduced. (McCloughlin and Clark, 1994). Thus
even within one organisation, the application of new technology, and the
consequences for the roles of the middle managers, varied between the
three departments of the American bank studied by Smith (1990), because
of their different structures, products and functions, and, hence, the
differences in the roles of the middle managers in each department. Few
of the middle manager respondents in Wheatley's more recent study (1992)
expected computer developments to have much impact on their future
roles, although 59% reported the recent installation of a new computer
network. Wheat].ey attributed this reponse at least in part to the 'fact
that more sophisticated (and hence more wide-ranging in their impact)
computerised systems - such as electronic data interchange which can
link different companies together - had probably yet to be introduced
fully in most of his respondents' companies.
The difficulties which some managers experience with the introduction of
tighter performance control systems and more autonomous and skilled
subordinates, which can accompany the introduction of new technology,
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have been outlined above. Changes may, of course, be minor, given the
tendency f or particularly first generation computerised information
systems to simply replicate the existing manual systems. Syedain (1991)
argues that while the current generation of middle managers is tending
to work with both computerised and manual information systems running in
parallel, new generations of more "computer-literate" individuals moving
into middle management positions will adopt more fully the more
sophisticated applications,	 thereby rendering "whole swathes" of
management becoming superfluous. Whatever the nature of managers' own
perceptions about the impact of new techonology on their particular
roles, it is clear that they will require additional skills and
knowledge to use the technology effectively; "discerning" skills are
particularly important, as computerised management information systems
tend to generate more data that managers know what to do with.
As Tapscott and Caston (1993) point out, the growing adoption of more
sophisticated computerised technology will intensify and increase the
communication and information flows at three levels in organisations -
at work group, inter-unit and department, and inter-organisational
levels - and will exacerbate the tendencies outlined above towards
"horizontal management".
Decisional Roles	 - Entrepreneur,	 Disturbance-handler, Resource
Allocator, Negotiator
As Mintzberg points out, the manager's informational role behaviour is
not an end in itself; information is the basic input to decision making:
"The manager plays themajor role in his or her unit's decision-making
system. As its formal authority, only the manager can commit the unit
to important new courses of action........only the manager has full and
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current information to make the set of decisions that determine the
unit's strategy." (1989, pl9).
As outlined in Chapter 1, organisations differ in the extent to which
the formal authority to take (usually operational) decisions is
centralised largely at senior management level (characteristic of
bureaucratic forms of organisation) or decentralised vertically down the
hierarchy to lower level managers and staff (characteristic of more
organic forms) . Horizontally, authority can be decentralised away from
line managers to specialist managers in the tecl-uiostructure (including
personnel and finance functions) . As noted in chapter 1, there has been
some increase in the degree of both horizontal and vertical authority
devolved to middle managers, within the constraints of control systems
focused increasingly on performance outcomes.
Within the entrepreneurial role, "the manager seeks to improve his or
her unit, to adapt it to changing conditions." (Mintzberg, p19).
Replacing the conventional distinction usually drawn between top
management and middle management, where the former are largely
responsible for initiating change and innovation from the top down, with
middle managers concentrating upon on-going incremental change and on
fine-tuning implementation plans, the popular management literature of
the 1980s places considerable emphasis on bottom-up or grass-;oots
entrepreneurship and innovation as an important part of the work of all
managers (Fulop, 1991). Thus, for example, Peters (1987) urges managers
to "learn to love change", and Kanter (1984, p212) sees middle managers
as key change agents in the organisation, going beyond the established
definitions of their jobs to focus on: "chanie, a disruption of existing
activities, a redirectional of organisational energies that may result
in new strategies, products, 	 market opportunities, work methods,
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technical processes or structures .....beyond what it takes to do the
routine job, to maintain already established strategies and processesu.
One of the managers interviewed by Dopson and Stewart (1988) also
emphasised the increasing importance of the entrepreneurial role of the
middle manager: "They are the change agents for the future" (p9).
There are two problematic issues behind this rhetoric. Firstly, Kanter
and the other "excellence" texts emphasise the importance of the key
role of top management in designing looser and more organic
organisational structures and cultures to ensure the "empowerment" of
middle managers to carry out this entrepreneurial role effectively.
However, as described above, decentralisation requires tight controls
over performance and resource allocation to ensure conformity to overall
corporate goals and culture, especially in times of recession, resulting
in the paradox that middle managers are required to be more autonomous
and innovative, while, at the same time, they are subjected to
increasingly tight controls and resource constraints which restrict
their autonomy (Smith, 1990; Donaldson, 1985) . These authors note that
it is not uncommon for strategic management to use middle managers'
apparent refusal to become more entreprenueurial as a scapegoat for
their organisational deficiencies, when, in fact, their own policies and
practices are the problem. As Smith points out, middle managers are not
just agents of change, but also objects of change. Moreover,' as
discusssed above in the context of the leader role, senior managers,
accustomed to bureaucratic structures, can find it difficult to adopt an
"empowering" leadership style.
Managers may rapidly assimilate what they perceive to be the "right"
words which are currently in vogue, and be eager to take up fashionable
new ways of working, whilst "still retaining their previous views,
opinions and perspective." (Cou].son-Thomas and Coe, 1991, pil). 	 A
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number of barriers can inhibit real behavioural change. 	 Real
internalisation, and subsequent operationalisation of concepts such as
"empowerment" require deep-rooted attitudinal changes which can take a
long time to acquire (Williams et al, 1989). Moreover, senior managers
can be reluctant to relinquish decision-making power to lower level
managers (Hales, 1993). Thus, the impact of changes in this decisional
role on the manager's job will clearly be effected by the organisational
context. The managers in the studies by Smith and Scase and Gof fee felt
increasingly constrained in the scope of their decision-making freedom,
reflecting contexts of increasingly tight controls and increased
concentration of decision making at senior management levels. However,
many of the managers in Dopson and Stewart's study reported real
increases in the devolution of responsibility and control over more
resources. Some middle managers felt that they had a wider and more
legitimate authority base for making decisions within the areas
delegated to them; their status and importance had increased with the
greater responsibilities which they carried in their	 "slimmer
organisations." (Dopson and Stewart 1988, p9).
Secondly, in addition to the pressures arising from these structural
constraints, middle managers' reactions to the requirement to become
more innovative will also depend on their own preferred work strategies
and styles.	 Kanter's three-step prescription for effective
entrepreneurial management - problem definition, coalition building and
mobilisation of resources - clearly requires extremely proactive and
opportunistic styles of information gathering, resource acquisition,
networking and political activity, corresponding to the proactive
leadership styles and horizontal management described above. Adoption of
these more flexible and high discretion roles can raise problems for
some managers, especially for those managers accustomed to more
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specifically defined and constrained job roles, and particularly £ or
women, who can find it difficult to break into male-dominated informal
networks, and who can operate more easily within more formal roles
structures (Scase arid toffee, 1989)
These significant changes in the entrepreneurial decisional roles are
accompanied by associated changes in the other three of Mintzberg's
decisional roles. The role of the resource allocator - where the manager
makes decisions about resource allocation, including his/her time, and
designs and allocates work to subordinates - is undergoing several
significant changes. Firstly, the development of autonomous work groups
requires extensive delegation of work design and allocation processes to
the group members themselves, thus requiring the manager to adopt more
consultative and facilitating leadership styles outlined above.
Secondly, as outlined in chapter 1, within the context of moves towards
more decentralised decision-making systems and towards control systems
focused around standardisatiori of outputs or performance outcomes,
organisations are introducing devolved management systems. As Barham and
Rassam (1989), and Dopson and Stewart (1988, 1990) suggest, middle line
managers are acquiring new responsibilities for 'staff functions such
as personnel and financial areas of work which had previously been the
province of staff specialists: Now.....section managers are responsible
for production, are custodians of the tecbnology and are involved in
commercial deals, not passively but actively. In short, they manage the
total of the business aspects which were functional activities. (Id
executive, Dopson and Stewart, 1988, p44). 	 Conversely, specialist
managers are requiring increased knowledge and understanding of other
functional areas in the orgariisation, including a thorough understanding
of the organisation's business and good knowledge of marketing and
finance.	 Phrases such as the requirement for all managers to have
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"business awareness" and a "commercial orientation", to act in a
"business-minded" way with an U awareness of what's best for the bottom
line" were used frequently by the interviewees in Barham and Rassam's
study (ppll4-5). Moreover, managers are increasingly required to be
mobile across their organisations, and to work in a variety of functions
(Coe and Stark, 1991; Nicholson and West, 1988; Inkson and Coe, 1993)
Whilst some managers appear to welcome the broadening of their job roles
and the greater freedom to take a wider range of decisions without
necessarily involving functional specialists (Dopson and Stewart, 1988),
others regret the dilution or removal of some task elements which they
had enjoyed. Some managers, especially those in the public sector, who
saw themselves primarily as professionals particularly regretted the
removal of some specialist technical or professional aspects of their
work and the presssure to move to managerial roles (Dopson and Stewart,
1988, 1990; Torrington and Weightman 1982; Watkins, Drury and Preddy,
1992). Feelings of isolation and problems with maintaining an adequate
level of professional/technical expertise were also reported amongst
those specialist managers who had moved from centralised functional
departments to posts located within decentralised business units based
on production/service delivery functions. New responsibilities, for
functions such as human resource management - including responsibilities
for implementing formal performance appraisal systems, and for ensuring
the provision of suitable training and development programmes - require
additional managerial skills and time. Yet the manager will have to
reconcile these demands with the requirement to achieve the financial
and other quantitative performance targets against which his/her
performance will be predominantly assessed, and rewarded (Purcell, 1989;
Kinnie, 1989). Moreover, in addition to the importance of achieving
performance results for ensuring career success, the emphasis on
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corporate cultures means that managers are also likely to be assessed
against additional less tangible attributes.	 Trustworthiness and
reliability, the ability to work in teams and commitment to
"organisational ideals" were all seen as very important success criteria
against which managers were judged in Scase and Gof fee's study (1989,
p88)
Devolved management involves the allocation of responsibility - for
functions such as resource management and service product delivery - to
line managers, who become accountable for achieving results against
product/service delivery and resource utilisation targets (Henley et al,
1992) . However, the term "to devolve" simply means to transfer or to
pass over, and it is important to distinguish between the devolution of
responsibility for various functions to middle managers, and the
delegation or deceritralisation of decision-making authority, which may
or may not form part of the devolved management process (Horngren and
Sundem, 1993). Thus, for example, with regard to devolved budgetary
management, managers may be held responsible for, and their performance
assessed against financial and service/product delivery targets, for,
say, maintaining spend within their allocated budget totals - or for
generating a particular rate of return on capital employed. However,
these managers may lack the authority to exercise control over , key
budget elements such as staffing, or using underspends in one area to
finance additional expenditure in another (Solomons, 1965).
Control systems, especially in periods of organisational decline and
retrenchment, tend to become tighter and more centralised, threatening a
diminution in the levels of operational decision-making autonomy
allocated to managers under the more decentralised devolved management
systems (Hales, 1993). The manager's degree of freedom to manage within
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the framework of performance outcome targets and criteria can become
constrained by increased levels of action planning and control over work
processes as well as over outputs (Smith, 1990; Cameron et al, 1987;
Robbins, 1990). Smith recounts the way in which senior management
attempted to dictate the methods and approaches which their middle
managers were to use to achieve strategic objectives. She also
highlights the different strategies adopted by the managers to limit
this encroachment on their freedom. 	 Managers' location within a
particular function or department, characterised by particular forms of
work technology and processes, affected the degree of authority and
power they possessed to resist senior managers attempts to reduce their
levels of operational autonomy, and hence led to the adoption of
different "resistance" strategies by these managers.
Lastly, as both public and private sector organisations attempt to make
more efficient and cost effective use of their resources in increasingly
competitive market conditions, managers are becoming subject to
increasingly severe resource constraints. Thus, many managers, even
those welcoming these additional responsibilities, felt pressurised by
the combination of increased responsibilities,	 the consequent
requirements for new skills and knowledge, and decreases in the
resources available for them to discharge these new responsibilities.
All of these difficulties will be exacerbated by the current pressures
on managers, arising out of organisational retrenchment in both the
private and public sector, "to do more with less" (Coulson-Thomas and
Coe, 1991, p12) - to achieve higher performance levels, often with fewer
resources, for what many managers perceive as inadequate reward levels
in terms of career and salary prospects and increasingly dire penalties
for failure: "One of the pressures is fear of failure.. .the day of
accountability has come... .Jobs aren't on the line because of one
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mistake, but certainly they are if there's continued failure.. .Reporting
lines are now much stricter and tighter. . ." (Scase and Gof fee, p32).
(The consequences of failure to achieve performance targets for public
sector managers are particularly significant because of the high degree
of public accountability surrounding their activities) . Conversely, some
of the managers in Dopson and Stewart's study reported that tighter
performance control had made them feel more in control of their jobs:
"Accountability......had brought with it the freedom to take initiatives
which 'the company were willing to back'."(1988, p45).
Mintzberg's other two decisional roles include the disturbance handler,
where the manager has to deal with unforeseen or unexpected pressures,
and the negotiator, where the manager spends time in negotiations with
colleagues outside his/her immediate work unit, including individual and
groups outside the organisation. Both of these roles are likely to
assume more significance for the middle manager in the context of the
changes taking place in the other managerial roles, and in relation to
changing organisational structures. As organisations increasingly adopt
"parallel" forms of structure, involving profit centre, business units
and project teams - based on market-like or networked structures as
opposed to hierarchies, managers are becoming increasingly involved in
the "horizontal management" role behaviour outlined above. / The
transaction required between these teams and units - whether organised
on a market or networking basis (see chapter 1 ) - increasingly involve
managers in negotiating and consulting forms of behaviour with the
members of other work units. Increasingly the managers work takes place
within teams - both permanent and temporary - with individuals operating
from within different professional/functional specialisms; high-level
communications, conflict-resolution and negotiating skills are clearly
required to ensure effective working both within and between these teams
(Wheatley). Moreover, with the development of the "boundaryless"
organisation (Francis, 1994), the scope of these activities increasingly
involves managers in negotiating and liaising with the members of other
organisations.
In concluding this section of this chapter, it is clear that changes in
organisational design and structure have resulted in significant changes
in the nature of the roles prescribed for middle managers across all
three of Mintzberg's managerial role sets - interpersonal, informational
and decisional. However, as Mintzberg's contingency model of management
suggests, the precise nature of these changes will vary according to
particular types of organisations,	 the location of a particular
manager's role within the organisational hierarchy and functional
department or section - and also according to individual managers' own
preferences for working within particular kinds of management styles. A
key component of the "new" more decentralised organisational structures
and management systems involves giving middle managers a greater degree
of discretion over how they carry out their responsibilities, which
requires, in turn, greater reliance on "self- or mutual regulation,
intrinsic rewards and an achievement ethic .......rewards emphasise the
intrinsic satisfaction of individual autonomy, team work and task
accomplishment..." (Hales, 1993, p158). As expectancy theorists such as
Vroom (1964) suggest, managers will differ in the extent to which'they
perceive such rewards as being available from their restructured roles,
the extent to which they seek to realise such rewards from their work,
and in the degrees of work satisfaction they derive from realising these
rewards. Many of the studies quoted above identified various changes -
both increases and decreases - in the levels of work satisfaction
reported by managers, as a consequence of organisational restructuring
and managerial role changes, and the results of these studies are
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summarised in the next section of this chapter.
The impact of managerial role changes on work satisfaction levels
There are numerous studies of work satisfaction, despite an absence of
agreed definitions of what constitutes 'job satisfaction'. 	 However,
discussions tend to draw upon a combination of: (1) the work of the
'content' theories of Maslow and Herzberg (assuming that all individuals
seek to satisfy certain key needs or drives); and (2) 'process' theories
such as Vroom's expectancy theory. These emphasise that individuals will
maximise effort towards achieving the particular rewards which they
choose to seek from their work, where the extent of their job
satisfaction derives from the extent to which their work offers them
opportunities to obtain their chosen rewards (Wilson and Rosenfeld,
1990; Poole et al, 1981; Scase and Goffee, 1989; Mansfield and Poole,
1991). Thus, these studies use the term 'work satisfaction' to refer to
the extent of managers' satisfaction with the intrinsic rewards (such as
self-respect and status, independent thought and action, and personal
growth and development), and the extrinsic rewards (job security,
working hours and conditions, pay and promotion prospects) available
from their work activities. These categories are drawn from Herzberg's
own identification of satisfying and dissatisfying factors; intrinsic
rewards are those derived from the nature of the work itself, and
extrinsic rewards are those derived from other facets of organisational
policies and management systems. Drawing on the expectancy theorists'
approaches, by attempting to assess the extent to which these rewards
are considered important by managers as well as the extent to which
their work offers opportunities for realisation of the rewards, indices
are constructed upon which questionnaires are designed to measure
employees' feelings of relative satisfaction and dissatisfaction with
each reward category.
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Each of these intrinsic and extrinsic reward categories has been shown
(in the studies listed above) to be important for most managers in terms
of generating high levels of work satisfaction. Looking first at changes
in the levels of work satisfaction derived from the extrinsic rewards
associated with job security, hours of work, pay and promotion
prospects, flatter organisation structures can mean fewer opportunities
for promotion,	 and decreasing career opportunities arising out of
flatter organisational structures and reduced middle manager numbers. In
more recent studies, ER Consultants (1992) reported that almost half of
senior management believed that there were fewer promotional
opportunities for middle managers than five years ago, and two thirds of
the middle managers were "worried" about their opportunities for
promotion. Wilsher (1993) reported that around three quarters of
managers surveyed in a recent study (not just middle managers) expressed
anxiety about job security and career prospects. Scase and Goffee
emphasise the threat posed to the conception of a career as "a
meaningful progression through a series of related jobs" (p79). Those
managers, who gained their sense of personal development and identity,
and related ideas of success or failure, through such an orderly career
progression, felt threatened by actual or possible reductions in
promotion and security - especially those managers hanchored il (Schein,
1978) to their careers through desires for career stability and
security, or through "vertical" career growth by climbing the corporate
ladder to more senior positions.
In addition, many of Gof fee and Scase's middle managers tended to
comment adversely on increased distancing of their positions from senior
management decision making. In comparing the results of a 1980 survey
with their 1990 survey, Mansfield and Poole found that the largest
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difference was found in relation to levels of satisfaction with job
security, which had diminished - most markedly amongst public sector
managers, who, as will be seen in the next two chapters, saw the virtual
disappearance during the 1980s of the high job security levels
traditionally associated with public sector employment. Dissatisfaction
with pay levels had also increased amongst public sector managers (much
less so amongst private sector managers), which reflected the
increasingly large differences in pay between private and sector
managers which had occurred at the time of the second survey.
Conversely, whilst Dopson and Stewart (1990) reported some concerns
about future career paths, many of their managers, particularly in the
private sector, felt that "increased responsibilities and accountability
had, in part at least, compensated for uncertain career paths and had
made their work more rewarding in itself." (P14). Wheatley (1992, p4),
too, found fairly positive responses amongst his middle managers about
their job security and promotion opportunities; four fifths of the
managers felt that "de-layering" exercises posed "no threat" to their
current jobs. Moreover most managers were "remarkably sanguine" about
the future: "three quarters anticipated remaining in a management role
in an organisation throughout their career. Over half the managers
surveyed expected that their next career move would be upwards, and no
one expected a downwards move". Dopson and Stewart (1988) and Stwart
(1991) also found that the shorter hierarchy had placed middle managers
closer to senior management strategy and policy making areas, with fewer
levels above them to control them and distance them from key strategic
decisions.
Secondly, whilst managers may be made redundant, some of their functions
and responsibilities will not. Whilst some tasks are simply no longer
necessary in the new slimmer organisations, the managers remaining in
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the organisation after job restructuring and redundancies are frequently
required to absorb the work responsibilities of the redundant managers,
a process which results in many organisations in "fewer managers doing
more work" ((Coulson-Thomas and Coe, 1991, p23) . Similarly, the ER
Consultants' study cites an increase in both workload and responsibility
reported by three quarters of the middle managers. In a nwnber of
studies, managers	 tended to report lower levels	 of resources,
significant increases in the hours worked, and insufficient and
ineffective levels of training provision to help the managers cope with
the increased pressure (Scase and Goffee, 1989) . 	 Dopson and Stewart
found that even those managers who welcomed the challenge of enlarged
and more responsible jobs felt pressurised by increased workloads - to
the point where one manager said "it's fine if your hobby is the job."
(Dopson and Stewart, 1988, p45).
In terms of the levels of intrinsic rewards - such as self-respect and
status, independent thought and action, and personal growth and
development - similarly conflicting reports about increases/decreases in
work satisfaction levels can be identified within the studies.
(Self-respect and status rewards meet the needs of individuals for
recognition by others of their achievements, their competence, and the
relatively high importance and prestige of their work. The other two
rewards meet individuals' needs to "grow, develop, and realise one's
potential", and to have the freedom to exercise a good degree of
creativity and independence of judgement in defining and achieving their
work role objectives (Hunt, 1979, p25).) The managers in Dopson and
Stewart's study reported increased levels of job satisfaction, related
to new freedoms to take on challenges, to reallocate resources according
to job priorities, to innovate and risk-take, and to develop and extend
their management expertise. Moreover, those managers, who had "survived"
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the reorganisations, had, as a consequence, gained confidence in their
own abilities; some also felt that they were "more in control of their
own destiny" (Dopson and Stewart, 1990, p14), and more confident about
moving to other organisations or setting up in business on their own if
necessary.
Whilst the managers in these case studies showed some concern about
reduced career paths, they tended to feel that the increased
responsibilities and rewards from their work as a result of
restructuring partly, at least, compensated for these reduced promotion
opportunities and possible redundancy threats. Managers from both
private and public sectors tended to feel that, in general, the changes
in their roles "had created a more challenging environment in which to
work. Most of the public sector managers ......said that they enjoyed
their work more because they were more accountable; jobs were also
viewed as more interesting, both because of the increased responsibility
and because of the new management systems that had clarified
objectives.. .The private sector managers whom we interviewed felt more
in control of the resources which they needed to achieve their
objectives. They now often controlled resources for which previously
they had had to rely on service departments to provide." (Dopson and
Stewart, 1990a, pp38-39)
The managers in other studies appeared to respond more negatively: "Many
feel overburdened and underappreciated. Even though they escaped the
cutting axe, they have difficulty forgetting how their companies treated
their peers, They are restless and dissatisfied." (Robbins, p286). Many
of Scase and Gof fee's managers reported increased levels of stress,
frustration and work pressures, with a predominant response of
resistance to, and anxiety about what they perceived as the major
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impacts on them of organisational restructuring - : more rigorous
performance standards to achieve, often with inadequate resources, a
requirement for greater commitment to the job and the organisation,
inadequate training facilities for both managers and subordinates to
adapt to the new roles, and erosion of managers' traditional, legitimate
bases of authority. In addition, managers who entered their organisation
with a largely professional orientation towards their work, and who
derived much of their work satisfaction, from the exercise of their
professional skills and competences and from their status and work
identity as a "professional", may resent the loss of such rewards when
required to adopt a more managerial role (Laf fin and Young, 1990;
Watkins, Drury and Preddy, 1992).
Even amongst the managers in Dopson and Stewart's case studies,
increases in work satisfaction levels were diluted to an extent by
increased levels of work stress amongst public sector managers (arising
from increased workloads and decreased resource levels), and the
pressures to achieve tighter and more rigorously scrutinised performance
levels, experienced by private sector managers. mongst public sector
managers, political constraints, and the associated requirements for
public accountability, unique to the public sector, also inhibited
middle managers' freedom to introduce innovations. Similarly, the
private sector managers in Smith's study expressed frustration with
senior management attempts to constrain their levels of operational
decison-making autonomy. Scase and Gof fee found evidence to suggest the
adoption of more calculative and extrinsic work orientations, with
declining levels of commitment, decreased levels of intrinsic job
satisfaction and fewer opportunities for exercising independent
judgement and thought, and for personal growth development. Similar
findings by Peppercorn and Skoulding (1987) amongst their managers
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compared unfavourably with the much higher levels of intrinsic job
satisfaction reported by the managers running their own business in
their survey. These authors predicted that managers were increasingly
likely to move from large companies to medium ones (under 2000
employees) or to set up their own businesses in the search for more
fulfilling and autonomous work roles. Interestingly, this prediction
was not fulfilled in Wheatley's 1992 survey, where about three-quarters
of the middle managers expected to remain within organisations, and only
6% envisaged setting up their own business.
The different responses of the managers within these different studies
can be attributed in part to different methodological approaches, and
also to the fact that they were undertaken in a variety of both public
and private sector organisations at different times. As Tyson and
Jackson (1992) point out, work satisfaction is a volatile concept, which
is difficult to measure, and which is highly susceptible to changes in
managers' organisational, job, and personal circumstances. Differences
between, and changes in, individual managers' expressed levels of work
satisfaction are likely to arise from a number of factors.
Firstly, managers differ in terms of their personal expectations about
the amount and nature of the rewards to be gained from their work
activities; these expectations will tend to differ amongst managers of
different ages, marital status and gender, at different stages in the
career life-cycle. Managers expecting an orderly career progression up
the organisational hierarchy will find these expectations frustrated by
the reduced opportunities for promotion arising out of organisation
decline downsizing. Middle aged managers in Schein's "midcareer crisis"
stage, will have to re-assess their career progress against their
ambitions, "dreams and hopes vs realities" (Schein, 1978, p43), and
reassess the relative importance of work and family and another non-work
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aspects of their lives; this process may be painful and difficult for
promotion orientated managers. Moreover, organisational requirements
for higher productivity and increased commitment make it difficult for
these frustrated managers to adopt response, strategies of psychological
distancing or disengagement (Scase and Gof fee, 1989) or of relatively
yielding and passive "easy life" strategies (Marshall and Stewart,
1981) . Others, particularly older non-graduate managers, who have
already, perhaps, progressed as far or further than they expected to,
may not wish for further vertical mobility, and others appear to reject
the increased pressures of "even harder work, more risk and, in some
companies, more travelling." (Dopson and Stewart, 1990, p14), which they
perceive as characterising senior management positions. Younger
managers, in the early/mid-career cycle, will tend to particularly
dissatisfied by reduced career/promotion opportunities, although they
may find it easier to rise to the challenge of a new job (Nicholson and
West), and, if unmarried, are more likely anyway to expect to move both
within and between organisations to further their careers; they are more
willing than their older, married counterparts to move geographically
(Coe and Stark, 1991).
There is evidence, marked amongst married managers, for a diminution in
the centrality of work identities, and a rise in the importance attached
to non work roles, especially the family (Nicholson and West, 1988)
Bellah et al, 1986), with increased interest amongst older mangers in
early retirement and earlier disengagement from the career cycle:
"learning to manage a life that is less dominated by work" (Schein,
p45), and refusals to move, primarily to avoid disruption to family life
and social networks. (Institute of Manpower Studies, 1987) . Partners'
careers also represented a significant factor, reflecting the increa
y.EN




less likely to accept job mobility, especially if married.
Gender differences amongst managers are also important. In addition to
the decreased promotion and career opportunities for all middle
managers, women continue to feel discriminated against in the workplace
(Collinson et al, 1990) . Increased hours and work pressures intensify
the home/work conflicts experienced by many women managers. They feel
more pressurised than men to achieve high performance results, and feel
disadvantaged in more loosely structured and fluid role structures due
to difficulties experienced with operating in largely male dominated
informal networks. (Nichols and West, Scase and Gof fee) . Senior
management role models tend to be male, and the more autocratic and
directive management styles practised by these men tend to be difficult
for women to adopt without risk of ridicule or resentment from male
subordinates and colleagues. Yet, while disagreeing with the stereotype
of men managers as competitive and ruthless and women as more
co-operative and concerned about the personal well-being of colleagues
and subordinates, McCloughlin (1992) argues that the moves towards
empowerment, improved communication and less directive management
styles, together with the need for more "caring" human resource
management strategies, may actually benefit women managers, with whom
these attributes are popularly associated.
Moreover, individuals simply differ in their tolerance of change, in
their preferences for more or less highly stable and structured work
roles, and in the extent to which they wish to be proactive rather than
reactive in their jobs. (Marshall and Stewart, 1981), These preferences
tend to reflect the kind of organisation that the manager works in; a
high degree of association has been found between a manager's expressed
preference and his/her organisational role characteristics (Nicholson
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and West; Ellis and Child, p45).	 Changes in managerial roles arising
from moves from essentially bureaucratic to more organic forms of
organisation would therefore appear to require, in many cases, fairly
substantial changes in some managers' fundamental orientation towards
particular styles of working. 	 Certainly, organisations differ in the
extent to which change is perceived as a normal "way of life". Miles and
Snow (1978) identify two contrasting types of organisation here - the
"defenders" where the prevailing culture emphasises the desirability of
stability and conservative risk strategies, compared with the
"prospectors" where the dominant climate is one of innovation,
risk-taking and continual change. Managers here are more likely to
become accustomed to, and learn to work effectively within, more fluid
roles and structures; continual organisational change or "learning" is
built into their roles (Starbuck et al, 1988). The location of a manager
within particular stages of a change process - identified by Nicholson
and West as involving four stages of preparation, encounter, adjustment
and stabilisation - is also likely to influence the nature of his/her
responses at any particular point in time. 	 It is interesting, for
example, that the most positive perceptions about the impact of
managerial role changes on work satisfaction levels in Dopson and
Stewart's study came from the Id managers, "where the change was
completed some time ago." (Dopson and Stewart, 1988, p11).
Lastly, the way in which changes in work roles impinge upon work
satisfaction levels is likely to be affected by the particular
circumstance surrounding organisational changes, and the way in which
they are planned and implemented. Firstly, managers are more likely to
respond positively to changes if they perceive the reasons for the
change to be valid. For example, competitive threats to the private
sector organisations in Stewart's survey were seen as more legitimate
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reasons for change than the largely political reasons for change in the
public sector organisations. Secondly, management responses will be
greatly influenced by the nature of the change process within the
organisation. In order to ensure positive commitment from the managers
concerned, numerous texts on effective change management identify the
need for carefully planned and integrated management of change,
including extensive consultation with and participation by the managers
involved,	 good communication and training to ensure effective
implementation, and the redesign of reward systems to reinforce the
desired behaviour and attitude changes (Brookes, 1980; Burnes, 1992,
Beckhard, 1992; Williams et al 1989; Plant, 1987)
Particularly when change is introduced in the context of organisation
decline (decrease in personnel numbers) and organisational downsizing
(reducing the levels in the hierarchy), which was the case in many of
the middle managers' organisations mentioned above, these prescriptions
for effective change management are less likely to be followed, thus
increasing the incidence of negative responses.	 Moreover, control
systems are likely to become more centralised and formalised (see
discussion above under decisional roles). Political infighting,
especially over the allocation of reduced levels resources, is likely to
intensify, with reduced levels of morale amongst staff, and the erection
of barriers to change amongst senior and middle management (Robbins;
McKinley, 1992; Cameron et al, 1987) . 	 The claims made that middle
managers act as barriers to effective change, are caused primarily,
according to a recent survey, by top management failing to adopt
appropriate change processes: "middle managers need to be integrated
with the change process and made comfortable with it. .They must be given
the skills to handle their new roles as change leaders, rather than
being left to flounder" (People in Business, 1992, p15; see also Smith,
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1990)
As this quotation suggests, the provision of appropriate training and
development opportunities to ensure that managers acquire the skills and
competences necessary for performing effectively in their changing
roles.	 All of the changes discussed above, in the interpersonal,
informational and decisional managerial roles - plus the general
requirement for managers to become more effective - clearly require the
development and acquisition by middle managers of additional knowledge,
skills and attitudes. Management jobs have tended to become less
specialised and	 more generalist in scope,	 with increased
responsibilities, a larger span of control, and a wider range of tasks,
together with increases in the skill/knowledge range and mix of
subordinates, who have been awarded increased levels of autonomy and
flexibility over organising their work. Barham and Rassani use the term
the all-round manager" (1989, 	 p114) to conceptualise these new
management roles.
While the training and development needs of each manager will obviously
differ according to his/her specific role requirements, there is a
general emphasis in the literature about the need for additional
additional knowledge - about financial and personnel management,
information technology systems, marketing and strategic planning - and
increased information and understanding about events and developments
taking place both around them in the organisation, and outside.
(Stewart, 1991; Peppercorn and Skoulding, 1987). The new skills and
attributes required include a particular emphasis on people management
skills - team building, communications skills such as influencing,
delegating,	 negotiating,	 conflict	 resolution,	 counselling,
leadership, and motivation - together with the ability to adopt more
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flexible proactive and adaptive responses and attitudes towards an
environment characterised by ongoing turbulence and change: "Change must
become the norm for middle managers" (Dopson and Stewart, 1988, plO)
Whilst some organisations are increasing their investment in training
and development programmes to prepare managers for these role changes,
many have not: "what many organisations have failed to appreciate is the
importance of training, development and re-skilling. . . some companies
have actively sought new opportunities and increased training in the
search for competitive advantage... .Other companies have retrenched and
pursued defensive survival strategies." (Coulson-Thomas and Coe, p22)
Moreover, both in companies which provide systematic management
development programmes, and in companies which do not, managers are
subject to increased pressure to take responsibility for identifying and
providing their own training requirements, "to take control over and
responsibility for.... . themselves and their own learning." (Pedler et
al, 1986, p3)
Whilst the efficacy of this technique for achieving attitudinal and
behaviour change has long been recognised by management development
specialists (Mumford 1989; Pedler 	 et al; Margerison, 1991), the
necessary resource allocation in terms of time, finance and other forms
of support for the manager from the organisation may well not be
forthcoming. This can result in yet another pressure on the manager,
whose skill and knowledge deficiencies will, in any case, become more
visible as a result of more rigorous monitoring of performance levels.
As ER Consultants demonstrated in their middle management survey: "Many
may feel threatened by their perceived lack of skills at a time when
managerial jobs are being shed. While they have a responsibility
themselves to maintain their own skill base, over half clearly feel they
do not receive adequate support from their organisation" (1992, p7).
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Conclusion
This chapter analysed the complex nature of management work, with
particular reference to the concepts of managerial roles, behaviour,
competences, effectiveness and styles. Mintzberg's model of managerial
roles - interpersonal, informational and decisional - was then used to
examine the extensive changes which appear to be taking place within
middle managerial work, in the context of the moves (identified in
chapter one) from bureaucratic to more organic forms of organisational
structure. The impact of these role changes on managers' levels of work
satisfaction - both positive and negative	 - was also discussed,
together with an assessment of the various factors which can act to
enable or disable managers' attempts to adopt the required changes in
their role behaviour, and to limit or enhance their opportunities for
gaining intrinsic and extrinsic rewards from their work.
As explained in chapter 1, with reference to the extent to which
organisations were, in reality, adopting more organic forms of
structures, it is difficult also to identify the extent to which the
changes outlined above in middle management role prescriptions and
behaviour are actually occurring. Clearly, much will depend on the
extent to which organisations are adopting the new structural forms
which require such changes in management roles.	 Thus, within
organisations moving towards the more organic forms of structures, these
structural changes will need to be complemented by the introduction of
changes in managerial role prescriptions and behaviour. In organisations
with more traditional, predominantly bureaucratic forms of structures,
management roles are likely to exhibit fewer changes.
Moreover, as Mintzberg's contingency model suggests, the precise nature
of such changes and their impact on managers' work behaviour and job
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satisfaction levels are likely to vaxy significantly between different
managers in different jobs in different organisations. Key contingency
factors here include the particular type of organisation, its location
within particular product/service sectors,	 the position of the
individual middle managers within particular functional areas, and the
way in which particular managers interpret, react to, and choose to
implement, changes in their prescribed role requirements. With regard to
the latter, an additional important factor here relates to the way in
which organisations introduce, plan and manage the change process, which
can have a signficant impact on managers' adoption of new role
behaviour, and on their work satisfaction experiences.
Both chapter 1 and chapter 2 looked at the general changes currently
taking place within organisational structures and management roles; the
next two chapters use this theoretical framework to focus specifically
on changing local authority internal structures and management roles.
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CHAPTER 3
Changing forms of structure within local authorities
The previous two chapters adopted a contingency approach to examine the
general changes currently taking place in organisational structures and
management roles. Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis adopt the same
theoretical approach to identify and analyse the patterns of change in
local authority structures and management systems during the 1980s and
1990. Using Mintzberg's (1983, 1989) contingency model of organisational
design, chapter 3 examines the changes which have taken place during
this period in the environment and internal structures of local
authorities. Chapter 4 then adopts Mintzberg's 	 (1973) model of
management roles to identify the impact of this restructuring on middle
management role prescriptions and behaviour.
The origins of local government in England and Wales date back to the
Anglo-Saxon period, with the establishment of the shires which form the
basis of many present-day counties. The foundations of contemporary
local government functions were laid in the nineteenth century, emerging
from the needs of the new Industrialists for improved infrastructure
provision and the concerns of social reformers with the social problems
arising from urbanisation (Laff in and Young, 1990). The Municipal
Corporation Act of 1835 was followed by the Local Government Aces of
1888, 1894 and the London Government Act of 1899, which established an
essentially two-tier system: 58 counties, which ran major services such
as education, major roads, planning, personal health, welfare, and the
police: 259 municipal, boroughs, 522 urban and 469 rural district
councils which were responsible for environmental health, libraries,
housing and minor roads (7,500 parish councils formed a third tier,
responsible for various minor local amenities). In addition, 83 county
- 109 -
boroughs, based on royal charters, formed a parallel single tier of
local government which was responsible for all local services and which
operated independently of the counties (Johnson, 1966; Greenwood and
Wilson, 1984)
In 1963, the London Government Act replaced the old London County
Council with the Greater London Council (GLC) and 32 London boroughs.
The 1972 Local Government Act established 47 non-metropolitan Councils,
369 district councils (including 36 metropolitan districts) and 6
metropolitan councils; the latter, together with the GLC were abolished
by the Local Government Act 1985, and their functions transferred to the
London boroughs/metropolitan districts respectively and to various joint
committees. (Greenwood and Wilson) . The third local government tier -
about 8,000 parish councils with responsibility for minor local
functions - was also maintained. At the time of writing, central
government has set up a Commission to consider further reorganisation,
involving different combinations of single- and two-tier authorities to
suit the particular needs of different local communities. County
councils' principle responsibilities include the provision of social
services, education, highways, structure plans, libraries, police and
fire services and consumer protection; non-metropolitan district council
functions include housing, amenities and recreation, road and footway
maintenance (through agency agreements with the counties), car-par]c.ing,
local plans and refuse collection. Metropolitan districts and London
boroughs operate essentially as single tier authorities responsible for
most of these functions, with the exception of some, such as waste
disposal, which have been transferred to joint committees.
As explained in chapter 1, the contingency approach argues that there is
a "best fit" or most effective form of structure for an organisation's
particular set of circumstances or contingency factors (Mintzberg,
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1983, 1989). In relation to local government, Greenwod et al (1980)
divide these contingency factors into two groups. Firstly, there are
external factors - the organisation's age and environment - which, for
local government includes not only the individual citizen and local
community problems/demands/needs which local authorities are required to
service, but also the institutional framework within which local
authorities are required by statute to operate, and which provides and
governs their funding and spending (Hinings and Greenwood, 1988;
Greenwood and Stewart, 1986) . Secondly, there are the internal factors,
involving size, type of work processes, and form of external control or
ownership (including the type of organisational goals/activities), all
mediated through the perceptions and strategic choices made by senior
members of the organisation. As outlined in chapter 1, Mintzberg
identifies five main types of organisation structure or configurations,
each appropriate for particular contingency situations - the machine
bureaucracy, the divisionalised form, the professional bureaucracy, the
simple structure, and the adhocracy - ranged along Burns and Stalker's
(1961) bureaucratic/organic management continuum.
This analysis of the contingent environmental factors of local
government focuses initially on the national changes which took place
during the 1970s, 80s and 90s in the economic, institutional and
socio-political environment which impacts on all local authorities -
with particular emphasis on changes which occurred after 1979, when the
first of several successive Conservative central governments were
elected. The analysis then considers local variations in local authority
structures and management systems in the context of the local
contingency factors. These include: size; the local economic, social and
political environment; the particular technical (production) systems;
the nature of their external control systems (elected members and their
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political composition). They combine to provide a unique history and
set of municipal traditions, influencing the development, within the
national statutory framework, of each authority's on local structures
and management systems (Greenwood et al, 1980; Elcock et al, 1988)
Changes in the external contingency factors of local government - age,
institutional framework and environment
As Mintzberg points out, °Axi organisation's structure seems to reflect
the age of the industry in which its operates," (Mintberg, 1983, p106),
and all contemporary local authorities share (within the context, of
course, of local variations - see discussion below) a common age and
history including the development of key institutional features, which
originated in the nineteenth century. The key nineteenth century
developments of professionalised corps of officers, to combat local
corruption and nepotism (Laf fin and Young, 1990), and elected member
committees, responsible for particular functions and services, continue
to influence the structure and management systems of contemporary local
authorities. (Knowles, 1977). Morris, writing in 1990, comments on the
extent to which, in today's very different world, the original Victorian
constitutional rules, procedures and standing orders remain "instantly
familiar in their language and in daily application.'1 (Morris, 1990,
pX).
The institutional framework of all local authorities, enshrined in the
legislation which set them up and in the numerous statutes which empower
them to carry out their functions, involves certain features which
continue to distinguish local authorities from other public, private and
voluntary organisations. Greenwood and Stewart identify five key
institutional features characterising local authorities. Firstly, each
authority operates with a local focus on a specific geographical area,
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and (until the l980s) operated on the assumption that it should be
self-sufficient - that it should possess all the skills and resources
needed to provide services, and that the local authority should itself
deliver the services for which it is responsible. Secondly, local
authorities have a degree of discretion and choice about the scope and
method of their service provision within a statutory framework of
national legislation; the extent of this local choice and discretion,
and the distribution of power between central and local government,
remains a subject of considerable contention. Thirdly, and linked to
the former, local authorities have the right to tax - to raise money
locally, currently through the council tax (business rates are now
determined centrally by central government, instead of being set
locally). Fourthly - the most critical characteristic - they have a
local electoral base, legitimating their decision making and ensuring
accountability to the local community. Fifthly, they are not
all-purpose public authorities; as the legislation described above
demonstrates, only certain functions are carried out by local
authorities. The division of functions between County and District
authorities, plus the allocation of other functions (such as health,
water provision etc.) to other agencies requires extensive inter-agency
coordination to ensure effective planning for the local community as a
whole.
These key institutional features, which remained largely unchanged until
the l980s, influenced strongly the type of organisational structure
adopted originally in the nineteenth century, which, again, remained
largely unaltered until the latter part of the 1970s. The traditional
characteristics of local authority structures and management systems
included: (1) committees of elected members, accountable to the
electorate, who carry executive responsibility for particular functions
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or service areas; (2) bureaucratic administration systems, based on
hierarchical positions, and an emphasis on standardised and formalised
procedures, rules and activities (with little emphasis on output
measurement) designed to ensure elected member/political control,
uniformity of service provision, and a high degree of procedural and
substantive integrity and probity (Hood, 1991); (3) a culture of
professionalism, usually based on service departments each with their
own dominant professional culture and expertise, derived largely from
from externally provided professional training and socialisation
(Greenwood and Stewart; Stewart, 1986). In relation to Mintzberg's
organisational configurations, this traditional form of local authority
structures equated essentially with Mintzberg's machine bureaucracy,
plus elements of the professional bureaucracy within those departments
providing professional services, and staffed by professionally qualified
and trained staff.
Challenges to the traditional professional and departmental domination
of local authority structure and management systems evolved initially in
the early 1960s. Increases in rate levies combined with staff shortages
to stimulate interest in productivity gains and increased levels of
administrative efficiency. There was more use of "management services"
such as work study and operations research, aided by the new
mainframe) computers, and an increase in the hitherto small number of
specialist support staff located in Mintzberg's technostructure part of
the organisation (Knowles, 1977, p224). The Local Government Training
Board (LGTB) and the Local Authorities Management Services and Computer
Committee were both established in 1967 to help local authorities
improve their management systems - they both merged in the early 1990s
to form the Local Government Management Board (LGMB). There was an
overall emphasis on the management rather than the administration of
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local authorities in the texts of the time (Keeling, 1972), which
largely reflected the Burns and Stalker distinction between mechanistic
and organic management models (Burns and Stalker, 1961).
A second phase of management reforms in local government, began in the
middle 1960s (Cockburn, 1977) . This was concerned not just with
efficiency, but with promoting an integrated or corporate management
system for the authority as a whole - in contrast to the highly
differentiated nature of most authorities,	 where professionally
dominated service departments operated virtually autonomously, held
together only by strong centralised control over the deployment of
financial, staff and other resources (see further discussion below under
planning and control systems). The pressures for these reforms emanated
from a variety of sources. Council boundaries had become increasingly
inappropriate for changing population distributions, especially in the
wake of post-war reconstruction and the advent of large-scale car
ownership. It was difficult for the smaller councils to manage
efficiently the increased nuniber and complexity of functions allocated
to local authorities. The division and fragmentation of service
responsibilities, both between the different departments of each
authority and between many different authorities, made coordination and
effective planning extremely difficult; there was also increased public
concern about the rising levels of public expenditure (Hepworth, 1980).
Commissioned in 1964 and published in 1967 in response to these
problems, the Maud Report, recommended the adoption of both vertical and
horizontal coordinating or integrative approaches, together with reduced
differentiation through fewer committees, subcommittees and departments
(Cockburn, 1977, Greenwood et al, 1980)
The Maud Committe's concern with corporate management - with resource
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management and overall efficiency - began to give way from 1967 onwards
to an emphasis on corporate p.anning, focusing on the effectiveness of
the local authority in meeting the needs of the local community. This
trend was stimulated by a variety of developments - central government
innovations in the control of public expenditure, a plethora of
government reports on urban problems hinting at the need for more
integrated approaches, growing opposition to the professional dominance
and control of so many public services (Laf fin, 1986), and a large
number of new councillors elected between 1966 and 1972 which unsettled
established attitudes. 	 The corporate planning approach, derived
initially from the American Planning-Programming Budgeting System
(PPBS), also emerged at this time. Information about the approach was
disseminated by the Institute of Local Government Studies (INLOGOV),
through various management consultancy reports (such as those produced
by McKinsey and Co. Inc.) commissioned by several local authorities, and
in a series of articles published in 1971 by Local Government Chronicle
(Hambleton, 1978). The approach was legitimised through its inclusion in
a number of central government reports published in the early 1970s,
including the Bains Report (1972) on management structures for the new
reorganised local authorities established in 1974 in England and Wales.
The Bains Report made a significant observation about the purposes of
local government: "Local government is not, in our view, limited tø the
narrow range of provision of a series of services to the local
community... . It has within its purview the overall economic, cultural
and physical well-being of that community." (Bains, p6). It recommended
the replacement of the traditional departmental approach by a more
integrated and wider-ranging corporate planning strategy - see further
discussion below.	 (The corporate planning approach,	 as outlined
repeatedly in the literature of the period involves the adoption of the
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following cyclical procedures, based on the traditional "rational"
decision-making procedure:	 assessing needs;	 setting objectives;
identifying alternative ways of meeting objectives; evaluating the
alternatives; deciding on a course of action; implementation; monitoring
the the action; and reviewing the process (Haynes, 1980) .)
Other key developments during the 1970s included the end of "the era of
growth" in public expenditure in 1974/5, following the economic crisis
(Stewart, 1986, p19), plus growing levels of disillusionment expressed
by a more discerning and better educated electorate with "public
services which appeared to be provided by insensitive, monolithic
bureaucracies in conformity with rigid and apparently unnecessary rules
(Elcock, 1993, p154). The latter development, plus the wave of public
sector strikes which occurred at the end of the 1970s, contributed to
the national electoral success of the Conservatives in 1979, who came to
power with a manifesto committed to reform of the public sector,
including local government.
From 1979 onwards, following the election of successive Conservative
Central Governments, with strong ideological views about the roles of
the public sector, the local government environment and institutional
framework changed significantly - between 1979 and 1990, 124 pieces of
legislation which had an application to local government were enacted
(Local Government Information Unit, 1990). The overall impact of this
legislation has tended to reduce local government autonomy from central
government and reduce the powers of local authorities to decide on the
nature and scope of their spending and service provision (Stoker, 1988).
Three main trends can be discerned since 1979 in central government's
policies towards local government organisation and management of service
delivery.
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Firstly, from 1979 onwards, increasingly stringent central govern.ment
restrictions on local government spending levels required authorities
to make cuts in expenditure (Cook, 1993). The cap" on permitted
spending levels	 (now applied to all authorities,	 not just
uhighspenders 1 ) includes limits on the amount which can be raised
locally from the council tax. The non-domestic (or business) tax base
has been removed from local authority control, and authorities may spend
only a limited proportion of any capital receipts obtained from selling
assets such as council houses. Arguably, all these constraints mean
that: "Effectively then, it is the Minister and a small group of civil
servants, rather than elected members, who are deciding the absolute and
relative growth of budgets in local authorities (Gibson, 1992, p2l)
Less than 20% of local authority expenditure is now financed locally,
with severe consequent reductions in local accountability.
These spending constraints compelled local authorities to look for ways
of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of their management and
service service delivery systems. In addition, the Audit Commission was
established in 1983 with powers to compel local authorities to improve
the three "E's" - the economy, efficiency and effectiveness - of their
management and service delivery systems, through the exercise of its
auditing role, and through its publication of comparative data about
local authority performance. Mintzberg (1983) and Hinings and Greenwood
(1988) also draw attention to the important role of ideas and fashions"
which can influence local authority decision-making. These "ideational"
influences operate both at the political level (through ruling group
political manifestos and ideologies), and at the level of management
fashions (the pursuit of "currently popular design parameters"
(Mintzberg, 1989, p109). They stem from many sources, which include:
central government; national political parties; numerous publications
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advocating "best practice" management models from agencies such as the
Audit Commission and the Local Government Management (formerly Training)
Board (LGMB); popular management texts - such as "In Search of
Excellence" (Peters and Waterman, 1992), whose influence can readily be
discerned in a number of publications issued by the LGMB during the
1980s. Acting in combination with the severe financial constraints
outlined above, these institutional/ideational pressures, from a variety
of sources, encouraged growing numbers of local authorities to introduce
changes in their management systems and organisational cultures.
Secondly, local government was subjected to the "establishment of market
conditions, through transferring services or assets 	 to private
ownerships, encouraging competitive tendering for services, or creating
internal markets." (Elcock, 1993, p155) . Under Compulsory Competitive
Tendering (CCT), and other legislation concerned with particular service
provision - for example, social services and leisure - local authorities
are required to distinguish between the "purchasers" and the "providers"
of services. Services are no longer expected to be provided solely, or
even primarily, by local authorities themselves; local authority
provider units are increasingly required to compete on the open market
with providers from the voluntary and private sectors to win service
delivery contracts. Originally focused towards manual services, such as
refuse collection, this market regulation of service provision is
increasingly being extended to professional services such as
engineering, finance, computer services etc.	 Legislation related to
particular service areas is prescribing to an increasing extent the
methods and processes to be used in service provision - for example, the
NHS and Community Care Act, 1990 (Moon and Kendall, 1993). 	 Certain
services are being removed from local authority control altogether, such
as polytechnics and further education colleges and schools who have
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chosen to "opt out" of local authority control. There has also been an
increase in the introduction of "arm's length" agencies such as Training
and Enterprise Councils (TEC) and Urban Development Corporations, with
whom local authorities have to work. (Stoker, 1991; McKie, 1992). These
measures are indicative of a trend towards the concepts of the
"enabling" and "fragmented" local authority, operating from within a
"mixed economy" of service provision (Stoker, 1989; Elcock, 1993) . The
term "Enabling" is used here not in the sense of "empowering" the local
community through more effective democratic processes (LGMB, 1992,
Citizens and democracy) - although this strategy can be, and is, pursued
by some local authorities (Leach et al, 1994) - , but more in the sense
of local authorities having the responsibility for defining the need for
and ensuring the provision of services, but not for delivering them.
Thirdly, there were moves towards the development of a "public service'
orientation, focusing on the public as clients, customers and citizens,
with a move away from supply-led to demand-led services, no longer
dominated by professional providers but responsive to the needs of those
being served." (Farnham and Horton, 1993, p239). This development arose
partly as a result of government policies, and partly as a result of
demographic and socio-economic changes. Central Government launched the
Citizen's Charter in 1991 (with a relaunch in 1992), which required
public bodies, including local authorities, to adopt a number of "public
service principles" that all citizens were entitled to expect from
public organisations (Spencer, 1992, p88) . These include entitlements to
certain standards of service provision, to more involvement in
decision-making, to information provision, to more clearly specified
complaints procedures etc.	 This initiative reflected the growing
demands of more highly educated citizens, with higher expectations about
public service quality standards (including suspicion of, and reluctance
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to accept unquestioningly, the "expert" judgement of professional groups
about problem definitions and solutions), for service provision which
was more responsive to their needs.	 The demands and pressures from
local groups and sections of the community for particular local services
targeted more precisely to their own more clearly articulated needs,
have increased significantly in nu.mber and intensity since the late
1960s (Gyford et al, 1989)
In terms of changes in the "markets" of local authorities - the
problems/needs/demands they are required to service - a nuiither of other
socio-economic and demographic changes impacted 	 on local authority
service delivery policies during the 1980s and early 1990s. 	 These
changes included an ageing population, an increase in single person
households, significant levels of unemployment and homelessness, and a
continuing increase in middle class occupations at the expense of
traditional working class occupations. Thus, local authorities needed to
target their increasingly scarce resources more effectively towards
those most in need, whilst at the same time meeting the demands of more
prosperous and discerning groups for more sophisticated and effective
services in areas such as leisure and education (Radley, 1992)
Internal contingency factors - size, technical systems, external control
systems and strategic choice
The post-1974 local authorities (pending reorganisation in the wake of
the Local Government Commission recommendations) vary extensively in
size from a few hundred staff in the smallest district councils to over
50,000 in the larger counties and metropolitan districts (Audit
Commission et al, 1985). 	 Local authorities are generally labour
intensive organisations, with staff costs as a percentage of the total
running at between around 55% for a large county, and 65% for a small
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district. National staffing levels across all local authorities in
England and Wales are estimated to have fallen between 1975 and 1993 by
about 13.3% (about 278,000 full-time equivalents), due partly to central
government policies such as removal from local government control of
further education colleges, and the introduction of CCT (LGMB, 1992a,
1994a;	 Nulty, 1994)	 Trends differ,	 however, within	 different
functional/service areas, with a general decrease in manual staff levels
(arising largely from CCT initiatives), 	 and increases in some
administrative, technical and professional staff categories, including
police, social services, housing, computing, and (due to the community
charge) finance.
In relation to technical systems, Greenwood et al (1980) focuses upon
the different number of tasks or range of functions performed by each
authority,	 rather than using the routine/non routine and low
discretion/high discretion dimensions to categorise local authority
technical systems, As noted in chapter 1, the impact of technical
systems upon organisation structure is most significant at the work unit
level (Robbins, 1990). While many local authority texts stress the
pre-eminence of professional àultures, Stewart (1992) draws attention to
the immense diversity of the work systems and processes existing within
each authority. These, range from, say, the highly complex and
non-routine work of the professional social worker to the 'more
standardised and routinised work of processing housing applicants, where
strict rationing criteria have to be applied and where outcomes can be
defined in advance; from refuse collection, where professionalism
characterises the design but not product delivery to education where
professionalism dominates the service delivery.	 Outside	 the
professional service delivery systems, there are, of course, technical
systems where the work is more susceptible to routinisation,
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standardisation and specification of work outcomes in advance, such as
council tax collection, street cleaning or refuse collection. The
growing use of coxnputerised work systems and management information
systems are also affecting the nature of work processes within many
local government occupations (see discussion below)
Greenwood et al	 (1980) use the term	 "public accountablity" to
characterise the nature of the external control systems of local
authorities, which involve two key aspects; firstly, the extent to which
the councillors "formally organise themselves into into identifiable
political groupings: this is the extent of political
organisation......Secondly there is the complexion of the controlling
political party: whether it is Labour, Conservative, or some other
party." (ppl2O-l21)
The external political control of local authorities means that, firstly,
decisions about which services to provide and the method of provision
are made, within the statutory framework, on the basis of balancing
resource availability criteria with essentially political, value-based
policy choices about local needs and demands. To meet public
accountability requirements, local authority elected members need to
provide justification for, and explanations of, both the ends and means
of service delivery policies and practices. Secondly, the "market" of
local authorities is different from that of the private sector, in that,
despite the 1980s rhetoric about "customers", local authorities are not
concerned "with demand for products at a price in the market." (Stewart
and Ranson, 1988, p3); nor are they dependent upon the market for
revenue, deriving this largely from central government and local taxes.
Defining the local authority "customer" remains a complex process. In
addition to individual, plural (children, parents, local employers for a
school) and collective (the local community) customers or users, Stewart
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(1992) argues that different aims underpin the provision of different
services - to compel, to ensure, to encourage or to ration (where demand
or need outstrips supply) the use of the various services (p11). Each
type of service will have its own management requirements.
Since the Widdicoinbe Report (1986) and the subsequent legislation
regulating local political control systems, the extent of political
orgariisation has increased: "Partisan conduct is rapidly becoming
coumorip1ace, with members of both major parties increasingly bound by
(political) group decisions and reflecting this changing expectation in
more partisan voting both in council and - a notable change this - in
committee meetings." (Young and Davies, 1990, p60) . From the early l980s
onwards, growing numbers of authorities have made efforts to defend and
justify the role of local government, in response to the changes (or
threats) imposed on local government autonomy by successive Conservative
central governments. 	 Increasingly, local authorities 	 are issuing
political manifestos outlining the particular policies, values and
missions which underpin their emphases and choices about service
provision and delivery (Stewart, 1986; Butcher et al, 1990; Gyford et
al, 1989). (This is occurring across the political spectrum , although
with differences remaining; Labour are more likely to do so than
Conservatives, and both parties more likely to do so in urban rather
than rural areas. Much depends on the nature of local political
competition and the perceived safety of ruling group party majorities.)
Implementation of such manifestos requires a more cohesive and
disciplined approach to political group organisation although the styles
of such approaches will vary between parties (Stoker, 1988)
The nature of the political complexion or party control - the political
composition of the ruling group, or, a new development since Greenwood's
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survey, of the "hung council, with no overall one party majority -
is also a significant contingency factor. This is probably more the case
now than at the time of the survey, in the context of the
"repoliticisation" of local government external control systems which
occurred during the 1980s, and the growth during this period of "hung"
Councils - involving increased representation of the Liberal Party at
local levels. The growing numbers of "hung" Councils, and the various
methods used to "govern" under such regimes, also tends to raise the
political consciousness of the political groups involved. 	 These
developments were a response, in part at least, to the increasing
intensity and polarisation of political ideologies at central government
levels during the decade (Butcher et al, 1990) . In addition to important
ideological differences between political parties about both the role or
"product" of local authorities and the nature of their structures and
managment systems, Stoker (1991) identifies several key factions, within
each party. These include, 	 for example, the Conservative "urban
ideologues" such as those who dominated Westminister and Wandsworth
Borough Councils in the late 1980s/early 1990s, and Labour's "urban
left" in several metropolitan districts and London boroughs - each with
their own strong ideological bases. These can produce significant
variations in service delivery priorities, and variations in structures
and management systems based on different attitudes to the nature of
power and control systems within work organisatiozis - such as the role
of trade unions (Laffin, 1989), and the perceived desirablity, or
otherwise, of privatisation and CCT (Audit Commission, 1988).
The nature of the political control of a local authority moves this
discussion about contingency factors towards consideration of the
differences between local authorities in terms of their own local
contingency characteristics, and also raises the issue of the part
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played by strategic choice exercised by key organisational members in
making particular interpretations of the contingency factors, and
particular form of structure.
In terms of variations between individual local authorities in the forms
of organisational structure and management systems used to deliver
services, Greenwood et al (1980) identified eight different patterns of
management to be found within local authorities. They used three
structural components to identify differences in local authority
structures: differentiation (in the sense of number of committees,
sub-conunittees and departments); integration (greater use of policy and
resource committees/subcommittees,	 corporate groups, 	 functional
specialists etc.); a rather difficult-to-measure component of "style of
integration or concentration. This referred, basically, to the
hierarchical level where patterns of interaction and involvement in the
integrative mechanisms tend to take place (pp 57-63) The eight patterns
of management ranged along a continuum from authorities with high
integration and low differentiation at one end to authorities with low
integration and high differentiation at the other. Using statistical
analysis, Greenwood then demonstrates that -local authority management
structures (particularly the extents of differentiation and integration,
less so the degree of concentration) are influenced by their diffe1rent
environmental characteristics. Thus, for example, the greater the range
of environmental problems, the more differentiated, integrated and
deconcentrated the authority will be, regardless of its type (district,
county, metropolitan district). (The impact of the availability and
predictability of resources was much less, and demand articulation was
not included due to measurement problems.) The greater the functional
diversity (range of services provided) the greater the differentiation,
although integration and concentration were largely unaffected.
-
The effects of size, political organisation and party control were less
straightforward, varying between the type of authority. The nature of
the controlling political party was found to have a greater impact than
the degree of political organisation, with f or example, Labour counties
and metropolitan districts having higher levels of differentiation than
their Conservative counterparts; 	 little difference was identified
between Labour and Conservative controlled district councils. More
extensive political organisation was associated with greater degrees of
integration: "the creation of various co-ordinating structures as the
majority party seeks to exercise its political will." (p149). However,
as Greenwood stresses: "The important point to note here is that the
metropolitan and shire districts, and the shire counties, are all
affected in some way by the variety of environmental problems, the scale
of the organisation, the measure of political organisation and the
complexion of party control." (p153).
The extensive changes, outlined above and at the beginning of this
chapter, in all of these contingency factors during the 1980s and 90s,
have undoubtedly influenced strongly the nature of the structural
changes which have taken place during this period, and it would be
interesting to compare the finding of a similar study undertaken in 1992
with the 1980 study. For example, the increases during the 1980s and 90s
in the extent of political control and politicisation of authorities
probabably contributed towards many authorities' increased use of formal
integration methods (such as strategic planning systems) to ensure the
implementation of political manifestos. These developments correspond
with Mintzberg's suggestions that "the greater the external control of
an organisation, the more centralised and formalised its structure"
(Mintzberg, p109). The impact of CCT on structures and management
systems also requires a systematic and detailed study (Walsh, 1992),
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as does the associated development of the board-member role for
members (Leach et al, 1994). While the extent of TM local choiceR is being
increasingly contrained by the increase in central government financial
and other regulations, it can be argued that the increased
politicisation of many local authorities has increased the exercise by
members of the ulocal choice TM options which remain.
The use above of the term choice is an important reminder of the need
to avoid an over-deterministic view about the impact of contingency
factors upon organisational structures. Implicit within the inclusion of
the	 political complexion 	 amongst the contingency factors is
recognition of the role of strategic choice - by key political actors
and senior management in the case of local government - in choosing to
adopt a particular service strategy, and, hence, a particular
organisation structural form. Thus, individual local authorities can
choose to respond or emphasise or play down the particular environmental
problems in their areas. Within national statutory and local electoral
feasibility constraints, they can to an extent create their own
environment or product market. For example, Canterbury City Council
members, following a change in political control in 1991, chose to focus
on the leisure needs of the community; they built two swimming poois and
a leisure centre, demands for which had been continually refused over a
number of years by the previous ruling group. Authorities can influence
demand articulation by introducing measures to discourage/encourage the
demand for services, such as setting up decentralised area/neighbourhood
service outlets to increase service usage, and to improve responsiveness
to local needs.	 The well documented practices of using ingenious
accounting devices to circumvent central government spending
restrictions represent very deliberate attempts on the part of some
(especially Labour) authorities to influence resource availability
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(E].cock et al, 1989; Elcock, 1993)
Greenwood (1987) applied Miles and Snow's (1978) typology of strategic
style - prospectors (who seek to pioneer new ideas and products),
defenders	 (who seek stability)	 analyzers	 (who combine the
characteristics of the previous types) and reactors (who have no
coherent strategy) - to identify differences in local authorities'
strategy choices, and then to identify the impact of the adoption of
each style by a local authority on its structure - most importantly, the
extent of its structural differentiation and integration. He found that
the orientation to change (adoption of the prospector style) was
associated very positively with decentralisation of personnel and
finance to service departments, although there was no relationship with
two other differentiation measures concerning numbers of committee and
department structure. The prospector authority was also more likely to
use a larger number of integrative or lateral devices such as
interdepartmental groups and committees. He concludes that his research
demonstrates that "in the local authority context, strategic style
appears to elicit an appropriate structural response" (p310) . Using a
similar typlogy of strategic styles, Elcock (1987) and Leach et al
(1994) also emphasise the range of strategic choices available to
individual local authorities. The latter actually develop, within the
new" management approaches (see discussion below) a range of possible
strategic approaches: the residual enabling role (emphasising business
values); the market enabler role (emphasising customer values), and the
community enabling role (emphasising citizenship values). Each strategy
has different implications for the role of elected members, the role and
structure of committees, the organisational culture, and the nature of
the authority's internal structure and management systems.
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Hinings and Greenwood (1988) also stress the importance of strategic
choice when attempting to understand the processes of organisational
change or inertia manifested by different local authorities. As Hales
(1993) points out, contingency theory is based largely on comparisons
made between different organisations at the same point in time, with
relatively little attention paid to the process of organisational change
in relation to changing organisational circumstances. Hinings and
Greenwood (1988) attempt to identify the key factors which precipitated
some local authorities within their study more than others to move away
from traditional departmental and professionally-dominated bureaucracies
to more corporate forms of organisational structures. Essentially, these
precipitating factors included two pressurising factors - a high level
of institutional and ideational pressure (as described earlier), and a
strong value commitment to change on the part of the organisational
elite - and at least one of the enabling factors. These consisted of
moves towards a transformational leadership style (which involves the
definition and restatement by senior management of "values, directions
and organisational forms" (p60), plus mobilisation of commitment to
these and/or the existence of expertise/competence within the
organisation in corporate planning and change management systems and
processes. In general, it can be concluded, that even within the
extensive pressures for particular changes exerted by central
goverumment legislation (Young and Mills (1993) found this to be the
most significant factor precipitating change), financial constraints and
other pressures outlined above, strategic choice on the part of elected
members and senior management plays an important part in determining the
strategy and internal structure of individual local authorities.
As a consequence of all these changes in both external and internal
contingency characteristics during the 1980s, growing numbers of local
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authorities appear to be changing their internal structures - moving
away from the traditional bureaucratic model described above to what
many authors have described as the "new" public sector management model
(Hood, 1991)
The "new" local government management model
The key features of this model are outlined below in a diagram adapted




self-sufficiency	 -----------> the enabling authority
near-monopoly	 the competitive council











This model demonstrates the nature of the moves from the traditional
"self-sufficient" local authority, which enjoyed a near-monopoly in
service provision, to the "enabling", "competitive" and "mixed-economy"
authority. Local authorities, acting as purchasers are responsible for
clearly specifying and then enabling, rather than directly providing
themselves, the services to be delivered by providers - from private and
voluntary sector organisations in addition to the authority's own
workforce (Brooke, 1989). Traditional management systems, based on
direct, detailed, hierarchical, and relatively centralised control
systems are seen as giving way to "arm's length" negotiated
relationships between groups of managers. More decentralised control
systems, focus on clear specification of performance outcomes, within
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the context of strategic and devolved management systems. Systems for
organisational regulation move from hierarchies to markets - and,
possibly, to networks, characterised by longer term collaborative
partnership arrangements between purchaser and providers in an almost
"boundaryless" organisation (Francis, 1994, p79; Peters, 1992; Flynn,
1994; Thompson et al, 1991). Devolved management involves "managers at
the lowest possible level having: more authority over resources; greater
scope for decisions; accountability for achieving agreed targets."
(Stoker, 1989, p33). These managers operate within a context of
authority-wide mission and "core-value" statements, and strategic
planning systems which include resource utilisation and service delivery
targets against which each manager's work unit performance is assessed
(Caulfield and Schultz, 1989) . 	 Considerable emphasis is placed on
tailoring local service provision more specifically to particular
individual and community needs, through the use of various strategic and
consumer marketing techniques (Walsh, 1989).
The extensive implications of these changes for local authority staff
correspond, broadly speaking, to moves from personnel to more flexible
human resource management strategies (Fowler 1988a; Storey 1992; Sisson
1994).	 Professional staff	 may acquire	 resource management
responsibilities, and tend to become subject to central management's
"policing role, encroaching on professional activities through such
techniques as cost-centre budgeting and performance indicators" (Lawson
1993, p74; Watkins Preddy and Drury, 1992). 	 Middle managers, who
usually begin their careers as professionals, are also likely to
experience similarly extensive role changes - to be analysed in detail
in chapter 4.
Overall, these changes in management systems and roles can be seen as as
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representing a move from cultures "dominated by traditional public
service values to ones attuned to the market, business and
entrepreneurial values of the 'new' public service model." (Farnham and
Horton, 1993, p238).	 Advocates of the new model claim that it
"increases accountablity, fosters efficiency and improves organisational
performance... .by stressing the management of resources, providing
better information on which decisions can be taken, and hence leads to
greater control" (Gray and Jenkins, 1993, p22) . Semi-autonomous business
units, operating within a clear strategic framework, become more
responsive to local customer and community needs. In addition, workforce
motivation is strengthened; the use of coherent organisational cultures
emphasise "commitment" rather than "control" strategies for regulating
performance (Walton, 1985) .	 Critics of the new model claim that it is
largely "hype" or rhetoric in that, apart from the terminology, little
has really changed, and that it promotes the interests, mainly, of an
elite group of "new mangerialists", rather than customers or lower level
staff. The main result has been "a rapid middle-level bureaucratisation
of new reporting systems" and the weakening of "elementary but essential
competences at the front line" (Hood, 1991, p9).
Hood and Gray also query the claims - that the new model can be seen as
purely technical or "neutral" mechanism, suitable for enabling the
achievement of goals set by elected representatives - local or national.
It is argued that the contingency characteristics of local government
continue to differ from that of the private sector - including
differences in the nature of the customer relationship, in basic goals
and purposes, the criteria for assessing organisational effectiveness,
the nature of external ownership/centrol, and the institutional
framework outlined at the beginning of this chapter (Greenwood and
Stewart, 1986;	 Broussine, 1992; Stewart and 	 Ranson, 1988) . Key
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differences between local government and private sector organisations
include local government's concern with matching service provision to
publicly defined needs, and with ensuring equity of provision to all
entitled to particular services, compared with private sector concerns
with product demands at a price in the market. Public accountability
is "required for both means and ends .......to explain and justify
actions taken" (Stewart and Ranson, 1988, 	 p4) rather than private
sector accountability to the market. The political process (the
political control system) is an integral and essential condition of
public sector management whereby collective needs are defined; the
political process tend to be seen as an irrelevance or a problem in the
private sector. Thus, despite the growth in arguments during the 1980s
that public/private sector differences were becoming blurred, most
authors continue to support the view that "the two sectors have features
which are unique and not shared with the other", thus requiring
different forms of structure and management systems to ensure maxiniu.m
effectiveness (Broussine (1992), p6)
However, most of the local government chief officers represented within
Broussine's (1988) research felt that many private sector management
techniques were applicable, to the public sector if they were adapted to
operate within the constraints of the local government institutional
framework. Broussine argues that there is a trend away from the purely
"public administration is unique" approach to management roles and
processes in the two sectors to the view that "Public service management
needs to change, but retain and strengthen its distinctiveness"
(Broussine, 1992, pp7-ll). In response to central government policies,
which are perceived in many academic and political circles as posing a
threat to the continued existence of local government, many of the
authors referred to above seek to emphasise the strengths of the unique
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characteristics of local government, whilst acknowledging the needs for
changes in structures and management systems to reaffirm and improve the
unique contribution of the local authority to the well-being of both the
local community and individual citizens.
The Audit Commission/LGTB publication (1985) , "Good management in local
government" is a good example of this genre. In 1985, the LGTB also
produced the first of many papers noting the limitations, but also the
possibilities of applying the eight attributes of the successful
companies outlined in "In Search of Excellence" (Peters and Waterman,
1992) to local authority management systems (Clarke et al, 1985). Thus,
under "close to the customer", the authors noted the problems in local
government of adopting the private sector approach of the customer or
the market as the authoritative judge of what products are required.
Nevertheless, they suggest using the concept of the Ucustomeril to
develop greater responsiveness (involving having to think about and
justify the role and value of local authorities) both to the local
community and also to individual customers' needs. Similarly, Stewart
and Ransom's use of the term "market", which would have been almost
unknown in local government circles until the 1980s, acknowledges in
itself the application and relevance of such concepts to local
government management, even when used to point out the differences.
Thus, the private sector marketing framework has been used to reaffirm
the importance of public accountability through, for example, "learning
from citizens about their understanding of needs" (Stewart and Ranson,
p3), rather than assuming that councillors somehow know this anyway.
Although private sector marketing "cannot be modelled on the private
sector alone" (p3), the inference is clear that the concept does, albeit
in a different way, have its place in local government. Similar points
can be made about all the other categories listed by Stewart and Ranson,
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and it can be argued that the changes in internal local authority
structures described above, while reflecting many trends taking place
during the l980s and 90s in the private sector, are nevertheless taking
place within the established institutional framework which continues to
distinguish local government from the public sector.
It should be re-emphasised that the whole point of the contingency
approach is to identify which type of organisational structure will best
enable the organisation to operate effectively in its environment. As
noted above, in the context of the Bains Report's definition of the
purposes of local government, the ultimate outcome or "product" of local
authorities is difficult to identify or measure in quantitative terms.
The criteria for assessing the effectiveness of local authorities
remains essentially a politically based value process - at both central
and local government level - rather than in terms of the assessment
against predominantly economic goals and criteria	 (ultimately
profitability) which characterise the private sector. The extensive
external political control of local authorities - legitimated by direct
elections, as noted in the key characteristic four of the institutional
framework - and their statutory obligation to provide specific services
and ensure equity of provision requires a critical degree of central
coordination through senior management to the elected members, who are
responsible (and directly accountable to the public) for their
activities. This suggests that local authorities need to retain, albeit
in amended and more flexible forms, at least some of the elements of an
hierarchical and bureaucratic organisational form.
The next section of this chapter uses Miritzberg's model of
organisational structures to examine in more detail the changes which
the literature suggest are being made by increasing numbers of
authorities in their internal structures. Mintzberg's four structural
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extensive written rules and procedures, and detailed centralised
personnel control over the duties, numbers and grades of staff.
(Fowler, 1988). Nationally prescribed conditions of service and grading
structures, with a long hierarchy of numerous grades with narrow salary
ranges, reinforced these tendencies towards the high degree of job
specialisation associated with the machine bureaucracy.	 Professional
jobs were narrowly defined on the basis of the particular professional
kil1s, knowledge and expertise required to provide highly specialised
services. In general, neither these staff nor their managers (who had
probably begun their local government careers as professionals) had
responsibility for, or control over, the resources - personnel, finance
etc. - used to deliver services; these tended to be controlled by
centralised specialist staff (see discussion below under decision-making
systems)
During the 1980s, local authorities were exhorted to adopt more flexible
patterns of role specialisation to achieve the more flexible and
innovative services provision and management required to become more
responsive to customer needs, and to meet the requirements of CCT. A
number of publications have recommended the adoption of many of the
private sector style initiatives described in chapter 1 (Audit
Commission, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991; Clarke et al, 1985; Fowler, 1988;
Stoker, 1989).	 These initiatives include more flexible patterns of
labour utilisation, such as more flexible employment contracts to
increase the transferability of staff between work units, and to enable
the adoption of functionally flexible working practices especially
amongst administrative and manual staff. Job descriptions focus less on
prescriptions about activities and methods, and more about purposes and
outputs, linked in to the adoption of more rigorous performance control
systems. New incentives for manual workers are based on group rather
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than individual schemes, with fewer rules and procedures to maximise
individual judgement and initiative and encourage innovation and more
flexible staffing/grading structures, linked to flatter organisational
hierarchies. Recent surveys, discussed below, show that such practices
are increasing, 	 especially in the south-east,	 where there were
recruitment and retention problems in the late l980s (Local Authority
Conditions of Service Advisory Board (LACSAB), 1990; Kessler, 1990)
Thus, the proportion of part-time staff within local government is
rising; for example, non-manual part-time staff numbers increased by
about 25% between 1984 and 94; full-time numbers decreased by about 10%
(LGMB, 1994a). In addition there has been an increase in the number of
mainly very senior officers on fixed-term contracts, and, increasingly,
numbers of manual workers are effectively employed for specific fixed
term contract periods for CCT services. Around 30-40 councils have
withdrawn from national bargaining, mainly in the south-east, designed
to aid recruitment and retention as well as to achieve higher levels of
functional flexibility (Donaldson, 1992). Both manual and, with the
extension of CCT to white-collar services, non-manual staff enjoy
significantly reduced levels of job security than those traditionally
associated with public sector employment - particularly those located
within provider, as opposed to purchaser, functions.
The LACSAB survey demonstrated that 33% of authorities surveyed (52% of
the total in England and Wales) had introduced flatter structures; 22%
had introduced extended salary scales; about a quarter had adopted
performance related pay (planned by a further one-fifth); one third had
adopted performance appraisal systems (planned by a further quarter).
Young and Mills (1993) reported that about 40% of their responding
authorities used performance related pay for various proportions of
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their white-collar staff. Over a quarter had carried out job redesign
exercises to ensure better use of skills. 	 Traditional rigid job
demarcations in the Direct Service Organisations had increasingly given
way to more flexible, multi-skilled workgroups under the impetus to win
tenders under the CCT legislation (LACSAB). These pressures are likely
to extend to other sections of authorities' with the forthcoming
extension of CCT to professional services. It is important to note,
however, as the authors of this survey suggest, that these figures
provide only a very general indication of recent trends, with little
detailed analysis of their impact on structure and management systems.
In addition, it is clear from the survey that many authorities had not
reported such changes in their employment practices.
Professional jobs are also being redesigned; the Audit Commission
(1989a)	 urges reassessment of the skills required to perform
uprofessional ll tasks,	 to identify those which require "limited
professional expertise" (p9) . These specialised tasks, requiring lower
levels of individual discretion and judgement, can be allocated to
non-professional staff, or be contracted out to the private/voluntary
sectors. The job roles and responsibilities of professional staff and
managers are becoming broader. They are taking on responsibilities for
new functions such as resource management, and, whilst retaining their
own professional specialisms, are likely to be working increasi,ngly
within multi-disciplinary project teams and work groups - across
professional and departmental boundaries, both within the authority, and
with other agencies, in the context of the "enabling", "competitive",
and "mixed economy" council (Watkins, Drury and Preddy, 1992).
Professional jobs are also increasingly being redesigned according to
the	 two different	 roles required	 within the	 functional
purchaser/provider split (see discussion below) required in some service
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sectors, such as social work, by government legislation.
Behaviour Formalisation
As indicated above, the mechanisms for formalising behaviour in the
operating core of local authorities traditionally involved fairly
extensive standardisation of work processes. These involved detailed
written job descriptions, and procedural rules and regulations
associated with the machine bureaucracy for manual, clerical and
administrative staff. 	 Standardisation of skills, associated with the
professional bureaucracy, was used to forinalise the work behaviour of
professional staff, plus personal supervision. Some recent changes in
the nature of local authority behaviour standardisation systems can be
identified, corresponding to the changes outlined above in the design of
positions - towards standardisation on the basis of outputs or
performance. It is important to note that this method still tends to
involve continuing use of (bureaucratic) written prescriptions, and can
actually increase the extent of behaviour standardisation for managers
who previously were not subject to formalised performance control.
Moreover, "adherence to procedures, proper records, detailed accounting
are backed by past traditions of public accountability." (Greenwood and
Wilson 1984, p22). Despite the trends towards greater devolution of
operational authority from members to officers, and from senior to more
junior managers (see below), the public accountability obligations of
local authorities will continue to require more operational regulation -
over means as well as ends - than private sector organisations, who are
not subject to the same public accountability requirements.
In contrast to the concentration on structures which characterised the
Bains report, recent initiatives also address issues of process - of
ensuring the adoption of the appropriate beliefs, values and attitudes
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(or corporate/organisational cultures) required to ensure effective
changes in behaviour (Flynn, 1994). Thus increased emphasis has been
made on identification from the top of specific corporate values,
visions and goals which are then expected to be disseminated downwards
through the management hierarchy to the operating core. A recent LGZIB
survey (Young and Mills, 1993) found that about 80% of the 285
responding authorities had already adopted, or were considering adoption
of, core value or mission statements. 	 Many examples of these local
authority corporate cultures or styles (Stewart, 1986; Audit Commission,
1985; Issac-Henry and Painter, 1991) are often obviously derived from
"In Search of Excellence" (Peters and Waterman, 1982), and include
references to the need f or more risk-taking, more innovation, increased
customer orientation, concern for staff etc. The pamphlet issued by the
London Borough of Bromley (1986, reproduced in exhibit 3.1) provides a
good example of the genre.
Acting in combination with corporate training policies (see below), such
corporate cultures also represent attempts to limit the "cosmopolitan"
orientation of professional staff (to their national/professional
association ethics and values) in favour of the adoption of a "local"
orientation (to the particular service policies and objectives of the
professional's own employing authority) (Gouldner, 1957; Laf fin and
Young, 1990). However, staff attitudes and values are not easily
changed. Staff with traditional departmental loyalties and professional
service ideals may view with scepticism the commitment to the "customer
approach espoused through an official corporate culture, especially if
they have to restrict their range of service provision due to
expenditure constraints (Clarke, 1984, 1988; Harrow and Willcocks,
1990). In any case, specific sub-cultures will still tend to develop
within each of the many, of differentiated work units in local
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authorities; increased levels of devolution to performance or cost
centres will reinforce the need for the development of strong corporate
cultures to limit these sub-cultural variations.
Training and Indoctrination Systems
As noted above, the effective dissemination of corporate cultures and
the effective operation of new formal standardisation methods such as
performance control systems, requires implementation programmes
carefully designed to socialise staff into the new behaviour patterns,
and underpinning values and attitudes, necessary for ensuring effective
role performance (Griffiths, 1989) . LACSAB (1990) reported an increase
in the use of various communication and involvement strategies: briefing
groups/team briefings, staff consultation procedures, 	 suggestion
schemes, improved communication systems (including staff attitude
surveys) staff welfare programmes (to promote the "caring" employer
image, and improvements in workplace and social	 facilities.	 The
reasons for the introduction of these measures were diverse, and
included strategies to improve staff recruitment and retention at a time
of staff shortages, but these developments certainly correspond to the
measures being adopted in the private sector to increase corporate
commitment.
Training provision is also an important method, not just for developing
skills but also for socialising employees into the norms and values of
an organisation. Local authorities have traditionally relied on external
training provision for its professional staff, which contributed
significantly to the predominantly "cosmopolitan" service orientation of
many of these staff, rather than the "local" commitment to a particular
local authority's policies and values (see discussion above). The LACSAB
survey reported an increases in training provision for professional
- 143 -
staff, focused significantly on traineeships and career grades in key
skills shortage areas, which enables recruitment at lower skills levels
and which also "tailors training towards corporate aims." (LACSAB,
report 3, pill). .n increased number of local authorities were also
systematically reviewing training needs (68%) and revising the content
of training to reflect service needs and corporate aims; three-quarters
of the authorities had provided courses on "dealing with the public".
The LGTB (1988a) and Fowler (1988) also urged adoption of management
training and development systems to develop corporate managerial role
identity, as opposed to the professional role identity of service
managers, who tend to be recruited from the ranks of professional staff.
Quoting practice examples from many local authorities, both texts
attached considerable importance to designing training programmes to
reflect the authority's own definition of the kind of managers it needs,
"who are capable of working with the organisation's future priorities.
For example, the challenge of competitive tendering, the changing roles
and relationships between councillors, officers and the public, the
moves towards a more market-centred approach, the importance of
inter-agency working. . . ." (LGTB, l988a, p45). Local authorities are
increasingly being urged to develop into "learning organisations" ,with
their staff involved in continuous improvement, change and adaptation
(Clarke and Stewart, 1988; Flynn, 1992; Stewart 1986). Some, albeit
limited, increases in management development/training provision during
the 1980s were reported by 70% of the 223 local authorities responding
to a LGTB (1990) survey.	 Young and Mills (1993) reported that
three-fifths of their responding local authorities had increased their
resource commitment to management development/training over the previous
three years, although a few had reduced spending here, due to budgetary
pressures and constraints.
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Design parameter 2 - Unit Size and Grouping
The core professional workforces of local authorities have always tended
to work in fairly small work units or teams, especially where, for
example, in social work, their work carries a fairly high degree of
interdependence. The development of flatter organisation structures and
increased decentralisation (see below) has tended to result in the
proliferation of larger numbers of smaller service delivery units,
either on a geographical area basis, or on the basis of the type of
service provided.
Professional staff in the operating core were traditionally grouped into
specialist service departments according to their function based on the
nature of their knowledge, skills, and work processes. Since their
clients select them/are served on this basis, the groups were
market-based as well - providing specific products or services such as
education, sports services etc. for specific client groups, within
highly differentiated service-delivery based units and departments.
Support/control functions, such as personnel and finance, were located
within specialist departments, - the technostructure and support
structure parts of Mintzberg's organisational model - with a management
team, of departmental chief officers, headed up by the chief executive,
at the strategic apex.
During the 1980s there were moves towards grouping professional service
staff together on the basis of location or geographical area, with
several services within an overall professional specialism provided
together in, for example, neighbourhood offices (Stewart, 1988; Lowndes
1992). (These arrangements may or may not involve devolution of
managerial and/or political power - see below, under
"decentralisation".) By the early 1990s, this decentralised area-based
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grouping had increased significantly amongst social services and housing
departments (Young and Mills, 	 1993). Some (mostly Labour/Liberal
controlled urban authorities) have taken dispersal of service provision
beyond traditional departmental boundaries, with area-based offices
which provide a range of interdepartmental services (Lowndes, 1992;
Lowndes and Stoker, 1992, 1992a; Stoker et al, 1988) . For example,
within Tower Hamlets, the Liberal ruling group, after gaining control in
1986, split the authority into seven neigbbourhoods, each with its own
neighbourhood chief executive, and its own neighbourhood committee, made
up of councillors elected for the area, which was responsible for all
service delivery in the area (Lowndes and Stoker, 1992, p49). These
developments, aided by the development of new information technology,
reflect similar moves in the private sector towards market-based
groupings. They are underpinned by a philosophy of getting closer to the
community and the "customer" to improve identification of, and response
to, their needs: "the spatial principle provides a strong countervailing
force to the functional principle." (Stewart, 1986, p148)
The introduction of internal market systems - required by central
government CCT and other service-specific legislation - is also making a
profound impact on departmental structures. The split required between
purchaser and provider functions, has involved restructuring along these
functional lines both between and within service departments affected by
this legislation (Fowler, 1988; Young and Mills, 1993). Thus, for
example, many authorities, in response to CCT requirements, have set up
a separate department with its own chief officer to manage and run all
the manual contracting service provision subject to CCT; the service
departments affected by CCT become managers of the client or purchaser
functions (Fowler, 1988). One district council is currently evolving a
purely functional split of just two principal departments - one for the
- 146 -
authority's client/purchaser role and one for the contractor/provider
role (LGTB, 1991). In response to the 1990 NHS and Community Care Act
requirements,	 almost half of the authorities' social services
departments in the Young and Mills (1993) survey had reorganised around
a purchaser/provider split; almost half were either planning or
considering such a split. It is also important to note that, under the
"mixed economy" service provision, provider functions are carried out by
provider agencies located outside as well as inside the local authority
- in private or voluntary sector organisations. These arrangements have
significant implications for both the nature and quantity of "lateral
linkages" required to ensure cooperation and coordination between these
functions (see next section below)
Forthcoming extensions to CCT - to professional services such as
personnel, information systems, finance and engineering - will
undoubtedly result in further such restructuring. Around one third of
Young and Mills' local authorities had introduced budget-holding cost
centre arrangements and service level agreements to regulate
transactions between direct service manager purchasers of legal,
financial, personnel and computer/IT services and the providers of these
services. CCT has also focused attention on the costs and methods of
central charging for these support services (Walsh, 1991) . Provider
managers, required to minimise costs to win tenders under the CCT
regulations, are increasingly questioning the value of these services,
and, in some cases, either opting out of their use altogether or
requiring service level agreements to ensure good value of money from
the central services they receive (Kay and Malone, 1990). Particularly
amongst larger authorities, there is a growing trend towards dispersal
of these support services to direct service departments, reflecting
similar developments in the private sector. Thus, for example, service
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departments may have their own personnel unit, whose head may be
executively responsible to either the service chief officer or the head
of central personnel (Fowler; Audit Commission, 1991) . The idea, as in
the private sector, is to steer support staff service provision towards
meeting the needs of the "production" or service departments, rather
than focusing on the traditional controlling role which can inhibit
efficient service delivery (Kessler, 1990) . As in the private sector,
dispersal of staff support services can prove expensive, and the
intensifying local authority expenditure constraints of the early 1990s
may result in recentralisation (Drummond, 1992)
Within the traditional service and function groups, other changes have
also occurred. Virtually all authorities established chief executive
posts in 1974 as recommended by the Bains Report, and most authorities
also have a management team, composed of the major departmental chief
officers and led by the Chief Executive (Audit Commission, 1989b)
Developments since then have included the increased attachment of
various support functions to the chief executive's department such as
public relations, corporate planning, personnel, management services and
administration. The number of departments - and chief officer posts -
has tended to decrease, with functions regrouped within a smaller number
of larger departments or directorates (Young and Mills, 1993). Some
authorities have established a few large directorates which group
services together, where the directors concentrate on strategic issues,
leaving each service head to concentrate on operational management. In
many authorities, some completely new departments, such as Direct
Service Departments (managing manual services subject to CCT
legislation) and economic development have been established, with the
functions of others regrouped as certain services declined in
importance. There are moves towards "flatter" organisation hierarchies
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within some authorities, with a shorter middle line of management
layers. The LACSAB survey (1990) 	 reported that a third of the
authorities had already reduced the number of management layers, and a
further 5% were planning to do so. For example, North Tyneside district
council replaced its "fossilised" departmental structure, with as many
as 16 layers between directors and employees, by a flatter structure
with no more than three layers between "the heads of functions and the
people on the ground." (Tighe,1992, p14).
Elected member structures also changed slightly by the early l990s. The
Audit Commission (1990) recommended fewer and larger service committees
and increased numbers of smaller sub-committees or informal work groups
to improve decision making and maximise member involvement. Reflecting
these recommendations, Young and Mills (p13) reported a general trend
towards streamlining management and decision-making structures with a
"slimming-down in the number and frequency of committees and
sub-committees" (reflecting moves towards the consolidation of
departments into larger directorates), and "a complementary trend
towards use of member working parties. In combination with the area
structures described above, a few authorities (mostly Liberal/Labour)
have developed multi-service area committees (Stoker et a]., 1988;
Lowndes) . In 1991, a central government consultation paper queried for
the first time the need for the conventional committee structure. It
outlined, amongst other options, the possibility of introducing
u cabinet...style ll government, perhaps involving direct election of its
members (Stewart, 1992). Such moves would "inevitably concentrate power
within a smaller number of hands (i.e. centralise the political
decision-making structure) . . . and also markedly affect the respective
roles of executive members and chief officers" (Leach et a]., p162).
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Design parameter 3 - Planning and Control Systems, and liaison devices
Many councils adopted the outward structural features of a corporate
management approach following the recommendations of the Bains Report,
although most did not adopt a comprehensive system of corporate planning
(see discussion above, under 'external contingency factors'). Amongst
those authorities which did, changes in their management and service
delivery systems tended to be largely cosmetic rather than real
(Greenwood, 1975) .	 The main problem with the Bains Report was its
emphasis on the need for a structure designed to promote the corporate
approach rather than on the corporate planning process. This mechanistic
approach tended to reinforce the weaknesses inherent in traditional
local authority structures. Based on the committee setting, this
bureaucratic mode and the professional culture lacked the flexibility
and outward focus to adapt quickly to the increasingly dynamic
environment, and failed to monitor effectively the implementation of
corporate policy (Stewart, 1986; Greenwood and Stewart, 1986); less than
half of the authorities set up performance review subcommittees. Most
authorities failed to introduce interdepartmental liaison groups, so
that departmental coordination took place only at the top of the
organisation - within the management team and specialist corporate
support sections. This reinforced the traditional independence and
separatism of the strong, departmental, professional baronies, who
tended to dominate policy formulation, acting largely in their own
departmental interests. Little real discussion took place about the
values (political or otherwise) on which these policy decisions were
based (Hambleton, 1978; Cockburn, 1977). Little or no attention was paid
to the need for planned change in the new authorities' cultural or
behaviour formalisation and indoctrination systems to ensure the changes
in role expectations, values, and behaviour necessary for the effective
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adoption of more flexible, interdisciplinary and integrated corporate
planning approaches to service management and delivery (Hayries)
In practice, for most authorities, the annual budget - the plans which
specify the costs of outputs for a given time period - was the
traditional dominant management tool for overall planning, coordinating
and controlling activities: "the budget was one of the few (if indeed
not the only) points at which an overall view of the range and cost of a
local authority's activities was possible" (Elcock et al, 1988, pp86-7)
The process was dominated by a "bottom-up 1' approach. Bids for resources,
originated by managers of the various service sections, were made by the
service departments and then matched with the supply of money available
for the coming year: "the annual battle between 'Advocates' and
'Guardians'" of the resources available" (Tonge, 1993, p76).
During the l980s and 1990s, several developments listed above - such as
central government funding and spending constraints, pressures to
improve value-for money, reqiirements for more flexible and responsive
services provision,	 the "repoliticisation" of elected members -
stimulated the development of a more strategic approach to service
planning and management within growing nu.mbers of local authorities.
This strategic approach is defined in the local government literature as
involving more than "just a set of financial and manpower projections.
'Strategic' means taking a broader view. . .examining issues that are seen
as important for the authority as a whole and the community it
serves.. .being concerned with inter-connected issues, and those that
have an impact beyond their own immediate effect." (Caulfield and
Schutz, 1989, pG). Noting the disenchantment with Bains-style corporate
planning systems, the Audit Commission (1988, plO) recommended the use
of a simpler but more effective planning system. Elected members would
work with officers to identify the main issues facing the council, to
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debate the best ways of dealing with them, and to ensure that members'
objectives are translated into into action by officers: "Unlike the
complex and detailed planning systems once in vogue, what is required is
quite a simple process, focusing on a limited number of key issues, and
with most of the subsequent work undertaken within individual
departments". The Audit Commission also stressed the importance of
defining and meeting local consumer needs, and of adopting performance
measurement and review systems, which, it was suggested, should focus
more on service delivery quality and effectiveness, as well as on
economy and efficiency (Rogers, 1990).
These prescriptions reflect the private sector changes in emphases
(identified by Mintzberg) from action planning systems which regulate
specific action, characteristic of bureaucracies - with a heavy top-down
emphasis involving considerable written and prescribed detail - to
performance control planning systems, regulating overall performance,
characteristic of more decentralised market based structures. "There was
no longer a belief in the possibility of centralised and comprehensive
'rational' planning within corporate organisations. Instead, it was
argued that strategic managers had the task of identifying key issues on
which their organisations should focus, while ensuring that their
decentralised divisions were able to respond flexibly to and create
demand for their products. They needed to be in touch with the demands
of the consuinersN (Cochrane, 1994, p152)
Surveys, plus local authority examples quoted in various texts, suggest
that growing numbers of authorities are adopting various features of the
strategic management approach advocated by the Audit Commission (for
example, Buckland and Joshua 	 (1992); Issac-Henry and Painter (1991);
Lavery and Hume, 1991; Caulfield and Schutz (1989) . Almost 60% of
the Young and Mills survey authorities had adopted, and 21% were
considering adopting, core value or mission statements. 	 Slightly more
uneven progress was reported towards the adoption of corporate/strategic
plans (mostly for three year periods with an emphasis predominantly on
annual reviews); just under 50% had adopted, (28% were considering) such
systems.	 Just under half of the authorities had introduced
authority-wide performance review committees (a similar proportion had
neither adopted such arrangements, nor were considering doing so); about
three-quarters had adopted/were considering systems for performance
review at departmental levels. The survey also suggested trends towards
a commitment to "Quality" (defined variously as a tool for achieving
greater effectiveness/means of meeting customer requirements/means for
achieving cultural change) through the development of explicit policy
statements/local charters, officer working parties and specialist posts,
and training provision. Customer involvement in setting performance
indicators was, however, relatively low compared with that of members,
and officers, and only 40% of the authorities had adopted arrangements
for providing user feedback in their performance review systems (a
further 20% were considering making such arrangements)
Clearly, individual authorities continue to vary in terms of the extent
to which they are adopting various aspects of a more strategic approach
to service planning and delivery. In an attempt to discover the etent
to which local authorities actually "conduct themselves in a strategic
manner" as opposed to simply reporting the existence of a strategic
planning system, Young and Mills reported that half the county council
chief executives claimed that their teams spent at least half their time
on strategic issues, with much more uneven practice reported by other
types of authorities (p25-26) . In addition, 38% of all the authorities
had established specialist strategic management posts, plus increases in
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the creation of specialist policy units. The increases reported earlier
in management training/development also suggest that authorities may be
paying increased attention to organisational processes and behavioural
change management, as well as to simply changing formal systems and
structures. Such a focus was found to be an important characteristic of
sixteen "well-managed" authorities, identified in a recent study (LGMB,
1993a)
However, Caulfield and Schutz (in examining a number of local authority
strategic planning systems) considered that many authorities' strategic
planning systems represented little more than the simple bringing
together of service plans, with little systematic performance review.
They tended to conclude that many of the problems experienced in the
1970s with corporate planning were resurfacing: "Above all there does
appear to be a lot of emphasis on the mechanics, and a relative neglect
of the underlying culture .....the moral is clear: the style, approach
and vision of the local authority are more important than the bare
achievement of producing a strategic plan" (1989, p94). Similarly,
Jackson (1993) reported that "few of the (public sector) organisations
studied employed an explicit strategic-management framework". They paid
only very limited attention to the need for change management, and
tended to focus on operational rather than strategic performance, with
little use of performance measures and indicators to assess the
achievement of longer-term or strategic, as opposed to operational,
objectives. Moreover, in terms of increased member involvement in, and
control over the strategic planning processes, Chief Officers were still
considered, in general, to exert significantly more influence over the
development of strategic thinking than members, raising questions about
the extent to which traditional "professional" domination of policy
making is being reduced (Young and Mills, 1993) (see discussion below).
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The use of performance measurement systems in local govern.ment have been
heavily criticised for concentrating on the "economy" and "efficiency"
rather than the "effectiveness" components of the three 'E's. Moreover,
measurement of the latter tends to focus on largely quantitative output
targets rather than on the definition and measurement of the expected
outcomes of service provision (Jackson, 1993; Elcock, 1993a; Flynn,
1993; Lawton and Rose, 1991. Recent central government initiatives, such
as the Citizen's Charter, have argued for "an increased emphasis on
notions of quality rather than value for money, with the argument that
successful business organisations were run in ways which ensured
quality, rather than in ways which emphasised retrospective scrutiny of
the extent to which they achieved their financial targets.0 (Cochrane,
1994, p152). However, there is confusion about the precise meaning of
the term "quality", as shown in the definitions provided within the
(1993) survey quoted above, and in the different meanings attributed to
the term in the Citizens Charter initiatives (Spencer, 1992).
However, a recent survey of performance management systems used in local
authority service departments (Palmer, 1993, p32) suggests that despite
the growing emphasis on the need for more qualitative performance
indicators, the indicators most commonly collected by these departments
were quantitative. They related to costs, volume of service, utilisation
rates, time targets and productivity: "indicators of quality of service,
customers' satisfaction and the achievement of goals appear less often,
if at all ......Authorities, perhaps not surprisingly, concentrate on
measuring what is easily measurable and this reults in a bias towards
measuring performance in terms of economy and efficiency, rather than
effectiveness". As Jackson suggests, this tends to reduce the extent to
which these performance management systems can contribute towards
organisational learning and improved service delivery, or inform the
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strategic planning and decision-making process. 	 Palmer concludes from
her research that performance indicators are more often introduced
within local authorities "as an act of policy, or in compliance with
external directives, rather than as a means of developing performance
monitoring as part of the managerial culture' 1 (p36).
Walsh (1992) also draws attention to the impact of market systems on the
complexities of local authority strategic planning processes.
Increasingly, in the context of market rather than hierarchical
regulation of service delivery activities, strategy formulation (and
inputs by less senior managers into the process) will occur primarily
within the "purchaser" group of managers. They will assess consumer
needs/demands, make policies (embodying elected member values and
strategies), develop new service provision ideas, define the quantity
and quality of service required, employ the contractors or service
"providers",	 and assess	 their performance	 against service
specifications, and measures of consumer satisfaction (Brooke, 1989,
pp2O-21; Audit Commission, 1989) . As Walsh suggests, in the context of
the planned extensions of CCT to various white-collar professional
services, formalised contract and service specifications cannot easily
be written in a way which allows amendment and change in the context of
policy changes to be made by the authority in response to chailging
political and environmental circumstances. He also draws attention to
the lack of discussion about the impact of contracting out service
provision on the role of elected members, which "may indicate the
significant depo].iticising capacity of competition" (1992, p73), and
which raises serious questions about consequent reductions in local
accountability. Even more importantly, echoing Mintzberg's assertion
about the difficulty of distinguishing clearly between professional
service delivery and informal/formal policy making, Walsh points out
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that "Strategy is riot something that can be done in abstraction from
specific services. If everything is contracted out, it is difficult to
see how those few strategists left will develop the understanding of and
familiarity with services that will be necessary for concrete action"
(1992, p78)
Lateral Devices
In addition to the coordinating mechanisms of direct supervision and
standardisation of work processes, skills and outputs, organisations
require additional systems to ensure liaison through mutual adjustment
both within and between departments and sections. The traditional
"departmentalism" of local authority structures and management systems -
the division of local authority functions into rigorously differentiated
departments based on professional specialisms - has always emphasised
vertical rather than horizontal or lateral flows of information and
communication (Haynes,1980). The latter tended to take place mainly at
senior levels in the organisation - in the strategic apex. As part of
its advocacy of a corporate approach, the Bains report urged the
adoption of lateral devices such as a management team (subsequently
established in nearly all local authorities), and interdepartmental
groups. Of both a temporary and permanent nature, these groups were to
cut across departmental boundaries - programme area teams grouped around
the overall objectives of the organisation, and project control groups
to implement specific projects. In addition to senior management teams,
Greenwood and Warner's (1985) survey identifies the presence of deputy
chief of ficer groups, administrative officer groups, interdepartmental
programme groups organised on a topic or service basis, and, more
recently, area-based teams relating to service delivery organised on a
geographical area basis. Most of the latter are centred around one
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service sector, such as housing, with a small number involving " one stop
shops" for a variety of services (see discussion above) . 	 Provision of
such devices varied from council to council, ranging, for example, in
the case of interdepartmental programme groups from 43% of the
metropolitan districts to 80% of the London boroughs in the 1985 survey.
The trends during the 1980s towards the creation of specialist units or
posts within service departments for central services such as finance
and personnel also provide additional mechanisms for liaison between
service and central support service departments, in a matrix for-rn of
structural relationships (Greenwood and Warner; Young and Mills,
1993)
At member level, Young and Mills also report increases in informal
member and member/officer working groups and parties. In addition to the
formal Policy Committee, providing overall direction for the authority
and established by nearly all local authorities in 1974, new approaches
are increasingly being adopted (in addition to formal committees
meetings) . These include: leaders' (of each of the service committees)
meetings; councillor panels and working groups to explore specific
policy areas and issues; new committees not concerned with running
services such as equal opportunities committees; informal seminars for
committees to review their working (Clarke, 1985; Davies, 1986). Small
increases (from 23% in 1980 to 25% in 1988) in the relatively few number
of councils with committees responsible for particular geographical
areas were reported by Stoker er al (1988). 	 Closer working
relationships between officers and members are developing, with an
increase in officers attending party group meetings and increased
contact between the chief executive and the council leader (Young and
Davies,	 1990), with increased contact between councillors and
departmental officers directly, rather than through the chief officer
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(Stoker, 1991)
In the context of the requirements for local authorities to replace
"organisationally determined" service provision (Clarke et al, 1985) by
more "user-friendly 11 systems of service delivery and increased emphasis
on quality of service provision and responsiveness to local community
needs (in the context of the strategic planning approach described
above), a number of publications urge the development of more flexible
communication, coordination and liaison systems both vertically and
horizontally across hierarchical and departmental boundaries (for
example: Clarke and Stewart, 1989; Jackson and Robson, 1989; LGTB,
1988a; LGTB, 1987; Stoker, 1989) . The development of market systems for
regulating local authority service provision also require increased
levels of "horizontal" liaison between purchasers and providers of
services.	 Increasingly, in the context of the "mixed economy" and
"enabling" council, such liaison devices have to operate not just across
internal departmental boundaries, but across organisational boundaries,
as provider units become	 located increasingly in external
private/voluntary sector organisations.
Both purchasers and providers have to work in close liaison with other
agencies and community groups, who contribute towards policy
formulation,	 service provision and performance review processes
(Cochrane).	 The "enabling" council, with its increased levels of
involvement with external providers, with partially locally authority
controlled "arm's length" agencies, partnerships, and part-ownerships
within various joint bodies, will require extensive formal and informal
lateral devices to ensure effective joint planning, working and
collaboration. Thus: "officers will have a major preoccupation with
inter-organisational relationships and the creation of networks to
achieve the Council's strategic goals.. .the Chief Executive and Chief
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Officers will see an increasing role in looking outwards at their area
as direct service provision by the authority declines... .Members and
Chief Officers will spend more time in developing convergent strategies
with external agencies and in developing joint networks for service
provision" (Brooke, p21). Corresponding changes can be identified in
middle management role prescriptions and behaviour (see discussion in
the next chapter).
These developments can be seen, in conjunction with changes in unit
grouping (discussed above), and more decentralised decision-making
systems (see discussion below), as representing an apparent move from
hierarchical to market through to the "network" form of an almost
"boundaryless" organisation (Peters, 1992; Francis, 1994). Aided by more
sophisticated computer technology, 	 this organisational form is
characterised	 by	 longer-term "horizontal",	 cooperative	 and
non-competitive relationships between all parties concerned (both within
and outside the organisation), to the mutual benefit of all, with an
emphasis on more use of the the "mutual adjustment" coordination
strategy, characteristic of Mintzberg's adhocracy configuration.
However, the limitations on the real-isation of such a model in practice
(apart from a few specific product/service sectors, discussed in chapter
1) tend to bear even more heavily upon local authority organisations,
with their more ambiguous purposes and functions, and public
accountability requirements, than on private sector firms. For example,
in relation to the "mixed economy" approach to care under the NHS and
Community Care Act, Langan and Clarke (1994, p88) argue that the idea of
the "seamless web" or "network" provision of services shared between a
large number of private, voluntary and public providers suffers from two
competing injunctions: "One is to use the competition inherent in the
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mixed economy of welfare to obtain 'value for money' services. This
places a premiut on contracting, looking for market advantages and
exercising purchasing power. The second is concerned with the 'enabling'
and 'partnership' visions of service delivery. These stress the role of
the authority in fostering alternative service providers, building up
good relations, developing multi-agency working and joint initiatives.
It is not clear that these two versions of the local authority role sit
comfortably together".
Langan and Clarke go on to suggest that these functions may operate at
different levels in the organisation, with lower level managers
concentrating on the "bridge-building" activities. Yet, even here they
draw attention to the problem of possibly conflicting strategic
priorities between partner organisations, and also to the different
processural and behavioural characteristics of the partner
organisations. Traditional differences, conflicts and tensions between
different professional and departmental groups within the same authority
are likely to be even greater between different organisations with
different priorities, professional cultures and power constellations.
Quasi-market regulation of transactions between purchaser and provider
groups within the same or different organisations are also unlikely to
provide a satisfactory mechanism for encouraging mutual collaboration
between the two functions. Walsh (1992, p77) draws attention td the
"contract bureaucracy" which can characterise attempts to apply the
discipline of service level agreements and service specifications to
more complex professional services: "contract management may easily
become proceduralised nd bureaucratised with variation orders for any
change, and a plethora of work orders and invoices.. .Lines of
communication may thus become longer and more complex".




strength of this centralised decision-making tradition, from operational
levels through the chief officer to the elected member committees, is
illustrated by the fact that the London Borough of Bromley (1989) found
it necessary to specifically include, as one of the components of its
move towards a new more accountable management style, the delegation to
staff of the power to sign letters and write official reports in their
own names instead of that of the chief officer.
During the l980s and 90s, there were moves amongst some authorities
(under the stimulus of the contract management systems required by CCT
legislation, and, for example, under the 1988 Education Act enforcing
local financial management systems for schools) towards a more devolved
management style. High levels of detailed control over operational
decision-making were replaced by more effective overall control"
(Stoker, 1989, p34). This involved the delegation of greater operational
responsibilities and more control over finances and other resources to
managers at the lowest possible levels, within a framework of clear
organisational and departmental goals, and the development of clear
service specifications and performance indicators. Young and Mills
reported that, within the three service departments covered by their
survey: " Decentralisation continues steadily in housing services, with
more than two-thirds of authorities now operating a wholly - or partly -
decentralised service.. .almost half of all Social Services Departments
are seeking further decentralisation in the context of a move towards
specialisation (of service provision) . . . close to half of the Local
Education Authorities are seeking 'maximum feasible decentralisation' to
schools under Local Financial Management, which has seen very large
increases in the proportions of schools affected between 1990 and 1992."
(p2l-22). Some, mainly urban authorities - such as Tower Hamlets -
introduced decentra].ised political as well as service delivery systems,
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with local area committees of councillors responsible for all service
provision within a specific geographical area (Lowndes).
A 1988 survey, which predates the development of schools' local
financial management, reported an increase from 12.4 % to 26.2 of local
authorities who had adopted devolved budgetary control to unit/centre
managers in some or all departments, although the authors stress that
the extent of resource deployment flexibility and/or autonomy given to
these managers was not examined (Stoker et al, 1988) . Some authorities
(nearly half of the Young and Mills survey authorities) have developed
comprehensive cost centre management systems throughout their
organisations; an example often quoted in the literature is Berkshire
county council with its 600 cost centres, excluding individual schools
(Geeson and Haward, 1990). 	 These trends towards decentralisation of
service delivery also involve changes in the role of the central
services. As Young and Mills point out, traditionally, these services
have been centrally maintained, with some partial decentralisation
within larger authorities. Managers operating under the constraints of
CCT and/or within more decentralised service delivery systems have
demanded both greater operational freedom and better value for money
from central services, resulting in close scrutiny of both the functions
and cost of central services provision (Walsh, 1991; Kay and Malone)
Young and Mills reported various new approaches to central service
provision, involving varying degrees of decentralisation of such
services within some authorities, including the introduction of Service
Level Agreements, and (but by only 10% of the authorities) the adoption
of a trading account format.
It is important to stress that, as Stoker (1989, p33) points out: "The
aim (of devolved management) is not to remove control over managers but
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rather to change the nature of the control exercised by the
administrative and political centre of the authority" - to move towards
control systems based on the standardisation of outputs, using clearly
defined performance standards, rather than through detailed operational
controls. Correspondingly, the role of the centre should move from an
emphasis on	 centralised routine intervention 	 towards	 "more
discriminating strategic guidance" (Campbell, 1991, pl3), both in
relation to its controls over the performance of the service departments
in relation to strategic objectives and in relation to its own service
provider role. The latter should distinguish clearly between, for
example, fairly routine personnel service provision and the strategic
role of central personnel in devising appropriate personnel strategies
for the whole authority, integrated within and contributing to the
authority's overall strategic plan (Audit Commission, 1991).
These developments, and the trends outlined earlier towards the
"enabling" role of local authorities through CCT, uaFs length"
agencies, neighbourhood offices etc., - the drift "towards the 'Quango'
agency model" (Campbell, p12) - parallel the trends in the private
sector towards the divisionalised form outlined in Chapter 1. As
Mintzberg (1989) points out, however, there are problems in attempting
the adoption of a divisionalised structure for public sector
authorities, connected particularly with the use of performance
measures: the public sector's goals Nare largely ill-suited to
performance control systems. In other words, many of the goals most
important for the public sector. . . simply do not lend themselves to
measurement, no matter how long and how hard public officials continue
to try	 (Mintzberg, 1989, pl7l). As noted earlier, it is difficult to
specify performance outcomes as opposed to more easily quantifiable
outputs, and managers can be drawn towards concentration on tangible
- 166 -
ecomomic/volume output goals at the expense of more intangible and
qualitative, but equally, or more important, social goals. Pressures to
achieve measurable goals tend to drive out goals that cannot be
measured, such as service quality, pride in work, and good service to
the customer.	 Moreover, rigorous performance measures can reduce
managers' inclinations to innovate; fear of failure or making mistakes
can also inhibit the degree of delegation down to lower level managers -
especially in politically sensitive service areas such as, say, social
work. Mintzberg concludes that: 	 "appearances and even trends
notwithstanding, the diversified configuration is generally not suited
to the public and not-for-profit sectors of society. . . .public-type
institutions that wish to divisionalise to avoid centralised machine
bureaucracy may often find the imposition of performance standards an
artificial exercise. They may thus be better off trying to exercise
control of their units in a different way" (Mintzberg, 1989, p172).
Mintzberg goes on to suggest a "normative" control system based on
coherent and specific organisational values and cultures within which
managers could be allowed to manage freely - similar to Walton's
commitment strategy (1985). In the same vein, Campbell urges the
adoption of some private sector firms' practices, where "the traditional
multi-volume codes of practice, in areas such as personnel, are being
jettisoned in favour of broad company principles" (1991, p20).
However, the local authority managerial requirements, involving rules,
procedures and standards to ensure public accountability, and
impartiality, neutrality and predictability in service delivery (Stewart
and Ranson, 1988) would appear to mitigate against the use of such a
strategy as a primary means of control by local authorities; its most
likely use in local goverument is as a kind of "overlay" over
conventional bureaucratic controls. (Moreover, such "cultural" control
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cannot easily	 be transferred	 to arrangements	 with other
voluntary/public/private	 sector agencies.)	 Thus, in addition to
fulfilling specific performance targets and procedural requirements,
managers may be required to follow less quantitative but equally
important corporate principles enshrined within the corporate culture,
values and mission statements produced by many authorities (see above
under behaviour formalisation and training) . Increased delegation to
local authority departmental/divisional heads and line managers of
devolved responsibilities for previously centralised functions such as
personnel, finance etc. has to be made within a regulatory framework of
central monitoring and control and appropriate resource allocation -
especially under the present central goverri.ment tight expenditure
controls over local authorities.
Similarly, in relation to decentralised service delivery systems,
control of professional work activities through performance outcomes
(derived from strategic plans) is likely to be supplemented by
operational rules and procedures issued by the senior management of each
department or division. These are designed to ensure statutory
compliance, uniformity and equity of service provision, plus consistency
of standards and practice. In addition, "rationing" devices are also
likely to be employed to fit the available supply to the potentially
unlimited demand for services.	 The requirement for public
accountability, through the chief officer to the elected member
committees (plus statutory requirements) limits individual professional
autonomy and choice about the nature of work activities, and the
composition of the client group. Johnson (1972) identifies this as the
u state mediation" strategy for controlling practitioner activities (the
key characteristic of a professionally controlled occupation is that
professional staff control the composition of their client groups and
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the nature of the service rendered to them). In general, as Mintzberg
points out, "public service regulations on appointments and the like, as
well as a host of other rules, preclude the degree of division manager
autonomy available in the private sector" (1989, pl72)
It is therefore difficult to avoid the conclusion that decentralisation
or divisionalisation in local authorities involves service and resource
utilisation performance controls and cultural "overlays" in addition to
only partially reduced procedural and operational controls. This may
tend to result in more rather than less bureaucratisation, and only
limited decentralisation of operational decision-making powers to unit
managers lower down the departmental or divisional hierarchy. The
continuing local public accountability requirements of local authorities
can also inhibit the degree of decentralisation within partner or
co-working arrangements with other agencies. For example, in the context
of a community care implementation exercise: "one particularly striking
feature was Health Service complaints about the slowness of local
authority decision-making and impatience with the need to 'consult
politicians.'" (Langan and Clarke, 1994, p88). (This need - basically to
ensure public accountability - is, of course, one of the reasons put
forward by authors such as Walsh and Stewart against the extensive
contracting out of local authority services to voluntary/private sector
agencies: "the contractor is... .not subject to the requirements imposed
on, for example, local authorities by public accountability, such as
access to information. . .nor is the interpretation of the contract
necessarily so clear that it can be enforced by the client in the way
that in principle, if not always in practice, it can be enforced in a
hierarchy" (Stewart, 1993, p5).) The recent report by the Public
Accounts Committee highlighted the need for more effective controls over
public spending by semi-autonomous agencies: "Taxpayers.. .want to know
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that it is not being spent in ways they disapprove of" (Willman, 1994).
Thus, there is a temptation for public sector organisations, including
local government, to avoid the dangers of public censure by adopting
control mechanisms which become so detailed and prescriptive that they
seriously limit the operational decision-making autonomy of local
authority unit managers; 	 the increases in their new devolved
responsibilities may not be aligned with increases in the levels of
decision-making authority devolved to them over their resource
deployment and service delivery operations. This issue is explored
further below in chapter 4, which examines the impact of the "new"
management systems on middle management role prescriptions and
behaviour.
Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the extensive changes, particularly since
1979, which have taken place in the external environment (including
particularly the institutional framework, of local government). It has
examined the way in which such changes, mediated through the strategic
control exercised by a local ruling group (of elected members) have
precipitated extensive changes in the internal structure and management
systems of many authorities. Across all four of Mintzberg's design
parameters - design of positions and behaviour formalisation systems,
unit/departmental grouping and design, planning and control systems,
decision-making systems - growing numbers of authorities have made, and
are continuing to make, significant moves towards the "new" management
systems identified within the public sector and local government
organisational literature. However, 	 individual local authorities
continue to differ significantly in the extent and nature of the changes
they have introduced in these structural components. It is clear from
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the literature and the surveys quoted above, that many authorities have
made only partial moves towards the "new" model, for reasons connected
predominantly with different local political control systems and
strategies.
Overall, the "new" model appears to 	 represent moves from the
bureaucratic structures traditionally associated with local authorities
(emphasising direct, detailed hierarchical and relatively centralised
control systems), towards more flexible structures with relatively more
decentralised control systems. These are based on specification of
performance outcomes, within a framework of clearly specified
organisational values, formalised strategic planning, and devolved
management systems	 -	 essentially,	 the private sector style
divisionalised form. Within this framework, in the Context of the
"enabling", "competitive",	 and "mixed economy" council, 	 and the
purchaser/provider split, there is more emphasis on horizontal as well
as vertical hierarchical regulation of activities. This operates through
market/contractual relationships between purchasers and providers
operating increasingly at "arm's length" from the authority, within
semi-autonomous business units located inside the authority, or within
external voluntary/private sector/other public sector organisation.
Yet, as discussed above, within each of the four design parameters, it
can be argued that these changes represent more of an amendment to,
rather than a replacement of, traditional hierarchical forms of local
government organisation and management. As noted above in chapter 1,
many private sector organisations are reluctant to reduce their reliance
on relatively detailed and centralised control systems - especially when
operating within rapidly changing/hostile external environments - for
reasons relating to senior management fears of losing power and status,
and with practical difficulties of maintaining control over
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decentralised management units (Mintzberg; Hales, 1993; Robbins, 1990)
Such problems are exacerbated within public sector institutions, such as
local government, subject to strong external political control systems,
and required to operate within a national institutional framework.
As Mintzberg indicates, the whole point of the contingency approach to
organisatiori design is to identify the form of structure which will best
enable an organisation to operate effectively in its environment. As
noted earlier, it is difficult to identify the ultimate outcome or
"product" of	 local authorities. The criteria 	 for assessing the
effectiveness of local authorities remains essentially a politically
based value process rather than the predominantly economic goals and
criteria, used to assess the ultimate effectiveness of private sector
organisations operating within market systems. The extensive external
political control	 of local authorities -	 legitimated by direct
elections, as noted in the key characteristic four of the institutional
framework - and their statutory obligation to provide specific services
and ensure equity of provision would appear to require a critical degree
of central coordination and control through senior management to the
elected members. The latter are responsible (and directly accountable to
the public) for the activities of local government service providers,
not only in terms of outcomes (however these may be defined), but in
terms also of methods and processes - "means" as well as "ends". This
suggests that local authorities may need to retain, albeit in amended
and more flexible forms (including more opportunities for involvement by
more "empowered" local communitIes and citizens in decision-making
processes),	 many	 elements of hierarchical	 and bureaucratic
organisational forms to regulate the activities of both their own staff,
and also those of external contractors.
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These issues are explored further in the next chapter, which examines
the impact of internal structural change within local authorities on the
role prescriptions and behaviour of middle managers, who arguably play a
key role in the implementation of many of these changes. The extent to
which changes are occurring in their work-role behaviour serves as a
useful indicator of the extent to which the changes described above have
actually had an impact on local authority processes and functioning.
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Chapter 4
Organisational restructuring and changing managerial roles in local
government
The contingency model of management was used in chapter 2 to analyse, at
a general level, the impact of organisational restructuring on middle
management roles. This chapter uses the same approach to identify the
impact of local authority restructuring (outlined in the previous
chapter) on local authority middle managers' role prescriptions and
behaviour.	 Contingency approaches indicate that the nature of
managerial work and style is contingent upon a number of situational
factors (Mintzberg, 1973, 1989; Stewart, 1976, 1982, 1989, 1991) . This
contingency framework includes: the internal and external situational
factors described in chapter three, such as the institutional framework
of local government, and the strategic choices exercised by the elected
members and senior management of a particular local authority; the
location of particular managerial posts within particular departments
and/or functions, at particular hierarchical levels; the "person"
occupying the role and his/her own values, style, skills and attributes
(competences); lastly, time factors such as seasonal variations in
workloads.
The moves identified in the previous chapter from "traditional 11 to mnew
forms of local government structure and management systems involve
extensive and significant changes in the roles of local authority middle
managers - defined here, as in chapter two, as managers with significant
supervisory responsibilities, who report to more senior managers, and
who	 have	 first-line	 managers/supervisors	 and/or	 senior
professionals/professional section leaders reporting to them (Dopson and
Stewart, 1990). Local authority middle managers are located in service
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provision departments in the middle line of Mintzberg's organisationa].
model, between the strategic apex at the top, and the operating core at
the bottom, and also in the technostructure and support structure parts
of the organisation, such as finance and personnel:
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(Source: Mintzberg (1989), Mintzberg on Manaement, New York, The Free
Press, p99.)
The "new" local government management systems involve fundamental
redefinitions of the managerial role, frequently described in terms of a
move from	 "professionalism"	 to	 "managerialism"	 and/or	 from
"administration" to "management" (Flynn, 1993). Focusing first on the
"professional" aspects of local authority management,	 "traditional"
middle management tends to operate from within a largely "professional"
orientation within the specialist departments responsible for service
provision - such as social services, education, planning etc. This focus
reflects	 Gouldner's (1957)	 "cosmopolitan" orientation, 	 involving
attempts at adopting a traditional "professional" form of control over
operations - defined by Johnson (1972) as a control strategy which
empowers practitioners to define the composition of the client group,
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their problems/needs and the type of service to be provided. Similarly,
Flynn describes this approach as involving three key features:
professionals are managed by other professionals, who are largely
autonomous from management structure imposed from outside the
profession; service provision is governed by standards and codes of
practice derived from professional associations, rather than the host
organisation; professionals - not their clients - have expert knowledge
about problem definition and the service required to resolve these
problems - services are provided essentially 	 people not with them
(Walsh, 1989)
It is, of course, important to emphasise that this professional ideal
was never realised in local government to the extent that it was,
perhaps, in "traditional" professions such as law and medicine. Because
of the public accountability requirements - through departmental chief
officers to committees of elected councillors - most local government
professionals tend to exercise what Rowbottom (1974) describes, for
example in the social work context, as "delegated discretion" rather
than professional autonomy. 	 There are parallels here with Johnson's
second occupational control strategy - patronage - where a powerful
employer "client" (in this case, the local authority) exercises, to
varying degrees, power over client and need/problem definition and
service provision. In addition, Johnson's third occupational strategy -
state mediation - can be seen clearly to apply to local authority
professionals whose role and functions are circumscribed by the
increasingly rigorous and detailed legislation governing local authority
service provision. Nevertheless, professional staff have tended to seek
to maximise their areas of professional autonomy - to varying degrees of
success, depending in part on the nature of the historical development
and relative status of the different professional groups (Johnson, 1974;
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Laf fin,	 1986; Laffiri	 and Young, 1990).	 For example,	 housing
professionals have not been able to attain the same degree of autonomy
over their work as, say, teachers (although the national curriculum is
currently diminishing the autonomy of the latter).
Conflicts over professional autonomy can operate through the existence
of competing segments within professional groups 	 (for example,
residential, field and community based workers within social work), each
with their own commitment to particular interests, work methods etc.
(Bucher and Strauss, 1961). Conflicts can also exist between core
professional staff's tendencies towards "cosmopolitan" orientations - to
national professional codes of standards values, and practices - and the
more "local" orientation - towards the particular local authority's
policies and resource constraints - manifested by members/chief officers
(Gouldner, 1957; Watson, 1975). The latter are likely to focus more on
"coordinative and management tasks, regulating the work of their staff
and influencing members' policy making, whilst still maintaining
professional legitimacy for their authority" (Laff in and Young, p25)
Lower level managers, who entered local government originally as
professional staff with professional experience and training, were, and,
indeed, continue to be, located in the middle of these tensions and
conflicts between core staff and senior management. Thus, in exploring
problems faced by first-line managers, a LGTB study (1984, p4) found
that: "There was a reluctance to let go of professional or technical
work. For some managers whose authority and competence is predominantly
legitimated by, and derived from, their professional expertise, such
role extensions can prove problematic; in addition they can be perceived
by their professional staff as "selling out" to senior management". The
extent to which such conflicts operate between middle managers - located
between first-line managers/senior professionals and more senior
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managers - is not explored in the literature, but they are likely to
exist to at least some extent. At senior levels, too, similar tensions
can emerge, between members, (with their political-based strategies) and
chief officers, who traditionally tended to hold what Laf fin and Young
(1990, p76) call the "professional advocate" approach: "their primary
commitment being to the development of their service locally, and, in
some cases, nationally as well".
Under the "traditional" local government management systems, the
managerial (as opposed to the professional supervision and regulation)
functions of these departmental "professional" middle managers tended to
involve largely "administrative" activities - as did also the roles of
managers in clerical/administration/manual work departments. Managerial
roles involved essentially "administering systems which are in a steady
state" within a departmental framework of tight budgetary and procedural
controls (Flynn, 1993, p191) . Middle managers had little or no control
over, or responsibility for, the management of finance and other
resources; these were controlled centrally by centralised finance,
personnel etc. departments (Campbell, 1991). As discussed in chapter
3, this old-style administration operated essentially within "an
organisation obsessed with budgets and procedures and forgetting about
the users", and tended to be dominated by professional adherence to
professional standards and prescriptions with little regard f or
community/consumer needs and involvement in service planning and
delivery (Flynn, 1993, ppl9l-l92)
During the 1980s and 90s, local authorities increasingly moved away from
this traditional system, based on "administration", towards the new
"managerialist" approach" - based on the view that "managers have 'the
right to manage, which means that they should be in control of the
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organisations which they run, and that they should be very
proactive. . . . It is this view of managers as controllers which underlies
many of the managerial reforms in the public sector. (Flynn,
1993, ppl9O-191). These developments tend to bear particularly heavily
on local authority middle managers, in the context of prevailing views
that management functions are increasingly becoming distributed
throughout the authority: "Management is best defined not as a limited
number of 'top' or 'leading' positions, but as a set of competences,
attitudes and	 q-ualities broadly distributed 	 throughout the
organisation." (LME, 1993a, p8). In the context of the moves towards
the divisionalised forms of structure outlined in the previous chapter,
middle managers are likely, as managers of semi-autonomous "provider"
business units, to acquire responsibilities for new functional areas
such as finance, personnel and other resource management. They are
expected to become proactive and outward- rather than inward-looking -
to the customer and the local community, to their local authority
"purchasers" or clients, and to opportunities for generating more
businesses, and providing a responsive service which meet "purchaser"
and end-user/local community needs/demands (Stoker, 1989; Stewart,
1988a). In the context of the "enabling" authority, middle managers are
also becoming increasingly involved in complex networks of relationships
both with the authority and with other community and voluntary/private
sector agencies through joint-planning, co-working and contractural
arrangements and activities - which will operate for both "provider" and
"purchaser" managers (Brooke, 1989).
Professional orientations, within the context of more formalised
strategic planning, are required to move towards a firm "local"
orientation, corresponding with Johnson's patroriage strategy for
occupational control, with a large powerful client - the local authority
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purchaser - defining service objectives and, increasingly, the scope and
nature of professional service delivery. Within performance management
systems, both middle managers and core professional staff are having to
accept "calls for greater accountability to politicians and managers"
(Stoker,	 p64).	 Moreover: "Professional	 expertise,	 traditionally
associated with the delivery of services, will no longer be an adequate
substitute for managerial competence. Professional staff will more and
more seek to augment their specialist knowledge by management
training..." (LGMB, 1993a, p13; Watson, Preddy and Drury, 1992).
Similarly, the role of middle managers will focus less on professional
supervision, and more on the new "managerialist" aspects of their roles
(see discussion on previous page). Chief officers' roles tend to move
towards that of the "engaged professional advocate": "Instead of the
earlier adovocate stance of Olympian detachment and assumed indifference
to local politics, the contemporary professional advocate adopts a
stance of engagement in and concern for local political processes, and
will generally work comfortably enough with a council whose political
persuasion strongly favours the development of the particular service"
(Laf fin and Young, phi).
CCT legislation, including particularly the forthcoming extension of CCT
to hitherto largely untouched white-collar professional services, and
the trends towards flatter hierarchies, pose a threat to the job
security and opportunities for promotion up the hierarchy which were
traditionally enjoyed by local authority managers, in the context of the
local authority as "model" or "good practice" employers (Farnham, 1993).
Job satisfaction and commitment levels may be affected by pressures for
more accountability, combined with increasingly stringent resource
constraints and the need to acquire new "managerialist" competences,
within an environment of accelerating and continual change (Leach et al,
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1993)
Essentially, the new management model operates on the assumption that
the differences outlined in chapter 3 between local govern.ment and
private sector management styles and systems are disappearing in the
sense that running, say, a leisure department is basically the same as
running a company. Certainly, the changes summarised above in middle
management roles reflect the changes occurring generally across all
employment sectors, as identified in chapter 2. However, as suggested in
the previous chapter, it can be argued that the institutional framework
of local government, with its unique local public accountability
requirements, continue to place constraints on the extent to which the
new managerialism can be applied to local authorities. Moves towards the
new management model, plus the constraints on such moves, are analysed
fully below, using Mintzberg's (1973,1989) managerial role framework to
analyse changes in local authority middle managers' work. This
framework, described fully in chapter 2, involves three types of roles,
with subsets for each (1989, p:lG)
FORMAL AUTHORITY
AND STATUS
INTERPERSONAL	 > INFORMATIONAL	 DECISIONAL
ROLES	 ROLES	 ROLES
Figurehead	 Monitor	 Entrepreneur
Leader	 Disseminator	 Disturbance -handler
Liaison	 Spokesman	 Resource allocator
Negotiator
Interpersonal Roles - figurehead, leader, liaison
The figurehead role, "the performance of duties of a ceremonial nature"
(Mintzberg, p150), has always been prominent in local authorities
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amongst senior managers such as the chief executive and the chief
officers, given the formal role of local government and its attendant
rituals and traditions deriving from its nineteenth century origins.
Thus 67 of the chief executives considered that representation of the
authority's interests on formal occasions constituted an essential part
of their role (Norton, 1991), and the Clarke (1988, p8) mentions the
importance of the "ritual function in the external environment" of chief
officers. The growth in public relations activities associated with the
development of the more "responsive" local authority is also likely to
increase the significance of this role (Franklin, 1988). The extent of
the involvement of middle management in such activities is not assessed
in the literature, but, in the context of increased decentralisation of
decision making powers and the growing importance of customer relations,
their role in this area would be expected to become more significant.
With regard to the ceremonial role inside the the local authority, this
is likely to assume more importance for managers throughout the
hierarchy, given the increased significance of the leader role (see
discussion below.
The leader role, refers essentially to the manager's responsibility "for
the work of the people of an organisational unit" (Mintzberg, 1989,
p16) . Changes here are arising from the increased devolution of
responsibilities/authority to middle managers (see discussion below
under decisional roles) resulting in increased "visibility" of middle
managers in terms of their accountablity for performance against pre-set
targets, the broadening of job roles as managers acquire new
responsibilities such as personnel and finance in their new devolved
roles, and increased emphasis on use of the leader's personal style to
motivate and "empower" his/her team of staff.
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In general, the concept of leadership in local government is relatively
new. Local authorities' tradition of "administration" rather than
"management" (as discussed above) 	 tended to emphasise a largely
administrative role of "carrying out, obeying, the demands of seniors"
rather than either the more reactive management/"transactional" style of
"providing hierarchical leadership and supervision" (Snell, 1985, table
1) or the more proactive management/"transformational" style of
inspiring and motivating subordinates. (Within the former, the power and
authority of the manager is clearly defined by his/her hierarchical
position, with an emphasis on conformity by both manager and
subordinates to rules and procedures, and providing rewards for
appropriate levels of effort. The latter is based less upon formal role
prescriptions and more upon personal expertise and attributes, with the
manager	 using innovative	 and proactive	 approaches towards
decision-making, and manifesting personal enthusiasm and commitment to
inspire, motivate and encourage subordinates to "go beyond" contract in
their work activities (Zaleznik, 1977; Bass and Avolio, 1991) ; see full
discussion in chapter 2.)
A number of publications emphasise the growing importance of the
leadership role for the chief executive (Norton, 1991), for senior
officers (LGTB, 1988, 1984; Jackson and Robson, 1989), for first line
managers (LGTB 1984), and for all managerial staff (Clarke and Stewart,
1990; Hadley and Young, 1990; Buckland and Joshua, 1990; Issac-Henry and
Painter, 1991; LGMB, 1991, LGMB, 1993a). These concepts of the leader
role tend to reflect the private sector developments outlined in chapter
2 towards more "transformational" styles. Thus, Clarke and Stewart (p26)
stress: "there will be a premium on leadership .... . at all levels in the
organisation.... . The ability to inspire and motivate staff to innovate
and develop service and to be their own agents for change, as well as to
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understand and marry the needs and interests of service users with those
of the organisation and its personnel are essential. They identify the
need for managers to develop both the task (setting performance
standards, and clarifying the basic values underpinning the authority's
policies and approaches to service delivery) and the people components
of the leadership role 	 (motivating staff and evaluating their
performance), with an emphasis on communication, staff development and
providing a "role model" of personal standards for staff to follow).
Similarly, the LG (1993a) stresses the importance of both "leadership"
and "people management/relationship" skills for managers throughout the
organisation: "Leadership skills - the ability to demonstrate
leadership ..... .both 'Individual' Leadership and 'Team' Leadership, to
inspire, guide, motivate individuals and teams. 'Strategic Leadership'
in setting and maintaining organisational direction and Leadership of
'Change' to maintain momentum and enthusiasm in change efforts... .Well
developed people management/relationship skills - Skills to relate to,
motivate, develop, appraise, empower and release potential of staff.
Ability to develop and lead a team. The personal flexibility to act as
both a team member or team leader. Ability and willingness to
delegate. . ..An ability and enthusiasm to manage diverse workforces with
proven commitment to positive action and equality..." (pp23-25)
Clearly, the extent to which these approaches are actually being adopted
by local authorities will vary from authority to authority. Some of
these publications provide examples of applications in particular
authorities.	 For example,	 Hadley and Young describe the
transformational-style " synergic" leadership approach adopted by East
Sussex for managers throughout the authority, and especially at lower
levels, involving "the underlying notion of creating conditions in which
increased scope for the growth and development of the worker and
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workgroups can contribute directly to the goals of the organisation"
(Hadley and Young, p154). Thus considerable emphasis is placed upon
enabling and "empowering" the members of a work group - both within
professional service delivery and within administrative and manual
services - to encourage group member involvement and participation in
new initiatives within the framework, conveyed by the leader, of the
authority's values and "vision". Similarly, in Nottingham (Buckland and
Joshua, 1992), the development of strong leadership at all levels in the
authority is seen as essential to communicate "vision", identify the new
direction, and gain the commitment and confidence of staff in the
context of moves towards a new culture emphasising the importance of
high levels of performance and service quality, improved financial
management and more responsive service delivery systems.
Trends identified in the previous chapter towards increased use of
performance appraisal systems, increased emphasis on training provision,
and the development of devolved management systems (see below under
decisional roles) also suggest the adoption by middle managers in
growing numbers of authority of at least some aspects of the new
leadership approaches. For example, managers are expected to take
responsibility for ensuring the development and training of their staff
in Nottingham City Council's new devolved management system. More
formalised performance appraisal systems require managers to focus on
the assessment of each individual staff member's performance, plus their
training/development needs (Fowler, 1988)
A number of problems can emerge in relation to the adoption of these
leadership approaches by middle and junior local authority managers.
Effective adoption by middle managers of these transformational style
leadership roles requires time for them to develop new forms of
behaviour, training to help them acquire the necessary skills, and
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resources to meet the development/training needs of their staff
identified through performance appraisal processes. General increases in
training/development resources and provision were identified within many
authorities in the previous chapter.. Yet such increases may not be
sufficient (especially in circumstances of more rigorous spending
controls) to meet the training needs of either the middle mangers or
their staff, resulting in frustration and disillusionment amongst both
parties. Only 46% of the respondents to a LGMB (1994) survey considered
that they received sufficient training for their jobs. Pressures on
managers "to do more with less" in the context of the resource
constraints which frequently accompany devolved management systems can
result in temptations to cut back on the time-consuming activities
associated with these leadership approaches in favour of concentration
on the achievement of more tangible and measurable performance targets
connected with resource utilisation and service delivery.
Moreover, some managers may simply find it difficult to make the
required changes in behavioural styles and attitudes. Despite a planned
management of change programme, including training provision, Hadley and
Young (p40) reported on the differing capacities of their lower level
managers to adopt more "transformational leadership styles: "Some
understood its demands well .....you see the importance given to team
building, to briefing members on developments in the wider organisation
and their implications for the team, and the care that is taken to push
out the frontiers on shared decision-making as interest and ability to
cope develop. But other managers have had difficulty in accepting the
need for participation and have sometimes run into opposition and
confrontation as a result". Respondents to a LGMB (1994) survey,
identified various areas for improvement in their superiors' leadership
behaviour, concerned mostly with: indadequate communication (both to and
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from subordinates) and information provision (see discussion below under
informational roles); the limited extent to which managers acted on
their subordinates' suggestions; an absence of clear work objectives and
feedback on performance. Half of all the respondents felt that good
performance was not recognised, and that little was done about poor
performance.
Managers can certainly experience problems in carrying out formal
aappraisals of their staff performance. Many managers in two recent
surveys (Spence, 1990; Palmer, 1993) expressed fairly positive views
about the introduction of performance management systems. They
considered that such systems improved communication between employee and
manager, clarified organisational goals and work objectives, and were
useful for justifying the use of resources, measuring progress aginst
plans, and raising staff/management consciousness about economy
efficiency and effectiveness. However, some managers were concerned
about the time required to carry out staff appraisals; they experienced
feelings of stress arising from criticisms of their own performance as
appraisers by their staff; they disliked the "uncomfortable experience"
of being compelled to judge the performance of others; they did not
consider performance review to be necessary: "there appeared to be some
resistance to the idea that employees should be managed proactively to
ensure that their potential is realised." (Spence, p4). Some managers in
Palmer's survey resented the heavy reliance on quantitative indicators,
which were seen as less valid than the less frequently used qualitative
indicators (see discussion below under decisional roles)
Campbell (1991), too, comments on the difficulties of ensuring that line
managers, with their new devolved powers, duties and performance targets
to meet, delegate in turn to their own supervisors and staff. Middle
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line managers "will often tend to restrict the autonomy of their own
subordinates" (p11) - for reasons connected essentially with fears about
loss of power and status, and with the technical problems of maintaining
control over more autonomous subordinates (see discussion below under
decisional roles). For first-line managers in a LGTB survey (1984) a
central concern surrounding their decisions about the scope of
delegation "was the anxiety of relying on another person's competence
and standards" (p4). Similarly, for middle managers, the introduction of
more rigorous monitoring and assessment of their more "visible"
performance levels may inhibit the extent to which they are prepared to
risk delegating performance responsibilities 	 (on which their own
performance will be assessed) to their staff. Managers can become
concerned that the justification for their position might be diminished,
resulting, ultimately, in the possible disappearance of these posts.
Moreover, senior management role models may not reinforce the
acquisition of more "empowering" leadership styles by lower level
managers. Some middle managers in the Nottingham and East Sussex studies
quoted above resented the way in which they were being urged to adopt
"empowering" management styles themselves, while senior management did
not always adopt such styles towards them.
Many of these problems reflect those reported in the private sector with
the more "transformational" leadership roles, but an additional
constraint, arguably exacerbating these problems, relates to the
institutional framework of local government. While there is undoubtedly
scope for managers' workforces to become more involved in team
decision-making and to exercise more control over work processes, public
accountability requirements can place constraints on the extent of
u empowering I leadership styles: "In a hierarchical organisation,
ultimately answerable to a committee of elected representatives, the
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team manager carries the final responsibility for the performance of his
team. In this sense, his role in ensuring at least the minimum required
standards of performance is more negotiable within the team than the
standards themselves and his stance has to be directive" (Hadley and
Young, p140).
Mintzberg's third interpersonal role, the liaison role refers to
managerial contacts outside the vertical chain of command; there appears
to be a trend towards an increase in such activities for middle managers
in the context of the general moves away from "vertical" hierarchical to
more "horizontal" market and/or "network" forms of management described
in the previous chapters. Thus, managers need to develop the abilities
to build and maintain complex relationships with a wide variety of key
people" (LGMB, 1993a, p23). In the context of developing a more
flexible "learning organsation" Clarke and Stewart (1988, p12) emphasise
the need to "actively encourage horizontal as much as vertical
communication and activity". The "learning organisation" requires
managers to take the initiative in developing both themselves and their
organisations. When accompanied by devolved management systems, which
encourage middle managerial innovation and a "willingness to challenge
traditional thinking", 	 such initiatives	 increasingly include
cross-organisational	 and inter-organisational	 activities such as
participation in working parties, secondments, 	 involvement with
professional associations etc. (LGTB, 1988). Middle managerial roles
increasingly involve work within a context of interdepartmental and
interdisciplinary groups and project teams, which require more
understanding and knowledge of additional specialist areas, more
contacts with managers	 from different functional areas, 	 and
"intelligence and information systems which cross professional
boundaries." (LGTB, 1988, p64; Watson Preddy and Drury, 1992).	 For
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example, the move towards area divisionalisation in East Sussex social
services department broke down the barriers, previously significant,
between the various social work professional specialisms such as
field and residential staff, and used management team meetings to ensure
lateral communication flows between the new area based work units.
lxi the context of the "enabling", •'competitive" and "mixed economy"
council, differentiation on the basis of professional specialisms is
being supplemented by a greater degree of functional differentiation:
"between purchaser and provider, customer and contractor, strategic and
operational, the generalist managers and the professional" (LGMB,
l993a). Such differentiation involves middle managers in increased
volumes of liaison activity between these functions. This includes,
increasingly, contacts with voluntary/private/other public sector
agencies located outside as well as within the local authority - as well
as with a wider range of customers and local community groups, in the
context of more responsive service planning and delivery systems. Within
devolved management systems, middle managers are becoming increasingly
involved in these contacts. The liaison role of the middle manager is
seen as crucial in ensuring effective implementation of these
market/networking	 forms of	 organisation:	 "Inter-organisational
partnerships will founder if middle management do not share a sense of
commitment to joint working" (Brooke, 1989, p55).
In addition to joint-working arrangements with other agencies, middle
managers, as purchasers of services, become involved in extensive
liaison with their provider counterparts both within and outside the
authority - both in the initial negotiation of the service level
agreement or contract, ongoing amendments to it, the actual service
delivery, and the monitoring/evaluation of the delivery (see the
discussion of Snow's (1982) 	 Lead Operator and Caretaker roles in
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chapter 2). Greater awareness of the need to become closer to customers'
wants, needs and priorities - both at the individual and the collective
level - involves more extensive contact with these individuals and
groups (especially by purchaser managers) to ensure their involvement in
the planning and monitoring of services (LGTB, 1987; Walsh, 1989). For
example, one of the reasons for East Sussex's decentralisation of social
services provision to area teams was to improve liaison with local
groups. In the context of a "new, outwards-directed" local authority
managerial style, this "governance role" focuses more and more on
maintaining existing external relationships, and building new ones:
"Management involves community leadership and the creation and
maintenance of networks within the authority's social and economic
environment. Management will help give voice to public grievance and
suggestion, and enhance the ability of citizens to acquire leverage not
only in their delaing with the authority itself, but with other public
service providers operating in the locality" (Hadley and Young, 1990,
p11-12).	 In some authorities, middle managers will also be in closer
contacts with councillors, as a result of the trends towards councillor
contact directly with the relevant officer, rather than through the
chief officer. Geographical service decentralisation is also likely to
increase contacts with local councillors (LGTB, 1989; Hadley and Young;
Lowndes and Stoker, l992a).
The purpose of these liaison activities is to gather, process, exchange
and disseminate information (informational roles), which, in turn is
used to inform and support the manager's decisional role performance;
each of these role sets is discussed below.
Informational Roles - Monitor, Disseminator, Spokesperson
A key role of the manager refers to collecting, processing and
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distributing a large volume of information, much of which takes oral
rather than written form (Mintzberg, 1973). The enhancement of the
leader role, in conjunction with a number of developments described in
the previous chapter, such as increased use of strategic management
approaches and performance management systems all suggest increases in
"vertical" information and communication flows - especially with the
growth of information technology	 (IT) utilisation within local
authorities. Similarly, the increase in the "horizontal" liaison
activities noted above suggest significant increases in the volume of
information processed by middle managers. Particularly in the context of
more devolved management systems, these managers are expected to play a
key role in these information processing activities, which form a
complex web of "horizontal" and "vertical" communication channels both
within the authority and between the authority and other
agencies/community groups, as well as customers (both individual and
collective)
In the context of examining the potentially radical impact of
sophisticated computerised technology on these information systems, and,
ultimately, on organisational structures, Tapscott and Caston (1993)
suggest that information flows have three main functions - to improve
work-group performance; to ensure effective integration, coordination
and control of activities within the organisation; to ensure the same
between the organisation and external agencies. These critical shifts in
the use of IT thus potentially enable enterprises 	 "to have a
high-performance team structure, to function as integrated businesses
despite high business unit autonomy, and to reach out and develop new
relationships with external organisations - to become an 'extended
enterprise'" (pl4) - reflecting the boundaryless or network forms of
structure described in chapter 3. A recent survey by the Society of
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Information Technology Managers (1991) suggests increasing investment in
more sophisticated IT systems by local authorities. These systems are
increasing authorities' capacity for achieving integration of various
information systems across the organisation, and, although to a lesser
extent, with other agencies: "most authorities now have a considerable
infrastructure of terminals and personal computers in their offices
which could be used for electronic communication, and facilitate access
by one	 part of the	 authority to information 	 held in
another.. . .Authorities now need to work more closely with with health
authorities, housing associations, voluntary associations and private
companies. They need to examine the information systems and facilities
which are available to them for communicating and exchanging information
with these agencies" (LGMB, 1993b)
For example, Hampshire County Council has developed a large network, of
over 3000 computer terminals used by 7000 people, which provides
information on a large variety of topics. Stevenage Borough Council has
developed an IT system including a mainframe computer with the capacity
to run both current systems and new ones as reqi.iired, plus a network of
workstations throughout the organisation (LGMB, 1993c) . While, partly
due to resourcing problems, these systems do not as yet appear to meet
the sophisticated and fully integrated ideal identified by Tapscott and
Caston - especially in relation to inter-organisational integration -
they are undoubtedly increasing the volume of information circulating
within authorities. In addition to the increased information flows
arising from the growing development of inter- as well as
intra-organisation work and management systems, devolved management
systems also involve managers in more operational information management
activities in the context of increased responsibilities for resource
management. Indeed, it can be argued that the development of IT
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information systems played a key part in facilitating the development of
such devolved/management by contract systems (Hambleton and Hoggett,
1990; Langan and Clarke, 1994).
Looking first at primarily "vertical" communication and information
flows, the emphasis on core values and policies emanating from the
centre, and on strong leadership at all levels of the local authority,
requires effective dissemination of these downwards through middle
managers to front line staff. Various improved communication system
include the use of e-mail, newsletters, staff presentations, briefing
sessions, training programmes, and meetings, briefings etc. - used by
managers at all levels to "sell" the changes to their work-teams through
the proactive leadership styles described above (LACS.AB, 1990; Buckland
and Joshua; Issac-Henry and Painter) . The "well-managed" authorities in
Leach et al's (1993) study all emphasised the need for "A commitment to
informing, developing and motivating staff, to create the climate of
identity and motivation necessary to deal with the pressures of change"
(p20). Opportunities for feedback from staff on these developments, up
through middle mangers to the centre, are also needed to ensure
realisation of the "caring, sharing" employer image, and encourage
commitment to change by lower level managers and core staff. The advent
of strategic planning and/or devolved management systems also requires
the dissemination downwards1 to middle managers and their work units, of
the departmental strategies, business plans, performance targets and
resource allocations which govern middle manager decisions about service
planning and delivery, and target-setting for their staff and/or
provider units. Conversely, middle mangers are required to monitor, and
then disseminate the information upwards, the extent to which they and
their work units (and/or provider units/contractors) are meeting
performance criteria/resource utilisation targets (Rogers, 	 1990;
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Caulfield and Schutz, 1989).
Thus, to take the Stevenage example quoted earlier: Managers are
expected to monitor and review constantly the way in which their
services are provided to ensure that service delivery and service
development are progressing according to plan and that the quality of
service, as laid down in service specifications, is achieved. The
development of the Council's information techonology system has made
possible the generation, dissemination and use of key information to
underpin these processes" (LGMB, 1993c, p4'1). In addition, purchaser
managers will be expected to obtain operational information collected
about a wide range of service delivery issues - such as, for example,
customer satisfaction/unmet needs - for feeding into, contributing to,
and informing the strategy formulation process. Hadley and Young (p132)
stress the extent to which devolved management "creates pressures for
more detailed information and more sophisticated criteria on which to
assess performance" (p132) . A comment by one manager, listing the
performance standards which he had to follow and on which he had to
provide information, aptly illustrates this point: "reviews need to be
completed on time, and are subject to disciplinary procedures.
Complaints procedures, professional standards, staying within budgets,
allocation of hours.. .no overtime working, no car travel excess, no
subsistence claims above normal, health and safety checks, fire drills,
home-help hours, staff development reviews and many other standards... U
(ppl22-3)
The growth in middle managers' liaison role described above - in
relation to increased multi-disciplinary, project team/group working
both within authorities and across authority boundaries with other
agencies, increased customer/local community group contact, and the
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purchaser provider split - also suggests increased levels of middle
managers' involvement in monitoring, disseminator and spokesperson
activities. Attempts to achieve better service quality and improved
customer relations in many authorities - plus the stimulus provided by
the government's Citizen's Charter initiative - have resulted in an
increase in marketing type activities to identify needs, involve
users/user groups in service planning, "advertise" service availability
and monitor the effectiveness of service provision (Walsh, 1989; LGTB,
1987; Audit Commission, 1985) . As the LGTB (1993a, p25) points out,
managers need to develop "Marketing skills - ability to analyse and
understand the needs and aspirations of the variety of service users,
develop responsive services and promotional skills" (25). 	 These
developments suggest significant additional responsibilities for the
middle manager. These responsibilities include the monitoring and
dissmination of strategic and consumer marketing-type information, and
increases in the number of occasions on which s/he may have to act as
spokesperson to local groups to explain council policy/seek local
opinions (LGMB, 1993a). Thus, for example, Nottingham council canvasses
consumer views through "direct contact, customer satisfaction returns,
user groups, suggestion boxes and consultation exercises" in addition to
improving customer complaints procedures. (Buckland and Joshua, p22)
The purchaser/provider split has also undoubtedly added to the middle
managers' liaison and information role activities; the following diagram
illustrates the complexities of the liaison and information
processing/exchanges involved in these market/network service delivery











Thus, purchaser managers,	 hierarchically accountable to senior
management and members in the context of the strategic planning process,
will liaise with referral agents (such as, for example within social
services, the NHS, education, police, housing, district councils etc.),
direct consumers and the general public, as well as with providers to
draw up service specifications and monitor the provider units' service
delivery. Provider managers, hierarchically acountable to their senior
management, are responsible to Purchasers for delivering services
according to the agreed service 	 specifications. This	 involves
information exchanges/contact with the service consumers/users, the
processing of referrals (including relevant service provision) from
other agencies, and various contacts with the general public.
As the LGMB	 (1993b, p19) publication points out, 	 a more open
information culture has to be developed within the authority, to
ensure that all managers and staff recognise the value of information,
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and become committed to using it and managing it effectively. However, a
number of barriers can operate to inhibit free liaison and informational
exchanges within local authorities, and between authorities and other
agencies, in the context of moves towards more open" and integrated
forms of management and delivery delivery systems.
Firstly, the use of computerised technology can pose problems for some
managers, whose attitudes towards IT can vary between those of
u luddites u and "enthusiasts" with most people located within these two
extremes (LGMB, 1993a) . Assessing the impact of IT systems, Davis-Smith
(1987/8, unnumbered pages) einphasises that middle managerial roles may
be particularly affected by the use of IT: "The role of middle managers
may change quite significantly because of the way in which
information-handling develops". Reflecting the discussion on this issue
in chapter 2, she contrasts the potentially positive aspects, involving
opportunities for more challenging and satisfying work and for more
freedom through an increases	 in the extent of delegated
responsibilities, with the more negative aspects (from the managers'
point of view) where IT can be used "to impose greater control and
tighter checks on employees' 	 outputs.. .loss of job security and
prospects.. .fears of deskilling, loss of job satisfaction and an erosion
of status and power". Managers and other staff require training to equip
them with the appropriate skills, knowledge and attitudes necessary to
enable them to make full use of IT; care is also required when designing
IT systems to make sure that they meet user requirements (see discussion
below).
In addition, particularly in the context of devolved management systems,
as noted above, sophisticated IT systems are required to meet both
corporate needs for information standardisation, consolidation and
control, and the budget-holder managers' needs for information tailored
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specifically to their own particular departmental needs which is 'easily
accessible, flexible in scope and content, up-to-date, and easy to
interpret' (Rawlinson and Tanner, 1990, p34; Audit Commission, 1989)
User-managers need to be involved in the design of information systems
to ensure that these meet their "business" needs. The emphasis needs to
move from information systems designed primarily to meet professional
accounting needs to systems designed to help line managers to make more
flexible use of their budgets to provide more efficient and effective
services. Several authors suggest that many local authorities may still
be deficient in meeting many of these informational requirements
(Lowndes and Stoker, 1992a; Lawson, 1993; LG!B, 1993b).
Secondly, in both market, and the more traditional hierarchical arid
departmentalised forms of regulation, the establishment of an
"information" culture requires significant attitude changes on the part
of the managers involved, including a shift towards seeing information
as "corporate property" rather than as the jealously guarded property of
particular individuals or departments 	 (LGTB, 1990).	 Information
possession can constitute an important source of power and status for
both individuals and departments; individuals may resist what they
perceive as a threatening loss of control over access to "their"
information, resulting in "authoritarian barriers to lateral or systemic
thinking" (Hood, 1991, ppl4-l5 ). The purchaser/provider split can form
a barrier inhibiting free information exchanges/communication between
the two sides, with the every-present risk of the "contract bureaucracy"
discussed in chapter 3. As Hulme (1994, p56) illustrates (using the
"prisoners' dilemma" analogy), contract regulation, especially under
conditions of uncertainty and only limited competition (quasi-markets),
can result in "selfish" behaviour involving the withholding of
information, rather than the "collaborative behaviour" where both
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parties	 freely agree to share information and ideas. Lateral
communication between managers in each function may also be further
complicated by the appointment of specialist liaison manager to assist
in establishing and regulating contractual relationships. Moreover
purchaser managers may become increasingly remote from the "coalface" of
service delivery/need identification, thus inhibiting the effectiveness
of the contributions made by such managers to the strategic planning
process (Walsh, 1992)
Professional staff, too, can be reluctant to accept the principle of
publishing and sharing information: "To many professionals 'information
is power' and 'hoarding information' is one of their less worthy
characteristics" (Watkins, Drury and Preddy, p87) . Such tendencies can
restrict the amount of information provided to the members of
professionals' own work units, and to the multi-disciplinary and
cross-functional groups within which, increasingly, they and their
managers are likely to be working. These practices can also have a
deleterious effect on the effectiveness of inter-departmental and
inter-agency working - exacerbated by continuing differences here in the
cultures, professional ideologies, and priorities of different agencies.
Enabling open access by both individual and collective locai
customers/community groups to certain "sensitive" information can also
be inhibited by fears that it could be used to put pressures on
authorities to provide additional services, and/or draw- unwelcome (to
the ruling political group/senior managers) attention to deficiencies in
resourcing or service delivery. For example, in the context of problems
over matching needs with available resources within community care
programmes, the chief inspector of the Social Services Inspectorate, in
a "leaked" confidential communication, "warned councils not to tell
older and disabled people of their rights under the new system unless
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funds were available to deliver the relevant services .... . 'practitioners
will have to be sensitive to the need not to raise unrealistic
expectations on the part of users and carers' (Langam and Clarke, p87).
Similarly, officers can be reluctant to make increased (computerised)
information available to councillors because it is seen as increasing
member control over internal management processes, at the expense of
their own. (Stoker et al, 1988)
Organisational "political" pressures and managerial desires to maintain
power and status - combined with technical deficiencies in information
systems design and IT applications, and lack of managerial
competence/inadequate training - can also inhibit internal information
flows up and down the organisation. Despite various initiatives
undertaken by some authorities to identify employee views about the
effectiveness of their communication systems, Skelcher (1992) found that
many employees were dissatisfied with the quality and quantity of
downward communication. They felt they had to rely too much on the
informal "grapevine" channels, rather that the preferred source of
meetings and discussions directly with their managers. Similarly, the
majority of the respondents to a LGMB (1994) employee attitude survey
were a little more likely to feel that they receive at best limited
information (53%) than they were to feel fully (7%) or fairly well
informed (37%). More senior officers and/or managerial staff tended to
be the most critical. Over 60% felt that "too little information" was
provided on the reasons behind major decisions, and decisions taken by
councillors, rising to over 70% on "plans for the future".
Opportunities for upward communication also appear to be limited in many
authorities; Skelcher suggests that "employees often experience
communication as a one-way process - downwards!", with inadequate
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channels for conveying their views about service delivery and other
issues upwards: "when there is an opportunity to express opinions and
ideas they seem to disappear into a vacuum since no feedback is given on
what has subsequently happened." (p8,11). Just over two-thirds of the
LG (1994) survey respondents expressed similar views. In addition,
Skeicher found that many employees felt that their managers were poor at
communicating information about the goals of work units and how these
related to the overall organisation strategy; the time and attention
paid to review of individual employees' performance and development
needs was perceived as insufficient.
Thus, while many publications stress the importance of improved vertical
and horizontal information/communication flows up and down the
organisation, it appears that progress may be limited within many
authorities.	 Contributory factors are likely to involve the
attitudinal/power/status problems mentioned above, including the new
tensions arising from market regulation of service provision,
insufficient training provision for enabling managers to function
effectively within an "information culture", and technical problems
arising from inappropriate communication/information design.
Essentially, however, managers themselves, within the new "information
culture", are increasingly required to: accept responsibility for
managing their own information; develop an understanding of the IT
facilities available; become competent in using facilities such as
personal computers "which are fast becoming standard in the offices of
all local authorities" ((LGMB, 1993b, p20).
Such requirements apply particularly to middle managers operating under
devolved management systems; changes in managerial work behaviour under
these systems are analysed in the next section of this chapter in the
context of Mintzberg's third managerial role set - the decisional
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roles.
Decisional roles; resource-allocator, entrepreneur, disturbance-
Handler, negotiator
Information monitoring, processing and dissemination, is not, as
Mintzberg points out, an end in itself; it forms the basic input into
managerial decision-making: "The manager plays the major role in his or
her unit's decision-making system. As its formal authority (leader
role), only the manager can commit the unit to important new courses of
action; and as its nerve centre (information role), only the manager has
full and current information to make the set of decisions that determine
the unit's strategy" (1989, p19). Corresponding to the changes in the
interpersonal and informational roles outlined above, 	 the local
government literature exhorts local authorities to devolve operational
decision-making powers to lower level managers, in the context of the
strategic planning and devolved management systems described earlier.
Resource allocator role - devolved management
Devolved management systems involve the allocation of (usually
operational) decision-making responsibility and/or authority to line
managers who become accountable for managing the resources (such as
finance and personnel) used to deliver the services for which they are
responsible. The term "to devolve" simply means to transfer or pass
over,	 and it is important to distinguish the devolution of
responsibility to middle managers from the delegation or
decentralisation of decision-making authority, which may or may not form
part of the devolved management process (Horngren and Sundem, 1993) . For
example, as discussed in more detail below, managers may be held
responsible, and their performance measured against resource utilisation
and service delivery targets, for, say, maintaining spending within
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their allocated budget totals. However, they may lack the authority to
exercise control over key budget elements such as staffing, or using
underspends in one area to finance additional spend in another. The
devolution of budgetary authority involves at least a degree of
organisational decentralisation, which occurs when "the authority to
make specified decisions is passed down to units and people at lower
levels in the organisation's hierarchy". This is in contrast to
organisational centralisation where the strategic apex at the top of the
organisation retains authority over most decision-making (Child,
1984, p146). As noted in chapter 3, growing numbers of authorities are
introducing devolved forms of resource and service delivery management
(Stoker et al., 1988; Young and Mills, 1993).
From the examples of local government devolution provided in the
literature, it would appear that the primary emphasis is on achieving a
degree of vertical decentralisation through the devolution of
operational decision-making powers down the hierarchy to middle and
junior managers (see studies by Lowndes and Stoker, 1992, l992a; Blake
et al, 1991; Issac-Henxy and Painter, 1991; Hood, 1991; Buckland and
Joshua, 1992; Duffield and Chuter, 1990; Scales, 1988) . 	 For example,
within Berkshire, middle managers have been empowered to make more
operational decisions concerning the work of their line units, including
the deployment of financial, personnel and other resources. They have
become accountable for their performance against various performance
criteria (focused as noted above on financial and other resource
utilisation targets, and on service delivery targets) within a framework
of clear organisational policies 	 (Geeson and Harward,	 1990)
Increasingly, under the contract management approach to service
provision, decentralisation of resource management (within a strategic
planning and budgetary framework) takes two forms - to the client or
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purchaser managers who have delegated powers to make decisions, in
accordance with corporate policies, about using their budget allocations
to buy specified levels of services from providers (located either
within or outside the authority), and to the provider managers who are
responsible for deploying their resources to provide services to the
standards and costs set out in the service level agreement or contract
agreed with the purchaser (Walsh, 1991, 1992).
The aim of devolved management is to enable managers to improve the
efficiency of their resource utilisation, and to achieve more flexible
and creative service provision which is more responsive to local
community needs and demands: "their energies can be focused upon getting
on with the job rather than being diverted by elaborate bureaucratic
rituals or protracted lobbying and negotiations with senior management
for the resources they want but do not have" (Hoggett and Bramley, 1989,
plO) . Moreover, given that managers tend to value opportunities for
independent thought and action,	 and for developing skills and
competences (Stewart,	 1982; Scase	 and Goffee,	 1989), budgetary
devolution is intended also to enhance motivation and job satisfaction
levels, and strengthen organisational commitment.
The introduction of a decentralised resource management system requires
changes within the organisation's financial and other management control
systems. Thus, in the context of encouraging local authorities to adopt
devolved resource management, the LGMB reassures senior management that:
"The aim is not to remove control over managers but rather to
change the nature of the control exercised by the administrative
and political centre of the authority. In many authorities, it
might be argued, control is exercised at too detailed a level at
the expense of effective resource management and policy
direction. Too often, detailed control has been a substitute for
deciding what needs to be controlled.....Devolved management
means that detailed control gives way to more effective overall
control" (Stoker, 1989, pp33-34)
"Detailed control" tends to be exercised through direct supervision,
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through the standardisation of work processes, and through formal
operational rules and procedures characteristic of the traditional
centralised bureaucracies associated with pre-l980s local government
administration (Stewart, 1988; Lowndes, 1992). UMore effective overall
control" (associated with the "new" more decentralised public sector
management model) involves more emphasis on managers themselves taking
greater responsibility for controlling their own, and their colleagues',
performance, within a framework of clear organisational policies and/or
contractual objectives and service specifications. Control systems focus
upon performance measurement, using performance targets (based on both
resource management and service delivery criteria) to control managerial
performance (Hales, 1993)
In practice, however, many organisations are reluctant to reduce their
reliance on relatively detailed and centralised control systems, for
reasons connected basically with senior management (and elected member)
fears of losing power and status, and for reasons connected with the
practical difficulties of maintaining control over decentralised
management units (Hales, 1993; Mintzberg, 1983, 1989; Robbins, 1990)
Thus, increased managerial autonomy over operational decision-making is
continually under threat from increases in local authorities' internal
procedural rules and regulations, from the possible centralisation of
the purchasing role in market approaches to service delivery, and from
increasingly tight and detailed specification of work processes as well
as performance standards. It can be argued that these tendencies are
likely to be exacerbated in local government by: public accountability
requirements for controls over "both means and ends... .to explain and
justify actions taken" (Stewart and Ransom, 1988, p4); by the high
political sensitivity of certain operational areas; by the uncertainty
of the relationship between the process of providing and the actual
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outcomes of services such as child care; by external threats such as
central government expenditure cuts (Flynn, 1993).
Echoing these concerns, Stoker et al. (1988, p:64) and Hoggett and
Bramley (1989) query the extent to which, apart from education, devolved
resource management is likely to include the delegation of resource
management authority as well as responsibility, below chief officer
level, to middle line managers: "Given the problems and difficulties of
breaking from traditional,	 hierarchical, detailed and centralised
systems of control, there are good grounds for being cautious about
whether the growth in decentralised resource management systems
represents a significant shift towards a new style of management and
organisation within local government" (Stoker et al, 1988, p64).
Four key elements can be identified within the devolution process which
have the potential for either enhancing or constraining middle
management autonomy, and which thus, arguably, will have an impact on
the extent to which the benefits potentially available from devolved
resource management will be realised (Audit Commission, 1989). Firstly,
as noted earlier, there is the extent to which devolution involves the
alignment of managerial decision-making authority with management
responsibility - the convention that managers' responsibilities for
resource management should be aligned with control over these resources.
The public sector middle managers in Dopson and Stewart's study (1990)
tended to feel that they were given "responsibility" rather than upoweris
under the new management system. Problematic areas, where this alignment
tends to break down in terms of managers lacking control over resource
management elements for which they are nevertheless held responsible,
are likely to include staffing levels and costs, and charges made for
specialist services such as legal, financial and personnel.
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Secondly, financial control systems can operate to enhance managers'
decision-making powers, through the use of systems focused around
controlling budget totals, or to constrain these powers through systems
focused around controlling budget details (Audit Commission, 1989). Key
issues here include the extent to which detailed and complex rules
dilute the manager's authority to vire between budget heads without
seeking permission and to use savings achieved on one expenditure head
to increase spending on another, and the extent to which managers'
entire budgets can be cut mid-year, perhaps to offset overspending
elsewhere (Arnold, 1987; Hoggett and Bramley, 1989). External controls,
imposed by central government legislation (such as CCT regulations),
also constrain managers' freedom to deploy resources - especially in the
context of generating new business and becoming more "entrepreneurial"
(see discussion below). The mechanisms required to regulate the new
contractual relatioxis between purchaser and provider managers can
"easily become proceduralised and bureaucratised with variation orders
for any change, and a plethora of work orders and invoices" (Walsh,
1992, p77)
It is important for senior management to achieve the right balance
between the two extremes of, on the one hand, a framework of complicated
rules and procedures which are "so rigid and minutely defined that the
front line is purely an instrument for delivering what is still a highly
centralised system" (Gaster, 1993), and, on the other hand, a situation
where the absence of suitable financial control and performance review
systems, and of clear policy and procedural guidance, can leave devolved
budgetary managers floundering and unclear about the extent of their
authority. This can result at worst, in "flexibility degenerating into
crisis management, and informality degenerating into favouritism and
rule by personality" (Lowndes, 1992, p58). Either way, the benefits of
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greater control over devolved budgets for both middle managers arid the
organisation as a whole will be diluted, with managers, frustrated by
unfulfilled expectations, losing faith in the system and/or simply
"getting round the system (eg by deliberate miscoding) when it looks
sensible to do so" (slake et al, 1991, p77).
Thirdly, managers require easy access to help and support from
specialist staff (such as finance and personnel), and to efficient
information systems to maximise their control and management of their
resources to the full. Changes may be required in the structure and
functions of central finance departments, 	 involving a clearer
distinction between corporate roles and financial service provider roles
(for service line manager budget-holders), and a new emphasis on
functions concerned with providing appropriate information, support and
advice for budget-holders in addition to traditional control and
auditing functions (Jackson, 1988; Audit Commission, 1989) . Specialist
staff may be relocated to service departments, with or without
transferring from the central to the service departmental staff
establishment. Overall, a greater emphasis will be required on
integrating financial with general management, focusing on the business
needs of service delivery middle manager 'customers'.
As outlined above, information systems may be inadequate, and specialist
staff may find it difficult to make the transition to their new roles of
supporting the line managers' business operations. They may experience
a degree of of role conflict in attempting to reconcile the two
potentially conflicting aspects of their role - ensuring adherence of
line managers to corporate standards, policies and procedures, whilst,
at the same time, trying to be responsive to the business needs of their
line manager McustomersN (Rawlinson and Tanner, 1990).
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Specialist personnel and finance staff who have been devolved to service
departments may also suffer from reductions in the degree of
professional support/development previously readily available when they
worked together with colleagues in centralised departments; career and
promotion opportunities may also be reduced (Scase and Gof fee, 1989).
A 1987 survey examining service chief officer opinions of their
financial colleagues' service, indicated generally that "Finance
departments do not yet appreciate the urgent need to change and adapt
systems to meet operational departments'/Direct Labour Organisations'
needs for an efficient and commercially cost-effective support service"
(Hoitham, 1987).	 Similar problems can also occur with the changing
roles of personnel services (Campbell, 1991; LGTB, 1988) and IT services
(LG, 1993b). Changes are, of course, likely to have occurred since the
date of this survey, in the context of the trends noted in chapter 3
towards more decentralisation of "central" service provision such as
finance.	 For example, a recent study examining the changing roles of
finance staff within Newcastle City Council reported significant
increases in levels of satisfaction expressed by line manager
"customers" with the attempts of newly devolved finance staff to become
more responsive to their business needs (Blackman and Stephens, 1993).
Fourthly, managers require training, which is not always forthcoming, in
the new financial, personnel and contract management skills and
competences required if they are to exercise their new devolved
responsibilities efficiently and effectively, and without undue strain
(Watkins, Drury and Preddy, 1992).
Devolved management systems are also expected to produce more proactive
and "entrepreneurial" middle managers - the second of Mintzberg's
decisional roles, which is discussed below.
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Entrepreneurial roles
Reflecting private sector developments, the entrepreneurial role -
"perceiving the changed circumstances and formulating the organisation's
response to them; developing a vision" - is seen as the cornerstone of
successful transition to more effective local authority management
systems (Thompson, 1992, p39) . 	 Similarly, the LGMB (1993a, p24)
emphasises the importance of managers developing: "Change management
skills - the ability to identify opportunities, initiate or respond to
change, maintain momentum, and monitor progress in change efforts. Have
a positive attitude towards change, and obtain the commitment of others
to change efforts. A capacity to cope with ambiguity, uncertainty and
change, and view problems as opportunities or challenges".
It is important to note the difference between Mintzberg's use of the
term "entrepreneurial" which refers essentially to the management of
change role of the manager, and the currently fashionable use of this
term which refers to a particular type of change management role which
should be adopted by managers. Thus, the local government literature
uses "entrepreneurialism" to refer to a particular type of change
management, which replaces traditional, essentially ad-hoc and reactive
forms of managerial behaviour with a focus on private sector style
innovation, risk taking and experimentation as key aspects of the change
management role - for middle as well as senior managers. They are
expected to become "entrepreneurial in the sense of constantly looking
for opportunities to innovate and find new ways of working to improve
the effectiveness of the organisation." Clarke and Stewart (1988, p31).
Issac-Henry and Painter's survey of seventeen authorities provides
several examples of a deliberate adoption of this approach. For example,
Gloucestershire County Council attaches considerable importance to
developing the entrepreneurial role of all managers, involving a "bias
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for action" through the devolution of decision-making responsibilities
to managers down the hierarchy, and involving uiovativeness:
cultivating a climate where new ideas are actively encouraged and
embraced" (1991, p74). In similar vein, Tower Hamlets' decentralised
neighbourhood office structure described in chapter 3, created an
environment with "opportunities for individuals to take initiatives and
experiment with new ways of working and service
delivery. . . .ntrepreneurial and active officers have opportunities to
create new agendas, schemes and projects - to become the sort of
"champions" Peters and Waterman (1982) want to nurture in the private
sector" (Lowndes and Stoker, 1992a, p145)
Reflecting the discussion earlier about the constraints on the
applicability of private sector management models to the public sector,
Harrow and Wilicocks (1990) suggest that there are limits on the extent
to which the less bureaucratic and more flexible organisational
structures, necessary for the full exercise of managerial innovative and
risk-taking powers, can be adopted by local authorities. The regulatory
frameworks, necessary for ensuring public accountability and equity of
treatment of clients, "cut across the opportunism and risk at the heart
of entrepreneurial activity," and continue to limit the extent to which
local authority managers can experiment, risk-take and innovate (Harrow
and Wilicocks, p296). These authors suggest that the adoption of more
cautious "low risk 'small win' rather than "high risk 'big win' change
strategies are more suited to public sector institutions "if the goals
remain what they are commonly held to be, namely greater efficiency,
better management and better service." (p301). Basically, the scope of
local authority middle managers' innovative activities is likely to be
restricted largely to incremental, as opposed to radical, innovations
within a framework of clear corporate policies and more rigorous
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control systems. The latter tend to be associated, as suggested above,
with the devolved management necessary for "empowering" managers (to a
limited extent, given the responsibility/power imbalance often found in
devolved resource management systems). to become more innovative.
Equally significantly, entrepreneurial management strategies require
adequate resourcing if they are to prove effective. Lowndes and Stoker
(1992a, p145) describe the "market-place" approach adopted by Tower
Hamlets: 'where resources and policy instruments are given to the most
successful entrepreneurs".	 However, certain departments, 	 such as
nurseries, had a "cinderella" status which inhibited the allocation of
additional resources to their officers; moreover, officers differed in
the extent to which they possessed the commitment and entrepreneurial
skills necessary for generating new ideas, and gaining the resources and
policy authorisations needed to implements them.
Most importantly, local authorities - unlike the private sector - are
dependent on increasingly limited public funding and spending
constraints (see chapter 3). They are subject to legislative constraints
on external trading, which restrict the income they can generate by
exploiting new market opportunities. In addition, the purchaser/provider
split, with precisely defined service specifications, may inhibit
provider managers' scope for introducing innovations; the agreement of
the purchaser managers will be required. Purchaser managers, separated
from the "coal-face" of service provision, may lack first-hand knowledge
of customer needs/demands, thus reducing their awareness of the need for
change (Cochrane 1994; Langan and Clarke, 1994).
Nevertheless, it can be argued that, within these constraints, the
changes in middle management roles listed above - more open
communication and information flows, increased liaison across the
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organisation and with external agencies, the adoption of more
"empowering" leadership styles with more emphasis on team building and
flexible working, and increased devolution of decision-making to lower
levels - represent a move towards a more entrepreneurial management of
change role for middle managers. These developments are all represented
in the comprehensive case study of change in the structure and
management systems of East Sussex Social Services Department (Hadley and
Young, 1990) and provide interesting examples of the tensions which can
arise from the introduction of devolved and "entrepreneurial" roles for
middle managers.
The first stage focused on the development of strong centrally driven
policies to gain control of the organisation and the introduction of
various key structural changes. Managers were required to compete for
all management posts in the new structure (which meant the painful
transition to "non-managerial" positions for those who failed to secure
a new management post). A clear system of delegation and accountability
was introduced for the managers of units, including, at a later stage,
devolved budgets; operational instructions and procedures were to
include prescriptions about the particular kinds of work, policies and
programmes of services to be provided for each client group. Management
control and information systems were established, involving performance
measures to assess the performance of each work unit. The concentration
on financial and other quantitative measurements was criticised for
implicitly ignoring what many managers perceived as the more important
qualitative "outcome" measures of their service provision. Whilst some
managers felt "hemmed in" by the information demands and performance
targets, others appreciated the chance to evaluate and justify their
performance achievements. Lastly, there was: "less visible, but even
more important, the creation of a managerial culture emphasising
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commitment to the goals of the organisation and loyalty to the
director." (p199). A residential sector strike which occurred in the
early 1980s was seen by the director as providing "the ultimate test of
the loyalty of his managers as well as an example of how conflict and
crisis can present opportunities for accelerating change." (p203). (A
feature of local government is that middle managers frequently belong to
the same trade union as their staff, which can cause severe role
conflicts.)
Structural changes also included new area-based new teams combining
several different professional -roles (some staff expressed a sense of
professional isolation, as meetings of, for example, professional staff
groups of heads of homes, were discontinued) and extensive programmes of
training and related project work to establish the new culture. The
strong central leadership by the director raised mixed feelings. Some
managers felt inhibited by his style from expressing doubts or
criticisms about senior management policies and disliked the atmosphere
of "yesness" which tended to prevail in meetings; others felt: "the
experience has been.. .positively liberating both in terms of one's
personal approach to one's work and in terms of enabling a whole
multitude of initiatives." (p203)
These developments clearly represent moves towards both closer central
direction or control and increased local discretion. Once the central
management policies and controls had been consolidated, the second phase
of increasing devolution to the front line managers and staff extended
the extent of local discretion, where "within the policy guidelines laid
down by the authority, front-line teams could increasingly take over
responsibility for the shaping of integrated and responsive services
suited to their different localities." (p205) - many examples are
provided in the study of innovative and more responsive methods of
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service delivery arising from the increased devolution of authority. The
previous emphasis on control through centralised systems was "replaced
by an emphasis on trust. It could be argued, however, that the term
"replaced" should read "complemented by", given the nature of the
central policy, procedural, performance and operational control
"guidelines" listed above. For example, restrictions within the devolved
budgeting system meant that viremerit between services could only be made
up to £7,000 before seeking authority from senior management (p127). The
particular pressures on the role of middle managers arising from
tensions between their roles and those of senior and junior managers are
aptly illustrated by the following quotation from an area manager:
"The departmental management team fear the organisation will get
out of control. In reality, the opposite is the case for people
tend to be conservative. After four or five years in a culture in
which you are jumped on for getting out of line it is difficult to
get people to take risks. Ken Young (the director) goes on about
giving away power but this has meant it was OK as long as you did
what he wanted. There was a stage where we had to turn that
centrally driven culture around. Patch teams were sceptical about
the 'opportunity' to plan. They said we had already decided. It
is a slow business getting them to change." (p206)
This study, together with the views expressed above by other authors,
suggests that the development of devolved resource management and more
"entrepreneurial" management roles is changing middle managers' work
role behaviour, but that a number of factors operate, particularly in
the local government context, to limit the extent of these changes.
Constraints on resource allocator and entrepreneurial role changes
While middle managers will, under devolution, experience increased
levels of responsibility and accountability (particularly for resource
management), these increases may well not be accompanied by similar
increases in the levels of their decision-making authority or control
over resource deployment (Flynn, 1994). As Mintzberg points out, large
diversified organisations such as local authorities, subject to strong
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visible external political controls, tend to adopt only limited forms of
decentralisation below diviøional/senior departmental) management
levels. As noted in chapter 3, while control systems may move towards
an emphasis on performance measurement against financial and service
delivery criteria (reinforced by new corporate cultures), such systems
will also tend to be supplemented by additional operational rules and
procedures, with more detailed financial control systems and more
regulation of professional service delivery activities. The latter is
taking place, increasingly, within the BS5750 framework, which can
involve the creation of an unproductive quality assurance system which
becomes "ever more introspective and static, rather than a dynamic agent
of change within the organisation" (Clarke, 1994, p176)
Overall, devolved management, in conjunction with the purchaser/provider
split, can intensify the various tensions or 'pulls' which exist between
the various parts of the organisation competing to acquire greater
degrees of power and influence. As Campbell (1991) and Mintzberg (1983,
1989) suggest (in the context of 'vertical' hierarchical tensions
associated with devolved management), middle management desires for
greater autonomy, potentially available from devolution, can conflict
with senior management desires to increase levels of centralised control
- especially over resource management and utilisation in a hostile
environment of increasingly rigorous external (central government)
funding and regulatory constraints. Specialist services' attempts to
provide (and meet middle managers' desires for) personnel and finance
service which are more responsive to line manager business needs can
conflict with prescribed corporate standards and procedures designed to
meet public sector probity and public accountability requirements. The
purchaser/provider split appears to be generating a new set of
'horizontal' tensions between 'purchaser' managers' desires to maximise
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their control over service specification and design (and to minimise
costs), and providers' desires to maximise their control over the
service delivery process (and to maximise the generation of surpluses).
To reduce such tensions, additional control systems are likely to be
required, given the "quasi-market" nature of many local authority
markets and the absence of true market mechanisms for resolving these
conflicts: "the use of market mechanism does not remove the need for
control, but rather requires the development of system management
concerned with the behaviour of the new market structures" (Stewart and
Walsh, 1992, p30)
The scope and nature of these tensions or "pulls" are likely to vary
across service areas. As noted earlier, local authorities are highly
differentiated organisations, providing a wide range of services within
highly diversified markets (Stewart, 1992) . Local authority departments
differ across a range of organisational dimensions identified by
contingency theorists (Mintzberg; Hales, 1993). These include, in the
local government context: the nature of the product/service and the work
process; the nature of the customer base and the market (fully
competitive to essentially non-competitive, "arm's length" service
provision); the degree of political sensitivity of a particular service;
the extent to which service objectives are unambiguous, measurable and
susceptible to pre-determination of the desired outcome, and, hence,
amenable to the discipline of contracts or service level agreements
(Flynn, 1993, 1994; Walsh, 1992; Stewart and Walsh, 1992) . In general:
"The greater the uncertainty and the more complex the interactions (with
customers/the public), the more difficult it is to develop the use of
contracts in the management of the activity or in relations with the
public. Where political salience is high and the activity cannot be
pre-determined, organisational control will be tight, leading to
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centralisation unless political control can itself be decentralised" (as
in the Tower Hamlets example quoted earlier) (Stewart, 1992, p17-18).
However, across all services, the high degree of operational visibility
arising from public probity and accountability requirements, and the
degree of political risk attached to failures, are likely to reinforce
tendencies towards centralisation. For example, following an
investigation into suspected "irregularities", and losses incurred on
certain contracts undertaken by a district council's Direct Works
Department, the council treasurer and policy committee decided to
exercise more direct control and tighter monitoring of this department's
activities, plus the "undevolution" of the department's finance section
back to central finance. Thus, following a meeting of the policy
committee, a statement, published in full in the local paper, was issued
by this council, including several measures for achieving these
increased levels of more centralised control - for example:
"in respect of the building division. . . tenders for larger contracts
only being permitted with the approval of the city treasurer and
the deputy chief executive after a full financial appraisal. . . . the
department shall not enter into any new activity, or re-enter any
activity now terminated without the approval of policy committee
and a financial appraisal... the assistant director (finance) be
transferred together with his finance section to the city
treasurer and deputy chief executive's department.. .all tenders by
WSD (the department) of over £5000... .shall be checked by the city
treasurer and deputy chief executive for financial prudence prior
to submission. .." (Napier, 1994)
In addition, market regulation of service within the context of
continuing public expenditure restrictions, is likely to involve
management styles which emphasise "price and volume control, rather than
quality and service development" (Flynn, 1994, p223). Thus, rather than
a move to the "commitment" strategies, away from from "control"
strategies, associated with the "new" management systems and roles,
emphasis is likely to be made on the latter, as illustrated in the
following diagramatic summary of the two approaches as applied to the
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empowerment to enable direct
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commitment and trust strategies
with people helped to grow into
their jobs
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service development; workers and
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services together
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few rights exercisable without
detailed control by authority
employees; purchasers determine
volume, shape and standards of
service provision; second-hand
consumer power/influence





* detailed control of work processes
through scientific management
and contractual regulation with
little provider worker/manager
empowerment; people located in
strictly defined parts of the
labour process
* Control through price and volume;
purchasers design services and
instruct workers on methods
* control of quality and innovation
* overall provider emphasis on
making as much money as possible;
service quality considered but
management focus is on keeping
costs down and revenues up.
Clearly, strategic choice exercised by individual local authorities can
move them towards one or the other end of this continuum; moreover much
will depend on the extent of the cooperation/collaboration achieved
between purchaser/provider managers; as outlined earlier, a high degree
of "collaborative" rather than "selfish" behaviour is required to ensure
effective operation of market based service delivery systems which are
genuinely flexible and responsive to consumer needs (Hulxne). However,
Flynn (1994, p224) considers that "only when the pressure to reduce or
contain spending is eased will it be possible to operate markets in a
way which emphasizes quality and service user control".
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These tensions and limits on middle management autonomy raise a number
of important issues in relation to the changing nature of middle
managerial roles and work satisfaction levels (see discussion below). As
the Audit Commission (1989) suggests, the absence of authority for
managers to use, for example, the revenue generated by achieving savings
in one area to offset overspending in another, or to use at least some
of the surpluses or 'profits' for new projects, can reduce the impact of
these incentives which encourage managers to improve resource
utilisation and service delivery effectiveness. Such constraints can
operate to frustrate managers' attempts to make more creative and
innovative decisions about resource deployment and service delivery.
Especially when combined with expenditure cutbacks, they can make
managers sceptical about cultural rhetoric urging them to adopt more
entrepreneurial and risk-taking management styles, which in reality they
do not feel empowered to achieve (Preston, 1991). Practices such as ad
hoc mid-year withdrawals by senior management from managers' budgets,
and/or unexpected increases in staffing costs outside managers' control
can inhibit managers' attempts to plan and monitor budget spend
effectively. They can also increase the risk of managers exceeding the
budgetary targets for which they are held accountable, for reasons seen
to be largely outside their control, which can then encourage them in
manipulating, and/or questioning the validity of performance appraisal
systems (Moizer, 1991)
Managers can also become sceptical about the utility of performance
measurement systems, because of the problems, mentioned earlier, 	 of
identifying appropriate performance measurements. Drawing upon the
(1990) LACSAB survey, Spence (1990) reported that most senior managers
considered that they had been able to develop appropriate objectives and
targets even in service sectors such as social services where outputs
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were not easily measurable. However, much depends upon what are agreed
as appropriate measures; quantitative output criteria are obviously
relatively straightforward to identify, but they may not reflect the
final outcome" of the service in terms of meeting overall client needs,
as an East Sussex team manager indicated: "The minimum I have to achieve
is very much financially based. My residential homes must have a certain
level of occupancy.....But that says nothing about the quality of care"
(Hadley and Young, 1990, p123). (Phase 2 of the devolution project aimed
to make increased use of "outcome" and more "quality" based measures). A
recent survey (Palmer,1993) demonstrated the heavy reliance by many
authorities on value-for-money and other quantitative, rather than more
qualitative and "outcome"-based, measures. Clearly, to be meaningful,
performance measures should vary according to the nature of the service,
as suggested above. Brignall (1993, p30) argues for recognition of the
value of "managerial intuition and judgeinent" as well as more "formal
'rational' information system" approaches to performance measurement in
difficult-to-measure areas of work such as social services.
Similarly, in the context of the functional purchaser/provider split,
Flynn (1994) and Cochrane (1994) suggest that, increasingly, local
authorities are becoming divided into two main groups. The core of
purchaser managers enjoy relatively high levels of job permanence and
status; as key implementers of and contributors to the authority's
strategic planning process, they are responsible for drawing up service
specifications in the context of these local strategies. The jobs of
Provider managers - even those employed directly by the authority - will
be less secure or permanent, and probably of lower status, given their
more remote connections with the strategic planning process, and their
dependence for work on the purchasing decisions made by purchasers.
Moreover, increasingly detailed service specifications are likely to
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limit the scope of their authority over service delivery processes. Such
tensions are also unlikely to promote good relationships between the two
functions. Much depends here on the nature of the systems developed by
the authority to control these relationships, and also on the managers'
willingness and/or abilities to develop appropriate behavioural skills -
which moves this discussion on to the third and fourth of Mintzberg's
decisional roles: the negotiator and disturbance-handler.
Negotiator and disturbance-handler roles
The acquisition of new devolved responsibilities, and "entrepreneurial"
managerial roles, plus the changes listed above in interpersonal and
information roles, requires managers to develop new decision-making and
relationship development/management skills and competences - the
decisional negotiator and disturbance-handler roles. As the LGMB (1993a,
p23) suggests, managers with devolved management responsibilities in the
new market systems need to develop not only business and commercial
skills, but sound decision-making and problem solving skills: "The
willingness and ability to make informed and timely decisions, both
individually and as part of a team. To act decisively when necessary. To
access and use information to inform decisions. To exhibit superior
judgement in decisions". ssentially, under devolution, middle managers
are expected to sort out problems themselves (the disturbance-handler
role) rather than pass them up the hierarchy to more senior managers.
Moreover, their new responsibilities for resource management also means
that, while help and support should be available from specialist staff,
middle managers are increasingly expected to take the initiative in
early identification of potential problem areas, and take the
responsibility for at least suggesting solutions, even if authorisation
for implementation is required.
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Managers also need to appreciate the increasing importance of, and
adopt, the cooperative and collaborative behaviour required to develop
and maintain effective relationships between purchaser and provider
sections, with other agencies and community groups/consumers, with
senior management, with specialist finance, personnel etc. staff, and
with their own workforces. Managers need to develop a sensitivity,
awareness and understanding of the different interests of different
groups within their organisation and within external agencies. They need
to acquire new negotiating, influencing, compromising skills, necessary
to gain support and acceptance from all parties involved in service
provision: "the ability to create win-win situations" (LGMB, 1993, p23)
The importance attached to these collaborative/negotiating competences
is illustrated by the recent publication focused solely on "Influence
and Influencing" as a day-to-day aspect of the managerial role (Clarke
and Stewart, 1994).	 The authors identify different forms of
"influencing", including "co-operation where the emphasis is one shared
aims and resources; bargaining with the emphasis on negotiation;
opposition, only to be used sparingly where an organisation opposes
something another wishes to do; persuasion, where argument and assertion
are important; and facilitation where resources are used to help another
organisation secure its aims" (executive summary) . Each of these
influencing methods can be used by middle managers as appropriate in
different contexts.	 Within the organisation these will include:
contributing to strategy formulation; contributing to and implementing
change management; team-building; negotiating performance/resource
utilisation targets both with superiors and subordinates; joint-working
in multi-disciplinary, cross-functional and interdepartmental groups and
project teams. Contexts outside the organisation include working through
- 224 -
and/or with other organisations to provide services, and involving other
agencies and community/consumer groups in service design, delivery and
evaluation. Good purchaser/provider relationships, as indicated earlier,
are of crucial importance for ensuring effective service planning and
delivery in market forms of service provision. In order to avoid over
reliance on purchaser determination of services to be purchased, and
over-detailed purchaser prescriptions about the service process (which
can reduce scope for provider flexibility and service development), the
development of trust and extensive collaboration is required between the
two parties - whether providers are located inside or outside the
authority.
Similarly, Hulme identifies the same need for "collaborative" rather
than "selfish" behaviour between the two functions (see discussion
above), reflecting the LGMB's exhortation to create "win-win"
situations. Hulme uses the "prisoner's dilemma" game to argue that in
the market regulation of service delivery: "the best outcome stems from
co-operation but only if the other party co-operates fully; if we do not
know whether the other party will co-operate and perform well, it pays
to adopt a self-interested course and let down the friend/colleague; of
we both adopt a self-interested course, we both lose out" (1994, p54)
In the purchaser/provider context, the "best outcome" refers to the
efficient, effective, flexible and responsive service planning and
delivery which will require the "collaborative" form of behaviour on the
part of purchasers and providers. (It is, of course, possible for
"collaborative" behaviour to take place in the context of collusion
between both parties designed to maximise their own advantages at the
expense of service quality, cost-effectiveness and/or responsiveness to
the consumer/local community. Appropriate control systems are required
to preclude such an eventuality).
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The potentially competing "value for money" and "enabling/partnership"
injunctions placed on suppliers may, of course, inhibit the development
of such collaborative relationships (Langan and Clarke). Hu.lme and Flynn
(1994) argue for the development of longer-term, broadly-based
relational contracts between purchasers and providers, which are more
likely to "lead to the concept of co-producers in networks of trust
providing dependable quality and delivery of goods and services"
(Oakland, 1989, p99). Clarke and Stewart (1994) suggests that effective
deployment by managers of all five forms of the "influencing" behaviour
depends on several key factors - acquisition by managers of the
appropriate skills and competences; provision of training by the
authority to help managers acquire these competences; the effective
mobilisation by managers of resources such as information, knowledge,
money etc.; the design of "appropriate" structures and processes within
the authority, and between the authority and other agencies, to enable
and facilitate the exercise of "influencing" forms of behaviour. The
barriers which may operate to inhibit such behaviour styles -
attitudinal, professional, inadequate information and communication
Systems - reflect those discussed above in the context of managers'
informational and liaison roles.
The middle managerial role changes described here in all three of
Mintzberg's role sets - interpersonal, informational and decisional -
combine to suggest extensive changes in all aspects of middle management
work behaviour. These changes are also likely to affect levels of work
satisfaction, which is considered below in the next section.
Middle managers' work satisfaction levels - the impact of role changes
The term work satisfaction is used here, as in chapter 2, to refer to
the levels of intrinsic rewards (such as self-respect and status,
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independent thought and action, personal growth and development,
opportunities for work friendships) and extrinsic rewards (security,
hours, pay, and promotion prospects) obtained from work activities.
Each of these reward categories have been shown in several studies to be
important, in general, for many managers (Stewart, 1982; Scase and
Goffee, 1989; Mansfield and Poole, 1991)
A recent LGMB (1994) survey provides information about levels of "work
satisfaction" (the term was not defined in the survey) reported by
senior officer/principal officer (SO/PO) grades which include most
middle managers. Comparisons with a previOus MORI survey (1989) are not
possible because the responses here were not differentiated by officer
grade. In terms of the job factors considered to be "most important" by
these officer grades, "interesting work" was rated top (by 78%),
followed by: "feeling you have accomplished something worthwhile" (70%);
good pay (67%); security (58%); good pension (41%); long-term career
prospects (33%). Overall, 63% of the sO/PO grade officers (roughly
representative of middle managers) were "very/fairly satisfied" with
their jobs (compared with the MORI general public sector norm (all staff
grades) of 55%). In terms of the survey's job satisfaction factors which
equate broadly with the intrinsic rewards listed above, the following
percentages of the SO/Pa grade officers reported that they were
very/fairly satisfied with: the "interesting" nature of their work
(86%); the feeling they had "accomplished something worth while" (73%)
In relation to the extrinsic rewards obtainable from work, over 60% of
the sO/PO grades were very/fairly satisfied with pay and pension levels,
but this fell to only 24% with promotion opportunities, 40% with
longer-term career prospects, and 35% with job security; 52% felt they
had "too much work".
- 227 -
The extent to which these fairly high levels of intrinsic work
satisfaction, and fairly low levels of satisfaction with job security
and career/promotion opportunities have been affected by the managerial
role changes outlined above is uncertain, given the scarcity of studies
concerned specifically with changes in local authority middle managerial
work satisfaction levels. In terms of changes in intrinsic work
satisfaction levels, a recent large-scale survey (although not focused
specifically on local government or middle managers) found that
satisfaction levels amongst public sector managers had declined very
slightly between 1980 and 1990 in relation to opportunities for personal
growth and development, and scope for feelings of self-esteem; there was
a very small increase in the level of satisfaction with opportunities
for independent thought and action (Mansfield and Poole, 1991) . Focusing
specifically on middle managers (in both private and public sectors),
Dopson and Stewart (1990a) summarise their views about the impact of
role changes on their work satisfaction levels as follows: "the broader
changes had created a more challenging environment in which to work.
Most of the public sector managers... .enjoyed their work more because
they were more accountable; jobs were also viewed as more interesting,
both because of the increased responsibility and because of the new
management systems that had clarified objectives" (p37-B)
They did, however, find evidence to suggest a less positive attitude to
organisational and management changes amongst the public sector managers
(in comparison with their private sector counterparts), arising largely
from the political constraints and the associated requirements for
public accountability, unique to the public sector, which inhibited the
degree of middle managerial freedom to innovate and exercise authority.
"There was a feeling that managers were given the responsibility, but
not the power, to meet specified targets" (Dopson and Stewart, 1990a,
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p39).	 (Conversely, but equally demoralising for middle managers,
decentralisation can involve inadequate specification of suitable
financial control and performance review systems, and of clear policy
and procedural guidance, which can leave devolved managers floundering
and unclear about the extent of their authority - described as an
"environment of chaos" by one third of Lowndes and Stoker's
decentralised local authority staff.) Moreover, the advantages gained
from public sector organisational changes were diluted to an extent by
increased levels of work stress arising from increased workload,
decreased resource levels, and demoralised workforces. 	 Similarly,
Lowndes and Stoker (1992a, p21), in examining the opinions of staff
(middle managers were not separately identified) about the impact of
political and organisational decentralisation on their work roles,
concluded that "many positive changes have occurred in terms of a more
creative, flexible and supportive working environment with numerous
opportunities for rewarding, interesting and innovative work".
Staff were enthusiastic about the new opportunities for more autonomy
and creativity in their work (including more responsiveness to customer
needs/demands and more effective service provision), more contact with
the public, and the more informal and less ' 1bureaucratic" management
styles.	 Yet they considered that the extent to which such rewards
actually accrued to staff were limited by inadequate training provision,
inadequate financial/management information systems, and feeling of
stress (expressed by three-quarters of the staff) arising particularly
from "the gap between the demands placed on them and the lack of
resources and time to meet them.....poor management, specifically a lack
of support and supervision in a context of constant change and the
absence of any sense of strategic direction" (Lowndes adn Stoker, 1992a,
p146).	 Similarly, Leach et al (1993, p16), in examining change
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management practices in sixteen "well-managed" local authorities,
reported that, in most cases, overall levels of job motivation remained
high, but that: "In all cases, middle managers felt that they faced
higher expectations, increasing pressure, longer hours and the need to
develop a range of skills relatively quickly." within an environment of
accelerating and continual change.
Such pressures can also coincide with the requirements placed on middle
managers to become more accountable for their performance against more
rigorous and more tightly defined performance standards, arising out of
the increased levels of adoption of formalised performance review
systems. Such systems can provide welcome and useful feedback on
managers'	 performance	 (also including identification of	 their
development/training needs), and can provide them with more challenging
job roles, with more opportunities for recognition of good performance
(Dopson and Stewart, 1990, 1990a; Hadley and Young; Spence; Spencer and
Welcbman, 1991). Yet, over half of the managerial grade officers in the
LGMB (1994) survey considered that good performance was "not recognised"
in their authorities.	 Moreover, resource constraints, increased
workloads and the pressures of continual change can operate to dilute
such benefits - along with the constraints on middle managerial
decision-making autonomy and risk-taking identified above. Managers can
be required not only to meet their specified performance targets, but
also to demonstrate their personal commitment to the more intangible and
less specific core values or culture of the local authority - "living
the style, conveying appropriate informal signals throughout the
organisation" (Issac-Henry and Painter, 1991, p73)
In terms of the extrinsic rewards such as pay, job security and
career/promotion opportunities, the Mansfield and Poole survey (1991)
identified clearly a significant increase in general public sector
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managerial dissatisfaction with pay (which the authors attribute to
comparisons made at the time with private sector managers pay levels
before the onset of the early 1990s recession), and with security, which
reflected here the unoticeable decline in many parts of the public
sector during the l980s" (p20). 	 The highest level of dissatisfaction
expressed in both 1980 and 1990 was in relation to promotion
opportunities, with hardly any change between the two dates; this
equates with the low level of satisfaction with promotion opportunities
expressed by SO/PO grade officers in the LGMB survey quoted above
(1994)
Various central government initiatives - particularly CCT legislation -
and the trends described above towards flatter hierarchies and more
flexible (numerical and functional) human resource management strategies
would certainly appear to pose a threat to the job security, "stability"
and "safety" traditionally enjoyed by local authority staff and managers
(Stoker, 1989; Farnham, 1993). For example, the extensive reorganisation
and "delayering" undertaken in one local authority - in response to
financial constraints and the need to produce better quality and more
flexible services - meant that "all 9,500 employees have had to apply
for posts at or around their current level. So far, the top three levels
have been appointed. The spotlight is now on the lower managerial tiers
where job cuts will be heaviest......NALGO, the white-collar public
service workers' union......expects 500 of its 3,000 members at the
council to lose their jobs..." (Tighe, 1992, pl4 ) . As noted earlier,
increasing numbers of staff, including middle managers, are faced with
the prospect that the role of the local authority as a direct service
provider and as a direct employer of staff is diminishing. In the
context of the "enabling" and "competitive" council, staff are no longer
employed directly by the local authority, whilst those remaining are
- 231 -
likely to be anxious about their om futures. Whilst most jobs to date
which have disappeared are located within manual work categories (LGMB,
1994a), the forthcoming extension of CCT to hitherto largely untouched
white-collar professional services i increasingly threatening the job
security of non-manual staff, including middle managers - especially
those managers employed within the Provider rather than the Purchaser
functions (see discussion above)
As noted earlier, the Local Government Joint Watch Statistics (LGMB,
1994a) do not publish information about changes in staff nu.mbers
according to staff grades; moreover, middle managers as a staff group
are not recognised or identified as such within the national grading
structure. However, within the Senior Officer (SO) and Principal Officer
(P0) grades, where many middle managers are probably located,
information provided by I'ulty (1994) suggests that there has been an
increase between 1987 and 1994 in the full-time-equivalent staff numbers
represented within these grades. Moreover the distribution of staff
within the six main grade categories has changed, with a decline in the
proportion of staff in the lower grades, and an increase in the
proportions of staff in the SO and P0 grades. This is possibly due to
an increase in junior/middle managerial appointments required to "handle
the contracting processes and to supervise contracts" within the CCT
services (LGTB, 1992, p2), and to expansions in some white-collar
service sectors such as finance ( due to the Community Charge) and Social
Services. It may be that the main threat to middle managerial jobs -
through the forthcoming extension of CCT to professional services such
as engineering, finance etc. - is yet to come, and it is likely to bear
most heavily on those managers involved in Provider functions.
As discussed in chapter 2, 	 there are likely to be significant
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differences between individual managers' expressed levels of work
satisfaction,	 in relation to differences in their particular
organisational and job contingencies,	 and in their own personal
circumstances/sets of values. In relation to private/public sector
differences, Dopsoxi and Stewart fou.nd that: "Overall.. .managers in the
public sector appeared to be less enthusiastic than their counterparts
in the private sector about both the possibility and the desirability of
change" (l990a, p38). 	 They suggest that the more cautious and less
positive attitude to change found amongst their public sector middle
managers may arise from the expectations with which they entered the
public sector - expectations of security, and organisationa]. and role
stability,	 and orientations towards the	 "administrative",	 and
"professional" role identities associated with the more "traditional"
public sector service ethos described earlier. The organisational and
role changes within the "new" private sector style management systems -
to more proactive management and leadership styles - tend to challenge
the traditional orientations and value sets "which may have been a major
reason for individuals joining the public sector in the first place"
(Dopson and Stewart, 1990a, p39). Individual preferences for work roles
with particular characteristics tend to reflect those prescribed by the
organisation that the individual works in; the two tend to reinforce
each other (Nicholson and West, 1988; Ellis and Child, 1977, p45) . For
public sector managers, the changes towards more entrepreneurial and
proactive, and less stable and structured roles (with less emphasis on
professional expertise and more on the new "managerialism") may require
more extensive and more difficult role re-orientation and re-definition
than for their private sector colleagues.
Much, of course, depends on the way in which changes in management
systems and role prescriptions are planned, introduced and managed - see
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full discussion in chapter 2. Thus, Leach et al (1993, p16) found "a key
difference (in motivation levels) between authorities where middle
managers felt supported and valued by their authority and those where
they did not.	 In the latter cases further pressures/demands could
results in a process of demotivation". Dopson and Stewart also emphasise
the importance of ensuring that the reasons for change are both fully
explained and also seen as legitimate by staff. One of the factors
contributing to the less positive attitudes towards change expressed by
the public sector managers here related to feelings that change was due
at least in part to unnecessary (party) political pressures, rather than
to more compelling and legitimate reasons such as the competitive
threats which might be posed to a private sector organisation.
Interestingly, Walsh (1991) found that the changes necessary for
introducing CCT - including even staff cuts - were achieved relatively
smoothly in most authorities. CCT legislation - however unwelcome - was
seen as basically unavoidable, and the need for changes in staffing
levels, work practices etc. were seen by trade unions as necessary if
local authority works departments were to retain work in the face of
real competitive threats from private sector contractors. Training
provision is also necessary to help managers to adopt new roles. As
indicated throughout this chapter, the extensive changes in
interpersonal, informational and decisional roles all require extensive
training and support to help managers develop the necessary new
competences. These competences include, most 	 importantly, policy
development, negotiation and networking skills, and political awareness
(predominantly for purchaser managers); leadership/people management;
business, service and operational management, and marketing skills
(predominantly for provider managers) (LGMB, 1993a, p25).
Yet, a number of SO/PO responses to the LGMB (1994) survey suggests that
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many authorities may be deficient in key change management areas. For
example) about three-quarters reported that they received too little
information about plans for the future, and too little information about
the reasons behind major decisions and about decisions taken by
councillors Local authorities were also seen as generally performing
poorly at: gaining staff commitment to change, setting realistic
timetables, explaining the reasons for change, and planning change; only
41% felt that they received sufficient training for their jobs.
In terms of likely future developments within local authorities, the
SO/PO of ficer grades in the LG 	 (1994) survey expressed rather
pessimistic views about the probable effects on their work experiences,
in regard especially to their job satisfaction levels, the amount of
training they expected to receive, their career prospects, workloads,
job security and general morale. No reasons were provided for these
pessimistic responses, but, essentially, organisational and management
role changes within local authorities are taking place largely within a
context of an increasingly hostile external environ.ment of continuing
resource constraints, tighter central government service delivery
prescriptions - including extensions in the services subject to CCT -
and expanding public demands for better quality services. It can be
argued that these trends are likely to intensify the factors identified
earlier which already operate to offset some of the rewards of more
interesting, challenging and stimulating work which can arise from the
hmnewu management systems. Managers are likely to become increasingly
accountable for results achieved within an organisational context of
more rigorous controls over both work processes and outcomes, with
reduced levels of job security and promotion opportunities, increased
workloads, reduced resource levels, and increasingly pressurised and




This chapter has outlined the extensive changes currently taking place
within local authority middle managerial role prescriptions across all
three of Mintzberg's managerial role sets - interpersonal, information
and decisional - as a consequence of the changing local authority
structures outlined in chapter 3. These changes equate with the moves
identified in the local government literature from the traditional
emphasis on professionalism/administration towards the new emphasis on
management". In the context of moves towards divisionalised forms of
structure and the purchaser/provider role divisions, middle managers are
likely to acquire devolved decision-making powers/responsibilities over
new functional areas such as finance, personnel and other resources, and
to become accountable for achieving more rigorously defined performance
standards - relating to both resource utilisation and service delivery
targets. They are expected to adopt more proactive leadership styles.
with an emphasis on inspiring and motivating their staff to achieve
higher performance levels, and on facilitating opportunities for staff
training and development. They are also expected to become more
entrepreneurial - looking actively for ways to improve resource
utilisation and service provision efficiency and effectiveness, and to
achieve greater degrees of responsiveness to customers/the local
community, and (for provider managers) to purchaser managers'
requirements.
Increasingly, both purchaser and provider managers will become involved
more extensively in liaison and information processing/exchange
activities. This is taking place both vertically - with subordinates and
with senior management/elected members within the local authority - and
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horizontally, in the context of purchaser/provider relationships and
increased levels of joint-working/collaborative cross-functional project
group and team working with staff and managers from other
departments/sections within their authorities, and from other
public/private/voluntary organisations. Whilst their work may become
more interesting and challenging, it may also become more demanding.
Managers are being required to acquire new skills and competences, and
to achieve results, within the new performance culture, within a context
of increased workloads, resource constraints and lower levels of job
security - especially for provider managers.
As Mintzberg's contingency model of management suggests, the precise
nature of the changes in role behaviour experienced by middle managers
will be affected by the extent to which local authorities have actually
introduced the new structural forms and new mangement
systems/prescriptions identified in the literature. As noted above and
in chapter 3, individual local authorities differ widely in terms of the
extent and nature of their adoption of such new systems. These changes
are also likely to operate differently for managers located within
different service/functional departments. Moreover, even within local
authorities, well-advanced in the adoption of "new" management systems,
a number of constraints noted throughout this chapter are likely to
limit the extent to which managers' behaviour changes in line with
changes in formal role prescriptions. Such constraints are likely to
operate at behavioural, technical, and structural levels, especially in
relation to devolved management systems, internal markets, information
and communication systems, and the nature of a local authority's change
management strategy. Individual managers will also differ in terms of
the extent to which they choose to actively embrace or avoid changing
forms of management behaviour, and in terms of their preferences for
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particular managerial styles. These preferences will, in turn, be
affected by the amount of effort put into management
training/development and change management systems by individual local
authorities.
Whilst the literature suggests that a growing numbers of local
authorities are adopting new forms of structure and management systems,
the scarcity of empirical studies focusing specifically on middle
managers' own reported experiences of the new management systems make it
difficult to assess the extent of real behaviour changes occurring
amongst this managerial group. The remainder of this thesis, focuses
specifically on identifying the views of middle managers themselves
about the impact on their role behaviour of the new management systems
introduced by a local authority well-advanced in its adoption of the new
systems. After an outline of the case-study methodology used for this
research, provided in chapter 5, the remaining chapters identify the
internal structural changes introduced by the case-study authority, and
present an analysis of middle managers' views about the nature and




Methodoloq-v and research design
Although there is an increasing vo].ujne of literature about the
development of "new" public sector management models - 	 and some
evidence to suggest that growing numbers of local authorities are
adopting at least some aspects of this model - the literature tends to
focus predominantly upon uofficia1l representations of changing
management structures and systems, provided by senior managers.
Relatively little consideration has been given within this literature to
assessing the impact of these formal changes in management systems and
role prescriptions on the work behaviour and satisfaction levels of
managers located lower down in the organisationa]. hierarchy. In addition
to focusing on the extent to which the "rhetoric" of the "new"
management model, as represented in prescribed changes in management
roles and systems, actually percolates down the hierarchy and produces
"real" behaviour changes, the research is also concerned with the role
of middle managers in implementing change. A number of (non-local
government) studies - Scase and Gof fee (1989), Smith (1990), Dopson and
Stewart (1988, 1990, 1990a) - suggest that middle managers frequently
play a key role in change implementation, and it can be argued that
careful consideration of the impact of structural change on local
government middle managers' work roles and work satisfaction levels is
required in order to maximise their commitment, and minimise resistance,
to the continuing and accelerating pace of change in local authorities.
Research design of the study
A case study approach was chosen for this research, because it has the
potential to provide valuable insights into the complex socio-political
processes which characterise behaviour in organisations, and which are
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difficult to elucidate through the use of "at a distance" methods such
as surveys (Crompton and Jones, 1988, p72; Bryman, 1989). For example,
Knights' (1993, p8) case study about the management of IT represents an
attempt to "go behind the official representations of the organisation
to discover how those lower down the hierarchy represent reality from
what may be seen as positions of repressed dissent or partial
subjugation". The case study approach thus appeared to be appropriate
for examining the complexities of the "inherently problematic process"
of managerial behaviour, and for generating insights into the multiple
meanings which managers can attach to their formally prescribed or
"official" work roles (Hales, 1993, pl5). The key problem with the use
of a case study approach is the question of the extent to which case
study findings are capable of generalisation beyond the confines of the
particular case - what Pugh terms the "peculiar paradox" of presenting
single studies as applying to all organisations (1988, p124). Attempts
at resolving this problem include: studying more than one case; using
teams of researchers, rather than just one researcher, to study a number
of cases; to seek a case which is "typical" of a certain number of
characteristics, so that other researchers can then examine comparable
cases which belong to other clusters of characteristics.
arset County Council (BCC) was selected for this study because it
represents an organisation which is critica1 h1 * - in terms of its
* The term "critical" is used here in Goldthorpe and Lockwood's (1969,
p31) sense of the term. Thus, Barset Council was selected on the basis
that, given its extensive adoption of the "new" management systems, it
"would be as favourable as possible" an organisation for examining the
impact of such systems on managerial behaviour. Thus the organisation
presented a "best chance of being able to study" these managerial
behaviour changes in that if changes did not occur in this "critical"
organisation, then they were unlikely to be occurring to a significant
extent elsewhere.
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possession of the cluster of characteristics associated with the unewN
public sector management system described in the local government
literature quoted earlier. The findings can thus be seen as illustrative
of wider trends affecting middle managerial work roles and work
satisfaction levels in other comparable local authorities, where further
research can be undertaken by other researchers. The evidence suggesting
that BCC provided a good example of a local authority who had adopted
most of the "new" management elements came from a number of sources. As
indicated in chapter 6, BCC had won national awards for its adoption of
new communication,	 training, IT, and customer care systems and
programmes; in addition, it had pioneered new approaches to management
and service systems which the government had subsequently drawn upon
when planning legislation. Key BCC senior managers had written articles
about their "new" management practices in a variety of management and
local government journals (not listed here to preserve confidentiality).
Various aspects of BCC's management systems had been quoted in the local
government literature as providing good examples of the "new" management
model - see, for example, Brooke (1989), Leach et al (1993), Glynn
(1991), Caulfield and Schutz (1989), Issac-Henry and Painter (1991) . One
text actually quoted Barset as "an authority nationally recognised as
being in the van of innovation"; the authority was praised by the Audit
Commission for making "the transition from a bureaucratic and
administrative ethos to the new management-led culture".
Difficulties in conducting the Research
Three main difficulties were experienced in conducting the research.
Firstly, national County Council elections were to be held in early May
1993, and so it was imperative that all the fieldwork was completed by
this date, as it was forecast that the Conservative ruling group, which
had controlled Barset since its inception in 1889, might lose control.
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Clearly, a new political administration might have introduced changes
which could alter, part-way through the research, the management systems
and role prescriptions associated with the existing "new" management
model.
Secondly, in terms of access to the organisation, some problems were
experienced in gaining access, within the time constraint set up by the
election date, to Social Services Department senior management, and,
hence, to a list of middle mangers suitable for interviewing. 	 The
Department was extremely busy with preparations for its new
responsibilities under the NHS and Community Care Act 1990, which became
operational on April 1, 1993. 	 In addition, so many requests were being
made for help with research (in connection with the development of new
service delivery methods) that senior managers were considering
"rationing"	 the	 numbers	 (a	 problem	 increasingly	 facing
organisational/management researchers: see Richards, 1993). A short
initial interview was made available with a not very senior manager, who
made some useful documentation available, and informal contacts were
then made with some social work staff and middle managers known
personally to the author. These managers agreed to participate in the
research, and suggested other middle managers whom they thought might be
willing to cooperate. Personal contacts are frequently used by
researchers to gain access to organisations (Buchanan et al, 1988). No
other difficulties were experienced in gaining access. Initial access to
the organisation was achieved through contact with a senior member of
the Personnel Department, known to staff at the local University, who
then secured permission for the research to be undertaken, and arranged
contacts with other senior managers in the relevant departments. These
managers then arranged access to the middle managers in their
departments.
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Thirdly, some factual data - for example, changes in the numbers of
middle manager posts and redundancies - was simply not available in the
organisation. The Personnel Director explained that records were not
kept in a form which made it possible to extract this data. Where this
occurred, estimates were obtained from the Personnel Director about the
probable trends towards increases or decreases in these numbers. Clearly
such statements are less reliable than 'hard", written, substantiated
data, and this limitation is acknowledged clearly in the relevant parts
of the text.
Methodologies
The plan was to use Mintzberg's model of organisation design parameters,
configurations and management roles (see chapters 1 and 2 for
explanation of the reasons for the choice of Mintzberg's model) as a
diagnostic framework to: analyse the structural changes which had taken
place in BCC between 1984/5 and April 1993 and assess the extent to
which the Authority had "officially" adopted the key features of the
"new" public sector management model; assess the nature and extent of
changes in middle management roles, behaviour and work satisfaction
levels. Before describing the methodologies used, it is necessary to
explain why the dates of 1984/5 - April 1993 were selected. As Hinirigs
and Greenwood (1988) suggest, it can be very difficult to affix specific
dates to the "beginning" and "end" of organisational change programmes.
Whilst specific features, such as the introduction of a performance
related pay scheme, can be dated precisely, other change areas - such as
the introduction and dissemination of new cultures or values - are less
easy to pin down. In addition, in respect to both forms of change, the
pace and stages of implementation, especially in large organisations
such as BCC, can vary between departments. Thus during the period when
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the interviews with the middle managers took place (January to early
May, 1993), some changes were continuing to occur with regard
particularly to the implementation of the Authority's purchaser/provider
split within the Finance sections, which meant that most of these staff
could not be categorised as "Purchaser" or "Provider" managers.
The early May date fixed itself, so to speak, because of the need to
complete the research by election day (when the Conservative ruling
group did in fact lose control for the first time in the Authority's 100
year history). The earlier date of (approximately) 1984/5 was fixed for
two reasons. Firstly, a new leader (of the ruling Conservative Group)
was elected in 1984, followed shortly afterwards by the appointment of a
new Personnel Director and a new Chief Executive; as indicated in
chapter 6, all of these individuals were key instigators of the
extensive structural changes which subsequently took place, and it was
essentially after the appointment of these managers that the significant
moves to the "new" management model took place. Secondly, the middle
managers clearly had to have been employed in the organisation for the
period covered by this research in order to describe and analyses the
changes which had taken place in their roles. To go further back than
1984/5 would have involved severe problems, within three of the four
departments, in finding enough middle managers who had been employed in
the authority at the beginning of the change period.
Moreover, as indicated by Dunkerly (1988), "oral" recollections of past
events clearly become less reliable over time, particularly with regard
to dates.	 It was accepted that whilst docunientary sources usually
provide clear indications of the dates when events took place, the
recollections of the managers in terms of providing precise dates for
the introduction of various changes might not be accurate. It was
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considered that this problem was not particularly significant. It was
made clear to the managers during the interviews that the purpose of the
data collection was to examine the extent to which the "new" management
systems had replaced the "traditional" management practices. The precise
dates when changes took place - whether slightly earlier in the l980s or
slightly later - were not considered to be particularly important. The
term "mid-l980s" was used in the interview schedule to cover this dating
problem.
Methodologies used at each stage of the research
As recommended in the literature on methodology, a combination of
quantitative and qualitative methods were used at each stage of the
research (Bryman, 1988, 1989; Easterby-Smith, 1991; Crompton and Jones,
1988).	 Quantitative methods typically involve the use of highly
formalised structured interviews, questionnaires, tests/measures (such
as personality tests) and structured observation to collect data.
UStructured li interviews are based on a carefully prepared set of
questions, with each interviewee asked precisely the same questions; the
researcher accepts what the interviewee says, tries riot to provide any
verbal or non-verbal reactions to interviewees' responses, and usually
does not question the interviewee's answers. Similarly, "structured"
observation is highly standardised and systematised, with preset
categories of behaviour and processes, against which activities are
classified and recorded. The researcher starts with a clearly defined
theory or hypothesis about the nature of the phenomenon under
investigation, and then collects data to confirm or not confirm the
theory (Easterby-Smith)
Qualitative methods typically involve the use of in-depth and more
unstructured interviews, more unstructured observation, and diary
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methods to collect data. Completely "unstructured" interviews involve an
approach where "the interviewee talks freely without intervention or
interruption"	 (Easterby-Smith,	 p75).	 However,	 because	 of	 the
difficulties of analysing or making sense out of data collected in this
way, unstructured interviews more commonly involve- a "topic guide" used
to form a loose structure for the questions (or provide broad
activity/behaviour categories for more unstructured forms of
observation). The interviewer then is free to pursue particular lines of
enquiry raised by the interviewees, whilst at the same time attempting
not to inject his/her own opinions and feelings into the interview.
Semi-structured interviews use a combination of both qualitative and
qualitative techniques, with some standardised questions put to each
interview, but allowing plenty of opportunity for the interviewer to
explore answers more fully, and for interviewee to put forward their own
views and opinions in ways not structured in advance by the researcher's
own theoretical framework and assumptions.
The researcher uses the particular theoretical framework adopted to
analyse the information obtained through content analysis - analysing
the number and frequency of particular responses or occurrences selected
on the basis of the hypotheses set, or through grounded theory. The use
of this approach involves essentially analysing the interviewees'
responses	 "to	 tease	 out	 themes,	 patterns	 and	 categories"
(Easterby-Smith, plO8) - to generate theories which are derived mainly
from the concepts and categories used by the interviewees to interpret,
orgariise and make sense of their physical or social world. It is,
however, important to recognise that the interviewer always operates
from a particular set of theoretical assumptions and values which will
influence the questions asked, the way in which interviewees are asked
to elaborate further on particular aspects of their responses (and hence
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the nature of the information obtained), and the interpretations made of
the information collected - including the researcher's identification of
any theoretical concepts and categories considered to be represented
within the interviewees' responses.
The selection of particular research methods is likely to be influenced
by a number of factors including the personal inclinations of the
researcher, and the aims and objectives of the particular research
project. In general, qualitative approaches are considered to be more
appropriate for investigating and understanding processes and the
significance or meanings which people attach to situations and to their
behaviour, and quantitative research to be more appropriate for the
"elucidation of structural regularities" in social or organisational
life (Bryman, 1988, p158). 	 However, although many authors suggest that
there may appear to be fundamental and incompatible differences between
these two methodological approaches and their underpinning philosophies,
they suggest that the differences in practice, in terms of the "actual
research methods and techniques used by researchers" are by no means so
clear-cut and distinct (Easterby-Smith, p26). Thus, Crompton and Jones,
in an article about the value of the case-study approach (frequently
associated with more qualitative methods) stress the point that
organisational research does not involve making a mutually exclusive
decision between qualitative and quantitative methodology:
"In reality, it is very difficult to study organisations without
using both sets of methods. In any event quantitative data
always rests on qualitative distinctions. We are, therefore,
sceptical of research which purports to represent organisational
realities, but which uses market research techniques.
Organisations cannot be studied at a distance. Conversely,
'organisational studies' which did not describe the structure of
positions, rules and hierarchies, etc. would also be suspect,
however sensitive and insightful the observers' account in other
respects" (Crompton and Jones, 1988, p72).
Similarly, within a classic example of the quantitative approach - the
well known Aston Studies 	 - the author, whilst using quantitative
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statistical survey techniques to test out specific hypotheses, also
adopted a qualitative approach involving the use of detailed case study
analysis at later stage in the research (Pugh, 1988, p127). The classic
case-study by Blau and Scott also ued a combination of methods from
both perspectives: "The study of County Agency employed unstructured and
systematic observation, interviewing, a self-administered questionnaire,
and the analysis of records and documents" (1963, p254) . Similarly, the
case study approach adopted here uses a combination of both quantitative
and qualitative methods in both stages of the research.
Stage 1
This stage of	 the research involved the analysis, from within
Nintzberg's model of organisation design parameters and management
roles, of the structural changes which had taken place in BCC between
1984/5 and April 1993 and assessment of the extent to which the
Authority had "officially" adopted the key features of the "new" public
sector management model. A checklist of a key features representing the
"new" management approach was prepared (reproduced in exhibit 5.1) . This
provided criteria against which the changes 	 in the Authority's
management systems were assessed, using semi-structured interviews,
non-participant observation, plus examination of various documentary
records. (Mon-participant observation refers to a situation where the
observer plays no part in the activity being observed (Shipman, 1981).)
The documents used included: the agendas of Committee meetings, the
County annual reports, corporate and departmental plans and budgets
since 1984/5; organisational charts for 1984/5 and 1992/3; the articles
listed above, by the Finance Director, Personnel Director, Corporate
Planners and the Chief Executive, and two articles reporting interviews
with two senior corporate IT managers; three MA/MBA theses by BCC
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managers (names withheld to protect the identity of the authority); all
of the Making Connections	 publications and newsletters	 (a
communication/development programme aimed specifically at middle
managers delivered between 1992/3); various reports and documents
relating to specific organisational/management system changes made
during this period. These included: the policies and implementation
guidelines for the Purchaser/Provider split, service-level agreements; a
customer satisfaction survey; a staff attitudes survey; a communications
survey; the guidelines for operating the staff development and
performance review system; the financial management handbook; the
County's general management handbook; members handbook for 1984/5 and
1992/3; a video, accompanied by a booklet, about the County's strategic
planning system and the principles (as stated by the Council leader and
the Chief Executive) behind the changes introduced since the mid-1980s.
The semi-structured interviews of one to two hours in length were held
(mainly in December 1992 and January 1993) with: several staff from the
Corporate Personnel, Corporate IT, Corporate Public Relations and
Corporate Planning sections; the Personnel Directors in the Commercial
Services, Social Services and Highways Departments (see below for
explanation of the choice of these departments); two senior managers in
each of the Highways, Commercial Services, and Corporate Finance
sections; one less senior manager in Social Services, and three social
workers/one middle manager known personally to the author, in view of
the difficulties, explained above, of gaining access to Social Services
senior management.	 Non-participant observation took place at two
one-day Making Connections seminars, where middle manager groups
presented the results of their learning set activities, and where Chief
Officers explained the nature and rationale of the changes which had
been, and were being introduced in the Authority's structure and
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management systems.
The interviews with the Personnel Directors of Highways, Commercial
Services and a senior manager in Finance included time set aside for the
identification of the middle managers to be interviewed in the second,
and main, stage of the research.
StacTe 2
The second stage of the research involved identifying, from within the
framework of Mintzberg's managerial roles, the nature and extent of the
changes which had occurred between the mid l980s and 1993 in middle
managers' work roles and work satisfaction levels. As noted earlier, the
case study approach, using interviews and observation techniques, has
been frequently used to provide in-depth and detailed analyses of
complex managerial processes (Stewart, 1967; Smith, 1990; Mintzberg,
1973; Dopson and Stewart, 1988, 1990, 1990a) . The methods of participant
and non-participant observation were not considered suitable for this
study as the purpose was not to gather data simply about current
managerial behaviour and work satisfaction levels, but to identify the
way these had changed since the mid 1980s, and, clearly, observation
would not yield information on this topic. The use of a standardised
self-administered questionnaire/survey was also rejected because of the
complex and wide-ranging nature of the changes in management processes
which were expected to be reported by managers in the context of the
extensive "official" changes made in management systems and role
prescriptions by senior management. It was felt that attempts to produce
a standardised measures	 (without opportunities 	 for face-to-face
clarification and discussion) of	 such changes, across four very
different	 functional	 management	 contexts	 (in	 the	 four
departments/sections) would result in key areas, seen by the managers as
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significant, but not anticipated by- the researcher, being excluded from
the findings. Managers would also be forced to focus on issues which
perhaps were of little importance or significance to them. Moreover
there was no comparable local government study, at the time of this
research, with which results could be compared. Conversely, it was felt
that completely unstructured interviews would not be suitable because of
the researcher's desire to explore specific issues raised in the local
government literature, and particular policies and developments which
had been introduced by the Authority.
To secure the advantages of both the standardised and unstructured
approach to the data collection, it was decided to combine both
quantitative and qualitative approaches by conducting in-depth
semi-structured interviews with middle managers located within four
departments. (Middle managers were defined as those managers who had
first line managers/supervisors or senior professionals/professional
section leaders reporting to them, and who reported in turn to more
senior managers (Dopson and Stewart, 1990, 1990a) . Certain standard,
largely open-ended questions (ie not requiring specific precoded
answers) about key management developments (derived from BCC formally
prescribed changes in policies and role prescriptions, practice and from
the local government literature) were to be put to the middle managers
selected for interview, plus a self-administered questionnaire measure
of work satisfaction. The latter was used partly to enable comparisons
to be made with two recent large-scale surveys which used the same
measure (Scase and Goffee, 1989; Mansfield and Poole, 1991), and partly
because there was insufficient time for exploring this very potentially
wide-ranging topic in a less structured manner. The key focus of the
interviews was on the nature of the changes in managers' role behaviour,
rather than on their work satisfaction levels. Within this standardised
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framework of largely open-ended questions, the researcher intended to
employ "conversational" techniques to "pick up" and explore the various
issues raised by managers, and thus seen by them as significant, as
fully as possible.
Bearing in mind the time constraints operating on the researcher, the
decision was made to interview 48 managers, with 12 drawn from each of
the two major direct service provision Departments - Social Services and
Highways, and two indirect service provision departments - Commercial
Services and Finance. The Departments were chosen on the basis that
local authorities are highly differentiated organisations (Stewart,
1992), and it was expected that • middle managers, within these four very
different contexts, would, as suggested by Stewart (1991) and Mintzberg
(1973), vary in terms of their managerial roles, and the impact of BCC's
changes on their role behaviour. Two criteria were used to select the
sample of managers: they had to have worked for BCC since the mid-1980s
(preferably since at least 1984/5) in order to have experienced the
changes in managerial systems and roles; their management roles had to
equate with Dopson and Stewart's definition of middle managers - (The
location of such positions within Barset's own grading system was on
points G,H,I and J.) The methods for selecting the 12 managers from each
department varied	 slightly; as	 Buchanan et al	 (1988) suggest,
researchers have to work within the constraints of what is available.
In Social Services, as explained above, no list of suitable managers was
available, and personal contacts were used to identify 12 middle
managers who were willing to cooperate; it was not possible to achieve
the spread which would have been ideal between the 5 geographical areas,
and between the Purchaser and Provider functional roles. By good
fortune, there was a reasonable spread between the professional
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specialisms of mentally ill,	 elderly, mentally handicapped and
families/children. The senior manager approached in corporate Finance
produced a list of 13 eligible managers; little choice was available to
the researcher about which managers to interview because only a very
small number on the appropriate grades had been employed with the
authority since the mid-1980s. 	 A reasonable spread was achieved of
Finance managers across the Authority, with 2 located at Corporate
Headquarters, and the rest located, under devolution, in various Service
Departments - including Social Services and Highways so that middle
managers' views about the roles of devolved finance staff could be
compared with definitions provided by the Finance managers themselves.
The Purchaser/Provider split was still being completed within these
devolved Finance sections at the time of this research and so most
Finance managers had not yet been identified as either Purchasers or
Providers.
Within the Commercial Services Department, a list of 15 managers was
produced (excluding those who worked for a section who had just lost a
contract); one turned out to be the wrong grade, and one refused to
allow the interview to be tape-recorded (the only refusal in the entire
project), which left 13 who met the length of employment criteria. The
Highways manager produced a list of staff across all of the branches,
with those managers marked who met the criteria of length of employment
and appropriate grades. Information on the Purchaser/Provider status of
these managers was not available on this chart (the new one had not yet
been produced), and so although a good spread of functions across the
branches was achieved, it was not possible to select managers on the
basis of their Purchaser/Provider functions. In each department, a
reasonable distribution between the four grades was achieved.
Initial contact with the managers, once their names had been obtained,
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was made in every case by telephone, and there were no refusals.
Complete confidentiality was guaranteed, and for this reason, the
managers' positions are not identified on the organisational charts
reproduced in chapter 6. Similarly, names and other data produced in the
quotations have been omitted or changed (without distorting the meaning)
where there was a risk that the manager might be identified. It had been
originally intended to interview the managers at home, where it was felt
that they would feel freer to express themselves and avoid work
interruptions, and where data could be more easily collected about the
relations between managers' work and family/social lives. It became
clear, however, after several phone calls, that the managers wanted to
be interviewed during their working day at work, and not at their homes.
This practice was thus adopted for all of the interviews (except for one
where the manager was on sick leave), and questions about managers'
family/social/work relations were omitted from the interview schedule,
which had become, in any case, rather too long. It subsequently
transpired that there were advantages to be gained from interviewing
managers in their work place. There were opportunities for some informal
observation of, for example, wall-posters exhorting staff to adopt
various customer care and quality management practices, and the attempts
to make the various reception areas more welcoming with plants,
prominent displays of the Departments' customer charters, complaints
leaflets etc.
Several pilot interviews were held to test the viability of the
interview schedule - one with a manager from each of the four
Departments, and four with students and ex-students from local colleges
who worked for the County. The two significant changes made in the
interview schedule as a consequence of these pilots related to the
elucidation of changes in the managers' disturbance handler and
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negotiating roles. It appeared that the topics were simply too wide,
capable of such diverse interpretations, and occurred in so many
different contexts, that they could not be covered in a systematic or
standardised way. The use of a standardised measure was considered but
rejected on the grounds of adding to an already lengthy schedule. It was
decided eventually that for the negotiating role - where all of the
pilot interviewees spontaneously brought up the topic in the course of
the interview - interviewees would be asked to comment on changes
experienced in this role as and when it emerged at whatever point in the
interview.	 Specific questions on the disturbance handler role were
simply omitted; this role is brought out most clearly in the research
studies, such as Mintzberg's own, which use observation methods.
Interview Schedule
As explained above, this schedule	 (see exhibit 5.2) included a
combination of standardised questions, with plenty of open ended
questions and "probing" reminders, and a "conversational" technique
where managers'	 views and opinions were discussed between the
interviewer and interviewee. At the outset of the interview (and
previously on the telephone when setting up the interview) the purposes
of the research were made plain to the interviewees, stressing that the
purpose of the research was purely academic, that it not been
commissioned by BCC, and emphasising that total confidentiality would be
ensured when reporting their responses in the text. Tape recording was
used to record the data; only one manager would not allow the interview
to be recorded, and this interview was not used because the transcript
based on notes made at the time was inadequate in terms of length and
accuracy when compared with the others.
The schedule was divided into 8 main sections. Essentially the idea was
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to present the interviewees with statements about BCC policies and
management role prescriptions, and then ask about the extent to which
managers were familiar with these, and about the impact these had had on
the managers' role behaviour, with particular emphasis on comparisons
with the mid-l980s situation. Section A included questions on a number
of basic and simple issues about age, pay, sex, location and functions
etc, including two questions about the probable impact, if any, of CCT
and BCC's policies	 of	 externalisation"	 of certain functions
(privatisation). The questions on age, pay and marital status were put
using cards with a list of ranges of possible answers - partly because
these can be slightly sensitive questions, and partly because it helped
to break the ice and establish quickly a friendly rapport with the
inevitable jokes made about age and pay. Section B questions were
designed to collect data on the managers' perceptions about the impact
of the BCC management changes on their job security and career
prospects, together with their reasons for joining BCC; the latter was
considered to have a possible bearing on managers' perceptions about job
security and career prospects, and about any changes they experienced in
work satisfaction levels (see section g) . 	 Moreover, the reasons for
joining BCC/entering	 local government constituted	 a fairly
non-controversial topic which it was hoped would encourage the managers
to get accustomed to responding fully to questions, before embarking on
slightly more controversial areas (in the sense of possibly being
critical of BCC's policies) concerned with impact of change on their
particular work roles.
Section C questions were concerned with the resource allocator role,
which was considered to be of particular significance because of its
concern with devolution (one of the Chief Executive's three core values)
and the allocation of increased decision-making powers to middle
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nianagers in operational areas such as service delivery, finance and
personnel management. The same questions - concerned basically with the
decentralisation/centralisation debate raised in the literature about
the nature of control systems - were asked several times in different
ways to maximise the responses from managers here. Finance managers were
asked some specific questions about the impact on their roles of being
devolved to Service Departments, because of the concerns raised in the
literature about possibly adverse consequences on these managers'
professional and career development. Similarly, service managers were
asked about the extent to which they considered there has been changes
in the roles of devolved finance managers, who were expected by BCC to
become more responsive to service mangers' business needs. In view of
BCC's move to control systems based on performance outputs, managers
were asked specifically about the impact of these on their work, and, in
relation to BCC's strategic planning system, how these linked in to the
new strategic planning in their departments, in terms of allowing these
mangers some involvement in this. The "red-tape" question was asked
because reductions in bureaucracy and red tape constituted one of the
Chief Executive's three core values, as did the the shift in emphasis
from "professionalism" to "management".
The entrepreneurial role (section D) questions similarly used the key
phrases disseminated by the Chief Executive throughout the organisation
as a basis for identifying changes in managers' practices here. Section
E questions, focusing on Mintzberg's Interpersonal roles, again took as
their starting point the Chief Executive's prescriptions about desirable
role performance in relation to the leader role (which equated closely
to the transformational leadership style outlined by Bass and Avolio
(1990)). The question about how they saw their immediate line managers'
leadership style was included because of the suggestions in the
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literature that senior managers did not always practise what they
preached about the more "empowering" leadership styles to be adopted by
lower level managers.
Section F focused on Mintzberg's three informational roles. Because of
the potentially vast amount of data which could have been sought here,
it was decided to concentrate, as had the literature review, on fairly
broad questions about the nature of horizontal and vertical
communication and information flows and exchanges within BCC and between
BCC and other organisations. Specific questions were asked about
managers' involvement and contact with "customers 1' in the context of the
Authority's policies about becoming more responsive to customer needs
and views about the quality of service provision. In addition, the
purchaser/provider split, with the associated notion of multiple
customer identities, and the possible horizontal barriers which the
literature suggests can arise from the introduction of internal markets,
was given specific attention here. 	 Specific mention was also made of
BCC's Making Connections programme (with the question about managers'
involvement in this), of BCC's expressed policy decision to improve
communication systems within the County, and to achieve a more "open"
organisation in the sense of more accessible and freer information
flows. One specific question was put on the impact of IT on managers'
information processing activities, because of the recent improvements
made to such systems across the County, and the importance
attached to them in the literature in terms of facilitating the
development of devolved management systems.
Section G focused on the changing competences required by managers in
the light of all the changes analysed earlier, and on changes they had
experienced in their job satisfaction levels. As explained above, a
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self-administered questionnaire was used to provide indications of
current job satisfaction levels, because of the wide-ranging nature of
this topic, and the limited time available to pursue it in a less
directive manner. The short questionnaire followed the format used in
two recent studies on changing levels of job satisfaction amongst
managers - Scase and Goffee (1989) and Mansfield and Poole (1991) - so
that comparisons could be made directly with the data of these two
studies. As explained fully in chapter 2, although there are numerous
studies of job satisfaction, there is an absence of agreed definitions
of what constitutes "work satisfaction".	 Discussions such as Scase and
Gof fee, Mansfield and Poole, and Poole et al (1981) incorporate
dimensions referring to both intrinsic and extrinsic rewards available
from work (derived from Herzberg's analysis of job satisfaction
factors), and use the expectancy theorists' approach (Vroom 1964) to
investigate both the levels of importance that individuals attach to
particular intrinsic and extrinsic rewards, and the extent to which
their work provides opportunities for the rea].isation of these rewards.
In terms of intrinsic rewards, measures or indices are constructed in
relation to the extent to which work offers opportunities for: (1)
self-esteem and status; (2) the ability to work independently or
autonomously,	 and through	 this:	 (3) the	 scope available	 for
self-development and personal growth. These commonly-used reward
categories are defined as follows (Hunt, 1979) : independent thought and
action refers to opportunities for managers to exercise their own
personal judgement and discretion in decision-making and 	 task
performance; personal growth and development involves opportunities for
managers to obtain self-fulfilment and satisfaction	 through the
utilisation of	 their own skills and talents; 	 self-respect and
self-esteem are concerned with managers' feelings that they and their
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work contributions are valued and recognised. In relation to extrinsic
rewards, these studies focus upon individuals' perceptions of (1)
security of employment; (2) remuneration; (3) promotion prospects; and
(4) opportunities for work friendships. In relation to both intrinsic
and extrinsic rewards, indices or measures are constructed upon which
questionnaires are designed to measure managers' feelings of relative
work satisfaction and dissatisfaction.
This approach was adopted here in the form of the short questionnaire
included at the end of the interview schedule. Managers were asked to
grade from ]. (low) to 7 (high): (1) the extent to which they considered
that their jobs offered opportunities for obtaining the rewards listed,
and; (2) the level of importance that they attached to each of these
rewards. Subtracting the scores in the "importance" column from the
scores in the "opportunities" column provides an indication of the
nanagers' levels of job satisfaction in terms of how far they perceive
the opportunities for obtaining each reward from their jobs to match the
importance attributed to the rewards.	 The closer these scores are to
zero, the closer the match between the "importance"	 and the
"opportunity" which they perceive for enjoying that particular element
of job satisfaction. After managers had completed the questionnaire,
they were asked about the extent to which their jobs had become more or
less satisfying as a result of the changes explored earlier in the
interview, and asked to give reasons for their responses.
Section H looked at managers' responses to the phenomena of the
Authority's accelerating and ongoing pace of change. The intention was
to assess the extent of managers' satisfaction with BCC's change
management process, using the key issues identified as influencing the
nature of managers' responses to change drawn up by Dopson and Stewart
(1990a): ie, changes imposed externally or internally, change management
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methods, the particular stage of change where managers were located,
(using Nicholson and West's schema (1988)), and the nature of the
managers' reactions to the "change as a normal way of life" feature of
organisational life.
Once the recording had been transcribed (about one third by a typist
employed for the purpose, and about two-thirds by the researcher), the
content analysis method (Bryman, 1988) was used to analyse the responses
(apart from the few pre-coded questions such as those on pay,
qualifications etc., and those questions asking for responses along
"mostly negative" or "mostly positive" lines).	 The responses were
analysed from within the various theoretical perspectives, derived from
the literature (and used to design the interview schedule); these are
restated at the beginning of each of the chapters which present the data
analysis.
Problems with interviewing as a data collection method
It is important to consider some of the problems which can be
experienced in the conduct of semi-structured interviews.	 Firstly,
there is the problem of the so-called "Hawthorne effect" (Shipman,
1981), where the act of doing research - asking individuals about their
work in this case - can alter their perceptions. Linked with this
problem is the concept of interviewer bias - that by asking questions in
a certain way, certain answers are more likely to be forthcoming than
others. Thus the wording of questions was carefully designed to avoid
"leading" the interviewee towards a particular response. There is also
the problem of inadvertent bias introduced into the situation by the
interviewer;	 numerous studies	 have shown	 that interviewee
characteristics such as the race, sex, age, social class, physical
appearance etc. of the interviewer can influence the responses made by
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the interviewee. Interviewees can also consciously or unconsciously
distort their answers, particularly on sensitive issues, towards
responses which they feel are "acceptable, or, simply become less full
and more cautious in their responses. The topic of managers' leadership
style was the most sensitive or "personal" of the subjects addressed in
this interview, in terms of the close and almost inextricable
relationships between the managers' own personality and their leadership
methods. Managers' responses were, as had been expected, less profuse
here than with most of the other topics - especially on the question
about their line managers' leadership styles. Statements made by some
managers in response to the leadership questions, such as "you need to
ask my staff about this, not me", suggested a degree of discomfort with
the topic.	 In general, most of the managers appeared to respond
extremely thoughtfully and fully to the questions; as Crompton and Jones
(1988) indicated in their study, many managers appeared to enjoy the
chance to reflect and expound on their work lives and experiences.
The case study of managers
The 48 middle managers interviewed for the study are listed by
case-number in exhibit 5.3., including information about each manager's:
age; sex; marital status; highest educational qualification; management
qualifications; job title; department and section; functional roles as
Purchaser/Provider/Twin-hatted (under the Authority's internal market
system); salary; number of years with the Authority. Information about
managers' precise work-grades is withheld to avoid any possible
identification of the managers' identity by the Authority (as promised
in the interviews). For the same reason, individual managers' positions
are not shown on the departmental organisational charts represented in
Chapter 6, although the levels where they were located are indicated
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clearly on these charts (see exhibits 6.7 - 6.13)
The next four chapters analyse the data obtained from the research.
Chapter 6 provides an analysis of the structural changes introduced by
Barset County Council (BCC) since the mid-1980s, using Mintzberg's four
organisational design parameters (described in chapter 1) as a framework
- including the changes in Barset Council's management role
prescriptions.	 These managerial role changes are analysed using
Nintzberg's model of managerial role sets, as outlined in chapter 2.
Chapters 7,8 and 9 focus on analysing the the data obtained from the
interviews with the forty-eight middle managers -about their experiences
of changes in their managerial work behaviour - identifying the extent
to which their behaviour changed in accordance with BCC's recently
introduced formal managerial role prescriptions.
Chapter 7 analyses the managers' responses about the impact of these
changes on their interpersonal and information work roles. Mintzberg's
six interpersonal (leader, ceremonial and liaison) and informational
(disseminator, monitor and spokesperson) managerial roles are used as a
framework for sunmiarising briefly the key features of change here
outlined in the local government literature (see chapter 4) . This is
followed by a short outline of the changes in formal role prescriptions
introduced by BCC, and then discussion at length of the responses of the
managers about changes in their managerial behaviour in these areas. The
same format is used in chapter 8 to identify the changes in the
managers' behaviour within the	 four decisional roles - resource
allocator, entrepreneur, disturbance-handler and negotiator. Chapter 9
then presents managers' experiences, deriving from these changes in
their work behaviour, of changing levels of work satisfaction.
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CHAPTER 6
Organisational restructuring in Barset County Council: changing role
prescriptions
This chapter identifies the key changes in management structures and
systems, introduced by the Authority's elected members and corporate
management team since 1984/85, when "a new Conservative leadership
embarked on a programme of organisational and managerial reform which
has had ramifications throughout the County Council, and has set BCC in
the vanguard of local change." (article, 1991; source withheld to
protect the authority's identity). The chapter begins by identifying the
key contingency characteristics of the Authority which appear to have
precipitated the extensive changes made during this period. Mintzberg's
model of organisation design parameters and management roles is then
used to outline the changes in the Authority's internal structures and
management systems during this period.
As outlined in chapter 3, contingency theory indicates that local
authorities will adopt different forms of structure according to
differences in	 their contingency or	 situational characteristics.
However, contingency theory is based largely on comparisons between
different organisational forms in different circumstances at a
particular point in time, with relatively little attention paid to the
process of organisational change in response to changes in circumstances
(Hales, 1993). Hinings and Greenwood (1988) emphasise the need to
examine the "interpenetration of organisational contexts and internal
organisational arrangements and processes" in order to understand the
processes of organisational 	 change	 (or	 inertia) within	 local
authorities. They identify two analytical categories of factors which
have the capacity to pressurise an organisation towards change or
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stability. These consist of: contextural factors (task/environment,
fiscal, and institutional/ideational pressures relating to the extent to
which central government and other sources act to legitimate and
necessitate change); strategic choice factors (concerned with the
existence of particular underpinning ideas and beliefs about
organisation mission, vision, and design "archetypes", and the extent to
which different groups within the organisation view themselves as
representing different and/or conflicting sectional interests) . A third
category consists of enabling factors which can assist or impede the
scale of changes. These involve the degree of concentration of power
within the authority (dispersed, concentrated or intermediate), the
extent of transformational rather than transactional leadership, and the
leadership's capability (skills and knowledge) in the management of
change arena, with a focus on changing values, behaviour and processes
as well as roles and structure.
Hinings and Greenwood (1988; see chapter 3) use this analytical
framework to identify the key factors which precipitated the authorities
within their sa.mple towards	 "reorientation" (the movement of an
organisation away from the traditional heterogenous professional
bureaucracy to n alternative corporate organisation form, involving
changes, as outlined below, in each of Mintzberg's design parameters)
Essentially, these factors consist of high levels of institutional
pressures, a strong value commitment to change on the part of the
organisational e1ite",	 and at least one "enabling" factor - moves
towards transformational leadership and/or the existence of significant
expertise in corporate planning and change management (p140-141). Fiscal
pressures were largely high/medium in strength; environment/task and
organisational size factors appeared to be low in significance.
n analysis of the factors precipitating the extensive internal changes
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in structures and management systems within Barset County Council (BCC)
during the 1980s suggests a close similiarity with Hinirxgs and
Greenwood's model. Firstly, for Barset*, as for other authorities, the
institutional/ideational and fiscal pressures for change during the
1980s were extremely high.; These pressures, discussed fully in chapter
3, can be summarised under three main categories. These consisted of:
pressures on authorities to improve the three "E's" of economy,
efficiency and effectiveness, exacerbated by the central government
constraints on local authority spending; the establishment of market
conditions, through requiring local authorities to subject certain
services to compulsory competitive tendering (CCT), and to introduce
internal markets with a clear distinction between the providers and
purchasers of services (the	 "enabling", "competitive" and "mixed
economy" council); the creation of more " customer " orientated systems
for planning and delivering services (Elcock, 1993) . Emanating from a
variety of ideational sources, such as the Government, Audit Commission,
the Local Government Management Board, and popular management texts by
Peters (1982) and others, these pressures precipitated moves within BCC
towards a private sector style "business-like" approach to service
planning and delivery, including an emphasis on more coherent strategic
planning and performance review systems, and on greater responsiveness
to the "customer". A video and booklet (Price Waterhouse/BCC, pp4-S)
produced in the early 1990s outlined clearly the "vast range of
pressures for change" experienced by the Authority during the 1980s,
which resulted in the replacement of a "traditional" local government
management model by a "strategic management" approach:
As noted earlier, Hinings and Greenwood concluded that pressures for
change arising from environmental/task and size factors were relatively
low; a brief description of BCC in relation to these factors, together
with the 1992/3 mission and strategy statement is provided in exhibit
6.]..
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UThe world of local government in the 80's has seen enormous change.
The election of a Conservative Government in the late 70's had
radical implications for everyone, but perhaps more for local
government than for any other business sector. The difficulties
facing the economy during this period combined with the
Government's new philosophy regarding its role in controlling local
government finance resulted in an avalanche of legislation
affecting the structure and function of local government .....This
took place against a background of rising public expectations over
the services to be delivered and the way in which they are
delivered, producing iore sophisticated and demanding customers. A
vast range of pressures for change were experienced which had to be
addressed by local authorities, including:
* pressures for development, versus environmental concerns and
population change
* growing awareness of social issues, particularly child abuse
* continuing concern about eductional standards
* fears about the workforce's ability to respond to the changes of
a changing economic environment
* the opportunities and threats (presented by unique local
developments - information withheld to protect confidentiality)
* the increasing demand for local services to be seen to be
provided in an economic and effective manner, and to be capable
of competing on equal terms with the private sector.
It is widely accepted that the "traditional" ways of managing local
authorities are no longer acceptable on their own...." BCC has
recognised the shortcomings of its historical approach to service
delivery, and has used the lessons of strategic management to
tackle the challenge presented by a changing world."
This clearly expressed need for a move away from the "traditional" local
government management systems to a "strategic management" approach draws
attention to the presence within BCC of the second of Hining's key
change factors precipitating "re-orientation" from one organisational
form to another - the emergence during the 1980s of a political
leadership and key senior managers who were strongly committed to
change. A study analysing the "key conditions" of change at BCC during
the l980s (author identity withheld to protect confidentiality) focuses
on the seminal importance of strong local political leadership, and
charts the progress of some senior Conservative members' attempts, from
the mid/late 1970s onwards, to introduce extensive changes in the
Authority's structure and management systems.	 Following the 1974 local
government reorganisation, several new (ruling group) Conservative
members were elected, who held different ideas from the members of the
- 267 -
old guard" about the management styles and structures which should
operate in the County.
Basically, the pre-reorganisation members tended to operate within, and
accept, the "traditional" local authority design archetype of an
essentially federated structure. This federated structure consisted of
the traditional heterogenous professional bureaucracy (described fully
in chapter 3) where the influence of the service department professional
chief officers was extremely strong, dominating service development
policies. Although BCC's Policy and Resources Committee possessed the
capacity for strong corporate control (all policy decisions made by
service Committees have to receive approval from this central
Coirunittee), the policy decisions 	 of departmental chief officers,
supported by the more traditional members, tended to prevail, resulting
in a lack of coherent overall corporate policy. The corporate planning
structure introduced during the seventies had little impact on
individual chief officer domination of service planning, and little or
no overall corporate planning or control of service provision took place
(see full discussion below under planning and control systems).
From the late l970s, three key members, with stronger (Conservative)
political orientations sought to gain political control and introduce
"genuine" (member political policy-based) corporate control over service
planning and delivery - in a national context of the public spending
reductions of the mid-seventies, and the growing criticism of the
unresponsiveness of professionally dominated local government service
provision to public needs. Efforts by these members to achieve this
change by setting up reviews and plans for restructuring of individual
departments (beginning with Highways) met with resistance from both
officers and (the more traditionally orientated) members. They achieved
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only limited change, but they helped to create the conditions necessary
for achieving subsequent and more wide-reaching county-wide changes. One
of these members acting as key change agents (Hind) was elected as
council Leader in 1984, following a previously unsuccessful attempt.
As the author of the study mentioned above emphasises, it is difficult
to identify the factors which resulted in the eventual victory, through
Hind's election, of the overtly change-orientated members within the
Conservative ruling group.	 Significant factors influencing the outcome
of the 1984 council Leader elections probably included the national
developments noted above which enhanced the legitimacy of Hind's change
programme - the election of the Conservative national government in 1979
with its programme of public sector reform - and dissatisfaction with
the performance of the previous (traditional political establishment)
council leader. Hind was an "outsider" (rather than a member of the
Barset Conservative party establishment), and, in terms of the impact of
his election on the direction of change within Barset, the author of
this study considered that " .....there is a sense in which Hind's
victory in 1984 replicated Mrs Thatcher's victory nationally in 1975.
Each was an outsider bent on radical change, and each had the good
fortune to face an establishment leader whose popularity was on the
wane".
Hind subsequently embarked on an intensified and accelerated structural
change programme, which embodied the three key "new" management
principles outlined above - improvement in the 3 'E's, introduction of a
"mixed" economy of service provision, and an emphasis on more
responsiveness to local customer/community requirements. Indeed, BCC, in
its annual reports during this period, drew attention to the fact that
Barset had actually pioneered some of these new approaches, which were
subsequently adopted by the Government as a basis for preparing
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legislation. Hind focused on the need to replace the traditional
professionally dominated federated structure described above with a more
unitary or genuinely corporate structure. This involved a utcabineth
style structure of senior members to determine policy, with the Chief
Executive acting as line manager to departmental chief officers, and the
introduction of clear command structures to achieve stronger corporate
control and strategic 	 management of the council. Such initiatives
included a redefinition and clarification of professional chief
officers' role, equating broadly with a move in emphasis from Laf fin and
Young's professional advocate role (involving strong professional
domination of policy) towards the role of the "enabler". This stresses
chief officers' "capacity to implement policy change specified by the
members, on behalf of the members ......The members look to them to grasp
and carry out their politically-determined policies" (1990, p111) . (Full
details of all of these changes are outlined below).
Following the (1985) recommendations of a external conultancy report,
Hind focused on the need for a new Chief Executive (the previous
Executive retired), who "would become the Authority's chief strategic
planner. He or she would lead the management team and be responsible for
the overall planning and budgeting process, the development of manpower
policies and reviews of the Authority's organisation and management."
(article written by the new Chief Executive, 1990) . As Hind himself put
it, he sought a Chief Executive "with the clout to tell chief officers
what to do", and who would play "a vital role" in taking change
forward." (Hind, quoted in Price Waterhouse/BCC, 1991/2). The role of
the new Chief Executive, Miuck, equates with Hining's third key
"re-orientiation" impetus - the need for the existence of "capability"
for change management within the organisation.
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Minck adopted from the outset what Hinings describes as a
"transformational" leadership style (clear definitions and restatements
of overall values underpinning elements of organisational form),
focusing not just on changing structures but also on changing processes,
beginning with a seminal paper delivered to the Policy and Resources
Committee in September 1986 on the importance of "Changing the
'Culture'". He continued this process with the identification of three
key underpinning principles - devolution; management not administration;
closeness to the customer. These, with various amplifications and
additions (particularly about the need for a permanent change
orientation throughout the organisation) 	 provided a coherent and
restated set of values underpinning the changes up until, and including,
the period of this research (December 1992-early 1993). The focus, of
both the new leader (elected in October 1992) and the Chief Executive
(Minck continued in post) was to continue with these policies, with
particular emphases on: developing the role of members; improving
monitoring and policy direction of direct services, 	 "without
backtracking from the principle of devolution; continuing to "reshape"
the organisation towards a mixed economy of service provision;
recognising the "value" of staff by minimising as much as possible the
impact of change on their work (Making Connections, October 1992;
Shaping up, 1993)
The changes made in BCC's structure and management system, in accordance
with this management philosophy, are outlined below, within Mintzberg's
models of organisational design and management roles which have been
used throughout this study to analyse organisational change. Particular
emphasis is made on the key features of changes which took place within
the Highways,	 Social Services,	 Finance and Commercial Services
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Departments. *
Within these Departments, middle managers were interviewed to examine
the extent to which formally prescribed changes in their roles had
actually been translated into behaviour and attitude changes (see
chapters 7, 8 and 9). Mintzberg's organisational design parameters are
reproduced diagrammatica]i.y below in the format adopted in chapter 3 to
analyse internal changes in local authority structures (1983, p27):
• Group	 Desigl7 Parametef	 R&ated Concepts
Desii of positions	 Job spedalization	 Basic division of labor
Behavior formalization Standardization of work
•	 •	 .	 content
Syst iof regulated flows
Training and	 Standardization of skills
indocination









Unit size	 5yStf of informal
Direct 5tipexisicn
Span of ccnol
Design of lateral linkages Planning and conQl 	 Standardization of outputs
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Design of dedsion-	 Vertical	 Mnistsative division of












(Source: Mintzberg (1983), Structure in Fives: Designing Effective
Organisations, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, p27.)
* A brief outline of each Department's functions is provided in exhibit
6.2.
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Desiqn of positions, behaviour formalisation, and training and
indoctrination systemg*
As outlined in chapter 3, the design of individual job roles and tasks
withiA local authorities traditionally relied ox high job security,
relatively inflexible employment contracts with detailed and
activity-based job descriptions, and extensive centralised control (by
central Personnel) over numbers, grades and duties of staff (Fowler,
1988). Nationally prescribed conditions of service and grading
structures (including national pay bargaining), with a long hierarchy of
numerous grades and narrow salary ranges reinforcing the tendencies
towards a high degree of relatively inflexible role specialisation.
In most local authorities, behaviour formalisation systems (referring to
the methods used for controlling work processes) focused on a high
degree of detailed operational control, through rules, procedures and
manuals for manual, clerical, and administrative staff. For professional
staff, control systems focused around personal 	 supervision plus
standardisation of skills and knowledge, based on externally derived
professional qualifications and expertise. Considerable emphasis tended
to placed by professional staff on professional autonomy - on the use of
their professional skills and expertise to determine policy (in the case
of professional chief officers)	 and service delivery methods
(professional staff), although, as Mintzberg (1989) and Walsh (1992)
suggest, it is difficult to distinguish clearly with professional
services between policy formulation and implementation; the two tend to
* This term is used by Mintzberg (1989: p104) to describe the process of
instilling coherently defined organisational values and beliefs into
employees, " so that they become responsive to its ideological needs and
can thereby be trusted to make its decisions and take its actions."
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intermingle. Tensions tended to arise between the more "cosmopolitan"
orientation (Gouldner, 1957: see chapter 4) of professional staff and
managers towards national external professional service aims and values,
and the more "local" orientations towards the particular service aims
and values of the local authority members' policies; this conflict
operated especially, but nbt exclusively, between lower level and higher
level staff.
Professional staff and managers also traditionally exercised little
control over resource deployment, which was controlled largely by
central specialist departments. Relatively little attention was paid to
standardisation through specification of service delivery outcomes or
performance outputs (see below under planning and control systems)
Training/indoctrination techniques focused largely around the external
provision of professionally based training, rather than on management
training and development. There was little formal attention paid to the
development of coherent corporate mission/vision statements and
"cultures" to channel the professional "public service ethos" (or
cosmopolitan orientation) more specifically towards precisely defined
(more local) corporate strategies and outcomes (which tended to be very
vaguely defined, if at all - see below under planning and control
systems)
Barset Council made significant changes in each of these design
parameters -	 design of positions, behaviour 	 formalisation, and
training/indoctrination systems - during the l980s and early 1990s,
largely in response to the institutional pressures described above. For
several reasons - local labour market difficulties (especially BCC's
proximity to London with its more highly paid private sector jobs), the
emphasis placed by new corporate values on managerial acountability and
a "performance culture", and the need to achieve more numerical and
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functional flexibility to improve efficiency - Barset was the first
local authority to break away from nationally determined pay and grading
systems, (article written by the Personnel Director). A locally
determined pay and benefits system was introduced in 1990 for
white-collar staff across all Departments (excluding teachers/lecturers
and uniformed services), with a new grading system, involving fewer and
broader overlapping grades which facilitated the development of more
flexible job descriptions (see exhibit 6.3. for a comparison of the
national and BCC's own grading structure in 1990, which continued to
operate in 1993) . Corporate guidelines over job descriptions clearly
identified the requirement for these to focus on job objectives and "key
performance indicators". Exhibit 6.4. provides an example of a typical
"new-style" 1993 job description and performance appraisal form from one
department, although the format used differed considerably across the
authority (in the context of the devolution of Personnel functions to
service departments) . (No "old-style" job descriptions from the mid
1980s were available for comparison purposes.) There was also an
emphasis on ensuring a more flexible use of staff resources: "in a
rapidly changing environment, you may need your employees to be more
flexible ........the job description is only a guide, and may vary in
detail over time." (BCC Management Handbook, pp3/ll-3/44).
The increased use of short-term contracts, especially for senior
officers, and the increase in part-time staff numbers between the
mid-1980s and 1993 also suggest enhanced numerical flexibility. Between
March 1983 and March 1993, the number of part-time males increased by
41.5%, and part-time females by 1.5% 	 (Personnel Report, 1994).
Organisational restructuring and the moves towards the "mixed economy"
of service provision (including the externalisation of some services
such as computing) which was increasingly affecting white-collar as well
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as manual staff, had involved the disappearance of some positions and
the requirement for staff to apply for new posts. Whilst BCC have
emphasised the need to minimise redundancies (numbers here were
considered by senior managers to be increasing, although no precise
figures were available), and to redeploy staff wherever possible, such
trends suggest a reduction in traditional local government job security.
A 1994 BCC Personnel Issues report commented on the increased levels of
stress for staff at risk from job losses, and/or under pressure to
maintain service provision levels often with udiminished resources and
less support".
The new pay system included a performance related pay element which
meant that staff progressed up the (longer) incremental scales only if
they achieved the necessary performance standards. The Staff Development
and Performance Review system, in operation for white-collar staff,
involved the setting of annual individual performance targets (see
Exhibit 6.4. for an example, although the precise format used differed
from department to department). These link into the departmental
business plan targets (see below under planning systems), against which
performance is assessed for both pay purposes and for identification of
training and development needs. (The interviews for each of these
purposes are held separately in conformity with recomzz2ende practicas.)
In addition, the performance ethos and focus on outcomes, rather than
the processes, of job tasks was strengthened by: the introduction of the
Purchaser/Provider split described earlier which focused the attention
of Purchaser managers around the need to identify clear service
specifications or outcomes, and Provider managers to focus on achieving
these; the introduction of devolved management (see discussion below
under decision-making systems). This made departmental managers at
senior, middle and junior levels accountable for achieving results
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against performance criteria. They were accountable for the operational
management of resources such as personnel, information and finance,
which had previously been subject to strong "central control"
(BCC/PriceWaterhouse, p8)
These changes in the nature of role specialisation and behaviour
forinalisation systems suggest, in line with local government literature
prescriptions, a move towards increased levels of vertical authority and
control for managers (greater authority to make operational decisions
about resource deployment and service delivery), and decreased levels of
horizontal specialisation as professional service managers took on
responsibilities f or new resource management 	 functions. Although
individual managers continued to function on a specialised
professional-task management basis, they were increasingly involved in
much more broadly defined interdisciplinary, 	 multi-skilled, and
functionally flexible group working. 	 This cut across traditional
hitherto rather inflexible professional and departmental boundaries,
both within BCC and between BCC and other organisations (Management
Handbook, p1/8-9) . Behaviour formalisation systems had moved towards a
focus on specification of resource utilisation and service delivery
performance outputs.
Considerable emphasis was placed on ensuring that the management and
content of professional activities were geared specifically towards
"local" corporate strategic, rather 	 than the more "cosmopolitan"
professional community based definition of, goals and objectives.
Mention was made in many of the 3CC documents referred to in this
chapter, of the need to dilute the traditional "professional monopoly in
service delivery - the 'we know best' approach". This was seen as
inhibiting the development of services which were genuinely responsive
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to customer defined needs, and which were seen - in the context of the
traditional "internecine warfare between service barons" - as inhibiting
a corporate approach to strategic planning and management and limiting
niember control over policy making (see further discussion below under
planning systems).	 Overall,	 the emphasis moved to combining
"business-like thinking with the strong professional ethos which already
existed at BCC.0 (BCC/Price Waterhouse, p8).
These changes in the nature of role specialisation and behaviour
formalisation systems reflected the complementary changes which took
place in training/indoctrination systems. During the late 1980s/early
1990s, a wide ranging and intensive programme of cultural change was
instigated with the repeated dissemination throughout the organisation
of core corporate values, based on the Chief Executive's tripartite
foundation of closeness to the customer, management not administration,
and devolution. These were supplemented by further principles involving
the "Ready Fire Aim" approach to decision-making, a focus on strong
transformational leadership styles at all organisation levels and the
need to adopt an entrepreneurial and proactive attitude towards changing
circumstances (see below under management roles for further analysis)
-	 Communications being issued at the time of this research focused on the
need for further restructuring and change to consolidate the competitive
and business-like "mixed economy" approach to service delivery" (Chief
Executive briefing, January & February, 1993) . There was recognition of
the need to acknowledge and deal with the inevitable "pain" experienced
by staff in adjusting to the extensive changes described in this
chapter; in the wake of a staff survey held in 1990, specific emphases
were placed	 on	 improving	 communication	 and	 management
training/development systems (article written by two BCC corporate
planning officers, 1991)
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In 1992-1993, the "Making Connections" programme (which won a national
communications award) was introduced for all middle managers, who were
seen as key change agents in the Authority. It was aimed specifically
towards ensuring that all middle managers, throughout the organisation,
were aware of the nature of current and future changes, and of the
reasons for the ongoing changes. Key features included regular
newsletters and seminars, where managers chose and worked on special
projects in learning sets, and where they were able to meet Chief
Officers and the Chief Executive to inform them of their (the middle
managers') views, and hear senior management expositions on BCC change
rationales.	 In addition,	 management training and development
initiatives, as well as service based training schemes, were introduced.
These included competency based management development programmes, and
the establishment of a Corporate Training Board to fund and plan a
number of management development initatives, in liaison with service
Departmental Personnel sections. The 1992/3 "learning themes" included a
focus on managing change and uncertainty, managing finance, quality
management and customer care, leadership, equal opportunities and Health
and Safety.
The Deputy Chief Executive expressed concern about the difficulties of
maintaining a "cross-cutting sense of (corporate) identity" in the
situation where the forthcoming extension of CCT to professional
services could lead to an increasingly fragmented County Council: "We
are in law a single entity, and as long as we have these unifying
responsibilities, there are going to be issues of cohesion and
continuity across the Authority of identity. We need to make the best
use of resources, and not just see the Local authority as a series of
services linked purely legally. Also, people in BCC like to work
together - sharing corporate values, members' directions and objectives
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and priorities are forces for combination AND fragmentation, but the
balance at the moment is tipping towards fragmentation because of the
eminent impact of CCT for white-collar services".
Overall, there was a shift in employment strategies, corresponding,
after the arrival of the new Personnel Director in 1986, to the Human
Resource Management model of personnel policies and practices which
emerged during the l980s in both the public and private sectors (Storey,
1992)
Social Services, Highways, Commercial Services Departments and Finance
Sections
All of the changes described above were introduced across all of these
Departments/sections. Particularly significant 	 for middle managers
operating within traditional professional task-based departments was the
shift in emphasis, introduced by BCC during this period, from the
"cosmopolitan" to the "local" aspects of professional practice, and from
the professional to the management aspects of their roles as middle
managers (see also discussion below under decentralisation). As outlined
above (see also discussion below about Chief Officer roles under
planning and control systems), professional commitment to "good
practice" within BCC was expected to be expressed from within a firm
framework of BCC's own	 (ultimately politically derived) explicit
strategies about service delivery policies and priorities. There was a
strong emphasis on this	 "local" orientation as opposed to the more
"cosmopolitan" orientation - to standards of "good practice" derived
from external professional associations, which is "outside the realm of
political or partisan (ie specific local authority) commitments" (Laffin
and Young, 1990, pill).	 There was also an emphasis on the need,
described above, for middle managers to develop and maintain management,
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as well as professional, competences and expertise. BCC developed a
number of prescriptions about the nature of the role behaviour expected
from managers at all levels and within all departments in the
organisation, which are described fully at the end of this section after
a brief outline of developments within each of the four departments
where middle managers were interviewed.
Within Social Services these shifts in emphases were particularly
apparent.	 A new Social Services Director, appointed in 1985, did not
have a social work background (unlike his predecessors), and he was
appointed with a specific brief to introduce a "business-like" culture.
This, with the introduction of devolved management and the
transformation under the Community Care Act of social workers into "care
managers", resulted in a situation where, in the opinion of many
departmental staff and managers: "management skills rather than
professional social work standards, were to become the key attributes,"
(Social Services manager quoted in an MA Thesis). A new Director
appointed in the early 1990s had extensive experience in social work
(although the Deputy Chief Executive explained that it had not been
policy to appoint a Director with a professional background). He
continued the emphasis on the importance of management skills, but
combined this with an emphasis also on the importance of professional
skills and expertise, which had been felt in some quarters to have been
undermined by his predecessor.
Within Highways, according to the opinion of the Deputy Chief Executive,
there appeared to be less of an obvious shift in emphases between the
orientations of the two Directors in post since the mid-l980s - partly
because the Highways Department had been the first department to
experience an extensive review and revision of its management structures
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and systems in the early 1980s. Whilst the earlier Director had been
extremely prominent in national professional civil engineering and
surveying associations - "to his roots, he was a professional engineer"
- he was seen as a person who was also keen to be involved with the
Chief Executive's new managerialist approach. His successor, appointed
on the previous Director's retirement in 1991, had taken advantage of
his entry into the organisation to develop perhaps a more proactive
approach to the changes under way - especially in relation to the market
system and contracting ethos - essentially because these developments
were actually being implemented at the time of his appointment. Finance
managers, under devolution, experienced similar role changes, involving
an emphasis on devolved Finance managers acquiring the new skills and
competences - in addition to professional expertise - needed to work
with, train and provide support for line managers with little or no
financial expertise (interview with senior manager)
Commercial Services business units were focusing increasingly on the
need to become more competitive, and develop a more entrepreneurial
orientation within more open market conditions; developments here were
evolutionary - "an exacerbation of ideas which have been around for some
time" (Deputy Chief Executive). Existing alongside the practice of each
business unit, operating independently to generate the required rates of
return, was an emphasis from the early 1990s onwards, (continued by the
new Director appointed in 1992) on the importance of inter-Unit
cooperation and the development of a corporate Departmental identity
under an "umbrella" concept. For example, while individual Business Unit
managers (unlike the practice in other BCC Departments) negotiated their
own charges for support services such as Personnel, they were expected
to use the in-house providers of these services. One of the regular
items on the Department's regular senior management meetings was
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'mutuality" to emphasise the importance of "working together" (interview
with senior manager).
Reflecting the pressures of operating within a commercial market
environment, Pay and conditions of service differed between white-collar
staff in some Commercial services business units and the rest of the
Authority, and also between between manual and white-collar workers. For
example, in one Business Unit, staff had been locally negotiated out of
the County's "Pay Plus" scheme, with no incremental progression. Manual
workers were not included in the performance related pay and Staff
Development and Performance Review scheme; moreover, specific agreements
about pay and conditions for manual workers were made separately, in
consultation with the appropriate trade unions, for each business unit's
manual staff. Moves towards harmonisation of blue-collar pay scales and
conditions (such as hours of work) with their white-collar counterparts
in some Business Units were also currently under discussion (interview
with senior manager) . In addition moves had been made to reduce the
status differentials between manual workers and staff through, for
example, job evaluation exercises, and, in one business unit, with
office staff occasionally undertaking manual work activities.
Within these different Departmental contexts, all managers were expected
to adopt new patterns of managerial behaviour, as outlined in the next
section of this chapter.
Changes in middle management role prescriptions
These changes in the design of positions, behaviour formalisation and
training/indoctrination systems had an extensive and wide-ranging impact
on the role behaviour of middle managers, who were required to play a
key part in implementing the "new" management model. Barset's definition
of "middle" managers - located on points G, H, I and J of their locally
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determined pay and grade scales (see exhibit 6.3.) - corresponds with
the definition produced by Dopson and Stewart (1990): those managers
with	 first-line	 managers/supervisors	 or	 senior
professionals/professional section leaders reporting to them, and who
report in turn to more senior managers. A brief outline of the role
changes prescribed by BCC for its middle managers (numbering about 1200)
is provided below, using Mintzberg's analytical framework of managerial
work described in chapter 2.
Decisional roles
The local government literature suggests that there' has been an increase
in the devolution of decision making responsibilities to middle
managers, particularly in such functional areas such as finance,
personnel and customer care, (Issac-Henry and Painter 1991) . Managers
are expected to become more proactive and entrepreneurial, "in the sense
of constantly looking for opportunities to innovate and find new ways of
working to improve the effectiveness of the organisation." (Clarke and
Stewart, 1988, p31)
Barset's introduction of devolved management was designed to maximise
lower level managers' accountability	 for, and control over, the
resources (people,property, 	 money and information)	 necessary for
providing effective and responsive service delivery, within a firm
framework of performance monitoring and review systems. In terms of the
move discussed in chapter 4 from "administration" to "management",
managers had been released to "make their own decisions within their
area of activity." (Making Connections, 1992; BCC/Price Waterhouse) . In
the context of acting as change agents (analogous with Kanter's (1984)
concept of middle manager "empowerment"), middle mangers were expected,
to use their devolved powers to become "outward-looking"; Future
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orientated;	 Proactive;	 Opportunistic;	 Entrepreurial".	 (These
change-agent" terms are not defined precisely in this document. The
middle managers'	 own understanding and interpretations of this
terminology, together with the nature of their attempts to apply them
within their role behaviour, were explored in the interviews held with
these managers (see the discussion in chapter 8).)
Managers were urged to: "stick their necks out, take risks, have
vision' in order to carry the process of change forward with conviction.
This cannot be simply at the Chief Executive level. This style must run
right down through the organisation - managers throughout the
organisation must be willing to stand up and be counted, to make
progress, to take risks" (BCC/Price-Waterhouse, p22). This was in a
context of enabling the provision of more flexible service provision,
tailored more precisely towards meeting the needs and demands of more
sophisticated consumers. The need for greater flexibility was
encapsulated within the "Ready, Fire, Aim" philosophy which "encourages
an active approach to decision-making and encourages staff to get the
basics right first and fine-tune later." (Making Connections, 1992). The
moves described earlier - from a vertical and hierarchical to a less
hierarchical and more "horizontal" structural form, and the introduction
of the Purchaser/Provider split - suggested that managers' disturbance
handling and negotiating roles would take on increased significance, as
would their informational role behaviour (see below)
Interpersonal roles
The local government literature suggests that middle managers are being
encouraged to become leaders rather than manaers with: "The ability to
inspire and motivate staff, to innovate and develop services and to be
their own agents for change, as well as to understand and marry the
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needs and interests of service users with those of the organisation and
its personnel" (Clarke and Stewart, 1990, p26). There is also increasing
emphasis upon work teams: "creating conditions in which increased scope
for the growth and development of the worker and workgroups can
contribute directly to the goals of the organisation." (Hadley and
Young, 1990, p154)
Within BCC, there was an emphasis on the importance of managers
throughout the organisation adopting a transformational style of
leadership - "a strong leadership, which gives an organisation a sense
of style" - in pursuit of the corporate values outlined above. In terms
of people management, reference was made to the need for all mangers to
focus on "enabling" rather than "disabling" their staff, and to "give
people room" to develop their abilities and energies to the full
(BCC/Price Waterhouse, p22).	 Managers were expected to demonstrate
conunitment towards developing and training their staff. A key element of
BCC policies was to "train and motivate managers to achieve the
effective operation of their departmental appraisal scheme". This
included: the setting of training priorities for managers' work-
sections; considering the most appropriate way of "enabling the
individual to learn"; focusing on the importance of managerial support,
feedback sessions and appraisal interviews to maximise the value of
training, and to ensure integration of learning into the individual's
work behaviour (Management Handbook, 1992, pp3.l3-3.l5). The Handbook
also emphasised the importance of managers "involving employees in work
issues, a process which often generates greater employee satisfaction
and can result in improved motivation and performance." (P3.16).
Managers' leadership style was seen as vital in ensuring commitment to
change objectives throughout the organisation, for providing a clear
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sense of direction under the pressures for change, and for ensuring
effective performance of three key sets of activities - the "must do"
activities (statutory responsibilities), the "need to do" activities
(meeting consumer demands), and the "want to do " activities (pursuing
member policies) (video). Staff were 	 to be encouraged to develop
questioning attitudes about themselves and their work, and change was to
be achieved "with" staff, rather than imposing change "on" them. The
Chief Executive also considered that this development of the leadership
role gave "the opportunity to many of our managers to become leaders for
the first time, and serves as a motivating factor throughout the
organisation."
Informational roles
The local government literature suggests that middle managers are
becoming more involved in information exchange and processing. This
increased involvement stems from a number of developments, including:
monitoring consumer satisfaction (Local Government Training Board, 1987;
Buckland and Joshua, 1992); working with external organisations (Brooke,
1989); disseminating core corporate values and strategy to their staff;
and providing more information for strategic monitoring and performance
review purposes (Storey, 1992).	 The growing use of computerised
management information systems,	 and a trend towards increased
distribution of computers throughout	 local authorities, are also
affecting managers' informational role performance ((Society of IT
Managers, 1991; LGTB, 1990; LGMB, 1993b)
BCC's emphasis on the importance of developing "lateral linkages" on an
intra- and inter-organisational basis ( together with their devolved
management system) focused attention on the increasing importance of
their managers' informational roles - at the level of improving
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workgroup performance, improving intra-organisational integration, and
developing more effective liaison with external agencies and
consumer/community groups.	 Thus, the Management Handbook stressed the
need for managers to become extensively involved in communication
activities with their staff: uyou must ensure you get the information
you need, and then pass on the relevant pieces to enable staff to fulfil
their role... .Commuriicating is a core part of the manager's job."
(p6/i). At the integration level, managers were urged to share element
of good practice, to "actively" seek opportunities to work with staff
from other departments on joint ventures (one of the purposes of the
Making Connections programme was to facilitate this process) and to
liaise with other departments and external agencies who were likely to
be affected by changes in work practices.
All of the changes referred to earlier, in both decisional and
interpersonal roles, suggested that middle managers' involvement in, and
responsibilities for, information exchange and processing activities
would increase - between Purchaser and Provider managers (both within
and outside BCC), between managers and external consumers/local
community groups, and between managers and their service planning and
delivery counterparts in other BCC sections/departments and external
agencies	 (joint-working	 activities) .	 In recognition	 of	 these
developments, the BCC Management Handbook (9/1) 	 emphasised the
increasing importance attached to information. This was seen as "a key
resource in all aspects of the Authority's services... .Devolution of
accountability has brought with it increased demands for information,
and places greater responsibility on departments and managers to plan,
develop and maintain information systems to meet their needs".
Similarly, BCC's Corporate Communications (formerly Public elations)
Section, stressed its objective of enabling BCC to become a more "open"
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organisation, and to break down intra- 	 and inter-organisational
boundaries.	 It emphasised that	 Communication has become the
responsibility of all of us. We can't sit back and say it's down to the
Public Relations unit, or anyone else. We have all got a part to play -
it's the responsibility of everyone." (interview with senior manager).
What of the impact of such role changes on BCC managers' levels of work
satisfaction? The literature suggests that organisational restructuring
can bring about reductions in the numbers of middle management
positions, and thus challenge the traditional "stability" and 'safety'
of local authority employment (Stoker,l989; Fowler, 1988; Stewart,
1991). Some studies suggest decreasing levels of job satisfaction
through reductions in job security, promotion and career opportunities.
These concerns could be partially offset by increased levels of
decision-making authority, and opportunities for managers to develop
their managerial competences (Dopson and Stewart, 1990) . A recent survey
of sixteen "well-managed" local authorities (of which Barset was one)
reported that in most cases job motivation remained high, but that: "In
all cases, middle managers felt that they faced higher expectations,
increasing pressure, longer hours and the need to develop a range of
skills relatively quickly." (Leach et al, 1993, p16)
Some indications about the impact of these role changes on levels of
managerial work satisfaction within BCC were provided in a MORI poll
into staff attitudes, commissioned by the County in 1990. Responses
indicated that over 50% of managers (at various levels) were "very" or
°fairly" satisfied with their jobs. Key reasons given related mainly to
having an enjoyable, rewarding or fulfilling job; the main sources of
criticism related to shortages of resources, increased workloads, lack
of training and career development/progression opportunities. Security
did not appear to play a significant part as a source of either
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satisfaction or dissatisfaction, although it was rated as ugoodu
elsewhere in the survey by 61% of managers. No data was available from
BCC about changes in the numbers of middle managers between the
mid-l980s and 1993 - about 1200 in 1993. Senior Personnel managers
estimated, on an impressionistic basis, that numbers overall had
probably declined slightly (although there might have been an increase
in Social Services arising from the service Commissioning role within
the Purchaser/Provider split). 	 Redundancies, as indicated earlier, had
increased, but, again, no hard data was available; departmental
restructuring had also involved the disappearance of some posts, and the
requirement for some middle managers to re-apply for new ones.
The acquisition of new managerial responsibilities by middle managers -
most of whom had begun their careers as "professionals" and who had, as
described earlier, seen a shift in emphasis from their professional to
their managerial capabilities - also required these managers to acquire
new competences. This need was recognised through the increased
provision of the management training and development programmes
mentioned earlier. While no data was available on the numbers of middle
managers with management qualifications, senior Personnel managers
considered, impressionistically, that the numbers had increased; they
emphasised that managers were encouraged to take up the increased
opportunities made available for management training and development.
These extensive	 changes in	 the design of positions, behaviour
formalisation, and training/indoctrination systems (for all BCC staff
and managers) were accompanied by significant structural changes within
each of the four departments between 1984/5 and 1992/3; these changes in
the second of Mintzberg's four design parameters - unit/departmental
structures - are described in the next section of this chapter.
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Desiqn of superstructure (unit/de partmental structure)
Using Mintzberg's model as a framework for analysis, the grouping of
activities together into units/sections and departments within local
authorities has traditionally been undertaken on the basis of the
functions (tasks) and market (particular consumer basis) of professional
activities.	 This resulted in a structure of: highly differentiated
service or operational departments - Education, Social Services etc.; a
techostructure and support structure of central service departments such
as finance and personnel; the Chief Executive and a management team
composed of departmental chief officers, plus, usually, a corporate
support unit, at the strategic apex. Within the service departments,
activities were grouped both according to function and/or on a
geographical area basis. Changes reported from the 1974 reorganisation
through to 1993 suggested extensive restructuring by many authorities,
especially in the last three years. 	 This included trends towards: a
smaller nuber of	 larger departments or directorates;	 some
decentralisation of central services functions to service departments;
some decentralisation within service departments of service provision
and decision-making power (Young and Mills, 1993).	 Almost all
authorities had a designated management team at the strategic apex,
whose size reflected the number of departments. Current preoccupations
were focused on restructuring activities between the functions of
service purchasers and providers, as required within the "mixed economy"
model of service provision.
BCC's structure broadly followed the traditional model in 1984/85 (see
exhibit 6.5.) with 7 service departments and 7 corporate service
departments including the Chief Executive's department - 14 in all,
organised around	 conventional	 service	 provision specialisms.
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Considerable change took place in overall Departmental structure during
the 85/84-92/3 period (see exhibit 6.6.. There was a move "away from a
structure based on traditional professional and functional divisions
with its associated hierarchies. This had impeded management control,
communication and, most importantly, good customer service. (BCC/Price
Waterhouse, p24). The number of Direct Services Departments increased
from 7 to 9 (additions were Arts and Libraries and Economic
Development). In early 1993, reorganisation of the Corporate Resource
Departments was taking place on the basis of separating the Providers of
corporate services (who could be in-house or external) from the
(in-house) Purchasers (of corporate services functions) . The Corporate
Resources Group was divided into Corporate Resource Purchasers who would
buy services from the professional Providers of services, some of whose
activities were to become subject to CCT under the next phase. Each of
these two functions had its own Director, with a subsequent reduction in
the number of Chief Officers posts which headed up the existing
corporate departments - apart from the post of Treasurer (renamed
Finance Director).	 This post was located outside the purchaser
/provider split to reduce the incumbent's involvement in routine
financial and budgetary management, and to enhance the role of reviewing
the County's overall financial health and performance, and setting
professional practice standards through exercise of the Head of
Profession role (see below)
The other key change for corporate service departments involved the
devolution in the late 1980s of most Personnel, Finance, and IT staff to
service Departments' establishments. Here, in a quasi-matrix form, the
staff were vertically accountable through their own specialist line
managers within this section to the Departmental Chief Officer. 	 They
were also horizontally accountable to their line manager "customers" at
- 292 -
all organisational levels for providing services which met their
business needs.	 In addition, the support section managers were
accountable on a "dotted line" basis to the Head of Profession (HOP)
role (exercised by the Treasurer) at the Centre for achieving a practice
standard which met corporate and statutory requirements. This role also
served as a source of professional and career development help and
support for devolved finance staff and managers:
Centre	 Service Department
Finance section	 Chief Officer
HOP role
Devolved Finance managers
Most service Departments were restructured to produce a similar division
between the Purchaser and Provider Roles (see examples below). The
Purchaser (or client) role responsibilities were to assess consumer
need/demand, define service specifications, purchase these from a range
of possible Providers (BCC, or independent sector), and monitor service
delivery against policies and	 specifications.	 The Provider (or
contractor) role held responsibility for providing the specified service
for the Purchaser at an agreed price. Providers held different statuses
and degrees of autonomy, which were being clarified at the time of this
research.	 External providers were non-BCC public/voluntary/private
organisations, including some previous BCC sections (eg: part of the IT
department) which had been "floated off " or "externalised" (privatised)
- to the private sector. Internal Business Units (IBU) operated with a
properly managed trading account (all costs are set against income with
no BCC subsidy; the income/expenditure is recorded as a surplus or
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deficit); they could trade competitively outside BCC and/or operate in
an area which was! would become subject to CCT legislation. In-house
Contractors operated like IBUs, but in work areas currently subject to
CCT legislation. Internal Provider Units operated on a similar basis to
the ThUs, but did not as yet conform to all the IBU trading account
requirements, and were hence limited in terms of trading outside BCC. In
order to become IBUs, they had to apply for formal accreditation from
the BCC Competitionu Group of senior officers (BCC Competition
guidelines, 1993; Making Connections, Feb/May, 1993). Most Providers
currently operated as IPUs, rather than IBUs.
During the period of establishing Purchaser/Provider contractual
relations and accredited IBUs, BCC developed a number of policies
designed to ensure smooth and effective operation of the system - to
avoid unproductive competitive forms of behaviour between provider
units, to ensure harmonious relations between Purchasers and Providers,
and to restrict (within legislative requirements) Purchaser managers'
scope for awarding contracts to external Providers, rather than to those
located within BCC. These policies indicated that: "staff destined for
future Purchaser and Provider roles will need to co-operate in many
ways, particularly with cost information, interim support and work
specification." (Making Connections, Feb, 93) . In addition, policy was
"to assume" that a "substantial" proportion of each IBU 's activities
would be for internal BCC customers, and that each Department would
develop its own operating policies, especially in regard to decisions
about which activities should (subject to legislative constraints) be
provided in-house, and which Provider Units should aim for IBIJ status.
Given these constraints, only a few units' activities (the IHCs and ThUs
and their corresponding Purchasers) could be equated with private sector
coamercial organisations in terms of operating under more or less free
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market conditions. Even here, Government regulations, which restricted
trading activities outside BCC (cross-boundary tendering regulations)
and forbad luprofitu generation, restricted operating freedom. Moreover,
Purchaser managers were required to follow the County's policy to:
"support staff in competing for work they currently do as part of the
County Council, and therefore Purchasers have particular obligations
towards IBtYs." (Making Connections, May 1993).
Ultimately, the intention in 1993/4 was to extend the Purchaser and
Provider split across the entire Authority, which would "in the long run
mean fewer separate departments with a consequent effect on the senior
management structure" (Policy and Resources Committee Agenda, 4/2/93).
Over 100 years of	 traditional local government organisation,
characterised by strong departmental 	 "baronies", would have been
overturned.	 Proposals were subsequently held in abeyance for
reconsideration, following the change of political control in May 1993
and the bringing forward of the date for Barset's tranche of the Local
Government Review.
An additional feature of the reorganisations during the 84/85-92/3
period included a focus on reducing the number of levels of management
(see examples below) within each organisation to achieve a flatter
structure: "A flat structure removes unnecessary tiers of managers, and
places responsibility and accountability for work with those who
actually do it.	 This increases job satisfaction, effectiveness and
reduces management costs" (Making Connections, 1992, p2) . The structural
changes which took place within each of the four departments (where
middle managers were subsequently interviewed) are outlined below.
Social Services Department
Social Services was organised in both 1984/5 and 1992/3 into
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geographical Areas, and within these on the on basis of service
specialisms - elderly, families and children etc., with some further
geographical dispersal (see exhibits 6.7. and 6.8.). Exhibit 6.8. shows
how each Area was reorganised into Purchaser and Provider functions in
1991/2; the two roles were combined in each of the Area Director
positions, and separated immediately below. The Department had operated
since the 1974 local government reorganisation with a degree of "mixed
economy" of service provIsion, through the long established traditional
use (although not on a formal contractual basis) of voluntary
organisations such as the WRVS, AgeConcern. etc. to provide certain
services. This use of external Providers was extended during the
1980s/90s (due partly to legislative requirements), and the progress
towards the idea of a formalised Purchaser/Provider split was
intensified after the arrival of a new Director in 1985, with the
establishment initially of care assessors and care managers.
For the initial period of operating under the clearly forinalised
Purchaser/Provider split (completed by early 1993), the Provider units
operated as Internal Provider Units (not IBTJs), and departmental
policies were being established about "core" activities which should
remain in-house, and those which should be subject to competition. (The
1990 NBS and Community Care Act required Social Services Departments to
spend a minimum of 85% of their transitional grant from DSS on care
services purchased from the independent sector; no services were subject
to CCT.) Except where there was existing use of external providers (eg -
private residential homes, foster parents, voluntary organisatd.ons such
as Age Concern), Purchasers were currently restricted in terms of a
"free choice" between competing	 in-house and external Providers.
Similarly, as in-house Provider Units (not IBUs) Providers were
restricted in practice in the extent of their opportunities to trade
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outside BCC. Their markets were restricted largely to a quasi-monopsony
situation - reliance on one large institutional Purchaser or customer
(i.e. the Social Services Department Purchaser) plus a few other public
bodies such as District Councils etc.
Documentary records were •not available for the mid-1980s structure in
sufficient detail to identify changes in the number of layers in the
hierarchy, or changes in the number of middle management positions
between the mid-80s and 1993. Senior manager recollections of the
mid-80s situation suggested little change in the number of layers;
opinions differed about middle management numbers. Some senior managers
considered that numbers had increased because of the new contractual
functions required by the purchaser/provider reorganisation. Others
considered that numbers had diminished, with the remaining middle
managers taking on an increased range of responsibilities and duties,
arising partly out of devolution 	 (see discussion below under
organisation decentralisation)
Highways Department
The Highways department was organised in the niid-1980s essentially on a
professional specialism basis (see exhibit 6.9.) with some geographical
dispersion into Area offices within the Design and Construction and
Highways Management Branches. Exhibit 6.10. shows the Purchaser/Provider
reorganisation which was completed in early 1993. The Purchaser/Provider
split occurred on a Departmental-wide basis immediately under the
Director, who combined the two roles, so that the various specialist
service based branches were themselves either Purchaser branches or
Provider Branches. The only exception to this was the Strategic Support
Branch, including support services such as finance and personnel, where
the split occurred at the the level of the Assistant Director of this
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Branch. Movements towards a Purchaser/Provider split had occurred in a
more gradual or evolutionary manner than within Social Services. For
example, in the Transportation Branch, the Transport Policy Group and
the Traffic Planning Group had traditionally involved a formally defined
client role, as had some sections within the Highways Management Branch.
As a senior manager explained, the nature of specialist engineering work
lends itself quite naturally to the distinction between the client role
and the provider role.	 The Waste Disposal Purchaser Role was
established in 1992/3 as a consequence of the 1990 Environmental
Protection Act requirements. In terms of these Purchasers' freedom in
early 1993 to purchase services from Providers on the open market, this
was considerable in the areas subject to CCT legislation such as waste
management, and road/footpath maintenance and repair; CCT is shortly to
be extended to include other engineering functions.
In relation to the Provider role, the Design and Construction Branch had
operated on a trading account basis as an independent business unit
since 1990 - its status, however, under the BCC provider designation
listed above was tecbnically an Internal Provider Unit, as it had not
sought formal business unit accreditation in early 1993 at the time of
this research.	 Similarly, within Technical Services, the Laboratory,
Highways Management & Maintenance, and Survey teams had operated on a
trading account basis since 1990 with formal status in early 1993 as an
Internal Provider, not Business, Unit. The Transportation Consultancy
Group had moved to operating as a Internal Provider Unit (not on a
trading account basis) by 1993. These Provider units, subject to the
cross-boundary tendering legislative 	 constraints outlined earlier,
operated within a market 	 consisting of with large institutional
customers such as the DCC Purchasers/clients, the Department of
Transport, District Councils etc. In 1993, 90% of certain engineering
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functions carried out by these Provider units was to become subject to
CCT by the mid 1990s; this percentage was reduced to 65% in 1994. Within
Technical Services, the Contract Services had operated since 1983 as an
In-House Contractor under the 1980 CCT legislation, carrying out
services for BCC Purchasers/clients, and other local authorities and
public bodies.
Exhibits 6.9. and 6.10. show the key changes between 1987 and 1993 in
the Highways Department's organisational structure, involving the
regrouping of activities according to purchaser/provider functions.
Senior managers explained that some reductions in the number of
hierarchical layers had taken place between	 the early 1980s
(organisational chart not available) and 1993, notably with regard to
the removal of deputy management posts at senior and middle management
levels. Documentary records about changes in middle management numbers
were not kept, but a senior manager considered that numbers had remained
steady or even increased because of the significant increase in the
department's workload which had taken place in the latter 1980s - due
partly to an increase in local road building and construction schemes.
Commercial Services Department
The Commercial Services Department was established in 1990, bringing
together the units who supplied (mostly manual) services to the rest of
the Authority, plus some external public and voluntary sector customers
(within the bounds of the cross-boundary tendering regulations). In
early 1993, it consisted of 9 business units, grouped together into a
loose federation under the "umbrella" of the Department, within which
the units shared common support facilities of personnel, information
systems etc. (see exhibit 6.11.	 Four of these units had In-House
Contractor status, subject to the 1988 CCT legislation which required
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them, in 1993, to make a compulsory rate of return on capital employed
of 5%. The remaining five operated essentially as Internal Business
Units, rather than Internal Provider Units, although only one Unit -
Printing - had formally gained IBU accreditation under under the BCC
scheme at the time of the research. Each semi-autonomous unit, operated
on a full trading account basis; there was no budget funding as each
unit had to generate its own income (achieve a set rate of return or
°break-even" point) from purchasers across the County and from other
organisations. Some units had operated on this basis since local
government reorganisation in 1974.
The Commercial	 Services business units' activities were almost
indistinguishable from that of a private sector firm - apart from the
cross-boundary tendering legislative constraints limiting the amount of
external work they could undertake. They competed on the open market to
provide services to a very large number of individual customers
(Headteachers, Heads of Residential Homes, individual lease-car users
etc.) both within and outside BCC, and to large institutional customers
such as BCC, other local authorities and public bodies (who were all
free for the most part to purchase these services from elsewhere if they
wished). If they failed to attract customers, or win tenders - as in the
case of a recent school meals contract - the sections involved would
cease to exist, and staff would lose their jobs (or be redeployed
elsewhere in the County when suitable vacancies occurred)
Finance Department
The impact of the Purchaser/Provider restructuring on the Corporate
Finance function's structure is shown in exhibits 6.5, 6.6, 6.12, and
6.13. Exhibit 6.5. shows the Finance Department as one of several
separate Central Services; Exhibit 6.6. shows how the department
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functions were split into two sections - Purchaser and Provider - plus
the retention of the post of the Treasurer for reasons described
earlier. Also clear, from exhibits 6.12. and 6.13., is the devolution
which had taken place by the late 1980s of most staff to service
Department establishments	 (see also the finance sections in the
diagrams of the Highways and Social Services Departments). 	 Here,
Finance staff and managers were accountable to, and on the establishment
of, each Service Department Chief Officer, with a "dotted-line"
relationship (see diagram above) to the Head of Professional role within
the Treasurer' s section to ensure, financial probity, adherence to the
Authority's corporate 	 financial standards, and the provision of
professional and career development support and guidance. (For the
impact of devolution on the role and functions of finance staff, see
below under decision-making systems.) The finance sections in each
service Department were preparing to reorganise their activities into
Purchaser and Provider functions within the Support Departments of each
department (which also included Personnel, IT etc.), but this was not
completed by the time of this research. Thus, most of the middle
managers interviewed in Service Departmental finance sections were
"twin-hatted", continuing to combine the roles of Purchaser and Provider
of financial support services. The 1991 and 1992 Government White Papers
required a certain proportion (under review) of Finance services to be
subjected to CCT by 1997.
Changes in the numbers of hierarchical layers and middle managers were
not possible to estimate because of the devolution, and consequent
reorgarxisation of the centre, of much of the finance function to the
service departments' establishments. Thus, Central Finance Purchaser
section,	 at the time of the research, employed about 35 staff; the
majority of Finance managers/staff members - about 400 - were devolved
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out to Service Departments, with a further 200 employed bY the various
corporate Provider	 functions, such as Finance	 services, Legal,
Property-related Services etc.
These changes in the design of departmental structures were accompanied
by significant changes in the third of Mintzberg's design parameters -
Planning and Control systems; changes in BCC's policies and practices
here are analysed below.
Planning and control systems and lateral linkages
As described in Chapter 3, there were abortive attempts by many local
authorities at corporate planning in the immediate post-1974 local
government reorganisation, when the concept of strategy and performance
review vanished under the sheer weight of detailed policy objectives and
action plans for every conceivable activity (Haynes, 1980). Most local
authorities relied essentially on the annual, incremental budgeting
process for planning their service delivery (Elcock, 1988). This process
tended to be dominated by senior (professional) managers (Chief
Officers) competing for resources, in the interest of maximising
resource allocation to their own departments, with strong tendencies
towards adoption of the "professional Advocate role by these Chief
Officers (see discussion earlier in this chapter).	 Programme planning
of service provision - identification of client/community needs and
categories, and design of programme to meet these needs - was carried
Out largely on a departmental basis, and tended, again, to be dominated
by specific professional interests. Control systems were based on tight
centralised control of inputs - finance, personnel etc - and of work
processes, to a greater or lesser degree depending on the nature of the
task and the strength of service managers and staff opposition to such
intrusions on their professional autonomy ( based on externally derived
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professional standards). Little or no attention was paid to outputs or
outcomes, so that, overall: "control is exercised at too detailed a
level at the expense of effective resource management and policy
direction." (Stoker, 1989, p33)
During the 1980s and into the 1990s these traditional practices began to
change in a growing nuiriber of authorities in response to the pressures
for change described above. As discussed fully in chapter 3, Local
authorities focused more on the use of formal strategic planning systems
designed to "concentrate resources and management attention on a few
critical thrusts which cohesively integrate the entity's major goals"
(Caulfield and Scultz, 1989, p8) . Many authorities adopted core mission
or value statements, and there was slightly more uneven progress towards
the adoption of strategic planning systems (Young and Mills, 1993).
Authorities also manifested a new commitment to quality service
standards, and to increasing their responsiveness to customer/local
community needs.	 Control systems were moving towards a focus on
performance output or outcomes; the introduction of internal markets
also focused attention on service outcomes, through the requirements for
precise service specifications.
Changes made by BCC during the 1984/5-92/3 period in its planning and
control systems correspond very closely to these new approaches. In
common with most local authorities, BCC in the early l980s lacked a
coherent strategic planning system and relied on the annual, largely
incremental budgeting process. This operated up until the mid-1980s,
with the following problems reflecting those identified in the local
government literature:
' a lack of clear and focused objectives
* an absence of processes for establishing priorities and making
choices
* a tendency for departments to act independently and
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parochially and to 'fight their own corner'
* policies being driven by historical factors and budgetary
constraints rather than customer demands
* lack of clarity in the roles of Councillors and Officers, and
poor communications between Councillors and Staff
* an absence of information about what customers really want
• It (BCC) failed to plan to any extent. Rather, it indulged
in annual incremental budgeting compounded by a pre-occupation
with economy, and perhaps with efficiency, but not with
effectiveness ..... . (BCC/Price Waterhouse, pp4-5).
As a consequence of these problems, Barset decided in 1986/7 to
introduce a formal Medium Term Planning process, which was fully in
place by 1990 across the organisation. This was designed to provide a
mechanism for "making difficult choices, in a heavily contrained
financial environment .... .where the demands are almost infinite whilst
the resources are very clearly finite. . . . is the means of making spending
decisions in a systematic, informed and efficient way." (BCC/Price
Waterhouse, p14). Particular emphasis was made on avoiding the problems
associated with the Bains style of corporate planning which emerged
after the 1974 local government reorganisation, by a focus on
organisational "capability" to ensure strategy implementation (article
(1991) written by BCC senior corporate planning officers) . Thus, there
was an emphasis on "pragmatism" through focusing on critical policy,
service and activity areas rather than attempting to cover everything
which 'overwhelms the decision-makers with information". There was
specific recognition of the need to change processes, &havIcur
attitudes at all levels in the organisation as well as structures (see
above for cultural change, and below on devolved management)
Reflecting the prescriptions in the local government literature, the
system involved drawing up a mission statement (see exhibit 1) and
3-year medium term strategic plans for all services. These were
translated into annual operational business plans (thus integrating the
strategic plan with the annual budget) for each department, with
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performance targets and indicators (both financial and service delivery
based) against which managers' performance was measured.	 From these,
and also serving as a mechanism for enabling bottom-up input to be made
into the planning process, were derived individual managers' own
performance targets (see discussion on Staff Development and Performance
Review system above). 	 Value-for-money,	 and policy reviews were
undertaken for all service areas on a regular basis. Increasingly
sophisticated approaches to defining strategy were adopted, including: a
projection of future key issues commissioned from the Henley Forecasting
Centre; increased involvement by other agencies (the "enabling council")
and consumer groups in the planning process; the use of several market
research studies to identify consumer views about priorities for service
development, and the quality of service provided. Citizen's Charters
have also been introduced, together with formal complaints systems, for
all major services; two of these won a government award in 1992. As the
Chief executive explained, his "getting closer to the customer" values
involved a movement away from "the professional knows best" approach to
an emphasis on strengthening "the practices already employed by many
staff: giving people more choice; treating them with respect as
individuals; involving them; being sensitive to customer preferences and
protecting consumer rights." (article, 1990).
The adoption of a "policy-led" approach to strategy formulation also
emphasised the need for a move away from professional officer dominated
policy making processes (associated with traditional local government
practices, such as the "professional advocate" role of Chief Officers,
and the "cosmopolitan orientation of professional staff - see earlier
discussion). The new approach emphasised that strategy formulation was
seen very clearly as the preserve of elected members, who, in an
inevitably politically value-based decisional environment, were
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ultimately responsible for determining strategy: "producing a policy led
budget is more of a political than a technical matter.... . There is no
'correct' answer to any policy issue - identifying priorities and
deciding what is most important is ultimately a matter of opinion and
values... .Officers with their expertise can advise Members .......Policy
cannot be the sole preserve of officers.... . " (article by BCC corporate
planning officers). Chief Officers were also required to accept budget
and manpower cutbacks - in direct contrast to the previous situation
where: "the traditional symbols of success have been bigger budgets,
more people and more services".	 It was made clear that, essentially:
"professionals, advocating their service, need to place it in the
context of the wide range of demands made on the County Council. . . ."
(BCC/Price Waterhouse). The priorities of the new Council Leader,
elected in 1992, included the development of "closer relations" between
the Chief Executive and members to identify ways of improving and
enhancing for member support services, and the building of closer
relationships with direct service departments.
The new formal channel for enabling lower level managers and staff to
contribute towards strategy formulation was achieved through the
individual staff performance review and target-setting system, which
both derived from and contributed to Departmental business plans, and,
through these, to overall policies. 	 Managers were, through the
dissemination of the new "entrepreneurial" 	 organisation culture
described above, positively encouraged to be proactive in developing new
imaginative ideas for enhancing service effectiveness, within the
framework of departmental policies (see discussion below under devolved
management roles). The processes used for achieving behavioural change
included extensive training programmes, and the introduction of more
sophisticated and structured briefing and communication systems. These
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included (for middle managers) the Making Connections newsletter and
workshops described above under the behaviour formalisation and
training/indoctrination systems sections of this chapter.
In general, control systems had moved- towards an emphasis on performance
outcomes and measurement: "Managing performance has not been one of
BCC's strengths in the past and a great deal of effort is currently
being committed to improve this situation." (BCC/Price Waterhouse, p16).
Performance measures and indicators focused around: 	 inputs (resources
such as people and finance consumed to provide services); outputs
(services produced from the resources); outcomes (measurement of the
effectiveness of services provided to customers) . Control systems also
became more decentra].ised - but within the context of an increasing
focus in the 1992/3 Policy and Resources Committee, February 1993) on
strengthening the role of the Centre in setting policy and monitoring
service delivery, although "without diluting the principle of devolved
management" (see discussion below under decision-making systems). Both
performance-based and proceduralised control over decentralised resource
management was enhanced by the installation of more sophisticated and
"user-friendly" computerised financial management control systems. These
were also designed to give control over budgetary monitoring processes
to the user managers, whilst providing a standardised framework for
monitoring their resource deployment. 	 (Devolved IT and Finance staff
were expected to develop mechanisms f or liaising with service line
managers to plan jointly the design of financial and other mangement
information systems to ensure that these met the particular needs of
each department.)
In terms of the lateral linkages or liaison mechanisms required to
ensure coordination and integration of policy and operations across the
Authority, the "departmentalism" and "professionalism" associated with
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traditional local authority management systems had tended to inhibit
integration across departmental and professional boundaries, both within
the authority and between the authority and other agencies. 	 The
developments described above - the adoption of strategic planning, the
introduction of the purchaser provider split, increased customer
liaison, decentralisation of resource management (see below) - all
required changes in the structural mechanisms designed to enable
effective horizontal" liaison at all levels of the organisation.
Barset's new strategic planning process included increased provision for
the coordination of strategy at the upper levels through seminars and
workshops held for members and senior officers throughout the budgeting
process, and through various policy review and performance review
groups. As noted above, the performance appraisal system also provided
vertical integration between senior management and operational levels in
the Authority, channelling strategic objectives down, to be used in
setting staff performance targets, and then channelling information
about performance against these targets back up to senior levels.
Increased emphasis, as noted above, was placed on the need for
strengthening the role of the Centre in monitoring service delivery
performance. Considerable emphasis was placed on the need to improve
vertical top-down, and bottom-up communication systems. Formal systems
of communication were introduced from the centre to departments, and
Departments were encouraged to adopt the same practices, involving the
more systemised use of briefings, meetings, newletters etc. (Management
Handbook)
The use of lateral linkages or connections was also required between the
managers at operational levels, 	 both between and within departments,
and between BCC and other agencies. Thus, departments were required to
11 create and environment" where managers would "look positively for
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opportunities to work staff	 from other departments", 	 on joint
initiatives and to ensure the avoidance of duplication or conflict in
the development of new ventures - especially within the context of the
devolved management	 system	 (Management	 Handbook,	 ppl/8-l/9).
iDeceritralised resource mnagement also involved a matrix-type structure
for decentralised specialist support staff who were accountable through
their own line management structure within departmental support section
to departmental chief officer. These staff were also required to liaise
extensively with their senior/middle service manager "customers" and
with central finance for guidance on professional issues (see the
diagram presented within the departmental structure section of this
chapter, and the organisational charts for Social Services and Highways
(exhibits 6.7_6.lO))
The new Purchaser/Provider split provided an integration mechanism
through the requirement for the individuals occupying these roles to
liaise on the drawing up of the initial service level agreements or
contracts regulating service delivery, and on the day-to-day amendment
of these once they were in operation. These arrangements operated both
between support services such as Personnel and their departmental
business manager "customers", within support services between the
Purchaser and Provider roles in these support services sections (this
split was still underway at the time of the research), and between
professional service delivery Purchaser and Provider managers. While
Purchaser managers were located within BCC, provider managers could be,
and increasingly were, with the growing development of the "mixed
economy", located outside BCC in other public, voluntary or private
sector agencies.
The requirements	 (due partly to legislation and partly to
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corporate/departmental policies) to involve individual consumer,
community groups and pressure groups more extensively in service design,
delivery and monitoring also extended liaison operations across
organisational boundaries. The "Making Connections" programme described
earlier, with its newsletters and seminars, represented a recognition by
BCC of the need to ensure integration of key values and practices across
the orgaziisation,	 especially within the context of increasingly
semi-autonomous business units operating within the devolved management
system. The County has also adopted an Open Systems strategy, with a
recent rapid growth on the use of UNIX and Personal Computer technology
to allow easier exchange of information across Departments, and, in some
cases, with other organisations as described below. In 1993 Barset had a
population of some 6,500 networked devices, and the Authority won a
national award in 1992 for its Open Systems achievements.
All of these initiatives combined to reduce the strong professional
separatism and departmentalism (and "cosmopolitan" orientation focused
on the national professional values and ethos) associated with
traditional local authority structure and management systems. 	 The
diagram reproduced below, drawn up by a senior IT manager, clearly
demonstrates the shift	 in emphasis during the	 l980s from tall
hierarchical structures with their strong vertical communication
emphasis, to much flatter and wider hierarchies, to a "semi-cluster" or
"network" form of organisation (Tiernan et al, 1994) in the 1990s.
Here, the emphasis moved to less hierarchical and more horizontal forms
of liaison between managers operating in cross-functional and







In 1992/3 Social Services, in addition to the 1992/3-1994/5 medium term
plan, produced 7 main business plans - a Departmental business plan, a
Headquarters business plan, and S Area business plans, which were
further subdivided into plans for specific client groups. Because of
the Purchaser/Provider split, the formal business plans concentrated on
the Purchaser side, and Providers side also had to produce business
plans for their activities. These plans had to be consistent with
Purchaser plans, which specified the services purchased from the
Provider.	 Resource Accountability Statements (RAS) allocated cash
limits and service targets to individual cost centre managers, amounting
to a statement of their accountabilities, derived from the business
plan, which then indicated the key performance targets to be achieved by
each manager. Service performance measures focused largely on
quantitative outputs, eg: To protect children currently at risk of
abuse: Ratio of new registration to deregistration - 1 to l.1 (92/93
Business Plan), with various more detailed, mainly quantitative service
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objectives and activities at Area plan level. Areas were able to add
their own performance objectives, within overall Departmental policy
objectives. Outcomes (effectiveness) were measured by consumer surveys
and recently introduced formal complaints systems.
Managers were required to operate within a regulatory framework of
Service standards, policies and procedures 	 (some required by
legislation) drawn up by the Departmental Quality Assurance Section for
each client group, and to adhere to Departmental (ultimately corporate)
standards and procedures in relation to resource management. A recently
introduced computerised Financial Management System (FMIS) enhanced
budget monitoring and control by Finance sections/senior management, and
also enabled individual cost centre managers to take responsibility
themselves for controlling and monitoring their spend against budgetary
targets. Service level agreements made between Purchasers and Providers
specified in considerable detail the service levels, standards and
operational activities required. The Department expressed a strong
commitment to "Customer Care", emphasising that "services should be
"provided for the public rather than providing services to the public."
(Business Plan, 92/3, p4). Key elements of the Department's activities
here included: a Social Services "Charter", providing information to
service users; consultation with service users and community groups;
improving reception areas and access points; coordinating a "rigorous
and revised" complaints procedure; undertaking a number of consumer
surveys; various new service initiatives to improve responsiveness to
consumer demands.
In terms of lateral linkages, a number of the Area business plans refer
to the growing volume of liaison required between Providers and
Purchasers, between the Department and various community and
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consumer/user groups, and to the need for a "partnership" 	 approach to
other public, private and voluntary sector organisations within the
"mixed economy" of service provision. More forinalised communication
systems, including more formalised team briefings, had also been
introduced within the Department. In addition, information flows were
improved by the adoption of new client data bases, and an innovative
project linking General Practitioners with Social Services. Progress
towards the installation of an E-mail system across the Department was
underway at the time of the research.
Highways Department
In 1992/3, Highways, in addition to the 1992/3-1994/5 medium term plan,
produced a Departmental business plan, plus a business plan for each
Branch. The performance indicators in the 1992/3 Departmental Business
Plan consisted of output measures such as a number of traffic calming
measures, and reductions in accident rates; outcomes were measured by
responses to consumer surveys. Individual managers' resource
accountability and service delivery targets derived from these plans.
Managers were also required to operate within a regulatory framework of
Service standards, policies and procedures drawn up by quality assurance
groups; BS 5750 accreditation had been gained by Design and Construction
(who were the first such local authority department to gain the award),
and by the Contract Services. Managers were also required to adhere to
Departmental (ultimately corporate) standards and procedures in relation
to financial resource management. A recently introduced computerised
Financial Management System (MIDAS) enhanced budget monitoring and
control by Finance sections/senior management, and also enabled
individual cost centre managers to control and monitor their spend
against their budgetary targets. Service level agreements made between
Purchasers and Providers specified in considerable detail the service
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levels, standards and operational activities required.
The Department's approach to customer care included a Highways and
Transportation Charter (with target times for responding to letters,
guarantees for all staff to wear name-badges etc.). A Communications
strategy, due to be implemented during 1992/3, involved: improved
infornation provision for customers "to publicise and promote all
aspects of	 the Department's activities"; consumer	 surveys; the
publication of a series of leaflets; better signing for roadworks; more
conspicuous and accessible reception areas; establishing more specific
targets, and publishing them widely; various new service initiatives to
improve responsiveness to consumer/community group demands. (Business
Plan, 1992/3, pp 4,8; Director's report 1991/2) .	 In relation to
internal lateral linkages, specific initiatives had been introduced to
dilute the traditional "separateness" of the Branches within the
department by setting up project teams and task forces to work on
cross-department training ideas and programmes. There was a focus on
encouraging managers to "step out of" their specialised technical areas,
and a growth in secondments to Centre project and review teams. The
adoption of more systematic approaches to departmental integration
included regular team briefings and meetings, Branch manager staff
"surgeries" once a month. The DIrector lunched regularly with a
cross-section of existing and new staff, and sent personal letters to
all staff on significant changes. A computer network E-mail system was
available for use by all staff, on matters ranging from "new Committee
deadlines to Christmas Greetings", plus a network connecting the
Department with the 14 District Councils, and the continuing development




As explained above, these Units, (within the constraints of the
legislation regulating public sector trading activities) operated
essentially as any private sector commercial organisation. They had to
operate within an open and competitive market situation to generate
their own income from selling their products/services. Fully responsible
for their own business activity on a trading account basis, they
received no budget allocation, nor were the nature of their services
(within the sphere of their core businesses) constrained by political
value-based corporate decisiOns about particular service • policies.
Unlike the other departments, strategy formulation for this Department
in 1992/3 was undertaken largely by each of the nine semi-autonomous
Business Units, within a framework of objectives set by the Director.
Thus, in the case of one Business Unit, for example, its business plan:
was" intended to inform the Commercial Services Director of the Business
Unit's strategies and forecasts." (p1). The three objectives set by the
Director required the Unit to: achieve "a trading recovery equivalent to
a 2% surplus (essentially "profit" but this term was not used) of income
over costs";	 "vigorously pursue" efficient service provision to
customers; "operate under the Commercial Services umbrella in a mutually
supportive way promoting colleague Business Units whenever appropriate."
(p1).
The Business Units' control systems focused around the performance
output measures, which referred,	 as with any private	 sector
organisation, basically to financial returns targets, and to mainly
quantitative performance standards set for a variety of activities such
as "Lead Times: Our aim shall be to deliver within 7 days of receipt of
order or 24 hours in the case of urgency." (Business Unit Plan, p2)
These standards were represented in all of the processes and procedures
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governing service delivery activities, and in the performance appraisal
and assessment of staff performance.	 Coxnputerised management
information systems were used by all Business Units to manage services
and resources. A new Computerised financial management system (CODA) had
recently been introduced which gave the Department complete independence
front BCC systems (apart from VAT and Payroll) in running incomes,
payments and the general accounts ledger; the Department had its own
bank account.
Considerable emphasis was attached to customer care, with a Business
Unit Quality Policy, and commitment to "total quality performance".
Market forces dictated whether both BCC and external customers chose to
use Commercial Services products, and "our job is to see that we get our
share of the market through careful pricing and quality services."
(Director, 1992, Departmental newsletter) . BCC customers were no longer
required to use Commercial Services) services/products, and the Business
Units had adopted various marketing devices such as, depending on the
nature of their business, catalogues, leaflets, sales representatives, a
special "shop" for displaying goods and advertising service availablity
etc. A marketing section was established within one Business Unit, which
was available for use by all Units.
In terms of lateral linkages, specific mechanisms were used to develop
and reinforce the idea, noted above, of ' 1mutuality" between the largely
autonomous Business Units, each with their own, different, core
businesses.	 "Mutuality" was a standing item on the agenda of the
regular Business Unit manager meetings. The common use by most Business
Units of support services such as IT and Personnel (including training
sessions) served as a coordinating mechanism; formal communication
systems included the use of an "away-day" for Unit managers, plus
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noticeboards, newsletters, and briefing meetings for staff within each
unit. The new Director, appointed in 1992, had made a point of visiting
each Unit and meeting staff.
Financial Sections
At Corporate level, the Finance Director produced the Council's medium
term financial strategic plan for 1992/3-94/5, Annual plans were
produced by each of the Corporate Purchaser and Provider sections.
Finance sections, located within Service Departments (apart from the two
corporate Purchaser/Provider units at the Centre) contributed towards
each Service Department's "Support Services" section business plan.
Thus, for example, within a Social Services Area business plan, the
Finance section plan included the identification of particular service
objectives, such as "to ensure the effective devolution of boarded out
payments and parental contributions", with control systems focused on
performance outputs such as, in relation to this objective, "complete in
line with Headquarters timetable." In addition, the service level
agreements, made with Service Department Purchasers, specified In
considerable detail the service outputs, standards and operational
activities required. Finance managers were required to operate within a
regulatory framework of Departmental (ultimately corporate) financial
procedures and standing orders.	 Computerised Financial Management
Systems enhanced budget monitoring	 and control by Finance
sections/senior management of both their own and their service line
managers' spend against budgetary targets. One of the key reasons for
devolving finance staff and managers out to Service Departments, was to
provide "a better service to the (Departmental) managers by applying the
principle of 'close to the customer' to our own service provision"
(article, 1992, written by the Finance Director).
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In terms of lateral linkages, Finance managers were required to liaise
extensively with their service line manager "customers". They were also
involved in extensive liaison at Service Departmental level, where
finance staff could be dispersed to various geographical areas (as in
Social Services), and, at the County Corporate level, through meetings
organised by the Head of Profession at County Hall.	 Contact was also
maintained here to: provide career/professional development guidance to
devolved staff; support them by providing Departmental managers "with an
assurance of the quality of their financial functions"; to ensure "that
the finance function and and finance activities throughout the
organisation are of an appropriate quality and standard." (Finance
Director)
The last of Mintzberg's	 four design parameters relates	 to
Decision-making systems, and changes in BCC practices are analysed
below.
Decision-making systems (centralisation/decentralisation)
As outlined in Chapter 3, organisational decision-making systems can be
distinguished according to the extent to which the authority to make
operational decisions - about resource management and service provision
- is delegated or devolved (1) vertically (from the strategic apex to
middle line managers and operating/professional staff) and/or (2)
horizontally from the strategic apex and middle line to specialist
support and/or techostructure staff such as finance and personnel
(Mintzberg, 1983).	 Thus,	 delegation or devolution "describes a
condition where the authority to make specified (usually operational)
decisions is passed down to units and people at lower levels in the
organisation's hierarchy. Centralisation also implies that control
information is passed to the top of an organisation, while delegation
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implies that some passes to lower levels." (Child, 1984, pl46).
Traditionally, local authority management tended to adopt the "wrong"
kind of "loose-tight" approach to decision-making authority (Campbell,
1991). Thus, there tended to be tight centralised control over the
deployment of resources, where central departments such as finance and
personnel "sought to ensure adherence to rules and procedure, enforcing
a formal accountability through, in many instances, detailed control of
establishments and budgets." (Stoker, 1989, plO). Fairly loose control
was exercised, however, over the outputs or outcomes of resource
utilisation and service delivery activities.
Growing numbers of authorities during the 1980s and 90s adopted more
decentralisation or devolution of decision-making authority to middle
and lower line managers and staff in terms of their control over
resource management and service delivery (Issac-Henry and Painter, 1991;
Buckland and Joshua, 1992). 	 The introduction of devolved management
systems focused on "looser control" over operational resource deployment
and service delivery processes, with "tighter" control focused on
performance outcomes, with managers held accountable for achieving
results against financial and service delivery output targets.
Barset's operational decision-making systems in the mid-1980s
corresponded broadly with the traditional model. Despite the
geographical dispersal of some central departmental staff - in Finance,
Personnel, and IT - to service departments, the authority to deploy
resources (within allocated budget and manpower levels) remained largely
with Central Departments who exercised detailed control	 over
departmental resource management, with little or no formal authority
devolved to Chief Officers or lower level managers. 	 (The Deputy Chief
Executive explained that, informally, when he arrived in 1986, authority
was already in practice being exercised to an extent at departmental
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level. He thought that this might be because departments were
anticipating the decentralisation changes planned by the new Leader and
Chief Executive, and partly because Departmental senior managers
understood so well the rules and regulations governing resource
management that they could in practice make decisions, knowing that the
approval, formally required through the Committee system, would be
forthcoming.) Nevertheless, overall, the emphasis was on maximising
central operational control over resource management and work processes
(economy and efficiency).	 There was a consequent lack of clear
managerial accountability, and the associated dangers of "inflexibility,
where the rules have become ends in themselves" (Chief Executive),
rather than on control over outputs and outcomes (effectiveness), and
clear mangerial accountability for results.
Thus, in explaining the need for change - notably the introduction of
devolved management - the Chief Executive stated: "The authority is
seeking to end the stranglehold of central departments and departmental
head offices on local initiative and responsibility as this has
frustrated staff and confused accountabilities. Devolution allows them
greater discretion to run services, using their professional judgement
and experience, so as to satisfy customer expectations. Front-line
managers are being given more scope for action where there is no
over-riding reason for greater central control." Devolution, along with
"management, not administration" (involving reductions in operational
and work process rules and regulations: "cutting the red tape to help
staff achieve a purpose not just process forms"), formed two key planks
of the Chief Executive's new management philosophy (the third was
closeness to the customer")
Devolved management was defined as follows: "In BCC, devolution is taken
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to mean a management style which allows those managers nearest the point
of delivery the maximum control of the functions which impinge on them
and the service required to enable them to operate, within a specified
organisational framework where accountabilities and limits of authority
are clearly understood." (Making Connections, 1991/2). Thus in relation
to budgetary devolution, spending power was allocated to each service
department, and monitored centrally or corporately. Then, the devolution
of Responsibility for control over a given service budget rests with
the Head (Chief Officer) of the Service Department .....Authority to
spend is then cascaded down within the service department to local
budget managers - ie, those front-line service providers who, from their
understanding of local needs, are best placed to determine spending
decisions. The loop is completed by holding managers accountable for
their actions	 and performance." (BCC/Price Waterhouse, 	 p15). At
operational level,	 this process	 thus ensured that professional
judgements about service delivery methods and spending decisions were
made within a firm management control framework which specified the
outputs to be achieved by service professionals in relation to resource
utilisation and service delivery.
In line with Audit Commission recommendations for effective devolved
resource management (1989), BCC attached considerable importance to
providing managers with the specialist support services, training and
management/financial information necessary for carrying out effectively
their devolved responsibilities. As	 described above,	 new, more
sophisticated and "user-friendly" 	 financial management information
systems - with local input and access - had been introduced across the
Authority to enable managers to control and monitor their own budget
spend (according to financial regulations) In addition, computerised
data systems - such as client record systems for Social Services,
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various data systems and computerised operating systems for Highways -
were continuing to be developed. Considerable emphasis was placed on
ensuring close collaboration between specialist IT staff and line
managers in designing the computer information and operating systems, so
that they met as closely as possible the business needs of line manager
"customers".	 Similar relationships were also expected to operate
between Personnel and Finance staff and managers and their line manager
"customers'1
Devolution of control over resource deployment (once budgets had been
allocated) to Chief Officer level meant that staff establishments were
no longer subject to detailed central control. However, with staff
forming such a large proportion of Departmental budgets, central
monitoring of staffing practices continued to take place (Medium-term
Plan, 1992/3). When overall funding became tight, or when there was a
need to redeploy redundant staff, central control was exercised over
Departmental recruitment to new or existing posts and/or establishment
totals (interview with senior manager).	 The levels at which changes in
planned spend, by Departments, required Committee approval were also
raised. Most of the Finance and other central departmental staff
(Personnel and IT) were devolved to service department establishments
(see earlier discussion under structure) . Here, their roles involved a
combination of providing help and support to meet the business needs of
service line managers, as well as the control/monitoring role of
ensuring that departmental practices met both corporate! Departmental,
and statutory, standards.
The pre-devolution "traditional detailed financial regulations" were
initially replaced by an emphasis on "freeing up the rules, with
procedures designed to give managers more control over their resource
management. However, following unexpected overspend problems in 1990
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and adverse comments on control systems by external auditors, a
programme was devised to provide uthe appropriate financial controls for
a devolved environment." and clarify management responsibilities
(Article written by Finance Director) . These included a Financial
Management Handbook, which set out the corporate tandards, the key
controls which had to be operated, and more detailed procedures relating
to financial activity for each Departments, plus detailed guides for
budget managers. Limits to delegated powers in the management of
devolved budgets were outlined in relation to managers' authority over
varying their budgets (making virements), making transfers within and
between budget headings, and incurring expenditure on headings not
included within managers' budgets. A similar Personnel Management
Handbook was also introduced. As the Deputy Chief Executive explained,
the "specified organisational framework" within which devolution took
place, was only clearly specified after devolution had been introduced,
rather than in place before, and was continuing to be refined at the
time of this research.
The restructuring of the Central departments described earlier was
intended to strengthen the role of the Centre in determining policy and
monitoring performance	 - although the "principles"	 of devolved
management were reaffirmed (Policy and Resources Committee, February,
1993). In addition, service Departments introduced various quality
control and assurance systems (see discussion earlier under planning and
control systems) . These, plus the contract discipline required under the
Purchaser/Provider split, provided a new regulatory framework within
which the management of professional service delivery took place. 	 In
general, these initiatives in the l990s tend to suggest the development
within BCC of the paradoxical tendencies towards centralisation which
can occur within decentralised organisations - especially in periods of
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financial stringency (Hales, 1993; Hainbleton, 1992)
Devolved management was introduced across all Departments, including
Social Services, Highways, Commercial Services and Departmental Finance
Sections. From only 50 budget-holders in the pre-devolution mid-1980s,
the Authority had moved to. a total of over 2,500 budget-holders in
1993.
Conclusions
In conclusion, it is evident that BCC made extensive changes in its
internal structure and management systems between 1984/5 and 1992/3,
within each of Mintzberg's four organisational design parameters - the
design of positions, behaviour fornialisation and training/indoctrination
systems; departmental structures; planning and control systems, and
lateral linkages; the design of decision-making systems. These changes
reflected very closely the "new" local government management model
outlined in Chapter 3. Indeed, as indicated in the methodology chapter
of this thesis, numerous authors have quoted BCC as a good example of
the "new" management practices which are being adopted, to varying
degrees, by growing numbers of local authorities.
These structural and managerial changes were precipitated by a
combination of external and internal organisational factors. These
included central government policy initiatives and legislation and
rising consumer expectations, and by the coming to power of a new
"change-orientated" political ruling group in 1984, followed by the
selection of a new Chief Executive, appointed specifically to replace
BCC's "traditional" management approach by a strategic management
system. The traditional emphasis on the maximisation of relatively
centralised and hierarchical control over resource management and work
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processes (focusing on economy and efficiency) moved towards an emphasis
on control over outputs and (although to a lesser extent) outcomes
(effectiveness). There was	 clear managerial	 accountability for
achieving results measured against resource utilisation and service
delivery targets - including adherence to more rigorously specified
service quality criteria - within a clearly specified corporate culture
of BCC core values and beliefs.
These control systems operated within a devolved management framework
(intended to devolve operational decision-making authority to front-line
managers), which operated within a new strategic planning system
designed to maximise elected member (rather than professional officer)
control over policy decisions. These policies then formed the basis of
the annual business plans drawn up for each department, which included
resource utilisation and service delivery targets to be met by all
mattagers and staff.	 The traditional emphasis on vertical and
hierarchical regulation of organisational activities moved towards an
emphasis on horizontal market regulation and coordination - through the
introduction of the internal market system with Purchaser/ provider split
and towards the "network" or "boundaryless" forms of organisation.
Such structural changes required new prescriptions for middle managerial
roles, operating in two key areas. Firstly, there was an emphasis,
within the strategic management approach, on ensuring that the
management and content of professional service delivery activities wac
geared specifically towards the BCC elected member-based "local" policy
objectives, rather	 than to the more	 "cosmopolitan" professional
community-based definitions of professional service objectives and
values. Secondly, there was an emphasis on the requirements for service
managers to acquire and develop managerial, as well as professional,
skills and competences.
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Thus, particularly in the context of the devolved management system and
the mixed economy model of service provision system, managers were
required to take on responsibilities for new resource management
functions. They were required to become accountable for achieving
clearly specified performande targets, and to act as change agents - in
the sense of developing more efficient and effective methods of
identifying and responding to consumer and community needs and demands
for services (Mintzberg's decisional managerial roles). 	 They were
expected to adopt inspiring and motivating styles of leadership, to
encourage staff to assimilate and practise BCC's new core values and
ways of working, and, in the context of BCC's new staff development and
appraisal system, to encourage and enable staff to perform up to and
beyond their	 capabilities	 (Mintzberg's	 interpersonal roles).
Particularly within BCC's new market and network forms of organisation,
they	 were required	 to	 become	 increasingly involved	 in
inter-disciplinary, multi-skilled and functionally flexible work-groups.
They had to become proficient in the negotiating and influencing styles
of behaviour necessary for 	 working effectively within the
purchaser/provider split, and for liaising with personnel from other BCC
departments, and external private,	 public and voluntary sector
organisations. Greater demands were placed upon their information
exchange and processing capabilities	 (Mintzberg's informational
roles)
The key issue here - to be addressed in the next three chapters - is the
extent to which BCC's organisational restructuring and new middle
inanageria]. role prescriptions: (1) were communicated to and understood
by their middle managers, and; (2) resulted in the manifestation of
actual behaviour change on the part of these managers. In common with
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most other studies indicating moves within local authorities from
traditional to "new" forms of structure and management systems, the
evidence (both written and oral) presented in this chapter about BCC's
adoption of the "new" management approaches was derived from senior
management sources, rather than from the middle managers themselves.
Formal management system/role prescriptions changes introduced by senior
managers may or may not be manifested in the actual behaviour adopted by
middle managerial incumbents.	 If little or no real behaviour change
takes place,	 then, arguably, moves towards the new forms of
orgarxisational and managerial systems are largely cosmetic - middle
managers play a key part in implementing organisational change
programmes.	 It is therefore essential, when attempting to assess the
impact of these changes within BCC, to consider the views of the middle
managers themselves about the extent to which, and the way in which the
formal BCC prescriptions have resulted in changes in their managerial
role behaviour.
The next three chapters, therefore, assess the extent to which BCC's
formally prescribed managerial changes have permeated and transformed
managerial work at middle management levels in the organisational
hierarchy. As outlined in chapter 5, semi-structured interviews were
held with middle managers located in four BCC departments - two direct
service provision departments (Social Services and Highways), and two
support service departments (Finance and Commercial Services) . The
information obtained from these interviews is analysed from within
Mintzberg's model of managerial roles (described fully in chapter 2).
Chapter 7 concentrates on changes in the managers' informational and
interpersonal roles; chapter 8 focuses on decisional behaviour, and
chapter 9 examines the impact of BCC's restructuring programme on the
managers' levels of job satisfaction.	 Bach chapter begins with a brief
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outline of the formal role prescription changes itroduced by BCC, arid
then analyses the managers' accounts about the chiges which have taken
place in their work behaviour.
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CHAPTER 7
Organisational restructuring in Barset: changing interpersonal and
informational roles
The previous chapter identified the internal structural changes -
including changes in formal middle management role prescriptions - which
had been introduced within Barset County Council (BCC) since the
inid-1980s, and concluded that the management systems in place by 1992/3
corresponded very closely with the "new" local government management
model described in chapters 3 and 4. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 analyse the
perceptions of middle managers within Barset about the extent to which
their work behaviour changed in accordance with the Authority's formal
prescriptions for change. They examine the extent to which "official"
changes made by members and senior management have permeated managerial
work behaviour at lower levels in the flatter organisational structure.
As used throughout this study, Mintzberg's model of managerial roles is
adopted here to analyse the responses of the middle managers about
changes in their work behaviour; this model is described fully in




















As Mintzberg (1989) emphasises, these three sets of managerial behaviour
combine to form an integrated whole. Thus, in order to make the
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decisions determining their work-unit strategy, managers are involved in
extensive interpersonal contacts both inside and outside their work
units - the interpersonal roles - and in extensive information exchange.
and processing activities through the exercise of their informational
roles. The interpersonal and informational components of managers' work
are, themselves, inextricably linked; their interpersonal contacts -
through ceremonial, leader and liaison activities - inevitably involve
them in information exchange and processing work. The first section of
this chapter focuses on the leader role, involving information
monitoring and dissemination primarily inside managers' work-units (the
departmental sections for which they are responsible) . The discussion
then moves on to ceremonial activities, carried out both inside and
outside the managers' own sections. It then concludes with an analysis
of managers' interpersonal contacts outside their immediate departmental
unit (the liaison role) plus the information exchange and processing
activities which are involved in this liaison work. The asterisks in the
following diagram indicate the contexts within which managers carry out
each of these interpersonal roles, and the link between these and the
informational roles (discussed later in this chapter):
THE MANAGER'S:
WORK-UNIT ORGANISATION EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
(other depts	 (other organisations;

















Focusing first, then, on managers' interpersonal and informational
behaviour within their work-units, Mintzberg argues that: "Because the
manager is in charge of an organisational unit, the manager is
responsible for the work of the people of that unit. His or her actions
in this regard constitute the leader role. Some of those actions involve
leadership directly - for example, the manager is normally responsible
for hiring and training his or her own staff. In addition there is the
indirect exercise of the leader role. Hvery manager must motivate and
encourage his or her employees, somehow reconciling their individual
needs with the goals of the organisation." (Mintzberg, 1989, p16) . As
discussed in chapter 8, the local government literature stresses the
extent to which - through the introduction of devolved management and
more formal performance appraisal systems - managers would be expected
to acquire additional responsibilities for general personnel functions,
such as recruitment and selection, performance monitoring etc. The
emphasis in this chapter is upon the second aspect of Mintzberg's leader
role - the indirect exercise through motivating and encouraging
employees - although, of course, the two aspects are closely linked.
As outlined in chapters 2 and 4, management literature in the 1980s and
90s - related to both private and public sector management - places
increasing emphasis on the importance of this aspect of the leader role.
Fincham and Rhodes (1992, pl97) suggest that the emphasis in the
literature moved	 during this	 period away	 from	 "abstract
conceptualizations" about the efficacy of various leadership approaches
- such as "style", and "contingency" theories - towards "a resurgence of
interest in what is termed transformational or charismatic leadership.".
Several authors distinguish between "managers" and "leaders" (Zaleznik,
1977; Kotter, 1990), and between "transactional" and "transformational"
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leadership (Bass and Avo].io, 1990)
Broadly speaking, Zaleznik and Kotter's "managers" can be equated with
Bass and Avolio's "transactional" leadership, and their "leaders" with
Bass and Avolio's ltransformationalu leadership. Transactional leaders
are seen as focusing on conformity to rules and procedures, on basic
reward/punishment" tactics for meeting staff needs, and on setting
goals for them based on an assessment of the effort to be expected from
them. The transformational leadership roles involve managers in
inspiring their staff through the projection of their own personal
commitment and enthusiasm, and in adopting involvement and "empowerment"
strategies which encourage their staff to "both develop and perform at
levels above what they may have felt was possible, or beyond their own
personal expectations. They build up the followers' confidence and
develop their abilities, enabling them to take on more difficult
challenges." (Bass and Avollo, p234). These authors identify three key
aspects of the transformational leadership style: the development of
charismatic and	 inspirational leadership 	 styles;	 individualised
consideration (of each staff members' own abilities and orientations;
the provision of intellectual stimulation and challeging work for their
staff.
Reflecting the requirements of the transformation leadership model, the
local government management literature focuses on the need for such a
model to be adopted by local authority managers - at all organisational
levels: "Good management will more and more be seen as unlocking
barriers to performance by colleagues and subordinates, enhancing their
contribution, and releasing their potential. 	 Management involves
simultaneously playing as a team member while pushing the team forward -
not least in conveying a sense of direction, by successfully painting a
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picture or vision of the future." (LG, l993a).
In line with these developments, BCC senior management (as indicated in
chapter 6) also placed great emphasis on the importance of a
transformational style leadership, or the role of the "leader" as
opposed to the "manager"; this formed one of the key planks of their
cultural change programme. Documents clearly reflected the importance
attached to enthusing staff by setting clear policy directions, and
encouraging the adoption by them of the new "entrepreneurial, outward
looking, future orientated, risk taking, high visibility" organisational
values. In addition, managers were urged to be "enabling, not disabling"
with their staff, to "give people room", to involve their workforces in
in decisions about work issues, and to develop their skills and
competencies through ensuring training and development opportunities.
The latter was included amongst the objectives of the recently
introduced Staff Development and Performance Review system. Given the
importance attached to the adoption of a basically transformational
style leadership, or the "leader" as opposed to the "manager" role by
the County's senior management, the middle managers were asked if they
saw a difference between the role of a manager, and the role of a
leader, and, if so, to specify the differences:
Distinctions made between "mana ger" and "leader" roles
Social	 Highways Finance Commercial Total
Services	 Services
Difference identified	 12	 7	 9	 9	 37
Notsure	 3	 3	 6
No difference	 2	 3	 5
12	 12	 12	 12	 48
As the table demonstrates, the majority of the managers reported that
the two roles were different; 19 of these managers were able to provide
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a definition of both the leader and the manager roles; 16 defined the
leader role, but were unable to define the manager role; 2 could define
neither, although they considered that the roles were different. The
manager/leader differences identified by the managers suggested a fairly
close correspondence with the distinctions made in the literature
between management/transactona1 and leader/transformational leadership
styles. (It is important to take note of a methodological issue at this
point. Bass and Avolio constructed a questionnaire of 142 items of
leader behaviour to identify	 the distinction made between
transformational and transactional leadership styles in their research.
Because of resource constraints (essentially time), it was not possible
to use such rigorous measurement techniques here. The content analysis
of managers' responses on leadership styles (throughout this section of
this chapter) was made on the basis of the presence in the managers'
responses of key words and phrases used in the authors' own definitions
of the different leadership styles (1990, pp250-25l) . Clearly, the form
of data collection and analysis adopted here (content analysis) can only
be used to suggest identification of, and moves from, one leadership
style to another.	 Further more rigorous and systematic measurement,
using indices such as those constructed for Bass and Avolio's own
research, would be necessary to enable any firm conclusions to be drawn
about movements between these leadership styles.)
The managers' responses equated "management" with the more reactive role
of "just maintaining the status quo", with managers concentrating on
largely administrative tasks. "Management" involved a reliance on the
formal authority of the role, which was used to monitor closely the work
of their staff and to "issue orders" in a rather autocratic fashion
rather than attempting to work with them, or ulet go" and allow their
staff more freedom to manage themselves:
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"I think the difference between a manager and a leader is - the
manager manages the status quo. A leader creates the new status
quo - it's about change, and directing people towards change,
and encouraging them towards change" (Commercial Services
Provider manager).
"A manager - life as a manager in the old administrative days,
when all they did was sit in a box in the corner of a room in a
little office, and dealt with all the paper-work. A manager is
someone who takes what is coming down the line - I will process
that, manage this - and off we go and just do it, do the same
things, and keep them going, while I think what they (BCC) are
looking for is someone up there, to set an example, and set the
direction, you know, to lead the troops over the top. A leader
is very much more proactive. Setting direction, setting targets,
motivating people, making sure that people actually enjoy their
work, that they've got a future career path, have got somewhere
to go." (Finance manager, Education Department).
In contrast to these definitions of the "manager" role, the responses of
the 35 managers who provided definitions of the "leader" role, focused
largely on the	 "charisma and inspirational", rather than the
"individualised consideration" and "intellectual stimulation" (of their
staff) aspects of the tripartite model of transformational leadership
provided by Bass and Avolio. Managers tended to emphasise the leadership
facets mentioned by these authors (and by Kotter) associated with
personal charisma. These included, for example, "earning the respect" of
their staff through "leading by example", setting a clear sense of
direction (especially when engaged in change management), and "taking
staff with you" by "inspiring", "enthusing" and "motivating" them,
persuading and "coaxing" them rather than "pushing" them. The adoption
of "participative " and "consultative" management styles were seen as
important here. Many managers emphasised the importance of direct
personal contact with their staff in this context, in the sense of being
"visible" to them in their role-model capacity, and through "managing by
walking about" and talking to staff:
"A manager ensures that a job is done, but a leader actually
shows that as well - he shows by example, and being there. He
pushes the boundaries a bit .......I used to find it
embarrassing to be a leader, but I don't now - the actually
showing by example and being different. Being in front, being







make that more obvious. You say to people, because of the new
procedures: "We have to be much more respectful of the public
we deal with.". So I do it with them, in front of them - that
sort of thing. And I show myself making mistakes and
apologising for them. That sort of thing, in front of them, in
case conferences when I chair them." (Social Service Purchaser
manager)
Leadership styles and behaviour actually adopted by managers
The managers were asked to identify any changes which had occurred since
the mid-1980s in their leadership role behaviour. Overall, 31 managers
reported that their leadership styles had changed in the direction
suggested by the County's "transformational leader" prescriptions:
Incidence of changes in leadershi p styles








at time of interview
9	 7	 7	 31









When asked about these changes in their own leadership styles (in the
context of BCC's prescriptions), managers focused more on the importance
of '1 enabling" and "empowering" their staff, as well as on the importance
of adopting strong inspirational, directive and charismatic leadership.
The majority of managers emphasised the extent to which they focused on
Bass and Avolio's "individualised consideration" and "intellectual
stimulation" of their staff. They attempted to encourage each individual
staff member to: identify the skills and knowledge areas where they
required development/training; set more challenging tasks and targets
for their staff, based on each individuals own particular abilities,
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strengths and weaknesses; provide training and other development
opportunities for them, according to their own specific needs.	 The
Staff Development and Performance Review (SDPR) system was seen by many
managers as a vehicle for encouraging them to undertake this in a more
formalised and structured way than hitherto, encouraging managers to
focus on the different needs of individual members of staff:
"I see the SDPR as a means of developing individuals. Some of the
team members have got far greater potential than others, of
course. And one way of actually trying to develop that
potential is by setting targets that are going to be a challenge
to them, whereas in the past they would just have been expected
to get on and do their daily work and achieve the annual
programme. I set targets which try and develop the individual,
so that they have to stretch themselves to achieve them
(Highways Provider manager).
"There's more opportunity now to give people work other than
their normal core of work - to help develop them as individuals
and future managers. I feel I have the responsibility to try
and develop the people I have working for me. I've involved a
lot more people in developing this computer system, that
wouldn't traditionally have been involved in the past. I think
it will develop these individuals - their characters, their
strengths." (Commercial Services Provider manager)
Many managers also emphasised the importance of stimulating and
motivating staff by delegating the responsibility for decision-making
and task achievement to them, within a framework of broad guidelines or
targets, and leaving staff free to manage the "how" and the "day-to-day"
aspects of their work, thus ensuring staff"ownership" of the work:
"I like very much to give people clear guidelines of what I
expect, and allow them to go away and achieve that within that,
knowing they've got the support to report back if they feel it's
not working. That way they can actually feel ownership of
something. I think my skills are better placed at the strategic
level. I've done the task bit myself; I've no wish to interfere.
Like the information systems thing - it was my customer services
manager who actually did the project. She defined it, what we
wanted, went away and did it - and did a very good job. . . .The
whole point really is to progress people on and develop their
skills." (Commercial Services Provider manager).
As well as trying to focus on individual development needs - (i.e. the
unique needs of each individual staff member) on a one-to-one basis -
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through the performance review and appraisal system, arid through
informal one-to-one contacts - many managers also reported various
efforts to develop their work units as a team (i.e. to encourage
individuals to work together towards common group/work-section goals).
Responses here ranged from delegating particular decisions to their
team, to involving them, through participative and consultative
leadership styles in decisions which had to be made:
"With certain elements of the job - like the client will write
in with a comment about something, but I won't make a decision
and tell staff, 'this is what we're doing from now on.' I
would circulate the letter or memo or whatever, and ask for
people's comments to get them thinking about what they're
actually doing.......it can ease pressures on me, because if
I've been asked how we would solve a problem, and I find out
what their views are, it saves me having to sit back and think
about it. Arid it actually gets them involved, keeps them
involved, and then it's a two-way exchange of information. I
can bat ideas off of them, and they can similarly throw ideas
at me." (Highways Provider Manager).
"I will make the decisions at the end of the day and I think
people understand that, but I will do it through people. For
instance we've got the budget......and I've got this, this
morning. It was agreed yesterday by the Committee - the
business plan targets - what we've got to do. I am actually
going to give my locality managers the budget sheets on
Monday, and give them that and say: "What I'd 2-i.ke the four of
you to do is go away and agree how you are going to apportion
these targets between the four of you, and then come back to
me." It saves me the work, and it's good experience for them."
(Social Service Purchaser manager).
Particularly in the context of the many changes in culture and values
w1ich were continuing to take place in the County, and the development
of various strategies by senior management to achieve more structured
and more effective and open communication systems (see discussion below
under informational roles), managers received, and were encouraged to
discuss with their staff, and feed back up, increasing volumes of
information about changes affecting both their own Departments, and the
County as a whole. Many managers emphasised the importance of ensuring
that staff were fully aware of, and understood the reasons for the
structural and cultural changes underway in the County - such as the
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customer care culture and the purchaser/provider split - and how these
would affect ways of working for their staff. Methods adopted for
achieving this by managers included: "management by walking about and
"setting an example" to staff by their own behaviour of what was
expected in the "inspirational" and "charismatic" style described above;
the use of wall-posters, which were clearly visible in some offices
during the course of this research; more circulation to staff of written
information, including newsletters; more structured and more regularly
held team meetings to discuss policy developments and problems:
"I'm doing it (holding team meetings) more formally now. Every
four weeks we have a team meeting, where I - I've really been
pushing the customer service idea, and it's been difficult for
some of them, and every four weeks we have a meeting where
people can just moan twere getting fed up with the job', and
moan about the customers. Remember, they're not allowed to be
rude to the customers, no matter how idiotically they behave.
When they come on, you know, 'I've cocked the machine up", we've
got to be sort of polite and help them through it, and it does
wear on them, and they've got to have a screaming point, so we
have once a month or so, where they can come in and really.. .."
(Finance manager, Highways Department).
"There's so many changes going on, the impact on morale is quite
high - the uncertainty, the fears about externa].isation,
Internal Business Units - people are quite worried so I see it
as important to enhance the communication process... .I've
attended some of those Making connections seminars, and I've
made quite an effort to feed the information back to my team and
help people to see what's going on." (Social Services Provider
manager)
With regard to team meetings and briefings, many managers across all
departments reported departmental policy initiatives requiring regular
team meetings and briefing sessions at every level to improve
communication flows up and down the organisation. While this represented
an extension or formalisation of practices which had already existed to
some extent, it also represented a significant change in style for some
managers:
"Communication with staff is very important - it's a key part of
management, making sure that people know what is going on. I
was criticised for not having regular team meetings as
frequently as others - my comments in the Performance Review,
you know, were "not communicating with staff as frequently as
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thought desirable", and I have them quite frequently now. .
(Highways Provider manager).
What of those managers in the "no change" and "not sure" categories of
responses about changes in their leadership styles (see table presented
alove)? Most of these managers reported either that they had always
tended to adopt the "transformational" style of leadership with their
staff, or that they adopted a "contingency" approach to leadership,
changing their approaches depending on changes in staff needs and/or on
changes in their operating environment. Two managers (in Finance and
Social Services) explained that it simply wasn't their style: "I know I
ought to be more leaderish, but I'm just not very proactive or
entrepreneurial; I tend just to accept what I am given...".
Constraints on the adoption of "transformational" leadership styles
Many managers - across all the response categories - mentioned various
contraints on the extent to which they pursued the "transformational"
style. As discussed in chapter 8, there were limits on the extent to
which managers felt able to innovate or ri.sk-take - within the still
relatively "risk-averse" culture of local government, where managers
also felt far more accountable and visible, through the business plan
and Performance Review system, for meeting their targets. This extended
to limits on the extent to which some managers felt able or willing to
"let go" in the sense of encouraging their subordinates to take risks or
make mistakes,	 and delegating responsibility to them for task
achievements: "they're MY targets that they're doing, and I need to keep
a close watch on their progress". Moreover, as Bass and Avolio note,
empowerment strategies require resources for training and development.
Some managers identified problems here in terms of finding funds or time
to enable staff to pursue development opportunities. Lack of time due to
work pressures was also cited by some managers as a problem which
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prevented them from devoting as much time as they felt they should to
the inspirational and motivational activities and contact with staff
required by the transformational leader style. A few, as noted above,
felt that this leadership style was simply not one which they felt
comfortable with.
In addition, managers raised the problem of differentials amongst their
staff in terms of their abilities and/or willingness to be developed and
stretched". For example, a Commercial Services manager explained that
some of his staff (particularly longer serving members) were less
willing than others to accept the need for greater flexibility in their
work practices: "some of them still haven't quite got round to the idea
that if a customer rings up to order something, it has got to be done
then and there - it can't wait till somebody else comes back from
lunch".
A related point here was what some managers saw as a contradiction
between the requirement for them to be directive and inspirational,
whilst at the same time being required to adopt participative and
consultative strategies - based on involving and enabling styles rather
than "issuing orders" or using the "stick" approach towards ensuring
that their staff attitudes and methods of working changed in accordance
with the County's prescriptions. As one manager explained:
"In some ways I've had to become more directive, more autocratic
almost ......It's linked in with the Barset changes because at
the end of the day when we looked at what actually needed to be
done to get the team into some sort of healthy shape to
actually be able to cope with the demands on the
purchaser/provider split. Clearly, there were some people in
the team who were less than enthusiastic about all of that. At
the end of the day they had to be dragged kicking and screaming
whether they liked it or not because we HAVE to to respond -
there's no choice any more, and there's a limit to the time you
can spend	 consulting and cajoling. .. ." 	 (Social Services
Provider manager).
In attempting to resolve this contradiction between participative and
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directional styles, some managers commented on the need to adopt
different styles of leadership for different task situations, and with
different sorts	 of people, reflecting the contingency model of
leadership.
Ten managers (5 in Social Services) commented, sometimes negatively, on
the rather "macho" nature of the leadership style advocated by BCC
senior management, and the Chief Executive in particular. Social
Services managers mentioned "Butlerism", a reference to the name of the
previous Departmental Director who was perceived as using a strongly
directive and "macho" style. This approach was felt, however, to be in
retreat under the current Director who was seen as using a softer, more
sensitive approach. These perceptions arose partly from the fact that
the new Director, unlike his predecessor, came from social work
background, and was thus as being more receptive to concerns raised
about the impact of changes on professional practices and values (see
discussion in chapter 6) . His less autocratic approach was also seen as
deriving from his own personal preferred method of exercising
leadership.
Some managers also mentioned the problems, well documented in the
literature, attendant upon combining performance related pay (PRP) and
staff development needs identification within one system (although
separate interviews had to be held for each purpose; the two systems
were still perceived as being linked) . 	 These problems included the
reluctance of some staff to "take risks" or be set challenging targets
(in case they should fail), or to be honest about their development
needs in case this should be seen as a "weakness" for pay award
purposes. Some managers expressed appreciation of the way in which the
?RP system reinforced the message of the new "performance culture" and
clarified the objectives towards which they should be working. Others
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regretted the way in which it focused on the notion of a "reward" for
work well done (redolent of the more traditional "transactional or
'management" style of leadership outlined above) rather than on an
intrinsic pride taken in work well done for its own sake. It was felt
the latter could actually be undermined when staff felt that they
deserved a higher grade pay award than the one they in fact received.
The inducements to improve performance offered by the PR? system were,
in any case, seen by some managers as largely illusory in that "nearly
everyone gets a 3 (normal incremental progression), a very few get a 2,
and you have to prove you can walk on water to get a 1".	 One manager
reported a story he had heard about the Chief Executive saying at a
meeting that he (the Chief Executive) didn't feel he deserved a grade 1,
and this manager considered that this reinforced the message that, in
practice, the scale stopped at 2. Moreover, for managers with staff at
the top of their grade, there was little scope for providing additional
monetary rewards.	 Some managers considered that the PRP scheme,
operating in this context, could damage staff morale - especially for
high performers - by raising expectations about monetary rewards which
were, in practice, rarely forthcoming. Other managers felt that the
scheme, after a few years of operating, had ceased to have any impact in
that most staff assumed that they would receive the satisfactory (3)
grade (with no serious expectation of achieving higher grades), and that
the scheme had had little or no effect on performance levels.
ina11y, - mentioned in the literature, 	 represented within BCC
prescriptions, and highlighted by the managers' own responses -
considerable importance is attached to the provision of "role-models"
and "setting an example" within the transformational leadership style.
Managers were therefore asked about the leadership style of their line
- 343 -
managers. Responses here tended, understandably, given the sensitivity
of the topic, to be brief. (It is also important here, as discussed
above, to bear in mind the methodological limitations of the interview
and content analysis methods for locating responses firmly within Bass
and Avolio's leadership style model). 	 However, all but six (which were
too short and/or vague) of the managers' responses could be tentatively
located within Bass and Avolio tripartite leadership style model - the
transformational and transactional models outlined above, plus the
"].aissez faire" model, indicating an absence of motivating/directing
behaviour or meaningful contact between leader and follower. It is
important to recognise that these responses were likely also to be
affected by the managers' own personal leadership style preferences, and
the extent to which they wanted to be empowered and encouraged to
develop by their immediate superiors. An approach described rather
negatively as "laissez-faire" by one manager could be seen more
positively as "transformational by another.)
The responses suggested that just over half of the respondents' saw
their line managers as operating a leadership style which tended towards
the transformational model in that the respondents were actively
encouraged to develop new ideas and methods of working. They were given
a substantial amount of freedom in determining their methods of working,
within the framework of performance targets and business plans, and with
advice/guidance provided by their line managers when needed - sometimes
within the context of a charismatic leadership style:
"He's great to work for. He's very much people orientated, and
really wants people to take - really be responsible for their
sections, which is good, and he encourages you to do this.. .This
place is always alive and buzzing - he never stands still for a
minute. He's faster than his own shadow, and it kind of
galvanises you into action. I suppose it makes me work longer
hours, and at times I think perhaps I ought to give more priority
to my family life.. .but at the end of the day, it's good fun.
It's that type of atmosphere." Commerical Services Provider
manager.
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Of the remainder, a few respondents felt that their line managers were
either too	 laissez-faire", in that insufficient support and guidance
was provided, and access was poor, or that line managers were too
autocratic and/or controlling. These respondents' felt subjected to
undesirably close levels of monitoring which inhibited their freedom to
develop new ideas and ways of working, and made them feel that their
levels of expertise and competence were undervalued, and/or that they
were not trusted to produce results on their own:
"I don't think I've ever worked with one (a boss) who is so
controlling. I don't like to use the word autocratic, but it's
bordering on that. ?nd he's like that with everybody so it's not
I'm singled out because he's worried about me - it's just his
style. Checking and double checking on everything - its
frustrating, and occasionally it's infuriating. I don't know how
he's got the time for it - I really don't" (Social Services
Provider manager)
Overall, the managers' responses about the leadership styles which they
bad adopted suggested that there was some progression, in accordance
with the County's own prescriptions, towards the transformational
leadership model, This appeared to be occurring particularly in the case
of the first aspect - the development of charismatic and inspirational
leadership styles. With regard to the second two aspects - the
individualised consideration and the intellectual stimulation of staff,
developments from the transactional to the transformational were perhaps
slightly less marked. For example, the Staff Development and Performance
Review system had undoubtedly focused managers' attention on the need to
develop individual staff and encourage them to take on more challenging
work, according to their particular requirements. This system together
with the business plan targets and the general effects of the new
"performance culture" also involved managers in more extensive and
structured monitoring of their staff's performance, as well as rendering
the managers themselves more accountable, and more subject to more
formalized monitoring of their own performances. These developments,
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together with the performance related pay system, and the changing but
still relatively risk-averse culture, suggested that the managers'
enabling and empowering activities here included at least some elements
of the transactional model - with its emphasis on rewards for meeting
agreed-upon objectives -	 as well as the transformational element of
stretching staff to perform beyond that they thought were their
capability limits, and encouraging them to develop more challenging work
methods and targets.
As explained at the beginning of this chapter, the interpersonal role of
the leader is focused largely on contacts and information exchanges
within the manager's own work-unit. The second interpersonal role - the
ceremonial - involves managers in contacts and information exchanges
both inside and outside the work-unit, and the liaison role is focused
on activities external to the work-unit. Changes in the BCC managers'
ceremonial role performance are outlined below, followed by an analysis
of changes in their liaison and informational roles; the asterisks in

























The second of the three interpersonal roles - the ceremonial role -
refers to formal duties of an inter-personal nature, which do not
involve	 significant	 information-processing or	 decision-making
activities. They are largely symbolic, reflecting the formal authority
associated with the manager's	 particular position within the
organisational hierarchy (Mintzberg, 1973). Within their work units,
managers officiate at various ceremonies - such as celebrations to mark
the occasion of a staff member's promotion, departure or marriage.
Outside the work unit, managers are involved in various official events
to open, for example, a new by-pass or youth club with which their
work-units have been involved, or, perhaps, a formal lunch with
politicians or other community representatives.
As explained in chapter 4, the local government literature provides very
little analysis of this role or changes which have occurred in it under
the "new" management systems. However,	 given the extent of the
orgariisational "de-layering" and the reduction in the importance of
rigid hierarchical role definitions associated with the new more
flexible and open management systems, it was suggested that middle
managers would be likely to become more extensively involved in this
role - especially with regard to activities outside their work-units -
than they had in the past. The increased levels of contact which
managers were required to develop under the new "competitive" and
"enabling" local authority service delivery services (see below on
liaison and informational roles) would also suggest	 increased
involvement by middle mangers here. However, most of the BCC managers
reported no change in the extent to which their activities within this
role had increased or decreased since the mid-80s:
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CHANCES IN CEREMONIAL ROLE PERFORMANCE
Numbers of managers responding in each category
Social	 Highways Finance Con:imercial	 Total
Services	 Services
1.No change	 9	 9	 11	 7	 36
2. Increased	 3	 2	 1.	 2	 8
3. Decreased	 3	 4
	
12	 12	 12	 12	 48
All of the managers reported participation in small quasi-formal events
with their staff	 (such as	 leaving/retirement ceremonies,	 the
presentation of engagement presents and the like); this was seen as a
normal part of the leader role, and no change was reported here.
However, in connection with formal social or ceremonial duties outside
their own sections, most managers reported that this role, both
currently and in the past, constituted a very insignificant and
infrequent aspect of their work. The relatively few examples provided
here included: attendance at various official opening ceremonies for new
buildings or for new services; occasional attendance at dinners/lunches
with local suppliers, contractors, local groups and other public sector
officials; putting in a "presence" at the beginning of various internal
events such as a special training day etc.; involvement in Panel visits
(by Social Services Committee councillors)
Most managers explained that, whilst they might occasionally deputise
for their line manager, this role tended still to remain within the
provenance of more senior staff. Finance managers explained that because
finance was seen as essentially a support function, they rarely got
involved in the formal occasions connected with service provision events
of one sort or another, and a similar feeling was echoed by some
Highways Provider managers. They felt that the Purchasers/clients who
had commissioned the work and/or the persons involved in the actual
construction were more likely to be involved in formal openings: "They
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don't often think about the bloke who designed it...!". One Commercial
Services manager reported that her manager actively discouraged
attendance at local functions put on by suppliers in order to maintain
an image of immaculate public probity, which he felt was essential for a
public sector business unit to project. 	 -
For the managers in the "increased" response category, ceremonial
activities formed a more significant part of their role, and had
recently increased. The Commercial Services managers reported that they
were encouraged - and that they felt it important in terms of promoting
their department within the increasingly competitive environment - to
attend various	 official functions such as the opening of new
buildings/services where the Comercial Services business units had
provided services. One Social Services manager felt that there was
fairly careful selection of people who attended formal occasions, which
often involved contact with members:
"There's more of it. I suppose just the fact that my
responsibilities have grown, and there's a sort of elitist thing
about that. In some situations we like to have the person who is
actually doing the job, so the person within the resource gets
to meet a well-known bigwig, but there is still a sort of
guardedness about our employers (counci].lors), and so Area
Directors are very nervous about who meets Lady Treadwell, or
who meets whoever else, and so we're almost vetted to see
whether we would be socially acceptable. And I clearly am now.
They used to be very nervous of me and I used to get to see
nobody. It was quite clear that I wasn't trusted.... . then I had
to do it and they realised I didn't do anything too disastrous!"
(Social Services Provider manager).
Overall, however, it appeared from the managers' responses that little
change had taken place in their ceremonial role behaviour; apart from
the internal exercise of this role at small ceremonies concerned with
enployee marriages,	 leaving	 functions etc.,	 middle managerial
involvement in external ceremonial occasions remained very limited, and
was seen as the preserve, largely, of more senior managers. Contrary to
indications in the local government literature that lower level managers
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were involved in more contact with members, most managers reported
little or no contact with members; this had not changed with the
introduction of the "new" management systems.
It is, however, important to note that most managers reported a
significant increase - outside the purely formal ceremonial role - in
their contacts, involvement and information exchanges with a vast range
of individuals, and groups both inside and outside BCC, in connection
with the changes taking place under the "new" management system within
the County. These developments are considered next, in the context of
changes in managers' performance of their liaison and information roles.
Liaison and Informational Roles
Mintzberg links these roles together under the general concept of the
manager operating as a "nerve centre" of the organisation. Managers are
involved here in the acquisition of information from various sources
both inside and outside the organisation (liaison and monitoring roles)
and then processing, using and transmitting this information to others -
who are again located both inside and outside the organisation
(disseminator and spokesperson roles) . The information is gathered and
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Basically the liaison role refers to the development by the manager of a
reciprocal network of	 contacts	 (both inside and outside	 the
organisation), from whom s/he obtains information (the monitor role),
and to whom s/he transmits information - to contacts within the
organisation (disseminator role) and outside the organisation (the
spokesperson role) .	 As the connecting line between the "manager as
nerve centre" and the decisional/leadership roles suggest, these two
functions are interrelated, in that changes in patterns of behaviour in
either function will affect behaviour patterns in the other. Given the
significant changes in the behaviour of managers within their decisional
and leadership roles, it is to be expected that these changes would have
an impact on managers' informational role behaviour. This section
concentrates on management behaviour within the liaison and
informational roles outside the managers' own work-unit; the monitor and
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disseminator roles concerned with work activities within the work-u.nit
were discussed in the preceding section under the leader role.
The analysis of an organisation's information and communication systems
can take place across a number of different dimensions, each of which
will influence the nature of the manager's informational role behaviour
(Townley, 1989).	 For example, information can take written (on
paper/through a computer network) or spoken forms, and information flows
can take place on a one-way or two-way basis between sender and
recipient. The distinction is also commonly made between formal systems
of communication and information flows. Formally, a manager's :job
description prescribes the exchange of information on specific issues,
to be made in a particular format, with designated individuals holding
particular positions both inside and outside the organisation). Under
informal systems, the manager makes his/her own decisions, outside the
formal network, about who to contact about what, and about what format
should be used for receiving, processing and transmitting such
information.	 On a broader basis, discussions about these issues can
usefully be subsumed within the conceptual model of relatively closed or
information systems - in terms of the volumes of information which
managers process, and the ease with which information exchanges take
place across the organisation, and with external organisations (Tapscott
and Caston, 1993)
Relatively closed systems tend to focus primarily on prescribed vertical
channels of communication and information flows. The emphasis is on
information flows down from senior management to middle managers, rather
than from bottom up, with limitations on horizontal flows within and
between departments at middle and lower levels in the organisational
hierarchy. It can be argned that TM traditional" local government
structures and management systems tended towards this closed end of
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the information systems continuum. Traditional departmentalism - the
division of local authorities into rigorously differentiated departments
and sections based on professional specialisms	 - combined with
relatively little devolution of authority and responsibilities to
managers at the lower ends of the tall hierarchies operated to restrict
both horizontal and vertical bottom-up information flows (Haynes, 1980)
Both the volume of information circulated, and the scope of managers'
access to it was limited. There were tendencies for information to be
used as a weapon in individual and departmental struggles for power,
and "to be treated by departments and even sections of departments as if
it were their property." (LGTB, 1990, p14).
More pp systems focus on the importance of free information exchanges
both horizontally and vertically, throughout the organisation. Flatter
hierarchies and devolved management systems involve managers in a wider
range of responsibilities for the work of their "empowered" teams of
staff, located within semi-autonomous and self-motivated business units
working towards fulfilling the organisation's overall objectives. Here,
managers and team members require full and open access "to the
inforniation and tools required for functioning and collaborating within
the team in a broader context." (Tapscott and Caston, p12). In the
context of devolved management systems, the availability of more
sophisticated computerised information and communication systems, and
the development of the "enabling", "fragmented" and "competitive"
council, the local government literature stresses the need for managers
to operate within "intelligence and information systems" which cross
professional and hierarchical boundaries both inside and outside the
organoisation. These developments involve more extensive co-working
across work-unit, departmental and organisation boundaries with an
increasing range of external private, public and voluntary sector
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organisations (Clarke and Stewart, 1988; Sroker, 1989; LGTB, 1990; LGMB,
1993b). Managers are becoming more involved in inter-departmental,
inter-organisational and inter-disciplinary project groups and work
teams which operate across traditional functional roles; managerial
information processing and liaison roles are becoming more significant.
As outlined in Chapter 6, BCC senior management had adopted a strategy
of encouraging managers to develop and maintain both formal and informal
links between sections and departments within BCC, and between BCC and
other organisations. They had pursued a policy of facilitating such
contacts and of achieving more open communication and information flows,
both vertically and horizontally within the authority. In addition, the
Authority had introduced sophisticated and more "user-friendly"
computerised financial/management systems. 	 These, together with the
installation of an E-mail system in some Departments and the development
of coniputerised networks with some external organisations, enhanced the
scope of managers' communication and information processing activities.
These developments, as discussed below, suggest some moves by the
Authority towards the "post-bureaucratic" horizontal market and network,
as opposed to the	 traditional vertical bureaucratic, 	 forms of
organisation identified by authors such as Kanter (1989), Peters (1992)
and Thompson et al (1991)
Reflecting the trends outlined in the literature, and the policy
developments within BCC, the managers' responses indicated that most of
them were becoming more actively involved in developing and maintaining
more contacts (outside their own work unit) with a wider range of
individuals both inside and outside BCC. They were becoming more
extensively involved in receiving, processing and transmitting a growing
volume of information. Different managers focused on different changes -
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including decreases as well as increases in involvement in some areas
for some managers. However, 44 of the 48 managers considered that their
involvement, overall, in liaison and information processing activities
had increased since the mid 1980s.	 39 managers considered that BCC had
become, in general, a more "open's organisation in terms of overall
increases in the volumes of information circulating, and in terms of
more open and accessible communication systems.
The individuals and groups (outside their own work units) with whom the
managers reported increased involvement in the exercise of their liaison
and informational roles of monitor, disseminator, and spokesperson, can
be grouped basically into the four categories, both within and outside
BCC itself. These involve contacts: between purchasers/customers and
contractors/providers of services; with other BCC staff, and with staff
from external agencies,	 involving inter-disciplinary and across
functional boundary project/team working and joint planning and
provision of services; copwith individuals/groups concerned with mutual
exchanges of managerial, professional and personal support and
development for the managers; with senior management (and subordinates).
The functions of these information exchanges can be analysed at three
levels, using Tapscott and Caston's model: at work-unit level, to
monitor and improve performance; at organisational level, to ensure
integration and coordination between the increasingly semi-autonomous
business units; at inter-enterprise level, to develop inter-agency
co-operation in service planning and provision. At each of these levels,
the complex horizontal and vertical information exchange systems within
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Information exchange and processing with regard to customer/provider
relationships operated at the level of ensuring improved team
performance (in terms of meeting customer/purchaser needs), and also at
the other two functional levels - ensuring integration between various
sections of the organisation, and inter-organisational collaboration in
the development of joint service planning and provision. Government
legislation plus BCC's own policy decision had led to the introduction
of a comprehensive internal market system within BCC - involving a
Purchaser/Provider split,	 and the development of semi-autonomous
business units operating increasingly on a trading account basis (see
discussion in Chapter 6). This role split had created for Highways and
Social Services managers, a new "horizontal requirement, which did not
exist before, for integrative liaison and information exchange between
managers occupying the two roles - within the same departments for
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Highways and Social Services managers. This took the form of reaching
agreement on initial service level specifications, ongoing liaison on a
day-to-day basis to deal with the details of implementation and
amendments to the original specifications, and rigorous monitoring by
the Purchaser of service provision against the service specifications.
Several managers attributed, the increase in their involvement in liaison
activities partly to the introduction of the Purchaser/Provider split:
"There's growth in it (liaison activity) inasmuchas we now have a
client (Purchaser) side and the D & C (Design and Construction)
side. Before, basically, we did everything - it was all Highways
Engineering in days gone by, and someone was told to do a project
,and they designed it, and they went out and supervised it, and
then they went out and did the next one. Now, we have the client
role, and therefore we have to act as a client and therefore we
have to liaise with the people who are actually doing the work
(the Provider) - we want to make sure they're spending our money
in the right way. In days gone by we were the people doing the
work." (Highways Purchaser manager).
In addition, the Purchaser/Provider split provided a mechanism for
integrating policy planning and resource allocation at departmental
levels. Purchaser managers contributed towards departmental business
plans and policies through feeding up suggestions for improvements and
modifications to services on the basis of their contacts with external
and internal Providers, end-users and various local interest/community
groups (see further discussion in chapter 8 on decisional roles). The
Purchaser held the budgets, and then decided how to allocate funds
amongst various provider groups - within or outside .&CC, who were then
responsible for ensuring service delivery according to the
specifications.
The following quotation from a social services manager illustrates the
complexities of Provider managers' multiple customer identities witin
this market system, and the complexities of the information exchanges
required between them:
"I think we tend to see that we've got three lots of customers.
357 -
We've got the pure Purchaser of the service which is the
Department, through the policy makers and the area commissioners
(of services) and a].]. those people, and even the politicians - we
tend to block them altogether as one. Now obviously they are
representing the interests of the end-user of the service - the
clients. But obviously, these are a customer in their own right
as well. Then we've got the third block which are the external
agencies which is the District• Councils. Now, I guess in terms of
how the Councils are represented, it tends to be through the
(Departmental) Purchasers, but, having said that, we work so
closely with them (the Councils), that I tend to represent their
view. I might say, well this is the viewpoint of Twelvetrees
District Council at this point, as we need to bear it in mind.
So, yes. In a way they all interlink. I think the staff have got
the idea that we've got three lots of customers, but at the end
of the day, it's the person with the disability and their carer
who are the people who are hopefully going to benefit." (Social
Service Provider manager).
As a consequence of the Purchaser/Provider split, and BCC's customer
care policies (designed to improve the Authority's responsiveness to
both individual and community needs and demands), 43 out of the 48
managers reported significantly increased levels of involvement with a
wider range of customer groups, both inside and outside BCC, as shown on
the diagram reproduced earlier. These included end-user individuals and
groups, local community groups, local pressure groups, and internal and
external purchasers/clients, responsible for ensuring the provision of
services by Providers to their own end-users. The purposes of the
information exchanges and processing centred around each of Walsh's
(1989) four customer care dimensions - service quality, access, choice
of service, and user-group! community participation in policy decisions.
For example, some social service managers were involved with the user
and voluntary groups who participated in drawing up community care plans
for their areas. The move towards improved service quality, access and
choice involved Highways managers in increasingly extensive contacts
with individual members of the public, local groups such as Chambers of
Commerce, Parish councils etc., and with national and local interest
groups focused around, for example, environmental and nature conservancy
concerns.	 There was increased emphasis on gaining feedback from
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consumers about the success of traffic schemes through questionnaires,
public meetings, and liaison with local groups and counci].lors.
Underpinning these developments were significant changes in the nature
of customer/provider relationships. The idea of providing services "for
and with people, not simply to them" (Walsh, pGO), -underpinned the four
key customer care dimensions. Managers were thus required to become more
extensively involved in liaison with their various customer groups, who,
under their new status, were more extensively involved on defining their
problems/needs and the particular goods or services they required -
rather than relying on the "expert" or "professional" judgement of the
provider.
Purchaser and Provider managers made a number of comments about the
impact of the internal market on their information processing roles.
Some, mainly Purchaser managers, considered that the internal market had
clarified information flows within the organisation:
"The lines of communication are a lot clearer, the functions are a
lot clearer, and, hopefully, they are more efficient because we
have a client who is in charge saying: "That's what we want done".
At the moment we're saying to D and C: "Go and do that." - before
very long, it will be going to D & C: "Give us a price", and
we'll say to Joe Bloggs, consultants: "Give us a price", and we'll
get the best job and the cheapest job - not necessarily the same
thing of course." (Highways Purchaser manager).
Many Highways and Social Services managers, however, especially on the
Provider side, also identified problems with the internal market system,
reflecting many of those identified by Walsh (1992 INLOGOV) as
accompanying the introduction of internal markets. (Some managers did
take pains to emphasise that "it's early days" in that the recently
introduced systems were still being tested out and reviewed.) Whilst
managers tended to emphasise that the Purchaser/Provider relationship
was intended, in line with the general changes in customer relations
described above, to operate as a partnership, they highlighted a number
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of obstacles in the way of achieving productive and cooperative
information exchanges between the two sides. Many Highways and Social
Services managers commented adversely on the increased fornialisation and
'contract bureaucracy" which tended to characterise the relationships
between Purchaser and Provider generated through the requirements for
precisely specified contracts or service level agreements:
"Things have changed over the last couple of years.. .The job hasn't
changed. They (the Providers) really do still know what needs to
be done but the ethos has changed in that they have taken one step
back and said to us (Purchasers): "Tell us what to do now." So
whereas we used to go and have a chat with Joe Bloggs and say,
"Well we ought to draw up a traffic signal scheme for this
junction or whatever, and he'd say, "Oh yes, I know what's to be
done, yeah, I'll go and do that" - he's got to take one step
back and say, "Well, you write down exactly what you want me to do
and I'll do it.". So we've come back to bureaucracy,- in a way, and
red tape. It's actually injected quite a wedge of form-filling and
red tape into the organisation. So whereas we were a nice
close-knit organisation and probably fairly efficient, I would
suggest that perhaps we're less efficient...." (Highways Provider
manager);
"We (Providers) agree to provide a service for the Commissioners
(Purchasers), and then the Service Development manager will enable
the thing to happen. They act as kind of go-betweens and
negotiators and brokers - facilitators between me and the
Commissioners. But most of the negotiations, we could do on a
one-to-one basis with the Commissioners, and I question whether
the Service Pevelopment bit gives any value added - in theory they
drive and facilitate the negotiations with the Commissioner, they
actually do the writing of them. But really, they're only writing
on the basis of what they are told by us - I could almost reduce
it to a clerical function, I think - it is very confused......That
is an example for me of over-bureacratisation,
over-proceduralisation - I went to speak to a colleague the other
day, and he was clutching this great big document - a 50 page
document, which was a service level agreement - written in this
awful legal jargon, you know: whereby and whereas at arid whereat,
the first named party etc, and he'd slung it in the bin and
written a single sheet back to the Commissioner saying: "This is
what we can do arid it won't cost you anything more and this is how
we'll do it - if you're happy with it, let me know", and he rang
up and Said "fine", and that was it. Why are these people doing
this - if they're saying let's cut the garbage, let's cut the fat
in the structure, then why is this happening...... " (Social
Service Provider manager).
Reduced levels of contact with end-user customers/the public was seen as
an adverse consequence of the split by some Provider managers, in that
the responsibilities for obtaining, processing and acting directly on
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feedback received from end-user customers to change service provision,
rested technically with the Purchasers (in liaison with the Providers).
•Theoretically, I have no contact with customers." explained one
Bighways manager, who went on to say that this depended on whether or
not the client chose to pass this function back within the contract
specification. Social services Provider managers tended to feel that
they were best placed to carry out these functions, given that they
provided the services. They commented adversely on the fact that, unlike
previous practice when they were able to amend services to meet changing
customer requirements, they now had to secure the agreement of the
Purchaser: "We have to come up with the good ideas, but then we have to
sell them, literally now, to the Purchasers." Clearly, as suggested in
the quotation above, the role split placed complex negotiating and other
conimunication skill requirements on managers, who were still in the
early stages of working out a modus vivendi. Thus, for example, linked
with the idea of "selling" was the importance beginning to be assumed
with income generation in the internal market through the trading
account status of the Provider Managers' work units. These managers were
dependent on the Purchasers for their fund allocation; although, again,
the intention of partnership was mentioned here, a number of managers
stressed the threat posed to free communication/information flows and
cooperation between work units, including inter-agency work:
"I think it must be a function of the Purchaser/Provider thing, but
I do virtually no liaison work at the moment. I think that's
because if we're in-house providers, these roles and relationships
with other agencies is something that has been somewhat highjacked
by Service Development (Purchasing role), and arguably it's not my
place to go and talk to, say, the education department. If the
Commissioner thinks that tacking on some education to our in-house
services might provide a better service, then it's for them to do
it, and, turning it round the other way, if another agency comes
and says we can do this if you can give us X amount of money - its
all about deals - we have no money to to give because we only get
what's allocated to us by the Purchaser. It's not quite so stark as
this; we do some good inter-agency work at a practical level -
education, health. Within the agencies, I've maintained my
informal network, but again - maybe it's an undesirable consequence
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of the split - it actually forces people, no matter how they try
and resist it, into some rather wary - you know, what are they
after here. We often joke about it, you know: "I'm not going to
charge you for this discussion - if you come and ask me for some
advice, this is free." ........I think we have resisted the worst
excesses of it in this Area, but in other areas some of the
Commissioners are being really macho and draconian, and saying: "We
are going to put you out of business." For Christ's sake, we're all
part of the same organisation, we've all got the same basic
qualifications, and the same basic organisational motivation.. .."
(Social Services Provider manager).
This quotation illustrates the tensions identified by authors such as
Walsh (1992), Langan and Clarke (1994) and Hulme (1994) which can
characterise relationships between Purchasers and Providers. The
collaborative" behaviour required can be threatened by by Purchaser
managers' desires to maximise their control over service design and
specification (and to minimise costs) and Provider managers' desires to
maximise their control over the service delivery process (and to
maximise income generation). This potential conflict appeared
especially problematic with services such as social work where the
complex nature of the task precludes a simple distinction between
service specification and delivery (see further discussion in chapter
8)
In the context of their reliance for work on the Purchasers, many
Provider managers emphasised the considerable efforts they made to
develop contacts with any potential Purchasers - both inside BCC and in
other public sector agencies - to generate new work and income
possibilities. For example, Commercial Services managers, explained that
they had had to develop new and more sophisticated methods for liaising
with with their enormously increased number of customers - such as
individual headteachers and heads of residential 	 institutions -
following devolution. This had changed from the pre-devolution period,
when they simply had to maintain contact with a small number of
departmental Purchasers, acting on behalf of all departmental users:
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"Under the old culture, there was more opportunity to talk to
people - for instance we involved the people in Education in the
requisition centre in decisions on products they were going to
buy. There isn't a centre now. You can't go and talk to 800
schools... .What's happened in reality as I mentioned earlier -
we're developing a bright glossy catalogue with a range of
choice, and we're adopting a selling role rather than a
coordinated purchasing role.' 	 (Commerica]. Services Provider
manager).
Joint Working Activities and Sources of Support for Managers
Many managers within all four departments,	 operating either as
Purchasers or Providers or simply as managers involved in joint work
ventures with other groups across BCC and within various external
agencies, reported increases in their collaborative working and project
work and contacts with such groups - in terms of increasing amounts of
time spent with a growing range of such contacts. 	 Differences between
internal and external service providers appeared to be diminishing as a
consequence of BCC's internal market and CCT and other legislation. The
use of service level agreements and specifications, and the subsequent
monitoring of service provision standards operated across the boundaries
between BCC sections and departments, and between BCC and other
organisations. These developments reflecting closely the development of
the "fragmented" and "enabling" local authority described in the local
government literature - and the "boundaryless" organisational form
(Peters, 1992; Francis, 1994) . One social service manager emphasised
the importance of her own part in breaking down inter-agency barriers
and encouraging collaborative working between them:
"I liaise all the time. I think it's absolutely crucial. I spend a
lot of time - I work incredibly hard and I see it as vital, as
we're moving more into inter-agency work care. I think we're
actually starting to look at the needs of the individual rather
than the resource-led implications, which is sitting behind your
carefully guarded agency walls and saying, "we'll do it this way
inside here, and we'll criticise you over there for doing it your
way and not doing it properly.". My definition of a middle
manager is somebody who breaks the walls. You have to enable
that, you have to get rid of this sort of defensive, protective
mechanism, and that's what I do all the time. It's a prime
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objective.. .1 chair what's called a Joint Care Planning Team for
children's services, and that's the three main agencies plus
voluntary agencies. I sit on inter-agency Child Protection
Committee; I started up an inter-agency joint funding mechanism
for learning disabled adults.. .I've make sure that we get
together to make decisions. There used to be an 8 month wait
sometimes for decisions on joint funding about children, with the
health service and education, to get everybody together.
(Social Services Purchaser manager). 	 -
Statutory requirements for more inter-agency co-operation - for example,
required by the Children's Act for Social Services, by EEC legislation
for some Highways functions, together with BCC's and the Government's
customer care requirements - also encouraged inter-group working. But,
as noted above,	 contacts were tending to become slightly more
formalised. The following quotation was typical of many responses made
by managers, illustrating the wide range and complexity of the networks
of contacts and information exchanges within which they operated. Their
involvement here, while varying according to the precise nature of the
managers' functions and their personal preferences, tended overall to be
increasing for the reasons just described:
"1 have probably 4-5-6 meetings a week sitting round a table -
telephone calls are legion - with Transportation, Traffic
Systems, Planners (BCC sections), people from outside like
Seeboard, Gas Board, BT, BR, Southern Water, National Rivers -
landscape groups, conservation groups, Barset Trust for Nature
Conservancy, pressure groups, planners, the Districts (Councils)
There's more and more legislation, more and more involvement -
it's become more sensitive recently with the planning side of
things and the landscape side of things. People are more
environmentally aware than they used to be. You've got the Green
side of things now, people are more aware of their rights than
they used to be - communication has increased public awareness
and they know more about their rights - not everyone wants to
know about what's going on, but there are more that do want to
know, there's the Citizen's Charter.....Materials suppliers and
contractors; I've always dealt with those; you get more involved
with contractors and things when you're on the Construction side
of things. We write the specification for these materials, and on
site they deal with the guys who turn up with the stuff, so I'm
less involved at the moment as I'm Design. I used to do the odd
lecture on aspects of geotecbriics and things like that; recently,
I talked to a girls' school on highways; it's probably about the
same here - I've always enjoyed doing that sort of thing... ."
(Highways Provider manager).
Project and collaborative/group working can operate at each of the three
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information exchange and communication levels outlined above - at the
level of improving the manager's own work-group performance, at an
organisational integration level and at an inter-enterprise level.
Managers mentioned a number of collaborative/group-work projects,
specifically geared towards organisational and/or departmental
integration. Forty-two of the forty-eight managers had attended Making
Connections. This was a BCC-wide management development and
conimunication exercise aimed specifically at middle managers to ensure
that they were kept fully informed about, contributed to, and understood
the policies underpinning all the changes taking place in the County.
Some managers mentioned a number of other County-wide training
initiatives in which they had taken part, and which had resulted for
some in on-going informal contacts with individuals across the county.
For example, some women managers had maintained contact, and formed a
mutual support forum, with other women who had attended a specialised
women managers development programme.
Many managers also reported involvement in departmental working groups
concerned with developing and integrating professional practice
standards across their departments. These included a Quality Assurance
group in Highways, a Mental Health Professional Development group in
Social Services, and a Use of Capital Assets working group in Finance.
Increases in involvement here tended to be attributed partly to meeting
the managers' own career and professional development needs (see below),
and partly to the larger number of such groups. A growth in these groups
derived from the Council's policy of involving lower level managers more
in decision-making, in response to the need, arising from devolution and
the internal market, to integrate the operations of the semi-autonomous
business units.	 At County-wide level, some managers from these three
Departments were involved in various other working groups, not
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necessarily directly related to their own work specialisms, including
such diverse topic areas as emergency planning, census liaison, a
"Green" team, the Council environmental committee, health and safety
teams etc.
Commercial Services provider managers tended to report less involvement
in BCC initiatives outside their Department, and, until the appontment
of a new Director, in Departmental-wide initiatIves. Managers here
explained that, previously, the emphasis on individual unit managers
working to improve the competitive position of their separate and quite
diverse businesses, including the achievement of the rates of return
required by the CCT legislation, had resulted a feeling of separateness
from the Council as a whole. It had also resulted in a rather fragmented
and non-integrated Department, with little inter-business unit working
(reflecting the concerns expressed by some managers earlier about a
possible similar impact of the Purchaser/Provider split in Highways and
Social Services). Two commercial managers	 explained that	 they
specifically avoided such involvement because of reluctance to spend
time away from their core businesses. However, some Commercial Services
managers reported that there had been recent increases in
cross-Departmental initiatives - for example, a communication group, and
management team "away-days" - since the arrival of a new Director who
had made a specific policy decision to encourage more integration and a
greater sense of corporate identify between the separate business
units:
"I suppose it's where the entrepreneurial spirit works against you
in that you basically only want to talk with people you can do
business with. That's how it works. You are more intent on
pushing business along, rather than making friendly contacts with
the rest of the Council. Each Business Unit has taken its own
identity and you go off in your own direction. But there's a
change in direction now. The last boss was very much for
independent Business Units, but the new Director is very much for
the closely-knit cooperative Department; we've come to learn to
work more closely together again. You know, you may need to
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become more entrepreneurial but you're not Richard Branson.
There's a common sense to actually doing things in a
business-like but more friendly way.' (Commercial Service
Provider manager).
In addition to operating at a Departmental and County-wide integration
level, these and other initiatives also related to helping managers to
improve their work-group performance - and to providing ongoing
professional development and personal support. Many managers reported
increasing contacts with colleagues carrying out similar work - both
inside and outside BCC. Social Services and Finance managers, who tended
to be dispersed geographically across the County, met regularly with
their counterparts across the county. One Social Services manager
commented on how contact with her peers was encouraged by Senior
management, "whereas previously, we weren't supposed to, because they
felt it was a waste of time". Some Finance managers mentioned attendance
at meetings at County Hall under the "dotted line" relationship between
the devolved Finance managers and Centre Finance staff to facilitate
professional updating and liaison between widely dispersed staff. In
addition, reflecting the rapid and numerous changes taking place in
professional practices nationally, (partly in response to legislative
changes), most managers reported receiving extensive and growing,
quantities of information about professional developments which was
circulated throughout their departments.
Commercial Services managers focused more on contacts with their
counterparts outside BCC involved in their specific work areas - for
example professional organisations such as the Institutes of Marketing,
Purchasing, Supply, and Printing, the newly formed Barset Professional
Partnership, and consumer groups such as the London Utilities Council,
and Energy Users Council. Highways managers commented on the extent to
which other local authorities made cortact with them, as Barset was
well-known for developing new working practices in their professional
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field.
Increases in involvement in all these initiatives tended to be
attributed to three main developments. Firstly, more opportunities were
being made available for managers to participate in such initiatives:
"you're encouraged to get involved". Secondly, there was the need for
new developments in work practices to be disseminated across the
Authority and thus avoid duplication of effort - "to avoid re-inventing
the wheel" as one manager put it. Thirdly, managers felt that they had
to make more efforts "to be seen", and to inform themselves about
developments in both the organisation and the outside world - for a
niixture of reasons connected with personal career development reasons,
and (particularly for Provider managers) the need to raise the public
profile of their work-sections or Department:
"The University of Barchester has just come to Prince Hill - I am
on the local, the Barchester branch of the Institute of
Marketing, and so they contacted me via that. And I said, "Hey,
hang on - you're a customer. Come and talk with me.". When I'm
on Making Connections, when I'm a SET advisor, when I'm on an
ODAS course - I feel very much that, particularly the role I'm in
now, but I think any role I've been in, that you are - when they
see Barset County Supplies on your label, then you are Barset
County Supplies to them, and the way you conduct yourself, and
the way you input into it gives a flavour of what Barset County
Supplies is about. . . .1 think networking is the new thing for the
90s, if you like, I think it's the way forward for communicating.
I think that within 3CC and outside , it needs to be a symbiotic
relationship - a two-fold thing that as times get tougher in the
economic environment, then the best thing is to actually group
together and make the best of it and learn from each other."
(Commercial Services Provider manager);
"I've a number of points of contact within other local authorities
where we share problems, and try and help each other through
difficult times .....And then, just getting together with other
people on an informal and formal basis, it keeps me in contact
with things that are happening. But also I want to get beyond the
point where I'm just managing my team, doing my job, earning
money. I'm looking to future progression. Future progression is
going to mean that I'm going to need to be involved in
branch-wide activities rather than the team, and in learning. The
first step on that ladder really, is to find out what happens
elsewhere in the branch and get involved in it, which is why I
asked to be involved." (Highways Provider manager)
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Several managers explained how the proliferation of cross departmental
and County work and project groups, together with the introduction of
devolution, had broadened their network of informal contacts:
"It's increased in the sense that because you have more contacts,
you know more people. If I walk into the canteen at Greenfield
now, I am just as likely to sit down and have lunch with someone
from County Supplies or Finance, whereas before it would have
been social worker type people. It's not necessarily on the
grounds of doing it with some machiavellian motive in the sense
of getting something out of them - it's just that I've met them,
and so I know them, and I'll sit and have lunch with them
because they're friendly." (Social Services Twinhatted Manager).
Finally, focusing again on the organisational integration functions of
information exchanges 	 and contacts,	 the reorganisation,	 of the
cross-County functions such as Finance, Personnel and Information
Systems, had also resulted in increased levels of formal and informal
contacts between line manager "customers" and support service providers.
The physical location, (under devolution) of these support staff within
the line managers' offices enabled, and the new devolved financial and
personnel responsibilities of the managers required, extensive contact
and information processing and exchange between the two groups. Many
managers commented favourably on the ease with which they could "pop
down the corridor" to see someone or telephone a known person in these
support sections who would be able to provide assistance. Finance
managers emphasised the extent to which their devolved roles involved
them in increasing levels of contact and information exhange with a
wider range of individuals and groups. For example, within Education
Finance, managers outlined the extensive nature of their contacts with
personnel outside their divisional education offices, such as school
Governors, headteachers, parents, and a special educational needs group
arising particularly from the local Financial Management of schools
initiative.
In addition to their relatively informal and personal contacts here,
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line managers also reported on the increasing extent to which they had
become involved with support staff in various working parties set up to
discuss and draw up information and/or financial systems. Here, under
devolution and the new emphasis on the "customer" relationship, there
was more scope for systems to be tailored specifically to the each
department's needs.
The Authority had introduced more sophisticated computerised management
information systems to accompany the introduction of devolved resource
management. When asked about the impact of new technology on their
information processing roles, most managers focused on the value of the
more extensive and detailed information provided on these computerised
systems which empowered them to make resource deployment decisions. They
also commented on the in which these systems had enabled close
monitoring of these decisions by specialist staff (such as Finance) and
senior management (see full discussion of the impact of these systems in
chapter 8). The Highways managers were the only departmental group at
the time of this research who all had access to E-mail. This was seen in
general as facilitating and enhancing communication and information
exchanges across the department, and, for some managers, with external
agencies such as district councils. However, some managers found it
unreliable, in that "not everybody has got round to using it" . In
addition, Highways managers reported the continuing development of more
sophisticated computer aided design and modelling software used to
improve their service delivery.
More open informational roles and	 systems - developments and
constraints
The managers' responses analysed above suggested that their liaison and
information exchange and processing roles were moving in part towards
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the role behaviour associated with the more open, as opposed to closed,
information and collaborative working systems described at the beginning
of this chapter. They were becoming increasingly involved in developing
and maintaining contacts with an increasingly wide range of individuals
with whom they engaged in various forms of task and project working and
the associated activities of information exchanges and processing -
across internal departmental and organisational divisions, and across
professional and function role boundaries. In addition, the 39 managers'
positive responses to the question about BCC becoming a more open system
in terms of increases in the volumes of information circulating, and
in terms of more open and accessible vertical and horizontal
communication systems - cited the disappearance of some of the practices
associated with more traditional relatively closed communication
systems.
Managers commented here on the considerable increase in the amount of
information disseminated from Centre management team about: current and
proposed future developments across the County related to policy and
strategic issues; changes planned in general organisational structure
and systems; central goveri-i.ment initiatives impacting on local authority
service delivery. All this was in addition to increased dissemination of
information related specifically to managers' own work areas and
professional spheres from their Departmental management teams (see
discussion in chapter 8 about devolved decisional roles). References
were made to feelings that the "grapevine" had become slightly less
important in that "people tell you things now", that information access
depended less on "who you know", and that there was less differentiation
in terms of managers access to information based on hierarchical
position. Many managers talked about a changing atmosphere where the
"information is power" assumption was no longer so tenable, largely due
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to the informational requirements of the many middle managers who held
devolved decision-making responsibilities. BCC was also seen as having
made a specific policy decision to improve communication flows, and to
reduce hierarchical and departmental barriers:
"Yes. I think it's getting better........There's our own
management team - we meet on a fortnightly basis. But sometimes I
feel that there's always the possibility that things are filtered
out before they get down to you. It's only as good as the person
telling you, isn't it? Whereby, in Making Connections, they send
round leaflets every and then, which is really good, and I pick
up things which I haven't heard of before. They're doing the
Shaping Up papers now, which is really useful. I think Making
Connections was something which really brought all this to the
forefront - people in my session were feeling that it could be
better, and I think it has been - I think they've made a positive
effort on trying to improve things. It's incredibly difficult
with an organisation of the size we work with -	 really
difficult. For me, Making Connections has been a real
break-through. I've been at meetings with the Chief Executive
talking to us all, and we've got a chance to meet Chief Officers.
Our two Chief Officers both offered that we could go and see
them, which I took up and went to see them individually which was
really good - that's something I wouldn't have been able to do
before. The Commercial Services Director is really good. He'll
come down and come out to lunch occasionally and things like
that. So it's nice to talk to him direct as well ......And I'm
sure that if you were concerned about any particular Section, I
think now they would make the time to talk to you, or at least to
answer you if you wrote about something. Yes, it's definitely
getting better." (Commercial Services Provider manager)
Iey improvements identified by managers involved more structured systems
of departmental management and briefing meetings, including circulation
of minutes, which provided a useful vehicle for passing information
down, and feeding information back up the hierarchical chain. They also
identified the dessimination of increased amounts of written information
directly to managers, with contact names for further information, and
attempts by more senior managers to become more accessible. 37 managers
considered that, overall, change management procedures had improved,
largely as a consequence of increased information provision - "you know
what's going to happen, and you know why" - both in terms of more
written information and more meetings with senior managers (see further
discussion in chapter 9).
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However, many of these managers also mentioned constraints on the extent
to which the organisation's communication and information systems had
become more open, and identified several barriers to information
dissemination. (Managers emphasised that, in most cases, the operational
information which they required to plan and manage their day-to-day work
- for example financial information related to their devolved
budget-holder roles - was fully available; see discussion in the next
chapter on devolved management) . The barriers mentioned by the managers
fell essentially into three categories (each discussed briefly below).
These were: logistical or technical problems connected with the design
of information/communication systems; the limitations of managers' own
information processing skills	 and knowledge; "political" barriers
concerned with the reluctance of senior management to disseminate
information concerned with departmental/organisational change and/or
policy issues,	 and/or to consult or involve managers	 in such
higher-level decision-making.
These different categories of information barriers overlapped in many
cases. For example, the sheer q-uantity of information circulation was
cited as a problem by many managers who experienced difficulties in
sorting out the relevant from the less relevant, in deciding what to
pass on to their work teams (see above under leadership role), what to
keep and how to file it. Some commented on the danger of missing
important information because of the way in which they were "swamped"
and "bombarded" with information, some of which was too detailed or of
only marginal relevance to them. At the same time they emphasised that,
in general, it was "better to have too much than too little":
"You get trivia about new arrangements for bicycle parking at
Greenfield, cheek by jowl with stuff about reorganising the
central departments - you get absolutely swamped, and there's
the danger of missing something important simply because you
- 373 -
can't process it all. But, having said that, it's better to
have too much than too little". (Highways Provider manager).
This "swamping" problem raised issues concerned with communications
systems design, the information processing skills and competences of
managers - and could also be linke& to practices associated with the
more "closed" information systems described above re].ated to individuals
and departmental involvement in organisational power struggles and
npoliticking lu *. Thus, this manager went on to speculate about the extent
to which the information "swamping" was an inadvertent characteristic of
a poorly designed system, and the extent to which: "you wonder sometimes
if it's deliberate - they slip something vital in on the assumption that
you might miss it!". In the same vein, several managers said that if
they wanted to make sure a message would be read: "you mark it as
strictly confidential - and then you're sure everyone will read it!".
Similarly, with regard to requests to comment on proposals for change,
some managers criticised the inadequate length of time made available
for them on some occasions to respond to such requests. They were unsure
whether this represented a "ploy" to discourage full responses (see
further discussion below), or whether it was due to poorly designed
systems. Several managers acknowledged the logistical problems faced by
an Authority which was so large, with offices located all over the
County, in designing communication systems which were quick and
efficient (see chapter 8 for a discussion of the effectiveness of more
sophisticated computerised management information systems)
Within more "closed" systems, communication systems tend to operate more
effectively from top to bottom than from bottom up, and managers'
* Many managers commented, albeit in rather generalised terms, on the
way in which "organisational politics" continued to constitute a
barrier to open information dissemination/exchange; unfortunately,
there was insufficient time during the interviews to probe for further
information on this complex issue
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conments highlighted this problem, particularly in connection with
change management planning and implementation. Whilst appreciative of
increased information provision, many managers, expressed concern about
inadequate opportunities for consultation, and/or scepticism about the
extent to which contributions passed up the hierarchy - whether verbally
or in writing - were used and/or acted upon by senior management:
"There's a fair degree of consultation on what is happening - my
query would be that in theory there is consultation, but I
don't believe people are actually influencing the
decision-making process - it's cosmetic.. .There's a lot of
apparent consultation, but in fact the Director and the
Department decides what they want to do, and that's what
happens - everyone understands that... ."
(Highways Provider manager).
Many managers felt that the County had made real efforts, with some
success, to "open up" the organisation in the sense of adopting a formal
well-disseminated policy about free information flows and open
decision-making. Yet, they felt that there remained behind the rhetoric
of the "open organisation, sensitive policy areas at senior levels where
only partial information was released, where "hidden political agendas"
were suspected, and where consultation was largely a "pretence" because
decisions had, in reality, already been made. As noted earlier, the
purchaser/provider split, and threats to jobs from competition were seen
as increasing the potential for power struggles in some instances:
"Information is power, and power - people are very scared, I
think, people are very scared about their jobs. Information is
power, so you hang on to the information rather than - in times
gone past, it was in everybody's interest to tell everybody
everything. But now it's not, because it's my job that could be
on the line. I mean, I've got to feel needed, wanted. We're all
the same - I mean, being in a business environment, you don't
necessarily pass on information which you think people may use
against you." (Commercial Services Provider manager);
"The Purchaser/Provider split has somewhat buggered up the
(communication) chains.. .some stuff goes through Service
Development who feeds the Commissioner, and some stuff comes
down the Service Provision chain, and again the value of good
informal networks are important. Quite often, John will copy
stuff to me which says "Purchaser/Commissioner". But in other
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areas, given the almost conflictual relationship between the
two, it's: "I'm not going to give them that because that will
HELP them", and certainly I'm concerned that John's stuff hasn't
come by a direct route to me - it's only because of my
informal ......I think maybe it's become, the culture has become
more closed because of the competitive spirit that has been
generated and forced uporz people, so people have become far more
wary and suspicious. Without a doubt I've learned to become a
bit more guarded and canny - there's sort of more sparring, and
people bidding for power, and trying to get. bigger slices of the
cake. There's a lot of that going on and it's very unclear and
very unsavoury and very wasteful."
(Social Services Provider manager).
In addition, some managers expressed doubt about the commitment to the
new "open" culture of a number of senior managers located at key
information flow points in their departments (such as Social Service
Area Directors, for example), who could act as blockages to free
information flows:
"Our boss - he went last month - but anyhow, he was on the
Departmental Management Team and he would have the minutes which
he was supposed to show us. But we never saw them. Because he
worked on the basis that that was what he was there for, to tell
me what he wanted me to know. He was of the old school, you know,
"this is my job, and you just have your little bit.", and he
would tell me about finance, my bits, but he wouldn't tell me
anything else. It put us in an embarrassing position when the
Director came down and said, "do you see the minutes of the
DMT?", and we said "not always", and he turned to my boss and
said, "These are the key people in your branch and they should
see them", and he said, "Yes, of course I will.". But he didn't.
The only time we saw them was when he wasn't there, and someone
else went and he would be given the file of them, and then he and
I used to read through them......". ( Finance manager, Highways
Department).
Managers also resented the "mixed messages" given out by the Council, in
the context of some of their cultural change initiatives. For example,
some Social Services managers commented on contradictions in some ways
between the customer care approach, and the resource constraints which
limited their scope for meeting consumer demand for services. Some
considered that	 that resource constraints and 	 (party) political
expediency limited,	 to little more than consultation at best and
manipulation or "tokenism" at worst, the involvement of users and other
interest groups at the levels of service planning and policy-making,
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rather than the full-blown "citizen control" end of the potential
continuum for consumer participation outlined by Walsh (1989). Social
service managers in particular reported problems with the way in which
user-group expectations could be unrealistically raised in terms of
invitations to:
"'come and tell us what you want', and then they do, and we have
to say: 'well, I'm terribly sorry but there's a cash limit',
and they sort of look like a child that's had its sweets taken
away. .
(Social Services Purchaser manager).
Other managers were sceptical about the County's human resource
management style policies geared towards ensuring increased levels of
organisational commitment to the County - what one manager called lithe
caring sharing employer crap 11 . They were critical about the coincidence
of such communications with notes about cuts in their expenses
entitlements, and with the insensitive handling of possible redundancies
(see Chapter 9)
Finally, managers were asked about the main reasons for the increases in
their involvement in liaison and informational monitor, disseminator,
and spokesperson roles. The single, most often quoted factor identified
by the managers as contributing towards the development of the more
open" information culture was the introduction of devolution (see
discussion under resource-allocator role in chapter 8). This involved
managers in additional information processing requirements as a
consequence of their additional responsibilities for new areas such as
personnel and finance management (and, for finance managers, devolved to
service departments, their broader, more facilitating and enabling
roles)
"It's devolution - you as a manager have so many more options and
so many more choices, that you have to have more information,
you need more information. There's the feeding up of
modifications and suggestions for change ......There was this
thing, you know, that information is power, which prevailed,
which is not so much now. It can't survive; that type of regime
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can't survive because people need to have information to be able
to function at all with devolution.... Finance manager, Social
Services Department.
In addition, BCC's adoption of improved customer care, more risk-taking
and entrepreneurial cultures (see discussion in chapter 8), coupled with
the internal market and the impact of CCT, required managers to seek out
increased volumes of information from a wider range of contacts, both
inside and outside BCC - for use in identifying opportunities for more
efficient and effective resource utilisation, and for providing services
which were more responsive to customer needs. The pursuit of such
identified opportunities involved managers in extensive discussion and
negotiation with purchasers/providers, with superiors, and with support
staff. Increased levels of accountability for performance - assessed
against more formalised performance criteria as a consequence of the
Staff Development and Performance Review system and Departmental
business plans and targets - involved managers in monitoring more
rigorously both their own and their subordinate's performance (see
leader role discussed above).	 In addition, they were required to
disseminate information upwards about their own work performance, and
feed back up suggestions for changes to the next year's business
planning and policy-making (see discussion of devolution in chapter 8).
Reverting to Mintzberg's model of the manager as "nerve-centre", it is
to important to emphasise that the functions of the liaison and
informational roles are, essentially, to ensure effective performance of
the interpersonal and decisional roles. Given the changes, taking place
in BCC managers' behaviour within these two roles, it is to be expected
that these changes would, in turn, act back upon, and change the nature
of managers' informational role behaviour.
Underpinning all these developments were the requirements of central
government legislation.	 CCT, and statutory requirements for more
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involvement of external agencies and local groups in service planning,
design and delivery, combined with the Conservative ruling group's own
similar policy orientations to push the Council towards the "enabling",
"fragmented" and "competitive" model - , requiring the development of
more open information systems, and closer collaborative work between
managers in different depatments and agencies.
Conclusion
Overall, the managers' responses suggested that some significant
progress had been made towards realising the Authority's stated aims of
improving	 managerial access	 to	 information and	 enhancing
communication/information flows, in the context of a move from a
relatively closed and vertical hierarchical to a more open and networked
horizontal form of organisation.	 Managers reported, in general,
significant increases in their involvement in liaison and information
processing/exchange activities at each of Tapscott and Caston's three
functional levels. These three functions involve: improving work-group
performance;	 improving integration, 	 and reducing departmental,
hierarchical and professional barriers to communication across an
organisation composed increasingly at operational levels, 	 of
semi-independent business units; improving liaison and collaboration at
inter-enterprise level.
Yet, many managers' comments suggested that some barriers to the
achievement of a new "open" culture remained. These barriers included
logistical or technical problems related to communication/information
systems design, and some concerned with managers' development of
appropriate information processing skills and conipetences (see further
discussion in chapters 8 and 9). Other barriers identified by managers
reflected the existence of "political" tensions within the Authority,
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associated with pluralist organisation models, 	 and related to
Mintzberg's identification of the sets of tensions or pulls existing
between various parts of the organisation as managers seek to gain or
saintain decision-making power and authority (see discussion in the next
chapter). These tensions operate both vertically between hierarchical
levels, and horizontally - particularly in relation to the recently
introduced internal markets. As noted above, there was insufficient
time during the interviews to pursue this complex issue in detail, but,
as several managers commented, information is, quite literally, 1tpower"
in this context. Thus, managers felt there was only limited information
dissemination and/or exchanges on sensitive issues connected with
resource allocation, policy decisions and organisational changes which
could threaten some employees' job security or role status.
Al]. of these tensions, compounded by the resource constraints and public
accountability requirements of local government, can inhibit the
openness of decision-making over sensitive policy and service delivery
issues. Such tensions are analysed further below, in chapter 8, in the
context of the managers' decisional roles, and tendencies within the




Organisationa]. restructuring in Barset: changing decision-making roles
The previous chapter analysed the changes experienced by Barset County
Council middle managers in their interpersonal and information role
behaviour. As Mintzberg (1989, p19) emphasises, interpersonal and
information work activity "is not, of course, an end in itself; it is











Liaison	 Spokesperson	 Disturbance - handler
Negotiator
The changes in managers' interpersonal and informational role
performance discussed in the previous chapter both contribute to and
derive from the changes occurring in their decisional work behaviour,
which is the subject of this chapter. Mintzberg argues that, using the
formal authority invested in their positions: "The manager plays the
major role in his or her unit's decision-making system." (1989, p19). As
entrepreneurs, managers act as voluntary initiators of change, and as
disturbance-handlers, they involuntarily respond to pressures and events
beyond their control - such as a supplier failing to deliver a product.
As resource allocators, managers make decisions about the allocation of
organisational resources - such as finance and personnel - towards
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particular objectives. Each of these activities invo1ve managers in
extensive negotiations - the negotiator role. This chapter focuses first
on changes in the BCC managers' resource allocator and entrepreneur
behaviour, and then goes on to consider their disturbance handler and
negotiator roles.
Resource Allocator and Entrepreneurial Roles
An increase in the extent of managers' control over resource allocation
and deployment - through the introduction of devolved management systems
- forms a key component of the new "managerialism" identified within
public sector organisations, including local government, since the mid
1980s (Pollitt, 1990) . Devolved management involves "ensuring that
within the Authority each individual manager has responsibility for
delivering a service or for achieving a stated result. This involves
managers at the lowest practicable level within the organisation having:
more authority over resources; greater scope for decisions;
accountability for achieving agreed targets" (Stoker, 1989, p33).
As discussed in chapter 4, the term "to devolve" simply means to
transfer or pass over, and it is important to note the difference
between the devolution of decision-making responsibility to middle
managers and the delegation or decentralisation of decision-making
authority. The two may not necessarily be aligned within devolved
management systems; devolution of responsibility for resource management
may or may not involve the equivalent degree of devolution of authority
to managers to make decisions about resource deployment. The devo]-ution
of authoritl involves at least a degree of organisational
decentralisation, where "the authority to make specified decisions is
passed down to units and people at lower levels in the organisation's
hierarchy", in contrast to organisational centralisation where the
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strategic apex at the top of the organisation retains authority over
most decision-making (Child, 1984, p146).
From the examples of devo].ution provided in the local government
literature (see chapter 4), it would appear that authorities have
focused on trying to achieve a degree of vertical decentralisation,
through the devolution of operational decision making powers down the
hierarchy to middle and junior managers. Middle managers are empowered
to make more operational decisions concerning the work of their line
units, involving the deployment of financial, personnel and other
resources against various performance criteria. They are accountable for
meeting resource utilisation and service delivery targets, which are
set within a framework of clear organisational policy objectives or
strategies.
Under the contract management approach to service provision, involving
the purchaser/provider role division, the decentralisation of resource
management (within a budgetary framework) will take two forms. Client
or purchaser managers have devolved powers to make decisions, in
accordance with corporate policies, about using their budget allocations
to specify and buy particular services from providers (located either
within or outside the authority). Provider managers are responsible for
providing services to the standards and costs set out in the service
level agreement or contract agreed with the purchaser (Walsh, 1992)
The introduction of a decentralised management system requires changes
within the organisation's financial and other management control
systems. Thus, in the context of encouraging local authorities to adopt
devolved resource management, the Local Government Management Board
(LG) explains that: uln many authorities, it might be argued, control
is exercised at too detailed a level at the expense of effective
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resource management and policy direction. Too often, detailed control
has been	 a substitute for	 deciding what needs	 to be
controlled.....Devolved management means that detailed control gives way
to more effective overall control" (Stoker, 1989, pp33-34).
Devolution (of decision-making authority) therefore requires changes in
the control systems which tended to characterise the traditional
centralised bureaucracies associated with pre 1980s local government
administration - detailed personal supervision of subordinates' work
activities,	 and the	 standardisation of work processes 	 and/or
(professional) skills and competences (Stewart 1988; Lowndes, 1992)
"More effective overall control" systems (associated with the "new" more
decentralised public sector management model) involve more emphasis on
managers themselves taking greater responsibility for controlling their
own, and their colleagues', performance within a framework of clear
organisational policies and/or contractual objectives and service
specifications. Control systems focus upon "ends" rather than "means" -
on performance measurement, using performance targets and indicators
(based on both financial and service delivery criteria) to control
managerial performance (Hales, 1993)
However, many organisations can be reluctant to reduce their reliance on
relatively detailed and centralised control systems. Senior management
(and elected members) may fear loss of power and status, and they can
encounter practical difficulties in attempting to maintain control over
decentralised management units (Hales; Mintzberg, 1983, 1989; Robbins,
1990). For example, it can be difficult to design and implement
financial control systems which can monitor effectively managers'
spending decisions, or to identify performance criteria suitable for
assessing and controlling managerial performance levels in some task
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areas, where specific, measurable targets or criteria may be difficult,
or impossible, to set. The mechanisms required to regulate the new
contractual relations between purchaser and provider managers can
also result in the generation of new forms of "contract bureaucracy",
with "vdth variation orders for any change, and a plethora of work
orders and invoices." (Walsh, 1992, pT7).
These difficulties can be compounded within local authority
organisations by their public acountability requirements, which tend to
encourage the use of control systems which focus on "both means and
ends" so that elected members are able to "explain and justify actions
taken" by officers (Stewart and Ranson, 1988, p4). This is particularly
likely to occur within highly politically sensitive service areas, and
with services such as social work where there are uncertain
relationships between the process of providing and the actual outcomes
of services provision. Moreover, hostile organisational environments can
result in moves towards (re)centralisation - especially for public
sector organisations such as local authorities, where spending levels
are controlled by central government spending limits. 	 Legislation
allows them to generate only very limited amounts of additional income
through exploiting new market opportunities, and severely restricts the
amount which can be raised each year from the local council tax.
Local authorities are therefore likely to be characterised by continuing
tensions between relatively centralised and relatively decentralised
forms of decision-making and control systems. Any increased levels of
managerial autonomy over operational decision-making is continually
under threat - from increases in local authorities' internal procedural
rules and regulations, 	 from increasingly tight and detailed
specification of work processes as well as performance standards, and
from the possible centralisation of the purchasing role in market
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approaches to service delivery. Stoker et a]. (1988) and Hoggett and
Bramley (1989) query the extent to which, devolution is likely to
include the delegation of resource management authority as well as
responsibility, below chief officer level, to middle line managers.
Failure to delegate decision-making	 authority,	 as well as
responsibility, to managers under devolved management systems can reduce
the achievement of improvements in organisational effectiveness which
devolution is intended to produce. The overall aim of devolved
management is to enable managers to improve the efficiency of their
resource utilisation, and to achieve more flexible and creative service
provision, which is more responsive to local community needs and
demands - rather than wasting their time on essentially unproductive
"bureaucratic rituals or protracted lobbying and negotiations with
senior management" for resources and authorisation to act. (Hoggett and
Bramley, 1989, plO). Particularly in the context of middle managers'
entrepreneurial roles - where the manager "seeks to improve his or her
unit, to adapt it to changing conditions." (Mintzberg, 1989, pl9) -
managers' scope for initiating such changes in service delivery and
resource utilisation methods can be inhibited. This is particularly
likely to occur if organisational control systems operate to constrain
their autonomy over resource deployment and access to information, and
to discourage innovative ways of working (Kanter, 1983)
Increased emphasis is placed upon this entrepreneurial role within the
"new"local governstent model. This role requires middle managers to
become "change agents for the future" (Stewart, 1988a), and to innovate
and "take risks in 'stretching' the organisation in pursuit of strategic
objectives." (Stoker,1989, p17) . Within this context, reliance on
traditional detailed control systems are likely to "thwart" rather than
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support or encourage the development of managers' entrepreneurial skills
and activities (Fulop, 1991, pp27-28). Moreover, managers can value
opportunities for independent thought and action, and for developing
skills and competences (Hunt, 1979; Scase and Gof fee, 1989). 	 The
devolution of authority as well as responsibility is important for
ensuring that such opportunities are maximised for managers operating
within devolved management systems, and that the benefits potentially
available to the organisation - from enhanced management motivation, job
satisfaction, and organisational commitment - are realised.
Several key elements can be identified within the devolution process
which have the potential for enhancing middle management autonomy, and
for maximising the improvements to organisational effectiveness which
can accrue from the introduction of devolved management. Firstly, as
suggested above, it is important to achieve an alignment between
managers' devolved resource management responsibilities, and their
devolved authority to make operational decisions about resource
deployment (Audit Commission, 1989)
In relation to financial and other management control systems governing
the exercise and scope of devolved powers, it is important for senior
management to achieve the right balance between two extremes -
complicated rules and procedures which are "so rigid and minutely
defined that the front line is purely an instrument for delivering what
is still a highly centralised system" (Gaster, 1993), and	 a situation
where the absence of suitable financial and performance control systems,
and of clear policy and procedural guidance, can leave managers
uncertain and unclear about the extent of their authority (Lowndes,
1992, p58) .	 Either way, the benefits of greater control over resource
deployment for both middle managers and the organisation as a whole will
be diluted, with managers, frustrated by unfulfilled expectations,
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losing faith in the system and/or indulging in dysfunctional
"game-playing" activities to "get round" the rules (Blake et al, 1991).
Linked with the requirement for appropriate control systems, is the need
for effective management information systems, designed to meet both
corporate needs for irxformation standardisation, consolidation and
control, and the devolved managers' needs for information tailored
specifically to their own particular departmental needs. This should be
"easily accessible, flexible in scope and content, up-to-date, and easy
to interpret." (Rawlinson and Tanner, 1990, p34). Clearly, computerised
information systems, using the sophisticated hardware and software
technology now available, have the potential to meet these needs.
However, in the context of management control systems, new technology
can be used to reinforce centralised corporate control as well as to
"empower" middle managers. Fincham and Rhodes, after reviewing several
studies on the topic, conclude that, rather than being used to maximise
middle management autonomy, "new technology tends to be treated as a
'window of opportunity' to support the managerial instinct for
centralised control." (1992, p319)
Managers within devolved management systems also need to acquire new
competences to carry out their responsibilities for new functional areas
such as finance, information, and personnel. Line managers require easy
access to help and support from specialist support staff, and the
provision of training to ensure that they gain the skills and knowledge
necessary to maximise their scope for managing and controlling their
resources. Changes will be required in the structure and functions of
central support departments. This is likely to involve a clearer
distinction between corporate roles and service provider roles (for
devolved service line managers), and a new emphasis on functions
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concerned with providing appropriate information, support and advice for
line managers in addition to traditional control and auditing functions
(Jackson, 1988; Audit Commission, 1989; Fowler, 1988) . 	 Support staff
say also be relocated to service departments - with or without
transference from the corporate support departmental to the service
departmental staff establishment. Overall, a greater emphasis will be
required on meeting the business needs of service delivery middle
manager "customers". (see chapters 3 and 4 for full discussion of these
issues)
As outlined in chapter 6, devolved management systems had been adopted
by Barset County Council in a form which closely corresponded to the
"new" management systems described in the local government literature. A
document issued to all middle managers explained that: "In BCC,
devolution is taken to mean a management style which allows those
managers nearest the point of service delivery the maximum control of
the functions which impinge on them and the services required to enable
them to operate, within a specified organisation framework where
accountabilities and limits of authority are clearly understood. The
purpose of devolution is to improve efficiency and the effectiveness of
service-delivery." (Making Connections, 1992)
Devolved management involved the allocation of authority over spending
decisions to "front-line" budget-holder managers (acting as Purchasers
or Providers within the Authority's still evolving internal market
system).	 These managers were accountable, through the performance
review system, for the management of the resources available to them to
purchase or provide services specified within departmental business plan
objectives - within a framework of corporate/departmental rules and
procedures which ensured adherence to corporate standards and
legislative requirements. The majority of central support staff - such
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as personnel and finance - had been devolved out to service department
establishments where they were expected to provide help and support for
their line manager "customers" as well as to ensure adherence to
corporate standards,	 and statutory requirements for probity and
integrity.
In addition, managers had been urged to become "entrepreneurial" and
"risk-taking" under a programme of corporate culture dissemination. This
culture included a focus on: customer care; "Leading" rather than
"Managing" (see chapter 7); continuous improvement - "asking naive yet
fundamental questions about the things they do" (BCC/Price Waterhouse
video); the "Ready, Fire, Aim" philosophy which "encourages staff to get
the basics right first and fine tune later" (Making Cormections
Newsletter)
Middle managers' responses to devolution
The 48 middle managers were asked about the extent to which the
objectives of the BCC's devolved management system had been met, in
terms of enabling managers to exercise greater levels of control over
their service delivery and resource management - and to adopt more
"entrepreneurial" and "risk-taking" management styles - in comparison
with the pre-devolutionary situation in the mid to late 80s. Their
responses are analysed here within the key elements of the analytical
framework outlined earlier. The increases reported by managers in their
control over operational decision-making, including their assessment of
the effectiveness of the support available to them from specialist staff
and management information systems, are summarised first (illustrating
tendencies towards organisational decentralisation). This is followed by
an analysis of the constraints which restricted their levels of autonomy
(illustrating tendencies towards organisational centralisation)
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Trends towards decentralisation and increased managerial autonomy
The majority of the managers - 45 out of the 48 - reported that,
overall, they had gained increased levels of control over various
aspects of their operational management activities - over the financial,
informational and personnel resources which they deployed to deliver
services to their customers. The importance which managers attached to
this increased autonomy over their operational management activities -
especially over their deployment of financial resources - and service
delivery was illustrated by their responses to the initial very general
question put to them, about the overall impact of devolved management on
their work:
IMPACT OF DEVOLUTION ON MANAGERIAL WORK
Number of mentions made in each category



























* Some managers made responses which fell within more than one of the
response categories, so the total number of responses for each
department amounts to more than 12 (the number of managers interviewed
in each department).
The responses of the managers within the first arid second categories
reflect the emphasis made in the local government literature about the
increased levels of responsibility, accountability and decision-making
authority which are expected to accrue to middle managers within
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devolved management systems. The following quotations are typical of
sany such responses made here:
"In a phrase, it's freedom to act. It gives a free rein to my
responsibilities and ability to manage, it's about being able to
make decisions and implement the decisions rather than necessarily
- certain decisions anyway - having to go through a line of
communication in order to get the final sanction. There's more
financial control over budgets, so I can balance the books, so to
speak, either by drawing in more resources if the money's
available, or by how I use the budget, how I use the staff over
which I've got more flexibility and control now than I had in the
past" (Highways Provider manager);
"It has meant greater responsibility and accountability for what
you are doing. You have greater freedom within the parameters of
good practice guidance, regulations and financial controls -
you're not continually having to ask the person above you for
something so there is a general cultural shift" (Social Services
Purchaser manager)
The difference in emphases on particular aspects of devolution by
managers from different departments appeared to derive, at least in
part, from the different functional contexts within which they worked.
This reflects Mintzberg's contingency approach to management role
analysis,	 where	 location	 of	 managers	 within	 different
functional/specialist areas are likely to affect their role perceptions
and behaviour. Thus, the key impact of devolution on the Financial
managers was related to their relocation within the direct service
provision department establishments - such as 	 ducation and Social
Services - and the consequent requirements f or them to become more
focused upon the particular business needs of their line manager
"customers"; hence the focus here on responsiveness to customer needs
(see further	 discussion below) .	 The same emphasis	 on customer
responsiveness requirements was made by the Commercial Services
managers, although for different reasons. The devolution of resource
management responsibilities to line managers in the direct service
provision departments, meant that these line managers could buy many
support services/products on the open market. In order to compete
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effectively for custom from BCC and other public sector organisations,
many Commercial Services managers had become far more aware of, and
responsive to, their customers particular requirements and preferences
for particular products/services, and to their competitors' product
ranges and pricing policies:
"As a business, itmearis we have lost the captive market. Up until
1988, schools and departments HAD to come to us, they had to
spend their money here, and the service we provided then was
appropriate to that status. It didn't matter if they waited 3
weeks for something, they had to come to us, all that sort of
thing. It wasn't exactly laissez faire, but there wasn't a drive
to - a real customer service. But we now have customers to deal
with who make their own decisions on their own budgets. We're
more customer driven in the fact that we have to understand what
they want more. So life has got tougher, it's got more
commercial.. We have to work harder to ensure that people still
come to us" (Commercial Services Provider manager)
Basically, failure to win business could result in the closure of
Commercial Services managers' business units; in general, the Social
Services, Finance and Highways managers were only just beginning to
operate in such an open and competitive market environment. In addition,
the transition to business unit status and the acquisition of devolved
responsibilities for resource management had occurred earlier and had
evolved over a longer period for most Commercial Services managers. As
a consequence the extent of the increases which they experienced in
their levels of control over resource management since the mid 1980s
(when they already possessed a degree of devolutionary autonomy) tended
to be less pronounced for most Commercial Services managers than for
their counterparts in the other three departments, where devolution had
been introduced more recently:
"You see, we work differently here, we always have. The jobs I had
before, we were responsible for budgets; we always had - not
business units, but cost centres, which are the same difference.
The rest of the Council's catching up with us"(Commercial
Services Provider manager)
Focusing in more detail on the impact of devolution on the managers'
control over resource deployment, 42 out of the 48 managers interviewed
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were devolved budget holders, and all of these managers' responses
indicated that they had gained increased levels of control over their
resource management compared with the pre-devolutionary mid-80s. They
had become more accountable, through the Authority's recently introduced
Staff Development and Performance Appraisal system (SDPR) (described
fully in chapters 6 and 7) for achieving both resource management and
service delivery targets. Within the Authority's market system, which
was still evolving at the time of this research, managers operated
either as: (1) providers of services (to internal and, sometimes,
external customers); (2) as purchasers of services (from internal and/or
external providers); (3) as utwin_hattedl managers (the Finance managers
devolved out to service departments had not yet adopted the
purchaser/provider split)
Highways and Social Services Purchaser managers held the budgets for the
purchase of services from the providers.	 They were responsible for
producing business plans detailing within the framework of objectives
set out in departmental plans and budget allocations, the costs, levels
and quality of services required from providers. They were also
responsible for monitoring spend and service delivery against these
targets, and for amending service provision in the context of changing
circumstances and requirements:
"We are moving towards a more objective assessment of needs so
that it may be possible, with a fair degree of objectivity, in
the not too distant future to actually place the money where we
really need to place it. The split of the cake will be
determined by the needs primarily. At the moment, to be fair, it
isn't totally needs, it's historical as well. But I think we are
trying to move towards a total needs-based assessment .....Within
that framework we set out an annual programme every year, but,
inevitably, something happens which prevents us from doing the
road resurfacing in one street, when there's a bit of a disaster
somewhere else. Now that means that at the present time, I have
the power to make these changes myself. I obviously tell someone
I'm doing it, but once upon a time I would have had to check
that I was able to do it from the financial point of view. As
long as I retain my overall budget spending within the cash
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limits, then I can changer things almost at will. So that's the
biggest change, I think ( Highways Purchaser manager).
Social Services Purchaser managers also highlighted the moves in their
department away from resource led to needs-based service provision
mentioned in the last quotation. Two. managers commented on the way in
which the business plan framework, and their own devolved
responsibilities for resource management and service planning within it,
had provided them with more structured opportunities to contribute
towards setting overall service priorities on the basis of their
knowledge about local demands for a particular service:
"We can give messages very clearly about where there is a
projected overspend. Last year I mounted a really strong
campaign because we were under-funded for (a certain service -
confidential information) . There was a projected overspend, and
I was just letting the Area Director know each month where we
were going. She was going upwards and now there is a
county-wide review of how those fundings are decided. It's very
different from feeling out of control a few years back. Knowing
that there was a much greater need than you had a budget for,
not knowing how to deal with it..." ( Social Services Purchaser
Manager).
Provider managers had acquired responsibility for planning, monitoring
and controlling their budget expenditure to ensure provision of the
service required by the purchasers (defined through contracts or service
level agreements). They were also responsible for balancing costs
against the income to be received from the purchaser to achieve
financial targets of "breaking even" or generating a "surplus" (profit):
"We have much more control. I think the creation of cost centre
managers at lower levels is the starting point. That was never
the case before - finance was controlled by senior management.
I'm responsible for the budget of my team, which has a turnover
of about half a million pounds. I have a trading account which
means that each person costs so much money per hour which is a
function of their salary - that's new - so I know that a person
will provide income if he's provided to a client on a piecework
or daywork or time basis; there's a surcharge on the cost rate
which makes a profit... .1 have to make a profit within my
turnover - I make money doing work for the Purchaser. The fee is
fixed, it is a function of the cost of the scheme. If I say my
fees are going to be £10,000 for a particular project, and I
spend £9,000. then I've made a grand; if I spend £11,000, then
I've lost a grand, and I have no way of clawing that back from
him. The profit gets rolled into my cost centre, and at the end
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of the year I have an outturn profit - or a loss, although I
haven't had one yet..... U (Highways Provider manager)
Increased levels of control over financial resources were complemented
by more control over personnel resources, which was reported by 40
managers.	 (Of the remaining 8 managers, 2 had no subordinates at the
tine of the research, and the other 6 explained that they had always
experienced a high degree of autonomy over managing their staff, and
that devolution had meant little or no real change for them.) Managers
were required to operate within the Authority's corporate policies,
including those relating to staff salaries, terms and conditions of
service. However, pay and conditions for manual staff employed in the
Commercial Services Departments differed between the various business
units, with some managers being involved in negotiations with the
appropriate trade union about pay and conditions.
Many managers emphasised the part played by the Council's SDPR and
performance related pay systems in involving them more extensively in
the monitoring and control of their staff's performance, and in the
identification of their training and development needs (see also chapter
7 under discussion of the leader role). Many also reported increased
levels of control over other personnel management areas. These included
staff recruitment and selection processes, more flexibility (both
numerical and functional) over the way they were able to deploy their
staff in response to changing service provision requirements and
resource constraints, and more involvement in sickness and absenteeism
issues, maternity leave, and disciplinary matters. 	 Social Services
managers had gained direct line management responsibility for clerical
staff who had previously been under the control of Area Office
)ministrative managers. Some managers stressed that they had experienced
greater feelings of responsibility for their own staff management than
previously:
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"Staff management has changed - like the performance review
system - the whole sphere of staff management has changed. I
think I feel much more responsible for the people here than I
would have done 10 years ago because their targets are set by
me, their money is coming out of my budget... .There's a much
greater feeling of them belonging to a particular setup."
(Highways Purchaser manager).
Managers operating within devolved management systems, require various
support facilities to enable them to carry out effectively their new
functional responsibilities	 and to exercise	 their devolved
decision-making powers to the full. They require training to help them
develop the necessary new competences; they need easy access to support
and advice from specialist staff, and to comprehensive management
information systems. Most of the BCC middle managers reported that they
had received some training on how to exercise their new devolved
responsibilities. However, some were critical of the amount, the timing
and the quality. All but two managers expressed a need for more training
in a variety of competence areas in relation to changes in their
decisional - and interpersonal and informational - managerial roles (see
discussion in chapter 9).	 Particularly in relation to their new
devolved responsibilities, 22 managers felt they needed more training in
financial management and/or information technology skills and knowledge.
Most managers expressed positive views about the level of support
provided by specialist finance, personnel and information systems staff,
who had been devolved from central departments to the various service
departments.	 Here, their operational activities were expected to be
directed towards the business needs of their line manager "customers"
(see below for discussion of some tensions here).	 Finanace managers
were asked about the impact of devolution on their roles vis-a-vis
their line manager budget-holder "customers". Ten of the 12 finance
managers reported changes in their roles which reflected Audit
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Commission recommendations (1989) about the need for moves away from the
"ivory tower accountant" or "old-fashioned auditor-type" roles towards
enabling and facilitating budget-holder managers to compile, monitor and
control their own devolved budgets. (Two explained that they had always
tried to operate in this fashion with service line managers). Many
finance managers stressed their freedom under devolution to design
financial systems to meet the particular needs of their service
managers' businesses, using a variable range of practices within the
overall corporate financial framework laid down by the centre. The
following quotation, from a finance manager situated in a SSD area
office, was typical of responses made here:
"As cost centre managers take on their devolved responsibilities,
it means that me and my staff are crunching figures less, and
imposing our figures less, and we are becoming more like trainers
and facilitators - we are doing less of our own professional
responsibilities ourselves, and more helping other people to do
it .......We see the cost centre managers as customers, we try to
emphasise that we are the support role, and we attempt to assist
and guide managers in their financial responsibilities a (Finance
manager, Social Services Department)
The use of the term "customer" in this quotation was replicated in
responses by other financial managers, some of whom reported regular
monitoring - including the use of surveys - of the extent of line
managers' satisfaction with their service provision. However, several
finance managers - 8 in all - also acknowledged the limitations on their
enabling and facilitating role. They explained that there were occasions
when the controlling or monitoring elements of their roles inevitably
took over in the interests of ensuring adherence to sound financial
practices and corporate standards:
"you still have to say NO! although you try and do it more nicely
- you try and persuade them and talk it through. (Finance
manager, Highways Department).
The "dotted line" relationship, operating through their Finance line
managers to the Head Of Profession role at Central Finance, was designed
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to offset the problems noted in the literature of ensuring professional
development and career opportunities for devolved support service
managers. (They could become isolated from mainstream professional and
personal development opportunities.) This mechanism appeared to work
well for most of these managers. Although some managers expressed
concern about unclear and/or restricted career paths, and the dilution
of their purely accounting roles, others felt that the broadening out of
their role, and the chance to develop new skills and competences had
enhanced rather than diminished their career prospects (see further
discussion in chapter 9).
In contrast to the negative opinions expressed about finance managers by
many of the line managers questioned in a Chartered Institute of Public
Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) survey (Hoitham, 1987), 24 out of the 36
service manager "customers" agreed with the finance managers perceptions
of themselves as becoming more accessible, facilitating and enabling.
Terms such as specialist advisor, partnership, and consultancy service
tended to be used by line managers to describe finance staff roles.
Several managers emphasised the important role played by Finance staff
in providing training in budgetary management skills; others stressed
the value of easy access to finance staff located in the same area
office, where "you can pop down and see them whenever you like." One
Social services manager explained that the appointment of a new
accountant from another authority had made her realise the extent to
which the role of finance staff had changed in recent years:
"We had a local government - a District appointment to our
finance manager last year. A really nice guy, but he was very
used to financing and controlling everything in his District
Council - finance, the lot ........ . And he's had to learn that
in our department he's (a) part of a team and (b) he's a
support person - he actually supports the business, he doesn't
run it. And that was difficult for him ........." C (Social
Services Purchaser manager).
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The Commercial Services managers tended to stress the value of being
able to move towards the more "commercial" and private sector style
accounting conventions and approaches (i.e. focused more around income
receipt) necessary for them to compete effectively on the open market,
although they were critical of the time it had taken to achieve this.
Only 5 service managers felt that the finance mangers and staff were no
more receptive or responsive to their needs than before (the rest were
unsure whether any change had occurred or not, and/or had little contact
with Finance staff)
Most managers made similarly positive comments about the changes in the
roles of devolved personnel and information systems staff, and the
increased focus displayed by these specialist staff towards on meeting
the business needs of operational line managers:
"Information Systems - yes, they've moved towards providing us
with what we ask for rather than telling us what we want.
We've got a system called CMIS which is our Care Management
Information System, and the care managers didn't use it
because it wasn't relevant to them, and so they - they started
to create user groups, and they've now modified and enhanced
the system - its still not perfect but ......We really are now
in the position to say, 'that's not good enough, go away and
come back. This is the business we are in and this is what we
need out of that system'".... (Social Services Purchaser
manager).
Apart from Commercial Services managers, line managers in the other
departments tended to be doubtful about the validity of the term
"customer" to define their relationships with specialist staff, on the
grounds, essentially, that "I'm not a customer in the sense that I have
money to buy these services". As Walsh (1989) explains, the term
customer is not appropriate for the situation described by these
managers where they were required to use the service provided by the
financial specialists, with little or no control over the cost and no
choice of provider. Commercial Services managers, on the other hand,
were fairly emphatic about their status as "customers" in that the
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business unit managers negotiated each year - "haggled over", as one
manager put it - the charges and the particular services they required
from specialist staff. The possibility had actually been raised,
although later discounted, that these managers would be free to purchase
these services from outside BCC. 	 Responses from some managers also
touched on the conflicting role demands made on support staff, who, as
noted above in the discussion on financial staff roles, had to try and
reconcile the enabling/facilitating and the controlling aspects of their
role:
"It's a difficult situation really for the people in Finance. I
mean, I have a tendency to feel that they try and influence the
way things are done to too great an extent, but then of course
the financial standing orders are fairly strict .....If I step
out of line I'll be told that I can't do that, and it's not the
people in finance saying I can't do it because they don't want
me to, but because of the standing orders" (Highways Provider
manager)
When asked to evaluate the effectiveness of the new computerised
Financial Information Systems recently introduced across the County, the
majority of the managers' responses were extremely positive. Numerous
references were made to the benefits of the new systems. 	 These were
compared favourably with previous systems in terms of being easier to
use and to understand, of providing "live" well-presented, accurate and
trustworthy information (in line with the recommendations made in the
devolution literature (Rawlinson and Tanner, 1993; Audit Commission,
1989)) which enabled the budget holders to have real control over their
resource management.	 Several managers emphasised that they no longer
needed to keep "ghost budgets" as they had in the past because of the
unreliability of previous systems. Some managers had been involved in
working parties, where Information Systems specialist staff worked in
partnership with line managers to ensure that the new systems met the
needs of the end users. The following quotation is typical of the
responses made by many managers here:
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"Before we had MIDAS (the new system) there was a regular flow of
large bundles of computer output which nobody read, because you
didn't have time to sit down and wade through an inch of paper
when you were only interested in 2 figures. The net effect of
the new system is that the information is all there and all
available and you can use it and you can access it ......it's
real hands-on stuff. I can go to my little machine in my office
and plug straight into it and, tell you what my state of trading
is - just like that" (Highways Provider manager).
Overall it was clear that the recently improved computerised information
systems had enhanced the scope of managers' control over their resource
deployment and service delivery. (These systems had also made it
possible for specialist staff such as finance to exercise more detailed
and rigorous control over line managers' resource deployment - see
discussion below.) 	 However, some managers, mainly within Social
Services, reported continuing difficulties	 in terms of access,
flexibility, comprehensiblity and clarity of presentation; two managers
were still using basically manual information systems for their service
delivery operations. (Managers explained, however, that the systems were
still being developed.) Some Social Services managers felt that the
absence of adequate financial information severely impeded the
effectiveness of their budget management:
"In terms of IT, we're still in the dark ages. Financial
management information is out of date, it's unreliable, it's
inaccurate, it's not always very easy to read, and the
information is often highly aggregated as well which isn't
always very useful.. .The financial systems are supposed to
allow people to act in an independent way but this really
barely exists" (Social Services Purchasing manager).
Several Finance managers highlighted that capacity of the improved
information systems for enabling them to extract the required
information more quickly, and to carry out more detailed monitoring,
more easily, of their line managers' budgetary activities:
"IT has had a significant impact. I can get into all the line
managers' accounts .....I could before, but it wasn't so easy.
We have been able to increase the visible part of our budget
monitoring - to supply more information, and more types of
information more quickly, and more often; it's more ongoing
and there's more of it. We're able to supply managers with
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additional detail and also supply members with additional
detail ....." (Finance manager, Social Services Department).
Managers provided many examples of the benefits which the Audit
Commission (1989) suggests should derive from devolution - enhanced
motivation, more efficient and effective resource utilisation, more
accountablity for results (based purely on their own views and opinions
- no objective measures were made available). Levels of accountability
had increased; 46 managers reported that they had become more
accountable and more "visible" in terms of being required to meet more
precisely defined performance criteria (including resource utilisation
and service delivery targets). 	 This change was attributed to a
combination of factors which included the new Staff Development and
Performance Review system,	 Departmental business plans, clearer
delineation under devolution of managerial responsibilities, and a
general "cultural shift" towards more emphasis on results
"If something is going to land on you, it will land squarely on
you now, whereas before you could dodge out from underneath it
because the tiered method was such that nobody actually took
ultimate decisions .....things are a lot tighter now"
(Commercial Services Provider manager)
As noted earlier, some managers emphasised the primary importance of
devolved budgeting, of actually knowing knowing what financial resources
were available to them. This was contrasted with pre-devolution
practices when their lack of budgetary responsibility - and even, in the
case of some social services managers, a lack of awareness about the
comparative costs of different types of service provision - made it
impossible to manage financial resources or service delivery in any real
sense. Many managers explained that their devolved powers (operating in
conjunction with greater levels of accountability for results under the
performance review system, and the pressures of operating in a more
competitive environment) had enabled them essentially to make more
efficient and effective in their resource utilisation. (Efficiency
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refers to minimising resource levels needed to deliver output and/or
xnaximising the output obtained from allocated resources; effectiveness
refers to ensuring that resource deployment achieves the desired results
or outcomes.) They were able to become more flexible and creative in
delivering services geared more directly to precise customer needs.
Overall, 39 managers reported increases in the extent to which they had
become involved in ucontinuous improvement" activities, in the sense of
continually questioning and examining work practices to introduce
improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of their resource
utilisat ion:
"There's been quite a shift in this respect. People are much
more geared up to looking at what they're doing, aind why
they're doing it, and how it can be improved. We're encouraged
all the time to find better ways of doing things, and cheaper
ways of doing things. I don't think that was around so much
before; people just went in and - that's probably unfair, but I
think that under devolution there is much more visibility now
in being a manager - of providing a better service. There is
certainly more competition to go higher and get more senior
management jobs - you have to look, you know, as if you're in
the business..." ( Social Services Provider manager).
All of these managers were able to provide examples of the way in which
their devolved powers had enabled them to deploy resources more
effectively and creatively. For example, one Social Services manager
explained that her increased control over her budget deployment had
eiabled her to make the decision to make use of an empty local authority
house to provide supported care for some mentally handicapped clients
rather than using the more costly and less effective (in terms of
outcomes for the clients) alternative of a residential home:
"I've just been able to do it, whereas, say, 4 or 5 years ago,
I'd have had to go up through the great paraphenalia of the
hierarchy to get that agreed. But it's my money, it's my budget
- I can do what I like with it within reason........Devolution
means that I have the flexibility - within pretty strict
criteria, there's not that much flexibility - but it does mean
that we have some flexibility to use the money we've got more
creatively. There's lots of small bits and pieces of projects -
we're not so constrained now as we used to be when I first
started by financial procedures and rules and regulations"
(Social Services Purchaser manager).
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As noted earlier, increases in the levels of managerial autonomy are
also a prerequisite for enabling managers to become more
entrepreneurial" in the sense of being proactive in identifying
opportunities for change, and acting as change agents. The Council's
cultural change programme - encouraging managers to respond more rapidly
to changes through adoption of the Ready, Fire, Aim approach to
decision-making, and to become more entrepreneurial and customer
orientated - had clearly been very effectively disseminated throughout
the Authority. For example, 44 managers were familiar with the Ready,
Fire, Aim approach and 40 were able to provide definitions equating
broadly with those of the Authority. (21 managers expressed doubts about
the efficacy of the latter approach on the grounds that it simply
encouraged the Authority to continue existing undesirable change
management practices - changes introduced too quickly, with insufficient
attention paid to the implementation implications (see Chapter 9). Some
also considered that the idea could result in an undesirable, and even
dangerous, dilution of professional standards which, it was felt,
required by their very nature, considerable attention to detail and the
niinimisation of risks.)
All of the managers were aware of BCC's requirement to adopt a more
entrepreneurial style (defined by the Authority as involving "Outward
looking;	 Future	 orientated; Proactive;	 Opportunistic"	 behaviour
patterns). Most managers (46 in all) were able to provide definitions
of the term.	 These focused primarily on the adoption of: (1) what
managers termed a more "private sector business style", involving
essentially the generation of additional income through actively seeking
new business opportunities, and the development of more efficient
management systems; (2) a more experimental and "risk-taking" approach
to service delivery, in the context of more control devolved down the
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hierarchy to enable middle managers to become more innovative;
"It means freedom of action to come up with ideas of your own, to
not have to be lead from the top. You can lead from the bottom
and actually come up with good ideas and experiments, and try
them out because you've actually got the money and the authority
to do so" (Social Services Provider manager).
36 managers considered that, since the mid-1980s, they had adopted a
more entrepreneurial and proactive approach to managing their work
wilts. (The negative responses included 4 managers who simply felt that
nit isn't my style". The remainder cited the constraints, not imposed on
their private sector competitors, of central government legislation and
associated BCC policies which restricted their scope to develop new
business activities and generate additional income (particularly within
Commercial Services and Highways). They also mentioned the requirements
for political accountability to elected members which restricted their
scope for	 "risk-taking" activities - see	 discussion below.) In
conjunction with their adoption of BCC policies about increased
responsiveness to customer needs, and a greater focus on customer
orientation (43 managers reported greater involvement in "customer care
approaches - see chapter 7), many examples were provided by managers of
their more entrepreneurial response to service provision:
"I'm very much an entrepreneur. I develop new ideas for the
Authority - like the Catalogue (of products for sale to
internal and external customers), and, more importantly, how
it's funded. £95,000 of the cost of it is funded by the
suppliers, and that's by developing a new supplier approach.
It's not just purchasing the product, it's also getting
technical support, selling support, and devioping those sorts
of things, and a lot of that has been entrepreneurial"
Commercial Services Provider manager);
"One of my colleagues has done a series of sitting in a High
Street shop somewhere, and advertising it, and invited people
to come in and ask questions about highways on his particular
patch, and it's worked quite well. That's not entreprenuerial
in terms of making money, but it's a fairly radical move
compared with what we might have done in the past. . . .He would
seek approval from his line manager, but we are encouraged to
have this sort of ideas, and go out and do it" (Highways
Purchaser manager)
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Overall, then, most managers reported greater levels of control over
their resource management, aided in many cases by more effective
information provision, effective assistance from devolved finance,
information and personnel support staff, and at least some training and
preparation for their new responsibilities. In addition, 38 managers
reported an increase ii their job satisfaction levels (see further
discussion in chapter 9). This was attributed by many primarily to the
introduction of devolved management; the comment, "It's more work on the
same pay, but in actual fact I like it epitomised the kinds of
responses made here.
Tendencies towards centralisation and decreases in managerial autonomy
Most managers - 46 in all - reported that, in practice, they experienced
a number of constraints which operated to restrict the scope of their
control over resource management decisions - and hence their realisation
of the benefits to be gained from devolution in terms of providing more
cost-effective and 	 flexible services	 to customers.	 37 managers
identified areas where they wanted to be allocated more authority over
their resource management. These constraints reflected very closely the
distinction made in the literature between the devolution of
decision-making responsibility and authority (the extent 	 of the
devolution of the latter provides the key measure of the extent of
decentralisation within an organisation)
"There's a paradox - you've certainly got more responsibility,
but you haven't got as much power - the appropriate level of
power to go with that responsibility. They've always kept back
more power than they've given you responsibility, so you have
more things you are accountable for - that has increased under
devolution - but for every 100% they've increased the
devolution, they've only increased the power to actually
exercise that by - 70%?" ( Social Services Twin-hatted manager)
Firstly, in relation to devolved budgetary management, the Audit
Commission (1989) identifies a number of potentially problematic issues
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arising from non-alignment of financial control with management
responsibilities, where detailed rules about the deployment of financial
resources can restrict managers' scope for making more flexible and
cost-effective use of their budgets. Many of these problems were raised
by devolved budget-holder managers. Thus, for example, despite the
raising of the spending level at which changes required approval by the
Service Committee (of elected members), managers' control over decisions
to switch expenditure (or make virements) between various budget heads
was inhibited by requirements to obtain authorisations from senior
management - mainly to ensure adherence to elected member policy
decisions. The political environment was cited as a key reason for
continued senior management monitoring of	 certain (politically)
sensitive decisions; for example, in Highways:
"All letters to elected members have to be signed by one of the
top men - not by me. And they have to be finished differently -
you know, 'yours sincerely' instead of 'yours faithfully', or
something like that. It's the same with MPs. Because they like
to keep control over sensitive issues" (Highways Provider
manager).
Although acknowledging that political constraints were an inevitable
factor in local government - "the price you pay for democracy" - some
Social Service managers nevertheless reported the adoption of various
manoeuvres, well-documented in the accountancy literature, to "get
round" the regulations, 	 such as recoding expenditure to avoid
detection. They assumed that, in practice, senior management were
concerned mainly with ensuring that budgetary spending simply remained
within the set totals. However, managers also felt that scrutiny was
becoming increasingly tight here, with reduced opportunities for middle
managerial autonomy. This was considered to be due partly to the
introduction of the more effective computerised budgetary management
control systems, and due partly to clearer policy specifications through
the recently introduced business plans. 	 For example, within Social
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Services, these were seen as becoming increasingly "like tablets of
stone.",	 reducing middle management flexibility over resource
deployment.
Flexibility was also inhibited by the lack of funds made available to
purchasers to provide and develop services (deriving from funding
constraints), and by prior commitment of most resources to fulling
statutory obligations enshrined in the legislation and/or departmental
business plans. Purchaser managers (all located within Social Services
and Highways) did not yet have the freedom to choose freely between
internal and external service providers - on the basis of the provider
who provided the best value-for-money service. This was because of the
Authority's own policy decisions about maintaining a degree of service
provision in-house, and various rules governing their choice of
provider. Ad-hoc "clawbacks", made by senior management from middle
managers' budget totals to offset overspends elsewhere made it difficult
for managers to draw up their business plans with any degree of
certainty, and they were not allowed to "roll forward" under-spends in
one year, to spend these funds in the next.
Provider managers also identified constraints on their autonomy to make
resource deployment decisions, and to adopt more entrepreneurial forms
of behaviour. Firstly, their opportunities to generate new business from
internal customers within the Authority were limited by increasingly
tight constraints (deriving largely from central government funding
restrictions) on the funds made available by the Authority to purchaser
managers to buy the providers' services. At the same time, they
experienced tighter government regulations about cross-boundary
tendering, plus the Authority's own restrictions on the amount of
external work which they could pursue. These constraints placed what
were perceived to be unfair and frustrating checks on provider managers'
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attempts to generate new markets for their services, and to become, as
urged by both the Government and BCC, more entrepreneurial and
competitive:
"There's no change (inS relation to becoming more
entrepreneurial). We still work for the same client, and we
can't tender for outside work. I think it's window-dressing,
personally - the idea that we are free to compete or be
equivalent to someone on the outside (private sector) . We are
competing with our hands tied behind our backs - we can't
compete with the outside and go out and tout for work"
(Highways Provider manager).
In addition, many provider managers - particularly in Highways and
Social Services - also felt that, in practice 	 their control over
resource deployment on a day-to-day basis was limited in practice by a
number of other factors. They expressed concern about budgetary items
over which they exercised little or no control to the point where "your
budget's not yours". Mention was made here by various managers of
various items such as: staff costs (salaries and conditions of service
were centrally determined for the whole workforce, and these costs
formed the major element in many managers' budgets)*; premises costs
such as maintenance; set charges levied for support services such as
personnel, finance and computing ("I would like to pay only for what I
use" was a common response here); the exclusion of certain items such as
training funds, and computing and other equipment from managers'
devolved budgets. One Highways manager commented here: 	 "I'm
* Managers raised this as a problem in terms of reducing their control
over their budgets, and restricting their ability to compete equally
with other organisations. However, none, apart from some Commercial
Services managers, actually wanted to take on the responsibility of
negotiating separate terms and conditions for their workforces. A key
area of concern for Social Services managers involved the "averaging"
method used to estimate their staff costs. This meant (unlike Highways
and Commercial Services Providers) that the true costs of their staff
were not reflected in their budgetary allocations - especially if they
had staff at the top of the scale, or who were awarded supplementary
wage increases (for supervision work, for example).
- 410 -
responsible for spending tens of millions of pounds, but if I want a new
pair of bloody boots, we almost have a Public Enquiry... U• The lack of
control over these and other items led some managers to comment
adversely on the frustrating paradox of being held responsible for
resource management elements over which they had no real control:
"I don't want to sound power mad, but I actually think that if
you are going to take responsibility for things, you've got to
be accountable for them...... . Like they've given us our
budgets. Now, if you give me my budget, then I'm accountable
for that budget, but I've got to have sole control over it.
It's no good you saying to me: 'well, it's your budget but I'm
going to take this bit of f.' Or 'You don't have anything to do
with the maintenance of the building; we'll do that but you'd
better put £2,000 aside on your budget.' This sort of thing. To
me, that's a nonsense" (Social Services Provider manager).
Detailed rules constrained many provider managers' autonomy over making
decisions about resource deployment, such as: recruiting staff (within
existing budgetary allocations); transferring spend from one budget head
to another; disposal of any profit generated - "the rules mean basically
it disappears into the black hole of the Centre". (One Commercial
Service manager explained that he would have liked to use his "surplus"
to introduce a dividend payment to his internal BCC customers along the
lines of the traditional Co-operative Society "divi".) Some managers
felt that the authorisation required, from their line mangers and/or
specialist staff, to make various resource deployment decisions amounted
basically to "rubber-stamping", which did not greatly constrain their
autonomy in reality. Others resented what they saw as unwarranted and
increasing interference with their managerial autonomy, arguing that
they should be free to make resource management decisions as long as
they met their service delivery and financial targets. For example, some
tiighways managers commented adversely on the requirement, recently
imposed, to obtain line manager authorisation to employ temporary agency
staff:
"There is a recent constraint on that, on employing agency
staff. My view again is, as a cost centre manager, if my cost
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centre can stand the cost of bringing in that extra person to
cover the peak in the workload, why shouldn't I do it? Why do I
have to get approval from all and sundry? .....because of
concerns about the increasing number of agency staff employed,
there has been a controlling imposed on that in that I now have
to get approval from my line manager" (Highways Provider
manager)
Similarly, on making changes in staff deployment:
"If we say, weU, we'll take out these managers and turn them
into practitioners, or take 3 people from there and put them
there, it's not my decision. It's in negotiation with the
General Manager (his line manager), and usually the final
clearance would come form the area director. Then, as
Providers, we also have to consult with our Purchasers. It's a
bit anomalous really - you're told that you're autonomous, that
you've got a responsibility as an accountable manager, but the
reality is very different."
(Social Services Provider manager)
Some Highways and Social Services managers, as a consequence of
experiencing all these constraints on their decision-making autonomy
over resource deployment, expressed doubts about the validity of
applying the term "devolution" (in the sense of exercising control) to
their newly acquired resource management responsibilities. They argued
that these amounted to responsibility for budget administration and
monitoring, but little else:
"In theory, there is devolution down, but the reality is that
devolution doesn't really exist at this level. It is really
very cosmetic. There is very little equipment on my budget, my
cost centre is effectively staff, and that is dictated... . If I
was, say, underspending on that budget, then in theory I have
the ability to spend that money on additional staff or some
bits and pieces. But the reality is that the group manager
would want my underspend to balance someone else's overspend.
Profits too - if my team was doing well and making an income,
then that income wasn't mine to spend because that was wanted
for the department generally. So it is very cosmetic. We are
the muggins playing on the screens and plugging things in, but
the reality is, because staff form such a high percentage of
it, there is no real control, not real control" (Highways
provider manager)
Commercial Services managers (who, as noted earlier, were all Providers,
and who had moved most fully to quasi-independent business-unit status)
appeared to experience fewer direct controls than managers in the other
three departments on their operational and budgetary management
- 412 -
processes. For example, with regard to filling vacant posts within
existing staff budgets - the emphasis was on "informing as a matter of
courtesy" their line managers, rather than seeking authorisation, as the
sanagers in the other three departments were required to do. They had
sore freedom to design and develop their own business plans, unfettered
(under the "Umbrella design of the Department) by overall departmental
business plans such as those existing in Social Services and Highways.
(These included strategic and operational objectives set for politically
I	 sensitive services, where it is more difficult to measure and predict
the outcomes of particular forms of service provision.) However, some
constraints,	 emanating particularly from Central Government CCT
legislation,	 such as cross-boundary tendering regulations, bore
extremely heavily on these managers' opportunities to compete, as
required by the CCT legislation, on the open market:
"We were told to go out and get business from London and the
rest of south-east England. So we did. .nd then along came
cross-boundary tendering, and, of course, we were punished for
having done precisely what we were told to do .......the very
people who told us to be commercial told us, 'Not THAT
Commercial!', and kicked us back down" (Finance manager,
Commercial Services Department)
In addition, there were continuing tensions between these managers'
requirements to adhere to corporate policies and standards - such as,
complex contractual procedures designed to ensure probity, and staff
conditions of service - and their need for flexibility in order to be
able to compete effectively. For example, one manager had secured
agreement from her staff to forego the annual increment award and annual
cost-of-living rise to help in winning a contract. But "it was
considered to be too difficult by Personnel, and that we really
shouldn't do it."	 Such tensions, and the	 regulations on their
competitive activities, caused some Commercial Services managers to echo
the views of their Highways and Social Services counterparts expressed
above in questioning the validity of the devolution concept when applied
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to public sector management:
"Devolution and delegation are two very different things in my
book. Devolution is relinquishing and handing over the right to
govern, to make the rules. What they really mean is delegation
- it is a matter of handing down responsibility and delegation,
but it is not devolution. The authority and the responsibility
to make day-to-day decisions has been handed down but the right
to make the rules hasn't. For example I ought to be able to
say, 'OK, well, I will trade with the private sector.'. That is
a rule I would dearly love to change. They haven't done that,
and they never meant to. What they really meant is delegation"
(Commercial Services Provider manager).
Finance managers, as noted earlier, reported that their own operational
budgets (as opposed to those of their line manager customers) were
concerned very largely with staff salaries. Here, their comments
reflected those of the Highways and Social Services mangers outlined
above -	 "the degree of freedom or flexibility is not great". Their
concerns over controls on their devolved powers related far more to
their roles vis-a-vis their line manager "customers' 1 . Finance managers
devolved out to area offices - in Education or Social Services - cited
resource shortages of time/and or personnel which limited the
achievement of desired service level to service line managers. These
Area-based Finance managers expressed concerns that their Departmental
Finance Centres were beginning to reintroduce a degree of
re-centralisation of financial functions and control systems, which was
reducing the scope of their autonomy over their individual Area
budgetary management
"Greenfield (where Departmental directorates are located) is
like the phoenix out of the ashes - it has re-emphasised
itself. What we are finding of late, probably the last 18
months to two years, is that there has been a bit of
back-tracking, the Areas have begun to be more dictated to, to
some degree, and of lesser importance. The budget preparation
that we do, we get quite a detailed pack of guidance and rules
and how to do it - literally, we must do this, we must provide
that, we must do that, must do it then, and so forth. . . . The
budget for this year, for example. We have got certain budgets
which are demand-led, or quite likely to overspend - statutory
rights like school transport and free school meals. You are
duty bound to keep going, so you go into overspend. The
Education Department are fully aware of this, so they asked us
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all in the six areas to save between us about £2 million, and
that was going to go into a back-pocket, so to speak, and sit
at Greenfield as an underspand, so we are all overspent in the
Areas, we have got all the pressure of the
overspends....Greenfield (the Centre), who has taken this money
away from us, is sitting there with a pot which is £2-3 million
just available with no expenditure against it so it is an
underspend... .We are told it doesn't matter when we are looking
at Education as a whole, but then why have we got Area Budgets
and Area Finance managers, Area Directors? U ( Finance manager,
Education Departmext).
Similarly, a Finance manager located at Central Finance, commented on
the difficulties he experienced between reconciling strategic
requirements with the pressures from Departments to go their own way,
and explained why devolved budgetary management required a growth in
written, formalised procedures:
"There were financial regulations but they were very limited in
their scope - there wasn't a great deal of documentation
because it wasn't necessary. Before, at the centre, you
(finance staff) just knew what to do, there was no need to have
it written down; everyone either knew or could consult with
somebody down the corridor - how do I do this? But that no
longer applies - hence the need to have much better
documentation on what those processes are" ( Finance manager,
corporate services, County Hall).
Several Finance managers also commented on way in which the new, more
sophisticated financial management systems had enabled them to
scrutinise in more detail the resource deployment of their line manager
"customers", and to ensure that rules about, for example, moving money
between budget heads were followed:
"We make the (computerised financial) system so they (the
managers) won't do it .....one of the managers said to me, 'you
keep closing the loopholes', but it's only because I know about
the loopholes that I can close them, and the door's never
slammed and locked. They can do it the official way - like,
they can apply to move money and it will go up the line of
responsibility and back down again, and if it's agreed right at
the very top, it's fine. What I'm stopping them doing is this
quick shift across without telling anyone. They accept it as a
challenge to see if they can beat me...." (Finance manager,
Highways Department).
The same manager went on to give several examples of the way in which
the more effective computerised information system had enabled him to
nionitor in more detail expenditure items such as overtime payment, lease
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car charges: uit would have taken too long before, with 700 people in
the department". He also emphasised the need for more intensive controls
and procedures to accompany the devolution to managers of responsibility
for, say, certifying invoices.
Highways and Social Services managers also tended to express the view
that their professional service delivery had become subject to closer
regulation, resulting in a reduction in their professional autonomy.
They considered that the introduction of formal Quality Assurance
systems (in some Highways branches) and formal procedural manuals and
handbooks, including detailed specifications about service delivery
methods (deriving partly from new legislation, as well as BCC policies),
had limited the extent to which they were able to use their own
professional judgement, and make changes in service delivery practices:
"What devolution has done is generated a bookshelf of rules which
didn't exist before.Those manuals (pointing to a shelf) - for
years, we had nothing. I remember when I joined Barset, the
divisional manual was that big (pointing to half-inch thick
book). Then, back in the 80s, they produced a half-baked
children's manual, which was that big (1 inch), and now we've
got, we've got this (3 inches thick). That's an interesting - it
links in directly with what I said about the counter-thrust.
You've got nominal devolution, and yet you've got - a tighter at
the centre, from the policy makes; nearly all this stuff has
come from the centre. . . .My overall view on this is that the
organisational changes have been under the GUISE of devolution,
but it's actually been around, yes, tighter organisational
control" ( Social Services Provider manager)
The introduction of control systems based on financial and service
delivery outcomes or results (identified in the literature as a key
feature of decentralisation) were seen as constituting an addition to,
rather than a substitute for detailed procedural regulation of resource
utilisation and service delivery management activities:
"We've always had a hierarchical structure within the department,
but overlayed on to that, or within that, has been the
performance related pay and the target-setting process... .1
don't think much has changed in my judgement. We just got







Overall, 34 managers considered that there had been an increase in the
scope and amount of rules and procedures governing their operational
management autonomy since devolution was first introduced. These
continuing tensions between centralisation and decentralisation were
illustrated graphically by a Highways managers to express the decline he
had experienced in the scope of the authority devolved to him since the
introduction of devolved management systems by the Authority:
Date of introduction	 Date of
of devolution	 interview (1993)
Managers attributed the move towards centralisation to a number of
reasons identified in the literature. These included the need for the
Authority to control costs more tightly because of increasingly rigorous
central government (and local member) determined spending limits; a
feeling, particularly amongst Commercial Services and Finance managers,
that devolution was expensive in terms of duplication of facilities such
as financial service provision. (Several Commercial Services managers
also commented on the increased costs incurred by inexperienced devolved
managers with new authority to buy, for example, photocopiers from
external sources, instead of using Commercial Services experiences to
achieve the best deal.) 	 Managers raised the continuing impact of
constraints related specifically to public sector organisations,
including restrictions	 on income generation	 and investment
opportunities, the political sensitivity of certain service areas, and
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the need for public accountability. They also mentioned a reluctance by
senior managers to relinquish control:
"I've got the feeling that it's started to reverse again - not
because devolution hasn't worked, but because the Centre are now
feeling threatened by the power of the Areas, and are trying to
pull it back because they see themselves dissolving. In true
devolution this would be the ultimate end, and they see this and
they don't like it, and they are trying to reverse it - not for
the benefit of the service but for their benefit. If I was
sitting in the Centre, I might have a different view of
course...." ( Finance manager, Social Services Department);
U] feels peculiar that they've given you all this authority, and
then suddenly they will issue instructions about what you shall
do in the event of child abuse with every t crossed and every i
dotted twice, and yet I know why - it's because they're
concerned about headlines in the Sun or whatever" ( Social
Services Provider manager).
Several managers suggested that, when devolution was introduced, senior
management had paid insufficient attention to the need for clear
delineation of authority for lower level managers. (Senior managers also
considered that insufficient initial attention had been paid to
specifying the framework within which devolved mangement systems were
intended to operate; see chapter 6.) One social services manager
emphasised the extent to which, initially, she had operated on a "trial
and error" basis in terms of finding out gradually what she was and was
not permitted to do in terms of exercise of her devolved decision-making
powers. She felt that this omission had since been addressed, with the
consequences, as described above, of increasingly tight controls over
devolved managerial activities. A recent external auditor report had
also raised the Authority's awareness about the nature of its' financial
control systems:
"They (Central Finance) opened the stable door, and everyone
rushed out, and now they are saying, 'Christ, I've got no
control', and they are trying to haul everything back in again,
you know. ..They said, 'Away you go', and we started heading off
in our own direction - so did Social Services and so did
Education - and then last year, the the auditors came along and
brought them up short, hence the review in this department. It
was felt that control had been loosened to such an extent that
the Treasurer could no longer exercise the control over his
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fiduciary duty... .They didn't plan the devolution, they let it
happen. U (Finance manager, location withheld to protect
identity).
The recently introduced Purchaser/Provider split in Highways and Social
Services, had caused some Provider managers to express concern about the
potential of the new internal market system for replacing the
pre-devolution vertical bureaucracy, which had constrained their
decision-making powers, by a new horizontal "contract bureaucracy". The
latter was reflected in the complex rules and regulations governing the
relations between the purchaser and provider managers through service
level agreements and contracts (see further discussion in chapter 7).
New procedures had been required for arranging initial contracts to be
drawn up between Purchasers and Providers, and for enabling subsequent
changes to be made to these agreeements by both parties. Previously,
"twin-hatted" managers (responsible for both functions) had been able to
make all the decisions about service delivery methods and resource
deployment on their own (in consultation with line management). For
example, one Social Services manager explained that, in the context of
attempting to develop new services at her elderly person's residential
and community centre, she had to secure the agreement of her Purchasers,
as well as the agreement of business manager support staff and her line
manager.
Unproductive conflicts had developed between some Social Services
purchaser and provider managers, arising from the aim of purchaser
managers to minimise the cost of service provision and the aim of the
provider managers to maximise their generation of "surplus" or profits.
This had resulted (in the absence of a true market mechanism for
resolving these conflicts) in problems for some managers in attempting
to reconcile sectional interests with the common cause of achieving
overall organisational goals. This could result in the "selfish" rather
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than the	 "collaborative't or cooperative partnership behaviour
(identified by Hulme, 1994) between Purchaser/Provider managers:
"Some of my managers became like landladies, you know, arms
folded - 'you've used an extra piece of toilet paper, that'll
be another 25p' ........we created these diverse cultures which
have been very unhelpful and very unhealthy, and I've had to
find a lot of time to bring all this back and say: 'We all
still work for BCC'."
(Social Services provider manager).
As noted earlier, the Commercial Services managers had operated longer
than the other managers within a market system, and thus had time to be
I	 accustomed to the procedures involved. 	 The nature of their
products/services such as printing services or the supply of business
goods like paper, furniture etc., also appeared more suited to a
Purchaser/ provider split. Thus the key potentially problematic issues
identified by Walsh (1992) - such as service specifications, forms of
contract, and packaging work for competition - could be more easily
resolved.	 Complex services such as social work - where outcomes are
less easily specified in advance, and where the division between service
policies/objectives and service delivery operationals activities is less
clear-cut - tend to be less susceptible to contractual forms of service
delivery.
The managers' responses, overall,	 clearly reflected the tensions
described in the literature between the conflicting tendencies towards
centralisation and decentralisation which tend to characterise large
divisionalised organisations such as Barset County Council. Before
returning to this topic in the conclusion to this chapter, the changes
which managers reported in - the other two decisional roles (the
negotiator and disturbance-handler) are discussed below; the
introduction of devolved management systems involved significant changes
in managers' behaviour within these two roles.
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Negotiator and Disturbance-Handler Roles
The changes, outlined above, in the managers' entrepreneurial and
resource allocator behaviour were accompanied by changes in their
negotiator and disturbance-handler role performance. The acquisition of
devolved responsibilities for resource management functions, together
with the introduction of the Purchaser/Provider split for many service
areas, tends to involve managers more extensively in taking
responsibility also for the negotiating and disturbance-handling
(essentially crisis management) forms of activities associated with
these developments/ Managers operate here in conjunction with the
increasingly wide range of individuals located within their work-groups,
within other sections and departments across the organisation, and with
the members of other private and voluntary sector organisations, with
whom, to an increasing degree, they are working to plan and deliver
services (see diagram reproduced in chapter 7).
In the context of these developments, the Local Government Management
Board (LG) emphasises the need for managers to acquire the skills and
conipetences associated with the negotiator and disturbance-handler
roles. These competences include: "those of the honest broker and
negotiator, requiring qualities of peacemaking and peacekeeping between
conflicting interests, and a temperament which maximises agreement and
mutual benefit ......a capacity to cope with ambiguity, uncertainty and
change, and view problems as opportunities or challenges (LGB, 1993,
ppl5 and 24). 	 Such competences were identified by the LGMB as one of
the key competences required by managers operating within the new
enab1ing", fragmentedz and competitive local authority, reflecting
local government moves towards network and Mboundaryless forms of
organisation (Francis, 1994; Peters, 1992; Kanter, 1984)
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The BCC managers' responses tended to reflect the growing importance of
the these role as stressed in the local government literature; 39
reported increased levels of negotiating and activities, with different
managers focusing on various different contexts - in relation to other
role changes which had assumed particular significance for them. As a
consequence of the introduction of the Purchaser/Provider split, and
their devolved responsibilities for drawing up service specifications
(Purchaser role), or delivering the service specified (Provider role),
both Purchaser and Provider managers reported increased involvement in
negotiating activities.	 These operated in connection with drawing up
initial contracts or service level agreements, and in interpreting and
amending these contracts when problems arose or circumstance changed -
in agreement with the other party. Managers in the Social Services
Department explained that their Purchaser/Provider negotiations also
involved a third party in the form of the contracts manager:
"We have joint meetings - I am going to be meeting with the
Service Development Manager tomorrow because we're looking at
another contract I want to establish with some voluntary
counselling agencies. I would meet with him first and tell him
what I want and then we'd have a three-way meeting with the
contracts manager, the Provider, and me. I would say what I want,
the Provider would say whether they could do it or not and what
price they wanted, and then you'd negotiate around that. So it's
sort of joint negotiating..." (Social Services Purchaser
manager).
Some managers stressed, again, the way in which, under devolution, they
had gained more responsibilities for negotiations:
"We bid for finances through various systems to the Department of
Transport (DOT), and they allocate us some money. We write
contracts which have to be in accordance with their
requirements .......What's changed is that I'm it with the DOT, if
you like, with the County. I am the chief person responsible for
running that agency agreement and everything that goes with it.
In days gone by, that wouldn't have been the case - someone
higher up would have been THE person. So most of the
negotiations which go on with the DOT, between BCC and the DOT by
and large come through me, and before, they would have been done
at a higher levels and I would just have carried out..."
(Highways Purchaser manager).
Pinance, and other managers who were responsible for providing support
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services across Area and Departmental boundaries, 	 reported that
devo].ution, in conjunction with the new "customer" status of service
line managers, had required them, of necessity, to become more involved
in negotiating activities - rather than "issuing orders" over the design
and implementation of new financial/information systems, or the amending
of existing ones.	 Clearly defined authority, based on the support
managers'	 hierarchical position position in the technostructure
component of Mintzberg's organisational model, had been reduced -
through the devolution of responsibility to service line managers of
responsibilities	 for finance,	 personnel and information. As a
consequence, these managers were required to negotiate rather than
simply impose new systems or amendments on service managers (although it
is important to remember, as stated earlier' that many line managers
considered that a degree of re-centralisation of authority was
emerging):
"It (devolution) had an impact in terms of the difficulty of being
able to implement corporate standards or corporate systems or
facilities across the organisation. . . it was partly a question of
authority. Control was something that was taken out of the
vocabulary. The pre-devolution days were such where the old
County Treasurer wielded very significant control over the
organisation. He could quite easily determine how a service
developed on the basis of what resources were available to it. So
we're talking about a central power base which has shifted. . . . So
the emphasis moved away from control to democracy if you like.
So, as a result of that, it becomes increasingly difficult if
there is a corporate policy, or if you want to try and install
something, you talking about a consultation process, a
negotiation process rather than a directed process. An example of
that was in developing systems .....we had a team of people
working with 20 different departments, all with their different
ideas, trying to give them as much flexibility and freedom within
the corporate framework. There were certain facilities in this
system which you could tailor to your own requirements, so to all
intents and purposes it was their's - they owned it - to try and
make it look as though it was something they had absolute control
over, whereas, in fact, it was something that did still need some
central direction" (Finance manager, Corporate Services, County
Hall)
In addition to focusing on customer and supplier negotiations,
Commercial services managers also mentioned the significance of their
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interactions with the various support service personnel, with whom they
negotiated services agreements and prices:
"The budget is now more or less down to each individual unit, and
you negotiate with personnel, marketing and all the other
subsidiary services, whereas before, they would say, 'well, it's
going to cost so much to keep the computer running', and that
sort of thing. Now they come over to you, and you haggle about it
more, and see whether you can afford it. .. . 'I (Commercial Services
Provider manager).
Overall, the development outlined above had resulted in an increase in
situations where managers were required to adopt negotiating styles of
behaviour. (These developments included, 	 primarily: devolution; the
Purchaser Provider split; the Council's customer care policy (requiring
more extensive liaison, consultation and negotiation with a range of
internal and external customers, including community groups); managers'
increased involvement with inter-disciplinary work-groups which operated
across sectional, departmental and organisational boundaries (see
chapter	 7) .) In	 addition, managers'	 personnel responsibilities,
increased since devolution, had involved them more directly than before
in a variety of personnel management issues - such as staff performance
monitoring and review, training and development, disciplinary and
grievance incidences.	 Here, as one manager put it: "you need an
understanding and a negotiation - a dialogue". The introduction of the
Staff Development and Performance Review system, and the linking of
individual performance measures with departmental business plan targets,
also involved managers more extensively in negotiation activities. These
took place with their line managers about their own targets, and with
their own staff about their targets and development plans. Most
managers' performance targets included some that were derived from the
departmental business plans, and some that managers suggested themselves
and put forward for negotiation with their line managers:
"It (setting performance targets) started out with my line
manager really saying what the targets should be, but in
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discussion. There's been a shift in emphasis in recent years to
the point where I've just received a memo from my line manager
saying that my interview is on May 24, and will I prepare four
targets for that date. So I'm setting my own targets in a way -
there's more of a dialogue..." (Highways Provider manager).
In connection with target-setting for his own staff, this manager went
on to say:
.increasingly the interviews, because staff are more aware of
what the system is doing, it's not a point of conflict - the
idea is to come to a joint consensus opinion, and that requires
negotiation, I think".
This manager, plus 9 others, listed negotiation/diplomatic/influencing
skills as a competence where further training was required, in view of
managers' increased activities in the "negotiating" aspects of their
role behaviour.
Within these contexts - of new devolved responsibilities for resource
management, for negotiating and amending service delivery contracts and
agreements, and the more rigorous exercise of the leader role outlined
earlier - the managers' responses indicated that crisis management and
the resolution of unexpected problems or difficulties had also become a
more significant part of their work. Increasingly, under devolution,
managers saw themselves, as opposed to senior management, as having the
responsibilities for sorting out problems which arose in relation to
budgetary management, personnel management, and service delivery
activities:
"In the old days, if something unexpected came up, you'd have
said, 'Oh!', and phoned your senior up. You can't do that now -
it's your problem. If a kid walked into the office from one of
our children's homes and said he had been beaten up, I would
have handled it by phoning central office - you, know, 'what
should I do?' kind of thing. If it happened NOW, I would be
expected to get on and deal with it and THEN phone central
office - keep them informed, but deal with it then and there,
immediately.....like with the flood disaster thing. In my
particular role, I'd got lined up all these BT engineers, word
processing companies and Christ knows what else willing to
donate furniture and equipment - we had so many offers that we
actually couldn't handle it all. Now that was rather a special
situation, OK, but you put it into context - with any normal
kind of situation, dealing with any emergency, I think that the
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onus is on you, the expectation is that you get hold of it
yourself - but God help you if you get it wrong!" (Social
Services Twin-hatted manager).
Such responses to problems were encouraged by the Authority's service
charters and customer care policies (requiring a prompt response to
customer demands), plus the development of the "Ready, Fire, Aim",
risk-taking, and proactive "entrepreneurial" culture described earlier
in this chapter. Similarly, with personnel and finance problems,
aanagers saw it as their responsibility - in conjunction with the help
provided by specialist staff - to resolve difficulties.	 However, as
indicated in the above quotation, several managers raised the issue of
the problematic extent to which the "risk-taking" element of the
cultural change had actually taken hold. They considered that there was
still seine adherence amongst some senior managers to the traditional
ethos of not taking risks, in that the tolerance of "mistakes" remained
low in many instances.
Speedy responses to problems were also required in the context of the
increasing pace and volume of change (see further discussion in chapter
9) - both that introduced by senior management, and change arising from
the managers' own "continuous improvement" activities described earlier:
"It's constant change - it's one reorganisation after another -
you know, we joke about it - when's the next reorganisation?
You've no sooner got to grips with one, than the next one's on
the way. You're constantly having to deal with the bits that
go wrong - inevitably, things go wrong - and you have to deal
with them, and try and keep your staff happy, and keep a
reasonable standard of service going at the same time...."
(Finance manager, Social Services Department)
Conclusion
Overall, the managers' responses suggested that extensive changes had
taken place since the mid-1980s in their role behaviour across all four
of Mintzberg's decisional roles - entrepreneurial, resource allocator,
negotiator and disturbance handler. The key change factor here was the
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introduction of the devolved management system. For the first time for
many managers, they were given the responsibility for managing resource
deployment, along with clear accountability for achieving resource
management and service delivery performance targets, within the context
of the new "performance culture". They also identified benefits arising
from these changes which had accrued to the organisation and the
customer/community in terms of more efficient and effective resource
utilisation and more responsive service provision - and to themselves in
terms of generally increased levels of work satisfaction (see chapter
9)
However, managers also identified limits on the extent to which changes
in their role behaviour had occurred - particularly in the context of
devolved management.	 It appeared	 that,	 for many managers,
decision-making responsibility and accountability for resource
deployment had clearly been devolved to them to a considerable extent.
Yet, the scope of their decision-making authority was becoming
increasingly inhibited by more precise and detailed regulations and
procedures (concerned with resource utilisation and professional service
standards) and/or requirements to gain approval from senior management
for their resource management decisions. The introduction of the
Purchaser/Provider split within Highways and Social Services was also
seen by many managers as generating additional procedural rules and
limits on their autonomy. This was experienced particularly by Provider
managers. They tended to feel less empowered to contribute directly
towards strategic planning decisions than their Purchaser counterparts,
who perceived themselves to play a more direct part in the policy-making
process - both in terms of customer/public contact and in terms of
drawing up service delivery specifications.
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In general, the managers' responses suggested that the Authority's
practices corresponded with the tendencies noted earlier for large
diversified organisations, subject to strong visible external political
control, to adopt only limited forms of decentralisation below
divisional (or in this case senior departmental) management levels -
within Social Service, Highways and Finance. Commercial Services middle
managers in charge of business units, operating on a quasi-autonomous
fu].]. trading account basis appeared to experience the greatest degree of
decisional autonomy. They represented an essentially divisional layer of
management operating, unlike their Social Services and Highways manager
counterparts, as an essentially divisional layer of management
immediately under the Director of the loose uuirellan of the Commercial
Services Department (see discussion of departmental structures in
chapter 6).
Control systems in the Authority had moved towards an emphasis on
performance measurement against financial and service delivery criteria,
reinforced by the coherent corporate culture introduced by the Chief
Executive. Yet, such systems were also increasingly being supplemented
by additional operational rules and procedures, with more detailed
resource control systems and more regulation of professional service
delivery activities. The introduction of the internal market was also
seen by many managers as generating additional procedural rules and
limits on individual managerial autonomy - the new contract culture
identified by Walsh (1992).	 The nature of these tensions or "pulls"
across the organisation appeared to vary across different departments
and sections - for reasons connected with differences in a number of
organisational dimensions identified 	 by contingency theorists
(Mintzberg;	 Hales, 1993)!.	 These	 include: the	 nature of	 the
product/service and the work process, the nature of the customer base
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and markets within which business units operated; the degree of
political sensitivity of services; the extent	 to which service
objectives	 are unambiguous,	 measurable and	 susceptible to
predetermination of the desired outcome.
Finally, it is important to note that the changes reported by managers
in their work behaviour across all three of Mintzberg's role sets -
interpersonal, informational and decisional - had significant
implications for their levels of work satisfaction and for their skills
and competence requirements. The impact of the changes on managers' work
satisfaction levels and on the skills and competence they required to




Organisational restructurin in Barset: chanes in -job satisfaction
THe previous two chapters identified the changes in role behaviour
experienced by Barset County Council middle managers, as a consequence
of the changes in management systems introduced by the County since the
mid-1980s.	 Managers reported significant changes in their managerial
behaviour within each of Mintzberg's three role categories:
Decisional roles: Under the County's devolved management system,
managers had gained responsibilities and accountabilities for new
functional areas such as finance, personnel and customer care. They had
adopted more proactive and entrepreneurial roles, in the context of
increased oppportunities to innovate and to improve their efficiency and
effectiveness of their resource utilisation and service delivery
operations. They had also experienced tighter control over their
performance, mainly through the introduction of a formal performance
appraisal systems, which included performance related pay, and the
development of a "performance culture";
Interpersonal roles: 	 Many managers reported the adoption of
transformational leadership styles, which included an emphasis on
inspiring and motivating their staff to adopt changing work methods and
attitudes, and to develop their skills and competences. The recently
introduced Staff Development and Performance Review process encouraged
managers to focus more on enabling staff to "stretch" themselves through
undertaking more challenging work, and on ensuring that staff training
and development needs were met. In addition, managers were placing
greater emphasis on involving their staff in decision-making, and on
ensuring that they were kept informed about developments taking place
County-wide;
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Informational roles:	 Partly as a consequence of their devolved
responsibilities, managers reported increasing levels of involvement in
liaison and information exchange activities within more Mopenn
communications systems. This involvement took place within the three
contexts of: improving their work performance; strengthening integration
between sections and departments within the Authority; working more
effectively with other organisations to plan and deliver services.
Managers reported working more closely with customers and community
groups to provide services which were more responsive to customer needs.
They had also experienced an increase in their involvement with
inter-disciplinary project working-groups, which operated across
internal departmental and external organisational boundaries.
A number of studies have examined the impact of these changes on
managers' levels of work satisfaction; after a brief review of these,
this chapter focuses on identifying changes reported by the BCC managers
in their work satisfaction levels.
Despite the numerous studies on work satisfaction, there are no agreed
definitions of the concept, although, as discussed fully in chapter 5,
many discussions draw on the work of Maslow or Hertzberg, combined with
expectancy theorists' approaches (Vroom, 1964). Accordingly, studies of
work satisfaction normally incorporate dimensions referring to both
intrinsic and extrinsic rewards, both of which have been shown in be
important, in general, for many managers (Stewart, 1982; Poole et al,
1981; Scase and Goffee, 1989; Mansfield and Poole, 1991) . In terms of
intrinsic work satisfaction levels, measures or indices are constructed
in relation to the extent to which work offers opportunities for (1)
self-esteem and status; (2) the ability to work independently, and,
through this; (3) the scope available for self-development and personal
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growth. These commonly-used reward categories (derived from Scase and
Gof fee, 1989; Hunt, 1979) can be defined as follows: independent thought
and action refers to opportunities for managers to exercise their own
personal judgement and discretion in decision-making and task
performance; personal growth and development involves opportunities for
managers to obtain self-fulfilment and satisfaction through the
utilisation of	 their own skills and talents;	 self-respect and
self-esteem refer to managers' feelings that they and their work
contributions are valued and recognised.
In relation to extrinsic rewards, job satisfaction measures tend to
focus on individuals' perceptions of (1) security of employment; (2)
remuneration; (3) physical working conditions (4) opportunities to
develop relations with colleagues at work; (5) promotion and career
prospects. In relation to both extrinsic and intrinsic rewards, indices
are constructed upon which questionnaires are designed to measure
employees' feelings of relative satisfaction and dissatisfaction (see
discussion in chapter 5). This is the approach which is used in this
chapter for analysing changes in the work satisfaction levels of the
Barset middle managers.
The recent empirical studies noted above in chapters 2 and 4 have
identified various	 changes in the levels of work satisfaction
experienced by managers, as a consequence of organisation restructuring
and managerial role changes. Not all of these studies clearly separate
out middle managers, nor do they all separate out private from public
sector managers; none of them deal specifically with the work
satisfaction levels of local authority middle managers.	 However, they
provide a useful framework from which to approach the identification of
changing work satisfaction levels amongst the case study managers, and
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the main findings from these studies are summarised below, focusing
first on extrinsic rewards.
The introduction of flatter organisation structures, with reduced
numbers of hierarchical levels, which usually accompany devolution can
also involve reductions in the numbers of middle management posts
(Dopson and Stewart, 1988, 1990; Stewart, 1991; Scase and Goffee, 1989;
Smith, 1990). The Local Authority Joint Watch Statistics do not provide
a breakdown of white-collar jobs by grade, and any changes in the
numbers of middle managers to date are difficult to estimate overall. A
recent study by Nulty (1994) suggests that there has been an increase
between 1987 and 1993 in the numbers of officers located within the
national grades where many middle managers are likely to be located.
middle managerial grades, It is, however, likely that the overall impact
of the orgariisational changes described above, including the adoption of
more flexible (numerical and functional) human resource management
strategies, has been "to challenge the relative 'stability' and 'safety'
of local authority employment." (Stoker,1989; Fowler, 1988).
A number of studies provide evidence for increased levels of
dissatisfaction with the decreasing security, promotion and career
opportunities arising out of flatter organisational structures and
reduced middle manager numbers (Lockwood et al, 1992; Goffee and Scase,
1986; Scase and Goffee, 1992, 1989), to the point in one study where
some unfortunates "feel that they are 'fighting daily' for their lives."
(Coulson-Thomas and Coe, 1991, p12). Scase and Gof fee emphasise the
threat posed by these changes to their managers' conception of a career
as "a meaningful progression through a series of related jobs" (p79)
Thus, those managers, who gained their sense of personal identity, and
related ideas of success or failure, through such an orderly career
progression, felt threatened by actual or possible reductions in
- 433 -
promotion and job security - especially those managers "anchored"
(Schein, 1978) to their careers through desires for career stability and
security or through "vertical" career growth by climbing the corporate
ladder to more senior positions. In addition, increased dissatisfaction
with pay levels were found by Scase and Gof fee, and, amongst their
public sector managers, by Mansfield and Poole. By contrast, Wheatley
(1992), in the most recent of these studies, found considerable optimism
amongst his middle managers about both their job security and their
future career prospects, despite the prevalence of "de-layering" within
their organisations: "most managers were remarkably sanguine about the
future." (p4)
Many of the managers in one study (Dopson and Stewart, 1990) reported
increased levels of intrinsic job satisfaction arising from the role
changes, involving new freedoms to take on challenges, to reallocate
resources according to job priorities, to innovate and risk-take, and to
develop and extend their management expertise. Moreover, those managers,
who had "survived" the reorganisations, had, as a consequence, gained
confidence in their own abilities; some also felt that they were "more
in control of their own destiny" (p14). Comparing the views of private
and public (although not local government) sector managers, Dopson and
Stewart	 (1990a,)	 found	 that	 "most	 of	 the	 public	 sector
managers.. . .enjoyed their work more because they were more accountable;
jobs were also viewed as more interesting, both because of the increased
responsibility and because of the new management systems that had
clarified objectives." (p37-8). They did, however, find evidence to
suggest, for a number of reasons, a less positive attitude to
organisational and management changes amongst the public sector
managers, arising largely from the political constraints and the
associated requirements for public accountability, unique to the public
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sector; these inhibited the degree of middle managerial freedom to
innovate. Moreover the advantages gained from organisational changes
were diluted to an extent by increased levels of work stress arising
from increased workload, decreased . resource levels, and demoralised
workforces (public sector), and by pressures to achieve higher and more
rigorously scrutinised performance levels (private sector).
These pressures can result in generally decreased levels of job
satisfaction: "Many feel overburdened and under-appreciated.	 Even
though they escaped the cutting axe, they have difficulty forgetting how
their companies treated their peers.	 They are restless and
dissatisfied." (Robbins, 1990, p487). Scase and Goffee found evidence to
suggest the adoption by many of their managers of more calculative
work orientations (involving little identification or attachment to the
organisation itself (Williams et al, 1989)), with declining levels of
commitment, decreased levels of intrinsic job satisfaction and fewer
opportunities for exercising independent judgement and thought, and for
personal growth development. These factors, combined with the reduction
in promotion opportunities and planned career progression mentioned
above, had resulted, for many male managers, in a reduction in the
centrality of their work and career as a major source of life
satisfaction: "unfulfilled career expectations, together with the
increasing dissatisfaction and uncertainty associated with programs of
organisational restructuring, have encouraged them to withdraw
psychologically from work, and to seek greater personal rewards in their
private lives... .managers are no longer prepared to "sell" themselves to
their employing corporations as the expense of their family
relationships and personal lifestyles."	 (Goffee and Scase, 1992,
p378-9)
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Evidence for increased work pressures on middle managers also emerged
from most of these studies. The managers remaining in an organisation
after job restructuring and/or redundancies were frequently required to
absorb additional work responsibilities, resulting in many organisations
in "fewer managers doing more work" (Coulson-Thomas and Coe, p23), with
inadequate resources, reduced staff numbers, and significant increases
in the hours worked (Scase and Gof fee). Dopson found that even those
managers who welcomed the challenge of larger and more responsible jobs,
in the context of the introduction of "empowering devolved management
systems, felt pressurised by increased workloads to the point where one
manager said "it's fine if your hobby is the job." (Dopson and Stewart,
1988, p45)
Despite such findings there is little data on changing patterns of work
satisfaction among middle managers in local government. A recent Local
Government Management Board/MORI survey (1994) provides some information
about current levels of work satisfaction, amongst local government
Senior/Principal Officers (these grades include some middle management
positions) . However, comparisons with a previous survey (1989) are not
possible because of different methodological techniques. As noted in
chapter 4, the 1994 survey reported that, overall, 63% of these officers
were "very/fairly" satisfied with their jobs, in relation to factors
which equate broadly with the intrinsic rewards listed above. In
relation to extrinsic rewards, scores were lower, especially in relation
to job security and promotion opportunities. A recent survey of change
practices in 16 local authorities reported that in most cases job
motivation remained high, but that: "In all cases, middle managers felt
that they faced higher expectations, increasing pressure, longer hours
and the need to develop a range of skills relatively quickly." (Leach et
al, 1993, pl6)
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Work satisfaction levels - middle managers' responses
During the interviews, the managers were asked to complete a short
questionnaire to identify their relative levels of work satisfaction,
using the scaling technique and the various intrinsic and extrinsic
reward categories adopted in the studies quoted above by Scase and
Goffee (1989), and Mansfield and Poole (1991). The definitions of these
rewards provided at the beginning of this chapter were read out at the
interview to clarify the meanings of these commonly used terms, and
ensure consistency of the managers' comprehension. Managers were asked
to grade from 1 (low) to 7 (high): first, the extent to which they
considered that their jobs offered opportunities for obtaining the
rewards listed; secondly, the level of importance they attached to these
rewards. The mean scores are reproduced in columns one and two of the
table reproduced below. The third column - obtained by subtracting the
mean scores in column 2 from those in column 1 - gives an indication of
managers' levels of work satisfaction in terms of how far they perceive
opportunities for these rewards to match their desire for them. 	 The
closer these scores are to 0.0, the closer the match beteen the desired
and perceived opportunities for obtaining that particular aspect of work
satisfaction:
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These results show clearly that the most significant source of job
dissatisfaction for these managers was a lack of the desired level of
job security, with opportunities for promotion ranked second. The
managers' desires for the intrinsic rewards of independent thought and
action, self-respect and esteem, and personal growth and development
were not met by the opportunities in their jobs, but to a considerably
smaller extent.	 Pay almost exactly matched expectations, whilst the
opportunity for developing close work friendships exceeded significantly
the importance which the managers attached to it.
Changes in middle managers' overall levels of work satisfaction
The managers were asked to indicate whether their overall levels of job
satisfaction had increased, decreased, or remained the same, as a result
of the changes introduced since the mid-l980s in their management roles
and the authority's management systems. They were then asked to identify
the main reasons for the changes, if any, in their work satisfaction
levels. The basic results are as follows:
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CHANGES IN MANAGERS' LEVELS OF JOB SATISFACTION
numbers (p.rcentages)
Overall increase in job satisfaction 	 38	 (79.2)
Overall decrease in job satisfaction 	 8	 (16.7)
Remained the same	 2	 (4.1)
Totals	 48	 (100)
Reflecting the generally positive responses of Stewart's middle managers
outlined above, the results suggest a general overall increase in the
levels of work satisfaction experienced by the majority of these
managers - over three-quarters - since the mid-80s. The reasons for
these increases were explored in the interviews, following completion of
the questionnaire, and the results are summarised below, followed by an
analysis of the responses by those managers who reported overall
decreases in their work satisfaction levels.
Managers experiencing an overall increase in satisfaction
Many managers attributed their increased work satisfaction primarily to
the perceived increases in the intrinsic rewards of personal growth and
development, and independent thought and action. These increases
appeared to derive predominantly from the managers' experiences of
greater degree of power, control and freedom over their management
decisions, arising from the introduction of devolved management. The
following quotation is typical of many such responses:
"It's more satisfying - with the devolution, I've definitely taken
on more responsibility in dealing with day-to-day matters. I don't
have to refer things upwards as in the past, and I have the
confidence that the management above me have confidence in me, and
I do things automatically now that perhaps years ago I would have
thought, well, I'd better check this with someone. I'm making
decisions, and I feel I'm actually contributing to things. When
you've got a brain as we have, you want to use it. You don't want
to be told forever, well, you've got to do things this way. I think
everyone feels that if they can use their potential, or get
somewhere near their potential, they're working better, they're in
a better frame of mind, and that means you're giving more to the
organisation,	 and the organisation's benefitting" 	 (Highways
Provider manager).
Numerous examples were provided by most of these managers of their
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increased work satisfaction arising from their greater decision making
powers. These ranged from, for 2 managers, their recently acquired
authority to sign their own letters (apart from those sent to elected
members, which still required "vetting" at more senior levels) to
increased control over service development and resource deployment,
including personnel and financial management. Reflecting the responses
made by Dopson and Stewart's middle managers quoted above, these
increased decision making powers were the largest single source of
increased work satisfaction reported by the BCC managers. Another
important source included increased feelings of achievement and
recognition deriving from a greater emphasis on results - on what one
manager described as the new "performance culture":
"In some ways, because it's longer working hours, the job is less
satisfying, but there's more satisfaction at the end of it in the
performance attitude. Achieving. You actually feel you can
achieve something, rather than just doing something" (Commercial
Services Provider manager);
"Power has devolved downwards. You stand or fall by your own
results, and therefore, if your results are good, then the
corollary to that is, then, that you stand up there as being the
person that's done it, you get the recognition, you have a higher
profile because of it" (Highways Purchaser manager)
In addition, some managers commented on the satisfaction they derived
from overcoming problems which had arisen from Barset's moves towards
the "new" management systems. These problems included increased
workloads, increased competition from deregulated markets, resource
constraints, and the needs within the new culture to focus constantly on
opportunities for achieving improvements in service delivery efficiency
and effectiveness:
"There are more opportunities for job satisfaction, simply because
if you win through a difficult - I mean, there are more difficult
situations now, so when you win through a difficult situation,
then you feel quite good about it. You feel as if you are getting
a positive result" (Commmercial Services Provider manager);
"I complain about the fact that there's more to do and there's only
the same time to do it in, but that's another challenge. And I
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prefer a job where I'm being challenged rather than a job where
I'm coping (Highways Provider manager).
Some managers clearly derived considerable satisfaction from introducing
more private sector style "business-like" improvements to their resource
utilisation and service delivery, and from running a "tighter ship"
(Finance manager). They appreciated the opportunity to overturn the
traditional adverse image of local government as "having, if you like,
dead-legs who will hide under all the bureaucracy and administration and
not make any decisions." (Highways manager). There was a feeling amongst
these managers that the restructuring had weeded out some of the "dead
wood" amongst staff who were unable or unwilling to become more
innovative and entrepreneurial. This meant that, almost by definition,
those managers (i.e., the respondents) who had survived the changes
constituted a "new breed" of local government managers, who were, in
many cases, more concerned about, and more able to manage more
efficiently and effectively, services which were more responsive to
consumer demand. Many managers expressed considerable satisfaction with
the many improvements they felt they had made to improve service
provision, and with the higher level of commitment which they perceived
as operating in the Authority towards meeting consumer needs. A Social
Services Department manager explained:
"There's been a huge change to actually looking at needs-led
services rather than resource-led services - using family aids to
actually do the things you feel the family needs, rather than
what the family aid resource said they could offer to start off
with. Before, your resource would be - you would know that your
resource was there to provide a support and cleaning service.
Mow, we're saying what we need is somebody who will help that
mother play with her kids.... Resources used to be cast in
stone. It was this feeling of security, you know, that people
were appointed to do a job. That they stayed. Now, they're
appointed to provide a service and there's a great deal more
emphasis on training and negotiation and clarity of
purpose... .you're actually talking to the person who needs the
service, and you're talking to the service provider - you know,
it's actual person-to-person negotiation. And it's great. My God,
the changes we've brought about in some of those families' lives
was just astonishing.	 So I'm great fan of that way of working.
The value is so clear" (Social Services Purchaser manager).
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Other factors contributing towards increases in overall feelings of job
satisfaction included more opportunities to develop new managerial
skills - such as financial management, people management, IT and other
skills, together with increased awareness of both Departments' and the
Council's overall policy direction. 	 -
The intrinsic rewards highlighted by managers, and where they had
experienced overall 	 increases in satisfaction levels, correspond
generally to those identified by Stewart's study, and reflect the
importance traditionally attached to intrinsic rewards by most managers
in the studies mentioned above. Only 4 managers in the "overall increase
in work satisfaction"	 category referred spontaneously to the
promotion(s) received as a consequence of reorganisation, as a source of
increased job satisfaction - although responses to earlier questions
showed that reorganisation had led to promotion for about half of these
managers, and appointments on the same grade level for the rest (with
one exception of one lower grade appointment). There was no spontaneous
mention of pay, security or work friendships as a source of increased
satisfaction.
it is important to note that most of these managers, although
experiencing overall increases in work satisfaction, also mentioned
areas where work satisfaction had been reduced by some of the changes
introduced since the mid-80s. The factor mentioned most here by the
managers referred to the sheer pace and volume of change - including
changes introduced by the Authority in its organisational structure and
management systems, and legislative changes affecting service delivery
methods. These changes were ongoing at the time of this research, and
were expected to continue with some internal changes already at the
planning stage, and with the Local Government Review of BCC due in the
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next year or so. As stated in Chapter 8, 41 out of the 48 managers had
indicated that, overall, they were generally positive about the impact
of the changes on their particular jobs (devolution figured
significantly again here). However, many managers, whilst taking care in
many instances to emphasise that they were not n dinosaurs u and were not
anti-change as such, expressed concern about the amount and the pacing
of the changes which they were expected to work with:
"The problem has been not the changes - I agree with every one of
them individually - the major problems we have is the quantity of
change which has taken place, one on top of the other. Very often
without being able to digest them - your feet don't touch the
ground. I mean, we had an occasion 18 months ago where we had 5
reviews taking place at the same time in this department and we
were spending more time being interviewed by people than we were
doing our work. I mean, that is all very well, but when it comes to
all of those reviews being put into effect at the same time, it is
a nightmare trying to make sense of it" (Finance manager, location
withheld to protect identity).
In addition some managers expressed concern about the introduction of
"change for change's sake" with insufficient attention paid to analysis
of the real need for change in some instances. Others were critical of
inadequate levels of consultation and planning, resulting in
difficulties at the implementation stage. Some managers said that they
actively enjoyed the continual change and found it stimulating, and that
they preferred, some for reasons connected with their own personal
predilections, a dynamic work environment. However, many appeared to
adopt a strategy that could be described as one of resigned acceptance
in the face of what they perceived to be an unstoppable and inevitable
situation of permanent change, due to the changes described above in the
national local government environment. Some managers also commented
adversely on BCC'S own policy of being seen as a "flagship" authority by
a central government of the same political persuasion, which they saw as
unnecessarily intensifying the pace and timing of the changes.
The second most significant source of dissatisfaction for the "overall
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satisfied" managers referred to limits	 on the	 scope of	 the
decision-making autonomy devolved to these managers under the devolved
management system (see full analysis in chapter 8). 	 Reflecting the
contradictions noted in the literature of the increased levels of
bureaucratisatiori which, paradoxically,	 frequently accompany the
introduction of devolved 'management systems (Hales, 1993, Mintzberg
1989), some managers, especially in the Highways and Social Services
departments resented the restrictions placed on the extent of their
devolved decision-making authority. In relation to their control over
the deployment of financial and personnel resources, they commented
adversely on the development of increasingly rigorous management control
systems to the point where many managers felt that devolution had not
"matched up to the expectations" raised by the authority's stated policy
intentions, and felt frustrated by these constraints. They also
expressed concern about reductions in their autonomy over professional
service development and delivery issues, arising from the introduction
of formal quality assurance systems in some parts of the Highways
department, and of manuals regulating service provision in Social
Services. Also significant here was the degree of control, through
service	 level agreements or contract, 	 exercised by Purchaser
professionals over Provider professionals (see discussion in previous
chapter).	 Expressing her frustration with these constraints on her
attempts to become a devolved "manager" rather than an "administrator"
(one of the cultural changes stressed by the authority), one Social
Services manager commented:
"A Manager has 'the buck stops here' sort of thing, and that's not
the case at all for me, almost to the point where I feel I'm
deskilled on some levels as a manager. Almost as if I'm not
trusted to make management decisions on my own and take the rap
for it if it goes wrong. We weren't managers in the mid-80s, and
things have shifted quite significantly since, but there's still a
residue around of not being able to - I always feel like Gulliver,
you know, sort of pinned down. I don't feel they've delivered what
they promised in terms of managerial responsibility and
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accountability. I sit here sometimes and think how the hell can
they expect us to become an Independent Business Unit if they are
still making us feel so dependent on our line management and on
the hierarchy - to answer to them for everything. They don't
actually trust us - it's an insult to our
intelligence .......Because of the concerns about scandals, and
more and more public accountability, and more and more being
answerable to the customer, the Citizen's Charter stuff and all
the rest of it, I think more and more we have to be, we're almost
unable to move, we're paralysed without someone more senior - I
can't appoint staff without checking up, I can't introduce new
fostering ideas because of the cost. It's all a bit of a sham
really" (Social Services Department Provider manager).
This quotation also points to the constraints identified by many
managers as continuing to distinguish public sector management from its
private sector counterpart. These included: the requirement for public
accountability (of both ends and means); the public visibility of both
the process and the outcome of decision making, especially in sensitive
areas like child care; the constraints of the central government
legislative framework within which local authorities are required to
operate; the nature of public sector funding, where, unlike the private
sector, opportunities for investment and income generation are severely
limited.	 A number of these managers generally accepted the
inevitability of such constraints in public sector organisations; they
understood and were receptive to the need for accountability - "it's the
nature of the beast". They nevertheless felt frustrated by the
restrictions thereby placed on their managerial and professional
autonomy, and, 	 hence, their levels of work satisfaction. These
frustrations were exacerbated when the legislation was seen as placing
essentially "unfair" restrictions on managers - for example, where the
cross boundary tendering regulations prevent local authorities from
competing on equal terms with their private sector competitors.
Similarly, the impact of potentially beneficial new initiatives, such as
the new "customer care" culture, was seen as limited in practice by
resourcing constraints, and by both national government and BCC's
restrictions on the extent to which income could be generated from
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customers or purchasers outside the Authority.
Other sources of dissatisfaction mentioned by some of these "overall
more satisfied" managers included many of those noted above in the
literature. Some managers expressed dissatisfaction with the increased
levels of	 routine administration, 	 arising from	 their new
responsibilities for budgets and personnel. Managers suffered from the
the contradictory pressures of being required to operate in a more
"risk-taking" and entreprenuerial fashion within a culture that was only
gradually shifting towards acceptance of the mistakes which would
inevitably arise from such risk-taking. At the same time, performance
was becoming more "visible" through the new formal appraisal system,
combined with the pressures of increasing workloads and working hours,
reductions in career opportunities as a result of restructuring (see
later discussion), and the need to develop and use new managerial
competence S.
While most managers had received training related to some of the changes
they had experienced in their work roles, opinions differed about the
efficacy of this training - the amount, the appropriateness and the
quality. All but two managers reported that they needed to acquire
further skills and competences. Using the Management Charter Initiative
competence areas as a framework, these competences included: managing
finance (15 mentions, particularly by Social Services and Highways
managers); managing information/communication, including computing and
negotiating/influencing skills 	 (27 mentions); managing people (8
mentions);	 managing operations,	 especially public relations and
marketing	 (11 mentions);	 personal effectiveness including	 time
management, problem- solving etc. (4 mentions).
Only two managers (in the "overall more satisfied" response categories)
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appeared to experience the tensions, which can be experienced by
professional staff who derive their work satisfaction and role identity
primarily from their professional excellence and expertise (and, in the
public sector, perhaps, from a "public service" ethos) and who are then
required, in part at least, to exchange this for satisfaction derived
from a managerial role identity instead. (Lorsch and Mathias, 1987;
Dopson and Stewart, l990a; Stewart, 1986). These Highways managers
regretted the reduction in their professional service activities, and
derived only limited satisfaction from their increased managerial
responsibilities, under the Authority's new "managerial" culture:
"I came into local goverInient because I wanted to do civil
engineering and serve the public - not run a business. But then if
you want to get on, you have to move over to
management.... (Highways Provider manager).
In contrast to these managers' experiences, most managers' responses
suggested that any reduction in their professional role satisfaction was
more than offset by "the management challenge", although some managers
expressed a desire to remain in the operational management sphere where
they managed their own professional specialist area. 	 Some actually
welcomed the opportunity to leave the professional service delivery role
behind them, and felt that the role transition was primarily a problem
for first line, rather than middle management. Discontent about the
Authority's "management" emphasis arose primarily from the threats posed
to individual professional autonomy by the closer regulation of
professional services activities discussed earlier. Social Services
managers appeared to be most affected by the Authority's shift in
emphasis from "cosmopolitan" to "local" professional orientations. This
was manifested largely through the reliance described in chapters 6 and
B, within the business planning process, on quantitative output
indicators for assessing performance. Some Social Services managers felt
that the more gualitiative aspects of their work were being be
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undervalued and, hence, carried out less thoroughly than previouSlY
(such as the assessment of the psychological condition of, say, elderly
clients, as opposed to their needs for concrete packages of services
like meals-on-wheels etc.).
One Highways manager speculated about the differences between his
professional services and those provided by Social Services (he had met
Social Services managers during the course of the Making Connections
programme). His analysis reflected Stewart's (1992) comments about the
differences between local authority services in the nature of the
clear/obscure relationships between inputs and outcomes, and the degree
of clarity/ambiguity of service objectives. These differences, in turn,
can contribute towards differences in management styles and control
systems, and the degree and nature of member and/or professional control
sought/gained over service provision decisions:
"Our reason for being is to look after the structure and fabric
of the roads. Now whether that's cleaning the gutters, or
resurfacing, or road construction - that is our function in
life. We have no freedom to say: 'we don't think that's the best
way of doing it, we'll make the railways better'. But Social
Services to some extent have - they may think 'that's not a
necessary task, we'll try another task' and solve the problem in
another way. We have a defined task - it's there, and we look
after it" (Highways Purchaser manager).
All of the managers were asked separate questions about the impact of
all the changes on their job security, their career plans and their
working hours. Their responses are discussed briefly below after
consideration of reasons given for declines in work satisfaction levels
by the eight "decreased overall satisfaction" managers.
Managers experiencing an overall decrease in work satisfaction
Only 8 out of the 48 managers interviewed had experienced an overall
decrease in work satisfaction. Three of these managers - all in the
Social Services Department - had lost their jobs at the time of the most
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recent restructuring; they had been given posts at a lower grade, one on
a temporary contract. All three reported extremely strong feelings of
reduced self-respect, esteem and status as a consequence, plus
reductions in decision-making authority and autonomy, a narrowing, in 2
cases, in the scope of their jobs, and high levels of stress:
"I got my redundancy notice in a fax. I got a fax that was signed by
a clerk - by a secretary in there (the office). My name was put on
it, you know - it was a DEAR NIGEL, a faxed letter saying that as a
result of impending changes I was likely to be made redundant. All
my colleagues in the area got the same thing. Then, the next time,
we got a nice letter from the same person when we actually got it
confirmed. It was a much more pleasant letter which said thank you
for your continuing support and all that crap ......I think I
suffered psychologically because of what happened to me. I became
very burdened by it all and I actually went off sick in the
November for 2 weeks, and that gave me the space to pull things
together. I've always been quite a go-ahead, quite dynamic sort of
person - not in a big way, but a positive person. But this year,
I've found it very difficult to motivate myself" (Social Services
Provider manager)
One manager attributed his increased feelings of dissatisfaction mainly
to decreased job security, and also to the increasing lack of certainty
about future developments in the Commercial Services Department, where
many business units were particularly susceptible to market pressures.
Three of the 4 other managers - all located in the Highways Department -
attributed their decrease in work satisfaction primarily to changes in
their job content. The situation of one manager clearly reflected the
tensions, which can be experienced by professional staff who derive
their work satisfaction and role identity primarily from their
professional excellence and expertise (see earlier discussion), and who
are then required, in part at least, to exchange this for satisfaction
derived from a managerial role identity instead. (Lorsch and Mathias,
1987; Dopson and Stewart, 1990a; Stewart, 1986). This Highways manager
regretted the reduction in his professional service activities, and
derived	 little satisfaction	 from his	 increased managerial
responsibilities which he did not enjoy.
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Two Highways managers resented the increased degree of job
specialisation, brought about by a functional reorganisation of
professional activities in the Highways department, as illustrated in
the quotation below. This development had reduced, the intrinsic job
satisfaction they gained from their professional role, and was only
partially offset by their appreciation of their increased managerial
responsibilities. This tendency towards increased role specialisation
was also mentioned as a source of dissatisfaction, particularly in terms
of career progression, for some "overall more satisfied" managers in
other departments:
"The job's become more stressful, but not more satisfying over the
last five years - it was more satisfying before when we were sorts
of jacks-of-all-trades for more jobs than we were strictly skilled
for, and there was training to make sure we could cope with it.
Since the splitting up of the function into Design and
Construction, it is not so satisfying" (Highways Provider manager)
One Highways manager felt that he had been too long in his job, and
wanted a sideways move to provide new experiences and challenges; he was
dissatisfied with the lack of provision within BCC to enable such
lateral mobility.
Impact of the changes on working hours, lob security and career
prospects
Specific question about these topics were put to all managers elsewhere
in the survey, and the results are briefly summarised here. Reflecting
the increased work pressures recorded in the studies mentioned earlier,
38 of the 48 BCC managers felt that their working hours and general work
pressures had increased. About half of these responses emphasised the
substantial nature of these increases. When taken together with the
associated pressures of the new "performance culture", reduced job
Security and sheer increase in the volume of work with restricted
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resource availability, these factors clearly posed considerable strain
for many of these managers. Such stress is illustrated by the comments
made by a finance manager who had moved, as part of the devo].utionary
process, from County Hall to a devolved post in the Education
Department:
"When I was at County Hall, you would be busy in the budget period
and you would be staying late, or taking work home or whatever, but
by and large you could see where your big pressure points were
going to come, there was more stability.......Now, the authority
has streamlined and most of the changes end up with slightly fewer
people and more work. You feel you are never quite doing enough;
however long you stay, there are 10 other jobs .......The job's
changed - you get the parents, the public, the headteachers - you
just didn't come across this at County Hall, you're more in the
front line now. Then you have also got to do the accounting type of
job, spreadsheets to write, and you think what should you delegate,
and what you should sort out, and it all tends to load up, so there
is a tendency - you think, well I got in at 8 and I'll do about 9
hours so I will go home at 5, and then you stay till 5.30, then 6;
then it is nearly 7 and it creeps round, and you think there is
something wrong with you, you're not actually coping, you're not
getting on, and then you can see that the other manager is still
here as well, and there are two more downstairs.....
Some managers felt the extra hours were an inevitable consequence of
increased work pressures; others emphasised that it was, to an extent, a
matter of personal choice. Thus, some managers emphasised that they
chose to work longer hours because of the personal pride and
satisfaction they derived from doing a really good, as opposed to an
adequate, job; others had adopted a policy of deliberately restricting
the potentially endless hours they could work as a kind of
self-protection measure. Some managers, both men and women, strongly
resented the "macho work culture" which they felt pervaded the
organisation (stemming from the Chief Executive's own well-known
"workoholic" attitude). It was considered that this was used (unfairly)
to assess the extent of managers' organisation commitment: "there's
something wrong with you if you 're not seen putting in the overtime".
Eight managers reported "no change" in working hours, explaining that
they had always worked longer hours than officially required; 1 manager
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had actually decided to reduce his hours and work effort because of his
overall reduced job satisfaction levels.
All of the managers felt that their job security had declined as a
consequence of all the changes in the local government environment -
"what job security?" was a common response here. Only B reported feeling
"reasonably secure" in their jobs. This decline was particularly
regretted by many managers within Finance sections and the Commercial
Services departments, who specifically mentioned the high levels of job
security associated with local government (at the time of their entry)
as a reason for seeking employment in this sector):
"I was made redundant twice in three years before I came here - I
didn't ever want to experience that sort of thing again, and I
thought I'd be safe in local government - but that's not the
case any more, it's a thing of the past - you're not safe
anywhere ....."(Commercial Services Provider manager)
Other managers, across all departments, saw the (originally) high levels
of job security they expected to experience in local government as a
kind of compensation for the generally lower levels of pay which they
considered were found within the public sector in comparison with
private sector pay levels. Many managers' underlying anxieties and
concern about their job security were exacerbated by the current high
unemployment levels (with few jobs available elsewhere in either the
public or private sector at the time of this research). The plans, noted
above, for further organisational change, in part related to the
forthcoming extension of CCT to white-collar services, were also raising
managers' job security anxieties. The purchaser/provider split, as noted
earlier, appeared to threaten the job security of Provider, more than
Purchaser managers. This reflects the concerns expressed in some public
sector literature that, 	 increasingly public sector organisation
employees were becoming divided into a core organisational "elite" - the
Purchasers, whose job security is relatively secure, in contrast to the
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more peripheral Providers whose jobs are at risk from private/voluntary
sector competition and/or externalisation (Langan and Clarke, 1994). One
Social Services manager, whose previous post had disappeared under a
departmental restructuring, commented that he had made special attempts
to gain a job on the Purchasing, as opposed to the Providing side,
specifically because he perceived Purchasing jobs to carry a higher
degree of job security. Overall, uncertainty about job security was the
largest single source of job dissatisfaction for these managers, as
shown on the table provided earlier, with dissatisfaction with promotion
prospects ranked second.
The responses to a specific question about the impact of the changes on
the managers' career prospects were very mixed. Thus, 15 (including 5 of
the "overall less satisfied" managers) reported that the changes had
resulted in a largely negative impact on their career propects, 14 a
largely positive impact, 9 reported "a bit of both positive and
negative", and 10 reported no impact at all. Positive comments referred
mainly to how the changes had "opened up" opportunities for obtaining
interesting new posts and for career development, partly by releasing,
through early retirement, some senior posts for new appointments, and
partly by providing more opportunities to develop and consolidate new
managment skills, useful for future career progression:
"With devolution, you've got a wider range of responsibilities,
you gain more experience and more breadth of knowledge which
makes you a better candidate when you apply for jobs. As
services devolved, we've taken on new responsibilities such as
the audit role, which we received quite recently, the welfare
benefits role, which was previously at the centre - we didn't do
that at all. We're soon to get fostering and boarding out
payments.. ." (Finance manager, Social Services Department)
Some managers expressed the feeling, too, that appointment processes had
become more "meritocratic", with more reliance on more "objective"
criteria of competence and performance capability. This derived partly
from the new "performance culture", which meant that opportunities
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increased for competent and committed managers:
"It's an improved situation for me. I think they are actually
looking at the people who are put in post a little more
rigorously, and, to be honest, if you are performing, it's
acknowledged more - it's calibre that counts more." (Highways
Purchaser manager).
Negative comments referred mostly to the decreased number of posts
available at more senior levels and the greater numbers of competing
managers on the next level down, due basically to the de-layering and
flattening of structures. The increased job specialisation into various
narrower professional areas (and by service department specialisms for
some devolved financial managers) were also considered as adverse
factors restricting some managers' future career progression. Some women
managers felt that women managers suffered, in terms of career
opportunities, from the authority's advocacy of a "macho" managerial
style. This was seen as represented by BCC's strong "Maggie Thatcher"
type leadership culture, by the few women managers present at senior
levels, by the "workoholic" pressures (particularly onerous for women
with families), and by the quasi-military terminology used for some of
the cultural change motifs such as:
"Ready, Fire Aim' - it sounds like a very masculine thing, you
know, like summing up at the end of a meeting: 'can we have some
BULLET points' - these awful male expressions ....." (Social
Services Provider manager).
These mixed responses reflect the divergent views presented by the
different managers represented in the literature noted above. They
result from a complex and interacting number of factors clearly
influencing individual responses such as the managers' positions in the
career cycle mentioned above, their degree of success in obtaining posts
they wanted under the reorganisations, and, for some managers, the sheer
luck "of being in the right place at the right time."
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Conclusion
Overall, then, the majority of the middle managers reported increased
levels of intrinsic work satisfaction, relating primarily to the
increased opportunities for independent thought and action, and personal
growth and development arising primarily from the the devolved
management systems, the new "performance culture" and the new emphasis
on improving service design and delivery. Those managers reporting
overall decreases in work satisfaction referred to decreased career and
job security opportunities, and changes in departmental groupings of
functions which narrowed the scope of their jobs, as the main reasons
for their dissatisfaction. Apart from the two key exceptions of
promotion prospects and job security, job satisfaction levels appeared
fairly high. However, for many managers, increases in work satisfaction
were offset by the considerable increases in both volume and pace of
change, together with increased working hours and work pressures, and
decreases in job security. Some managers, especially in the direct
service provision departments, were also concerned about decreases in
both their managerial and professional autonomy deriving from increased
centralised regulation of their activities in both of these spheres.
Comparison with other studies (mentioned earlier) about the impact of
similar organisational changes on middle management work satisfaction is
difficult because of different methodologies and survey dates, and the
absence of studies concerned specifically with local authority middle
managers. However, the results from this survey correspond more closely
to Dopson and Stewart's study 	 (1990a; public sector managers
specifically), showing a generally more positive view of the change
impact on middle managers'job satisfaction, than to the more negative
attitudes expressed by Scase and Gof fee's (1989) "reluctant" managers
(public and private sector mixed). A recent large-scale survey on the
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subject (Mansfield and Poole, 1991; public sector managers identified
separately), comparing 1990 work satisfaction levels with those
identified from their earlier 1980 survey, reported relatively small
changes in their public sector managers' work satisfaction levels. The
exception here related to significant decreases in satisfaction with
security (as would be expected) and with pay, reflecting comparisons
being made at the time with private sector managerial counterparts.
Apart from job security, the BCC managers reported generally higher
levels of job satisfaction across the measurement categories than the
managers in other studies.
Apart from the methodological considerations, a number of key factors
undoubtedly contribute towards the different views about changes in work
satisfaction levels expressed by the managers in these studies and in
this survey. Individual managers' expressed levels of work satisfaction
will tend to vary over time according to perceived changes in these
managers'	 general organisational environment, in 	 their specific
departments and jobs, and in their personal circumstances (Mintzberg,
1973; Tyson and Jackson, 1992). This appeared to be reflected in the
responses of the BCC managers, although the sample characteristics and
small numbers preclude any firm conclusions. Thus, for example,
individual managers' age, sex and position in the career cycle can
influence their work satisfaction levels.	 Corresponding to the results
of Scase and Gof fee's study, the importance attached to promotion
opportunities declined amongst the older managers in this study, who
were at the end point in their career cycle. The 11 women managers were
twice as dissatisfied with their promotion prospects as the male
managers. All except 1 of the 11 women managers (located largely within
younger age groups than their male counterparts) had strong career
aspirations, and wanted to progress further up the organisational
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hierarchy, and some, as noted earlier, felt that this was harder for
women to achieve than men. However, the problems highlighted in a
number of public sector management texts (Dopson and Stewart, 1990a;
Laf fin and Young) of persuading professionals committed to a
professional role identity to assume that of a manager, did not appear
to any significant extent amongst the BCC managers, possibly because
this transition, in cultural terms, had been largely completed by the
time of this survey. Moreover, as one BCC manager suggested, it may be
that this role conflict is experienced mainly at first line management
levels, and is largely resolved by the time managers progress further.
In addition, departmental differences could be identified in the levels
of work satisfaction reported by the BCC managers, reflecting
Mintzberg's contingency theory of management roles, where managers'
particular functional specialism and departmental location can influence
the nature of their role behaviour. For example, within the independent
thought/action satisfaction category, whilst the Commercial Services and
Social Services managers both attached the same high level to the
importance for them of independent thought and action, there was a
significant difference in the opportunities perceived as available by
the managers in each department - these were significantly lower amongst
the Social Services managers, resulting in lower work satisfaction
levels for them than for their Commercial Services counterparts. These
differences may reflect, at least in part, the different service
characteristics of these departments. 	 As John Stewart (1992)
emphasises, local authorities are not single homogeneous entities in
terms of their products" or services; particularly at County level,
local authorities are highly differentiated. He notes that within
services where political salience is high and the activity cannot be
pre-determined, organisational control will be tight leading to
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centralisation" (p18)
The nature of Social Services departments, within BCC as elsewhere,
would appear to reflect this model. The services provided here can be
very politically sensitive (child abuse, for example) and often involve
uncertain performance outcomes which cannot easily be predetermined. For
example, it is difficult to determine in advance the service package
required by a particular family, or set clear criteria here for
assessing performance effectiveness. This analysis supports the comments
made by the Social Services managers mentioned above about the
tendencies they perceived towards increased centralised managerial and
professional regulation of their activities, which was limiting their
opportunities for work satisfaction. 	 In contrast the Commercial
Services products were not politically sensitive, and the outcomes were
predictable and capable of predetermination - sales targets, turnover,
financial rates of returns	 etc.	 These required less senior
management/member regulation of day-to-day operations, and, consequently
more scope for independent thought and action by the managers - see also
the discussion in Chapter 8 about devolution.
In relation to the managers' problems with the continuing pace of change
and the impact that this will continue to have upon work satisfaction
levels, the change management literature suggests that several key
change management factors will have an impact on levels of managerial
work motivation and satisfaction. A recent Local Goverxment Management
Board study (Leach et al, 1993, piG) "a key difference (in motivation
levels) between authorities where middle managers felt supported and
valued by their authority and those where they did not." This view is
supported by Dopson and Stewart (1990), who similarly argues that middle
managers' attitudes towards change are likely to depend on, amongst
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other things, "what is done to try and help them to think positively and
to adapt to change, including incentives, management training and
communications about the rationale for the changes. 'The real issue is
can the organisation provide the manager with a challenge, stimulus and
reward'" (p 12).	 -
As noted above, many BCC managers reported that their jobs had become
generally more uchal].enging and stimulating", and, by the time of this
survey, BCC had certainly introduced many of these recommended change
management practices. For example, partly as a result of an employee
survey, held in 1990, BCC had introduced a number of initiatives to
ensure that more information about current and expected future changes
was disseminated widely throughout the Council by means of reports and
newsletters issued regularly by the corporate management team. These
initiative included a comprehensive middle management development and
information dissemination programme - the Making Connections initiative
described earlier. Many managers also expressed the view (as indicated
in chapter 7) that the Council had certainly tried, even if it had not
always succeeded, to introduce better information provision about
proposed	 changes	 (although	 progress	 towards	 more
consultation/involvement opportunities was less evident) . Mention was
also made of the training provided to help them acquire new managerial
competences (although opinions about the efficacy of this inevitably
differed).
BCC's relatively careful attention to improving its change management
processes certainly appeared to contribute to the increased work
satisfaction levels reported by the majority of the managers. A more
crucial contributory factor, however, appeared to be the increases in
managerial autonomy, arising largely from the introduction of
devolution, identified by many managers as the primary source of their
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increased work satisfaction levels. 	 Yet,	 these	 increased
decision-making powers are beginning to be eroded by the
counter-tendencies towards organisational recentralisation and reduced
levels of managerial autonomy reported by the managers in the previous
chapter. These tendencies - plus the doubts expressed by many managers
about the efficacy of the Purchaser/Provider split, and their concern
about the accelerating pace of change (including fears for their own job
security and career prospects) - clearly pose a threat to the
continuation of the managers' current relatively high job satisfaction
levels. These problems raise a number of theoretical and practical
issues related to the management of change in public sector





n increasing volume of puh].ic sector literature during the l980s and
1990s identified the development of a "new management model within
local government, involving essentially a move from bureaucratic and
professionally dominated "administration" to more flexible, customer
orientated, private sector style "management" of service provision.
However, the evidence suggesting that growing numbers of local
authorities are adopting at least some features of the "new" management
systems tends to be derived predominantly from "official" accounts of
such changes, provided by senior managers. Relatively little empirical
investigation has been undertaken into the extent to which these formal
changes in management systems and role prescriptions have resulted in
changes in work behaviour and job satisfaction experienced by managers.
Formally adopted changes introduced by senior managers may or may not be
manifested within the actual role behaviour adopted by middle managers.
If little or no real behaviour change takes place at this level in the
organisation, then, arguably, moves within local authorities towards the
"new" management model are largely cosmetic. It is thus essential, when
attempting to assess the impact of formally espoused changes within
local authorities, to examine the extent to which, and the way in which,
middle managers have adopted new forms of work behaviour in accordance
with the "new" managerial role prescriptions.
The objectives of this research, therefore, have been to identify the
extent to which the formal managerial role prescriptions included in the
"new" management model were translated into behaviour change by middle
managers. In addition to focusing on the extent to which the "rhetoric"
of the new" management model percolated down the organisational
hierarchy to produce real" behavioural change, the research has also
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been concerned with the role of middle managers in implementing change.
As a number of studies suggest (Scase and Goffee, 1989; Smith, 1990;
Dopson and Stewart, 1988, 1990), middle managers play a key role in
change implementation. It can be argued that consideration of the impact
of structural change on middle managerial work roles arid work
satisfaction levels is required in order to maximise their commitment,
and minimise their resistance, to the continuing and accelerating pace
of change within local authorities.
After reviewing the increasing volume of literature identifying the
nature and extent of the adoption by local authorities of the 'new"
management systems, a case study approach has been used for conducting
the empirical research. A local authority (Barset County Council), which
had adopted as a matter of policy most of the prescriptions and
practices associated with the "new" management model, has been selected
as a critical case for examination. Documentary evidence and interviews
with senior managers have been used to analyse the authority's
progression during the l980s and early 1990s from the "traditional" to
"new" forms of organisational structure and management systems, followed
by interviews held with middle managers to identify the extent to which
the Authority's formally adopted "new" managerial policies and role
prescriptions had permeated and transformed their work behaviour.
Semi-structured interviews have been held with 48 middle managers
located in four departments - two direct service provision departments
(Social Services and Highways), and two support service departments -
Finance and Commercial services. Nintzberg's models	 1973, 1983, 1989)
of organisational design and managerial roles have been used throughout
the research as a framework to provide theoretical coherence for
analysing the general trends within local government towards the
adoption of the new management systems, and for analysing the data
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obtained from the case study authority.
Key results of the case study research
The extensive restructuring which took place within Barset County
Council (BCC) between the mid-1980s and early l990s, corresponded
closely with the key features of the unewil management model identified
in the local government literature. The traditional emphasis on vertical
and hierarchical regulation of organisational activities moved towards
an emphasis on thorizontal" market-based forms of regulation and
coordination - involving the introduction of internal markets (the
Purchaser/Provider split) - and towards the network or "boundaryless"
forms of organisation, involving managers in extensive liaison
activities with service suppliers and consu.mers/referers in other
public, voluntary and private sector organisations within the "mixed
economy" of service planning and provision. The traditional reliance on
the standardisation of professional skills and knowledge together with
relatively centralised resource management control systems (focusing on
the achievenient of economy and efficiency) moved towards an emphasis on
control over outputs and outcomes (effectiveness).
These control systems were designed to enable the decentralisation of
operational decision-making authority to lower level managers within a
devolved management system. Managers at all levels were made accountable
for meeting clearly defined resource utilisation and service delivery
targets, operating within a strategic planning framework (including
business plans for each department), designed to maximise elected member
(rather than professional officer) control over policy decisions. A
clearly specified corporate culture of core BCC values, beliefs and
principles included, predominantly: a strong sense of leadership,
direction and purpose throughout the authority; the introduction of
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devolved management	 systems	 (the devolution	 of operational
decision-making authority to lower level managers); the development of a
customer care approach, involving increased levels of responsiveness to
consumer and community demands and needs for services.
These changes required new middle management role prescriptions, within
each of Mintzberg's thre managerial role sets - interpersonal,
informational and decisional. 	 Managers were expected to adopt
transformational and motivating styles of leadership, which facilitated
staff assimilation and adoption of BCC's new core values and ways of
working. In the context of BCC's new staff development and appraisal
system, they were expected to empower their staff to perform up to and
beyond their capabilities, involve their staff more in their work-unit
operational decision making activities, and ensure their participation,
in Barset's more "open" organisation-wide communication and consultation
systems. They were required to become proficient in the negotiating and
influencing styles of behaviour and information exchange activities
necessary for exercising their new functional responsibilities within
the devolved management system, and for working effectively within the
Purchaser/Provider market system. This required more extensive liaison
and information exchanges with personnel from other BCC departments, and
from external organisations, and more involvement in inter-disciplinary,
and functionally flexible forms of team working with staff from many
different professional orientations. 	 In the context of BCC's moves
towards more decentralised decision-making systems,	 control over
operational decision-making was devolved to managers at lower levels in
the organisation, within a firm framework of accountability for
achieving performance targets. Managers were expected to act as
entrepreneurial change agents - in the sense of developing more
efficient and effective methods of identifying, and responding to,
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consumer and community needs and demands.
Interviews with managers indicated that the majority of them had made
significant changes in their work behaviour within each of the three
role categories - in accordance .with BCC's new managerial role
prescriptions. They were aware of, and able to define most of the key
features of the new corporate culture and management system, and they
provided concrete evidence to suggest that they had put into practice -
to varying extents - many of the behavioural prescriptions outlined
above. However, within each role category, they also identified a number
of constraints operating to limit the extent of these behavioural
changes - suggesting, in turn, limits on the extent of Barset's
transition from the "traditional •• to the "new" management model. They
appeared to experience a degree of role tension and ambiguity, with some
factors driving and enabling them towards adopting the new role
behaviour, and other factors inhibiting this progression.
Thus, within the leader role, many managers' responses suggested that
they were attempting to adopting more charismatic and inspirational
leadership styles - corresponding to Bass and Avolio's transformational
leadership model (1990). This included an emphasis on enthusing staff by
setting clear policy directions, and encouraging them to develop
positive attitudes towards change, and to change their working practices
in accordance with the new BCC core values and management systems.
Within the recently introduced staff development and performance
appraisal system, managers were focusing more on enabling staff to
identify their own individual training and development needs. Managers
were encouraging them to "stretch" themselves by taking on more
challenging work, and on empowering them to take responsibility for
planning and carrying out their own work within a structured framework
of clear performance targets.	 Managers were also placing greater
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emphasis on participative and/or consultative leadership styles,
involving their staff in work unit decision-making, and on developing
more structured processes for ensuring that they were kept informed
about, and had the opportunity to discuss and provide feedback on,
developments and changes relating to their own work-unit, and to wider
departmental and organisational issues.
Yet, certain factors inhibited the full adoption of this leadership
style. More charismatic, inspirational and participative leadership
styles were seen by some managers as simply alien to their own abilities
and preferred ways of working. Some managers appeared to experience
tensions between requirements to adopt more participative and enabling
management styles and, because of pressures to drive change forward
quickly, the need to adopt more directive - and even autocratic - styles
to ensure speedy implementation of change, especially with staff members
who were more resistant to the new culture. Some managers experienced
tensions between the way in which they were held more tightly
accountable for achieving results, under the new "performance culture",
and the expectations that they should adopt more "empowering and
enabling" management styles. They felt there was an unacceptable degree
of risk in delegating operational control to their staff over achieving
results for which they (the managers) were held accountable. Similarly,
the tighter performance monitoring experienced by their staff, through
the formal performance appraisal system, resulted in reluctance on the
part of some staff to adopt more challenging or "stretching" work
targets. Perceived links between "success" or "failure" in meeting
performance targets and the performance related pay system exacerbated
such reluctance.	 Moreover, the idea of "payment by results" also
encouraged more calculative attitudes to work amongst staff, especially
as the opportunities for gaining the higher performance pay grades were
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perceived as very limited.
Within their liaison and informational roles, most managers reported
increased levels of involvement in liaison and information processing
and exchange activities. These increases arose largely from their new
functional responsibilities under the new devolved management system,
and the recenty introduced Purchaser/Provider split. BCC's moves towards
a more "open" and flexible organisation, also involved increased
information and communication flows both vertically and horizontally
throughout the Authority. Operating within a complex network of internal
(BCC) and external organisational contacts, the managers' involvement
here took place within the key contexts of: improving their work-unit
performance levels; working more effectively with, and improving
integration between sections and departments within BCC, and between BCC
and other public, private and voluntary sector organisations. Within the
market system of service planning and delivery, extensive liaison and
collaboration was required between Purchaser managers and Provider
managers (both within and outside BCC) to plan services and set up
initial service agreements or contracts, and to manage and monitor
service provision - corresponding with Snow's (1992) Lead Operator and
Caretaker managerial roles. Within the framework of BCC's customer care
philosophy, managers reported working more closely with individual/local
community consumers to plan, provide and monitor services which were
more responsive to local needs. As a consequence of these developments,
most managers reported an increase in their involvement with
inter-disciplinary project working-groups, which operated across
internal departmental and external organisational boundaries.
Managers also identified various key factors inhibiting the achievement
of effective integrative and collaborative forms of behaviour, and
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"open" communication and information flows. They experienced tensions
within the Purchaser/Provider structure between the conflicting demands
placed on them for "collaborative" forms of behaviour (required to
ensure effective partnerships between the two sides), and uselfishu
forms of behaviour (Hulme, 1994), arising from Purchaser managers'
objectives to minimise the cost of service packages and Provider
managers' objectives to maximise income from service provision. These
tensions were particularly evident in the absence, for the most part, of
true market mechanisms for resolving such conflicts. Other barriers
inhibiting free and open cooperation, communication and information
flows throughout the organisation, both vertically and horizontally,
included: the limitations of managers' own negotiating, communication
and information processing skills; logistical or technical problems
concerned with, for example, the new "contract bureaucracy" involved in
the	 Purchaser/Provider	 split,	 and	 the	 design	 of
information/communication systems; organisational "political" barriers
concerned with the "information is power" concept. The latter operated
particularly in connection with Purchaser/Provider relationships; an
additional upoliticalu problem concerned the reluctance of senior
management to communicate as openly as many managers wished on some
organisational change and/or policy issues, and to consult and/or
involve lower level managers in such higher-level decision-making.
Reductions in the professional/departmental separatism associated with
traditional local government management systems, were being replaced by
new "horizontal" tensions arising between Purchaser and Provider
functions.
tJnder the County's devolved management system, managers reported
significant changes in their decisional role behaviour. They had gained
responsibility for, and more operational decision-making control over,
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new functional areas such as finance and personnel, within a firm
framework of accountability for achieving results against resource
utilisation and service delivery targets. These were derived from
departmental business plans, and set for each manager within the
recently introduced appraisal and performance related pay system and the
new "performance culture". Many managers had attempted to adopt more
entrepreneurial change-agent roles, in the sense of actively seeking
opportunities to innovate and improve the efficiency and effectiveness
of their resource utilisation and service delivery operations. As a
consequence of these new decision-making responsibilities, plus their
adoption of the new Purchaser or Provider roles, the negotiating and
disturbance-handler roles also appeared to assume more significance for
many managers.
A key problem identified here by the managers reflected the crucial
distinction highlighted in the literature between the devolution of
operational responsibility as opposed to authority to lower level
managers (Mintzberg; Hales, 1993; Audit Coiiunission, 1989).	 Many
managers identified limits on their decision-making autonomy over their
newly	 acquired	 resource	 management and	 service	 delivery
responsibilities. The moves towards more decentralised forms of control
exercised through the performance measurement system (focusing on
outputs and outcomes) were accompanied by the introduction of
increasingly rigorous operational controls over work processes - over
both resource deployment, and,	 through more formalised	 quality
assurance mechanisms, over professional service delivery activities,
thus posing a threat to professional autonomy levels. Iew performance
controls over outputs were seen as constituting essentially an
additional overlay over existing and intensified forms of control over
work processes, exacerbated by the new "contract bureaucracy" which had
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been developed to regulate Purchaser/Provider relationships. Overall,
these developments suggested a strengthening of htcontrol N , rather than
"commitment", strategies on the part of the Authority. Many managers
considered that these contraints on their managerial autonomy restricted
the benefits associated with devolution. They felt limited in their
scope for adopting more entreprenurial ways of working, for achieving
more efficient and effective resource utilisation, and for becoming more
responsive to consumer needs and demands.
The increased overall levels of job satisfaction reported by most
managers - (within the intrinsic rewards categories of independent
thought and action, opportunities for self-developments, self-esteem and
status - were attributed by managers largely to their new devolved
management powers. However, the increasing level of contraints on their
managerial and professional autonomy were beginning to dilute their
relatively high job satisfaction levels. These were also threatened by
the continuing and accelerating pace of change in the Authority, and by
reductions in the levels of job security and promotion/career
progression traditionally associated with the public sector.
These findings raise a number of important theoretical and operational
issues concerning changing management roles within local government.
These issues are analysed below, together with the implications raised
for effective change mangement within public sector organisations.
Before doing so, however, it is important to emphasise that the findings
must be treated with caution, in the context of the limitations of
undertaking a small case-study analysis.
The key problem with a case study approach is the extent to which the
case study findings are capable of generalisation beyond the confines of
a particular case. Although, as outlined in Chapter 5, Barset County
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Council represented a "critical" case, where the results can be seen as
illustrative of wider trends affecting middle managerial role changes in
other comparable authorities, further research within other authorities
with similar external and internal characteristics is clearly required
to assess the extent to which the results generated here would be
replicated elsewhere.
Moreover, resource constraints - particularly time - inevitably limited
the amount of data which could be generated - notably through limits on
the number of middle managers (forty-eight) who could be interviewed
about their role-change experiences. The broad nature of the topic ( the
impact of organisational restructuring on managerial behaviour) also
meant that some issues could not be explored in as much detail as would
have been preferable. Some topics - particularly the leadership role,
and the nature of the "political" forces operating within the Authority
- required more extensive, structured and systematic treatment than was
possible in the semi-structured interview format used.
In addition, the relatively small number of managers who were
interviewed made it impracticable to use statistical methods for
analysing the responses to the questions with predetermined range of
responses	 (including the self-administered questionnaire on job
satisfaction levels) . This meant that it was not possible to attribute
with any degree of certainty differences in the responses between the
managers to particular factors such as age, gender, departmental
location etc. Any such differences which could exist require further
research - especially in terms of identifying the specific factors which
may affect their responses (see discussion below).
Ke Research Issues
This section considers the utility of Mintzberg's contingency theory of
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organisational structure and managerial roles for carrying out the
research undertaken in this thesis, and then goes on to consider some of
the issues raised for future research.
As outlined in Chapter 1, Mintzberg's theory was used throughout the
thesis to provide an ordering framework for: (a) organising the
extremely wide range of theoretical and empirical material available
about organisational restructuring and the impact of restructuring on
managerial roles; (b) selecting and analysing the empirical data
obtained from the case-study local authority. In general, this framework
worked well in both these areas; it proved, as Mintzberg intended,
suitable for identifying and analysing the key changes from
"traditional" to "new" management systems and roles within local
government, and for analysing the empirical data. In particular, given
that the main purpose of this thesis was to examine the extent to which
the "ideal type" "new" managerial roles prescribed by the "critical"
case-study authority were actually being implemented by the middle
managers (acting as key change agents), Mintzberg's managerial role-set
worked very well for assessing the extent to which these behaviour
changes had occurred in accordance with the authority's expectations.
Moreover, the differences in responses between individual managers about
their behavioural manifestations of the "new" roles appeared to reflect
many of the contingency differences predicted by Mintzberg in managerial
role behaviour - notably, differences between public and private sector
environments (and, hence, structural features and role prescriptions),
between functions and departments, and between individual managers' own
work-role preferences and expectations.
tn relation to the latter point, the main limitation of Mintzberg's
contingency theory of managerial roles concerned his focus on developing
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predictive connections between these variables and managerial role
behaviour, rather than on exploring the notion of underlying causal
mechanisms or processes (see chapter 1). Thus, given its stated aim of
producing an ordering, descriptive analysis of middle managerial role
changes within the Authority, this thesis could only suggest the
existence of possible causal connections between these factors and the
various different behavioural changes reported by individual managers.
Further research could usefully investigate such possible causal
relations, through a	 systematic analysis of the managers' own
constructs about the purpose and content of their managerial roles
within local authorities - about the meaning they attached to these
roles, and about why they chose to adopt, or not, particular forms of
managerial behaviour. Such research would generate additional insights
into the extent of the managers' resistance and/or receptiveness to the
"new" managerialism, particularly in relation to the part played here by
informal power relations and "organisational politics".
One interesting issue raised for further such research during this study
concerned the way in which the managers' locations within the four
different departmental/functional specialisms appeared to affect the
nature of their role behaviour changes. 	 Thus, for example, the
managers' adoption of the two most crucial components of the new
managerialism - devolution, operating in conjunction with the new market
system - clearly varied between the four departments in relation to: the
managers' different interpretations and understandings of these role
prescriptions; the different ways in which their behaviour changed as a
consequence; the different constraints and opportunities which operated
to enhance and/or to inhibit the benefits (in terms of greater
efficiency and effectiveness) which were potentially available from
devolution and market systems. In general, for example, the application
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of devolution and market Systems appeared to be more problematic within
Social Services than with Commercial Services managers, for reasons
attributable, at least in part, to the very different nature of the
goods/service provision and work tasks and processes in these two
departments.
Social services provided personal, high-risk,	 highly politically
sensitive services - such as child-abuse work - to vulnerable end-users,
based on their needs and/or their statutorily/locally politically
determined entitlements. The line between particular work activities and
particular performance outcomes was not clearly demonstrable, and it was
more difficult to specify precisely in advance the desired outcomes of
complex work processess. As a consequence, service level agreements
between Purchasers and Providers (operating within a largely simulated
market) were more difficult to specify, and more likely to require
ongoing amendments. In contrast, Commercial Services provided low-risk,
non-politically-sensitive goods/services to a much wider range of
non-vulnerable customers located essentially within an almost full,
private sector-style market system, which was subject only to some
central government restrictions . on cross-boundary tendering, and to the
local authority constraints on the amount of "surplus" that could be
generated from internal customers. Performance outputs were unambiguous
and fairly easily predetermined - turnover, sales targets etc - in the
context of the provision of more impersonal, easily standardised goods
and/or tangible services.
The case study research clearly supported the construct of local
authorities as highly differentiated organisations, providing a wide
range of services within highly diversified markets. Local authority
departments differ across a range of dimensions identified by
contingency theorists such as Mintzberg, including; the nature of the
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product/service, and the different work processes associated with these
different outputs; the different expectations, 	 orientations and
skill/knowledge bases of managers and staff; the nature of the customer
base and the market; the degree of political sensitivity and/or risk of
a particular service; the extent to which service objectives are
un/ambiguous, non/measurable, and non/susceptible to predetermination of
the desired outcome - and, hence, amenable, or not, to the disciplines
of contracts or service level agreements. These differences are
important because they raise issues (which could usefully be pursued in
further research) about the optimum degree of differentiation (in terms
of centralised/decentralised management and control systems, use of
market systems etc.) which could most profitably be adopted by local
authorities for ensuring maximum efficiency and effectiveness of service
delivery within different departments.
Thus, for example, with regard to devolved resource management, further
systematic research could explore the extent to which (within different
departments, and within different Authorities) the potential benefits of
more efficient and effective resource utilisation are being realised, or
not, and why - especially in relation to the departmental differences in
the degrees of devolutiox-i of authority as opposed to responsibility
reported by the case-study managers. Similarly, with reference to the
purchaser/provider split, further empirical research could explore the
different forms which this system takes within different departments,
and identify the factors associated with more or less effective
implementation of such market systems within different service areas.
Particularly within simulated market conditions, what steps could be
taken by senior management - through the adoption, for example, of
particular forms of service level agreements or contracts and particular
types of internal pricing mechanisms - to reduce the tendencies towards
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the "selfish" behaviour manifested by some of the case study
purchaser/provider managers, and promote the development of more
productive "collaborative" relations between the two functions?
For ensuring maximum effectiveness, the research results suggested that
different systems and procedures are required for different services,
with their different client or customer groups, their different work
processes and service objectives, their different degree of true or
quasi-market status, and their different degrees of political sensitivey
or risk. As this case study demonstrates, middle managers, who occupy
key roles in the implementation of these devolved management and market
systems, can provide a valuable source of information about the
advantages and disadvantages of the possible alternative approaches to
service design adn delivery within different local authority
departments.
The same problem with achieving the optimum degree of differentiation,
whilst at the same time ensuring the approriate levels of coordination
within an organsation is, of course, experienced by private sector
enterprises as well. However, this point raises another significant
issue about the extent to which the different constraints and
opportunities operating within each department (to improve effectiveness
under devolution and the market system) could be attributed to: (a)
largely "technical" or "practical" problems experienced within all
organisations; or (b) wider "value-based" differences between public and
private sector organisations - related to the unique public
accountability requirements and the ambiguous (and subject to continuous
debate) roles of public sector organisations (Gray and Jenkins, 1993)
The results of this research suggest that some of the barriers to the
realisation of the full potential benefits of these "new" management
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systems were clearly "technical - albeit to different degrees, and in
different ways within each service department. These barriers included
problems with the design and implementation of information, training,
communication and change management systems, the practical difficulties
(within devolved and market systems) of maintaining control over more
decentralised organisations, and senior management (and elected member)
fears of losing power and status within such decentralised
organisations.
Yet, it was also apparent from this research that some of these problems
were exacerbated by, and derived at least in part from, the unicIue"
characteristics of local government. Essentially, the ultimate outcome
or "effectiveness of an authority is impossible to define objectively.
The overall effectiveness of individual local authorities can only be
assessed in terms of politically based value outcomes and processes,
rather than in terms of the achievement of the predominantly economic
goals (ultimately, profitablity) which measure the success of the
private sector organisation. The external political control systems of
local government (legitimated by direct, local elections), together with
local authorities' statutory obligations to provide specific services
and ensure equity of provision to those entitled to services, requires a
critical degree of central ccordination through senior management to
elected members, These local politicians are directly accountable to the
public for both the policies they adopt and the actions taken by staff
to implement these policies; the effectiveness of local authority
management systems has to be assessed, at least in part, in terms of the
extent to which they enable these public accountability requirements to
be met - and to be clearly seen to be met by the public.
The debate continues about the extent to which various components of the
"new managerialism" enhances or inhibits the achievement of these
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multiple and complex local government objectives. Further empirical
research is clearly required into the outcomes of the attempts made by
different local authorities to adopt - in different ways, and with
different aims - various aspects of. these 	 "new" management systems.
Given the absence of any clear measures of the effectiveness of such
systems within local authorities, with their multiple and diverse
values, tasks and objectives, middle managers constitute a useful source
of information about the operational efficacy of these systems.
Much of the impact of the "new" systems within individual local
authorities will, of course, depend on the ways in which the transition
from the "old" to the "new" is planned and managed. 	 This case-study
research raises a number of implications for effective change management
within public sector organisations, which are discussed briefly below.
Effective change management
Middle managers usually play a key role in change implementation. It can
therefore be argued that effective planning and management of change is
essential in order to maximise the commitment of these managers to the
proposed changes, to ensure effective implementation, and to minimise
structural and/or behavioural barriers which can inhibit the adoption of
new work patterns, and hence reduce the expectedly level of benefits -
at both individual and organisational performance level - to be realised
from change. As outlined earlier, the extensive changes reported by the
case-study managers in their work behaviour, 	 and their obvious
familiarity with the new corporate values and beliefs associated with
the Authority's "new" management approach, tend to suggest that Barset's
change management programmes had been fairly successful - in achieving
their stated ends of changing managerial behaviour and attitudes
throughout the Authority to those associated with the "new" management
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model.	 Moreover, most managers expressed fairly positive views about
the nature of most of the changes (although with significant
reservations in some cases about the purchaser/provider split) - in
terms of improving, overall, their .work satisfaction levels, and in
terms of ensuring more efficent, effective and zesponsive service
provision to individual and community consumers. 	 Most managers,
however, still identified a number of areas where change management
systems had been inadequate, and/or where the potential benefits - at
both the organisational and the individual manager levels - had been
only partially, or not at all, realised. Barset's change management
policies and practices (which have been noted and praised in a number of
Local Government Management Board and other publications), and the
managers' experiences of them, suggest a number of "good practices"
which could usefully be followed by public sector organisations when
designing and introducing change.
Firstly, individual managers simply differ in their own personal
preferences and predilictions for, and feelings that they operate more
effectively within,	 relatively stable or dynamic wor roles and
environments - in the extent to which, essentially, they enjoy or
dislike change.	 Whilst the practices discussed below can help to
alleviate negative attitudes towards change, some individuals will
nevertheless continue to have a preference for stable and more
structured work roles and work conditions. It is essential, when
recruiting new staff, to use selection systems which will ensure the
appointment of managers with the appropriate degree of orientation to,
preferences for, and competences in, working within relatively fluid,
flexible and changing work roles and environments.
Managers' reluctance to embrace changing working practices is also
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likely to be influenced by the degree to which they already possess or
need to acquire the new competences necessary for discharging their new
responsibilities. Clearly, an Authority can achieve much here, by
ensuring that adequate definitions of, and training in, the newly
required skills, knowledge and attitudes are identified and provided -
in advance of managers taking up their changed roles, and provided on
an ongoing basis thereafter in response to individuals' particular
needs. Training to develop skills such as time management, delegation,
information processing etc. may well prove of immense value in helping
managers cope with the problems, which frequently appear to accompany
public sector change, of "doing more with less", which can lead to
undesirable work pressures and stress, and longer working hours.
Managers are also more likely to be committed to change, and adopt
changing work behaviour roles if they perceive that enhanced intrinsic
and/or extrinsic rewards are likely to be derived from changed working
practices. The likely impact of changes on the rewards valued by
managers should be assessed when planning change. It is desirable to
ensure that changes can enhance, at least to an extent, opportunities
for the intrinsic rewards which appear to be of considerable value to
many managers - such as opportunities for self-development, self-esteem
and status, and, arguably of particular importance, independent thought
and action. It may be more difficult to maintain extrinsic reward
opportunities - especially those concerned with job security and
promotion opportunities. Authorities need here to focus on changing a
culture emphasising traditional hierarchical promotion structures to one
where lateral opportunities for movement are emphasised - involving
perhaps opportunities for enhanced intrinsic rewards of, say, chances to
acquire and develop new skills and roles. More advice and assistance on
career planning can also help here. If redundancies become inevitable,
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then systems which focus on sensitive handling of such issues, with an
end to uncertainties as soon as possible, plus provision of counselling,
arid help with finding alternative employment etc., can soften the
experience for staff made redundant. They can also serve to reassure
others, that, should the worse happen, support is assured to ease the
transition to alternative employment. Job insecurities are likely to be
increasingly experienced by Provider rather than Purchaser managers.
Provider managers may feel, unless measures are taken to prevent this,
increasingly less significant and of lower status than their Purchaser
manager counterparts - who may be seen as more secure, and more heavily
involved in high-status corporate activities such as strategy
formulation and planning.
Public sector managers' willingness and/or ability to adopt in full any
proposed changes in their work systems and behaviour is also likely to
be influenced by other interrelated factors. These are likely to
include, in particular, the extent to which: (1) the changes are
perceived as arising from "real" needs for change (i.e. changes which
will improve service delivery effectiveness and responsiveness to
customer needs) as opposed tQ externally imposed "Political" or
doctrinaire requirements, seen as having little or no relevance to
improved organisational performance); (2) the aims and objectives of,
and the reasons for, changes are clearly communicated at an early stage;
(3) appropriate procedures and processes are used to involve managers
adequately in change planning and design at an early stage, especially
to avoid unnecessary problems at the implementation stage; (4) the way
in which changes are "paced" in order to avoid overload or over-lapping
of too many changes simultaneously or in fast succession.
In relation to points (1), (2), and (3), clearly much here depends on
the strong and coherent leadership from the top - on clearly
- 481 -
disseminated consistent and well-argued communications, outlining useful
and positive rationales for the planned changes, followed by procedures
for ensuring that managers and staff throughout the authority are
involved as much as possible. This should involve real (as opposed to
token; the latter is usually quickly detected and can be worse than no
systems at all) participation and/or consulation over the changes - not
just at the outset, but on an ongoing basis. Continual monitoring and
reinforcement - particularly of cultural and value based changes - is
essential to avoid "drift" back into the "old" ways of doing things.
Role-model examples provided by senior management can be important here;
exhortations to adopt stringent "value-for-money" practices will be
resented and evaded if senior mangement are perceived to be spending
money on inessentials such as, say, new executive suites.
Little can be done by senior management or members about central
government legislative prescriptions or requirements for particular
changes. However, the way in which these are communicated, planned for
and implemented, with emphasis placed on the benefits, as well as
acknowledgement of any commonly perceived drawbacks (together with
positive proposals for overcoming them) can help to overcome resistance
to what may be perceived as "unnecessary" changes. Plenty of opportunity
for participation on operational matters from managers and øtaff located
lower down the organisation is also useful, as noted above, to help in
developing a sense of change "ownership". Clearly, too, members and
senior managers should be aware of the need to avoid "unnecessary",
"change for change's sake", especially in the context of point (4). Even
managers who are predisposed to "dynamic" role structures and
environments need time to consolidate and reflect on recent and current
developments. The pace and volume of central government prescribed
change is unlikely to slacken; neither are local member requirements for
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more effective resource utilisation in times of continuing resource
constraints, nor the ever-increasing demands from the public for more
effective and responsive services. Effective change management will
continue to be of high priority for all local authorities.
Future trends for middle managers in Local Government
What, then, is the future likely to hold for local government managers?
The short answer, essentially, is likely to be a continuation of the
current, ever increasing move towards the "new" management systems and
roles within the majority of local authorities (most of whom will
continue to exist in their present form following the vexy limited
proposals for reorganisation (in England) made by the Local Government
Review Commission in late 1994). Given the election of Tony Blair to the
Labour Party leadership in October 1994 and his launch of the "new"
(i.e. non-socialist) Labour Party, the hopes of some public sector
managers (and members) for the election in 2-3 years time of a Labour
Central Government, which would undo some of the legislative and
managerial prescriptions of their Conservative predecessors, are
unlikely to be realised. A new Labour Government would probably maintain
many of the new managerial initiatives and values introduced during the
l980s and 90s. Thus, managers will continue to be subjected to
increasingly tight resource constraints, continuing demands from both
central and local government politicians and the public for more and
higher service standards, and the continuation (including extensions
currently in the pipeline for many white-collar services) of mixed
economy forms of service provision.
Within this relatively hostile environment, local authorities are likely
to pursue either a business approach (involving a dominant business
culture or ethic, similar to that found within divisionalised private
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sector companies)), or a governmental approach (involving an emphasis on
community leadership and empowerment, and governance) (Leach et al,
1994). Either way, local authorities may well tend towards the adoption
of increasingly centralised control systems, in attempts to counter the
potentially fragmenting impact of these approaches. They may adopt more
rigorous and extensive use of performance measurements and work process
controls and specifications - especially within the context of the
extensions of market forms of service delivery, the need for contracts
and/or service level agreements to regulate service delivery, and the
strategic planning systems required to coordinate such fragmented
service delivery systems. Such control will be facilitated by the
growing use of more sophisticated computerised management information
systems, which are as yet, are only in their infancy in many
authorities. Utilisation of such systems may lead increasingly to a
fuller realisation of the enabling and fragemented "network" or
boundaryless u forms of organisation associated with the development of
the "enabling" and local authority, as more private, voluntary and other
public sector agencies become responsible for actual service delivery.
Increasingly, local authority workforces are likely to become subdivided
into a relatively secure and priviledged group group of core staff and
managers involved in strategic planning and purchasing of services, and
a less secure group involved in service provision - at risk from job
losses should contracts not be secured from the "enabling" authority.
Clearly, managers will need to continue to enhance their development of
the appropriate management skills and competences required to operate
effectively in this environment - especially in the areas of policy
analysis	 and	 development,	 networking,	 inspection/regulatory,
negotiation,	 and political awareness skills (for Purchaser Managers),
and leadership, business management, marketing,	 and operational
- 484 -
management skills (for Provider managers). Provider managers, in
particular, will have to develop new career and self-advancement
orientations - more akin to those of self-employed business-people - to
replace traditional vertical and hierarchical career structures.
Yet they may well operate wihin a more sympathetic public climate - in
the sense of a growing public acknowledgement of the value and
importance of welfare state and other public service provision, and a
decline in the aagressive individualism and self-responsibility
idelogies of the l980s.	 Market regulation and provision of service
provision - especially for manual services - is unlikely to disappear.
But there may be more emphasis on the development of more
non-competitive, as opposed to market, forms of service provision, where
trust and collaboration can be firmly established between purchaser and
provider functions. This may help to minimise the present growing gap
between policy-making and execution of service delivery, strengthen
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CH.APTER 5: EXHIBITS 5.1. - 5.3.
Exhibit 5.1.
Title:
Schedule for assessing the adoption of the "new management model by
Barset County Council, used for interviews with senior managers and for
examining documentary sources in stage 1 of the research
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Schedule for assessing the adoption of the knew management model b
arset County Council, used for interviews with senior mana gers/and for
examining documentary sources in stage 1 of the research
1. Change precipitators: (Hinings and Greenwood)
* Pressures on BCC from government and other sources to change
- financial, ideological - 3 'e's
- purchaser provider/internal markets/cct
- customer orientation
* key value changes from leader and senior managers during 1980s -
missions, strategies etc
* organisational capability - the CE and senior managers, leadership
style, implementation strategy etc.
* Functions of four research depts - Social Services, Highways,
Commercial Services, Finance
2. Organisation Design Parameters - changes (Mintzberg)
(configurations: loose federation of warring Depte to corporate
form?)
Design of superstructure
- changes in Committee and overall departmental structure since 1984/5
- charts
- Purchaser Provider split at Corporate headquarters and in Depts
- changes in structure of 4 depts - Social Services, Highways,
Commercial Services and Finance - charts for 1984/5 and 92/3
- Changes in numbers of hierarchical levels
- Changes in numbers of middle managers
Design of positions, behaviour formalisation, indoctrination
(culture)
- job descriptions - changes since 1984/5 - detailed activities to
objectives and performance targets? Numerical and functional
flexibility?
- cosmopolitan versus local orientation of professionals,
inter-disciplinary working/breaking of professional boundaries.
Emphasis on managerialism as well as professIonalism for middle
manager roles?
- PRP schemes and Performance Appraisal and Staff Development scheme
- part-time staff - changes. Temporary contracts - changes
Redundances?
- formalisation by detailed operational rules/professional external
expertise/performance outputs? Changes?
- cultural changes - training (Making Connections), new values from
CE? Professionalism and managerialism? Managers with management
qualifications
- examples in the Research depts?
Planning and Control systems
- New strategic planning system - medium term and annual plans and
performance targets for four depts
- changes in member/chief officer relations
- control systems - changes in operational rules/procedures,
professional (external) skills and knowledge, performance outcomes,
control through inputs, outputs and outcomes. Purchaser/provider
split and service level agreements/contracts.
- lateral linkages - within BCC, and between BCC and other agencies
- strategic planning, purchaser provider split, cross organisation
working groups etc. With external agencies? With customers/ the
community? Role of IT - new computerised management information
systems? Role of technostructure and support structure depts, in
light of devolution? Head of Profession role for Finance?
Communication systems?
Decentralisation/Centralisation of Decision-Making
- extent of horizontal (from technostructure to middle line)
decentralisation, especially finance
- vertical - devolution - rationale and method. From centre to
departmental COs to Areas to middle managers (see video book).
- controls on and limits of devolved powers
Middle Management Formal Role Prescriptions (Mintzberg)
- BCC definition and grades of middle managers
Decisional roles
- devolution, authority, control frameworks. CE values about
entrepreneurialism, Ready Fire Aim etc. (Kanter and empowerment,
middle managers as change agents). impact of purchaser/provider
split. Extent of fluidity and flexibility of roles here - see job
descriptions above.
Interpersonal Roles
- ceremonial, leadership. Impact of Staff Development and Performance
Review systems, CE statements on leadership, empowering workforce
etc. Transactional - Transformation leadership?
Liaison role - do under Information Roles
Informational Roles (plus liaison)
- See lateral linkages above, focus on work-group performance,
organisational integration, inter-organisational integration
(Tapscott and Caston). Links with customers (purchaser/provider
split, BCC close to the customer values). Who are customers -
individuals, purchaser, community; external or internal. Making
Connections. Impact of IT
Work satisfaction
- BCC staff survey, 1990. Changes in middle management numbers,
redundancies, re-application for jobs? Training provision?
Exhibit 5.2
Title:
Schedule for interviews with middle managers th Barset County Council
- 493 -
Schedule for interviews with middle managers
Section A
1. Name/identification number	 Date of interview
2. Age	 3. sex
3. Marital status
4. Highest educational qualification -
0 levels/CSE	 A levels	 OND	 HND	 1st degree
MA/MSC PhD	 Other Professional qualifications
5. Management qualifications - CMS 	 DMS	 MBA	 other
6. Job title	 7. Grade (g-j)	 8. Department & Section
9. Function - Purchaser 	 Provider	 Twin-Hatted
10 is your sëction/ünit's area of work subject to CCT within the next
two years?
11. Do you expect to be subject to "Externalisation" in the next 2
years?
12. Salary - list shown on card	 13. Other benefits apart from pension
14. Number of subordinates directly accountable to you
15. How many years have you worked for BCC
Section B
16. Have you always worked for BCC - Yes/No
17. Yes - Why/what made you decide to work for BCC
Was there any particular reason for choosing local government/the
public sector rather than the private sector?
18. No - ask for previous position, and firm
why did you move to Local Government (previous post private)
or	 if other public sector, why did you move to BCC
19. How long have you been in your present post
20. Why/how did you move into it/get it
21. How many posts have you held during your employment with BCC
22.Where do you see yourself moving next/ your career progressing?
Probe for reasons and extent of satisfaction with prospects
23. There have been a lot of changes at BCC recently with regard to
management and service delivery systems - what sort of impact do you
think these have had/are having on your career/promotion
prospects/opportunities?
24. For Finance - you are now based in the service departments rather
than in your central professional department - what sort of impact is
this having on your career/promotion routes?
25. Local government has a tradition of secure employment - how do you
feel about your job security with BCC?
26. (Depending on response), How important is job security to you? How
would you feel about having to leave BCC?
Section C
(Decisional Roles - resource allocator first).
27. I'm going to ask you now about the impact on your job as a manager of
some of the specific changes that have taken place over recent years
at BCC. One of the most important is the move to devolution - The CE
has talked a lot about the importance of devolved management. What
does devolution mean to you? How do you feel devolution has affected
your work?
Give CE definition: In Making Connections, the CE described
devolution as "giving those managers nearest the point of delivery
the maximum control of the functions which impinge on them and the
service req-uired to enable them to operate within a specified
organisational framework where accountabilities and limits of
authority are clearly understood."
Then - operational, financial, personnel devolution:
28. What impact has devolved management had on the extent of the control
you have over managing the services you provide for your customers - -
Ask for examples and then probe as necessary. Changes in control
since mid-80s?
29. How does this work - what sort of controls/limits are there on it
from your departmental superiors/departmental manuals/from the
centre?
30. How does the extent of your autonomy over service provision compare
with the pre-devolution days of the mid l980s? Examples?
31. Are there any areas where you would like more freedom or autonomy?
32. The performance appraisal system, and the performance targets - what
sort of impact have these had on your work?
33. What sort of input do you have into setting strategy and targets for
your service area - what sort of influence over these?
34. Looking at financial management, what impact has the introduction of
devolved budgeting had on the extent of your control over managing


department's goals. Have these ideas had any impact on the way you
work? Changes since the mid 80s? Examples?
57. BCC also seems to be emphasising the need for managers to give
people room", to concentrate more on enabling and helping staff
realise their potential. Have these ideas had any impact on the way
you work? Changes since the mid 80s? Examples?
58. What impact, if any, has the introduction of the Staff Development
and Performance Review system had on the way you manage you staff?
Changes since the mid-BOs?
59. Has the way you manage your staff changed since the mid 80s or
remained much the same? Probe on training and development activities.
60. How would you describe your own boss's leadership style with you?
(Ceremonial role)
61. Another aspect of the leadership role mentioned in the textbooks
refers to the role of the manager as a kind of figurehead - where
there is no decision making involved, but where the occasion demands
your presence as a kind of BCC or departmental symbol or figurehead -
like attending the official opening of a youth club, or presenting an
award for long service. Are you involved at all in any of these kinds
of activities? Any changes in extent of your involvement in this
sort of activity since the mid 80s?
(Liaison role)
62. Looking at your involvement with people and organisations outside
BCC, would you say you are involved in contact with other people to
exchange information or who are useful contacts to have? Examples?
Changes in the extent of your involvement with these activities since
the mid-l980s? Why?
Section F
(informational roles - all three)
63. I'm going to look now at the manager's role in collecting and
disseminating information - the idea of the manager as a kind of
nerve centre or clearing house for information gathering and
distribution
Looking first at communication with customers or clients outside BCC,
- BCC is placing increased emphasis on the importance of closer
contact with customers and the public generally. What sort of contact
do you have with customers and the public generally? Examples? Any
changes in the extent of your involvement here since the mid-80s?
(For managers with internal BCC customers, ask the same questions on
INTERNAL customers)
64. What impact has the Purchaser/Provider split had on your work here?
Examples?
65. Are you involved at all with Organisations or agencies outside BCC
providing services/resources/help for you or with you?
66. Has your involvement here changed at all since the mid 80s? Has it
increased or decreased or stayed much the same? Has the way in which
you do it/the importance attached to it changed or remained the same?
For managers who are customers receiving services from internal BCC
contractors/service providers ask the same question.
67. What impact has the Purchaser/Provider split had on your work here?
Examples?
68. Can you tell me about your involvement in inter-departmental!
inter-agency/interdiscip.inary work and project groups? Changes since
the mid 1980s? More or less involvement or remained much the same?
69. Turning now to communication within BCC, the employee survey of 1990,
identified the need for improved information flows and communication
systems within the authority, up and down, sideways, one-way and
two-way: What involvement do you have in these communication systems?
Changes since the mid 80s?
70. Communication horizontally or laterally, with managers and staff in
other sections of your department or other BCC departments - What is
the extent of your communication and information exchange with these
other sections and departments? How does it take place - what are the
mechanisms used - ask for examples. Changes since mid-80s?
71. Did you attend the Making Connections programme for middle managers
72. Looking at accessibility for you to information from elsewhere in the
County - since the mid-80s, has this become easier or more difficult
or stayed much the same?
73. Communication down from the Centre to you and from you back up again
- Have there been any changes here since the mid 80s in the amount of
information going up and down
74. The information you pass on to your staff - has the amount of this
changed at all since the mid-80s?
75. What impact has the introduction of computerised management
information systems had on your information processing activities ? -
probe about impact on the volume of information, its usefulness,
user-friendly nature of systems
76. Overall, would you say that the extent of your involvement generally
in information processing and exchange activities has changed since
the mid 80s - has it increased or decreased or remained much the
same?
77. Generally speaking, overall, in terms of information flows, to what
extent would you say that BCC has become a more open organisation, or
stayed much the same or got more closed?
Section G - competences and satisfaction
78. As a consequence of all these changes in your management role, what
changes would you identify in the management competences you need to
carry out your work effectively?
79. Overall, looking back to the mid-SOs, would you say you were
generally positive or generally negative about these changes and the
way in which your own job has changed?
Probe for reasons and for specific examples including:
Effect on length of the working week?
Show Porter Schedule, explain first two statements, and ask managers to
complete it (see last page of exhibit)
80. Has your job become, overall, more or less satisfying as a result of
all the changes? Probe or reasons.
Section H - Change
81. What do you consider to be the reasons for the introduction of all
these changes since the mid-1980s? Probe - were the changes an
unavoidable response to external pressures such as government
legislation or were they the result of choice by top
management! couricillors?
82. Also ask whether more or less direct contact with Councillors?
83. People's attitudes to organisational change can be affected by the
way the changes are introduced - the amount of consultation, the time
and effort given to planning and carrying out the changes etc - What
are your views about the way in which BCC went about introducing all
these changes?
84. There are various stages within the organisational change process -
preparing for changes, trying them out, adjusting to them and then
settling down with them/consolidating your position, so to speak -
what stage would you say best describes your own position at the
moment?
85. To what extent would you say that change is becoming a "normal way of
life at BCC? If a positive response, ask - have you and your
staff's attitudes towards change altered as a result of this "change
as a way of life" culture?	 -
86. To what extent has your own job security been affected by the
changes? - promotion and career prospects and importance - although
should have emerged under earlier questions
iiy other points the respondents wish to make
Listed below are a number of possible characteristics regarding your job,
please answer all sections and circle the number of each scale that
represents your opinion about each of the following:
low	 high
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
1. The opportunity for personal growth and development in my lob
position
a. How much is there?	 1 2 3 4 5	 6 7
b. How important is this to me? 	 1 2 3
	
4 5	 6 7
2. The opportunity for independent thought and action in my job position
a. How much is there?	 1 2	 3	 4	 5	 6 7
b. How important is this to me? 	 1 2	 3	 4 5	 6 7
3. The feeling of security in my job position
a. How much is there?
	
1 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
b. How important is this to me?
	
1 2	 3 4 5	 6 7
4. The amount of py for my job
a. How satisfactory is it	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
b. How important is this to me? 	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
5. The opportunity to develop close friendships in my job
a. How much is there?	 1.	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
b. How important is this to me? 	 1 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
6. The opportunity for promotion in my job
a. How much is there?	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7
b. How important is this to me? 	 1 2	 3	 4	 5	 6 7
7. The feeling of self-res pect/esteem derived from my job position
a. How much is there?	 1 2	 3	 4	 5	 6 7
b. How important is this to me?	 1 2	 3	 4 5	 6 7

























Characteristics of the 48 middle managers interviewed for the research
Notes:
This exhibit outlines the characteristics of the 48 middle managers
interviewed for the research within (1) Social Services (2) Highways (3)
Finance (4) Commercial Services.
Expansion of the abbreviated headings is as follows:
Highest Educ.Qual - The highest level of educational qualifications
obtained by the managers
Management Qual. - Management qualifications obtained by the managers
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EXCLUSION:
This exhibit is ommitted from this copy of the thesis to prevent any
possible identification of the managers who were interviewed.
CHAPTER 6: EXHIBITS 6.1. - 6.13.
Exhibit 6.1.
Title:
Barset County Council (1992/30): functions, mission, and strategy.
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Barset County Council 1992/3 - Functions, mission and strategy
BCC is one of the three largest English County Councils, serving a mixed
urban and rural area of 3730 square kilometers, with a population of
around 1.5 million in 1992/3.
The Conservatives have controlled Barset since its inception following
the 1888 Local Government Act, (although it became •Ihurigu with no party
in overall control for the first time after the 1993-May elections, by
which time this research was. completed). The Authority had, in 1992/3,
99 elected members, a workforce of about 34,800 full time equivalents
(including locally controlled Education), and a gross annual budget of
£1,212 million.
Barset is responsible for ensuring that the following services are
provided (either by BCC's own workforce or through other public,
voluntary and private sector agencies); responsibility for some of these





Police and Traffic Wardens
Highways and Transport Planning








* No 1 Priority - Public Services
* Maximise Barset's Interests
* Businesslike, Leading Edge
* Competitive, Added Value
* European and International
BARSET COUNTY COUNCIL
.THE PLACE TO BE...









Parks and Open Spaces
Museums and Art Galleries
Economic Development
Strategic Priorities 199213 - 94/5
* Improving the Range and
Quality of People Services
* Creating the Conditions for
Economic Success
* Improving the Physical
Environment
* Better Public Protection
* Sound Budgets
* Switching Resources from
Overheads to Service Delivery
Sources - Members' Handbook, 1993; BCC/Price Waterhouse, "Facing the
Challenge: Making Strategic Management Work"; Making
Connections, 1992; Medium-term Plan, 1992/3-1994/5.
EXHIBIT 6.2.
Title:
Social Services, Highways, .Conunercij Services Departments and Finance
Sections (1992/3): size, budget and inctions
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Social Services, Highways, Commercial Service Departments and Finance
Sections, 1992/3: size, budget and functions
Social Services Department
Size:	 approximately 4,494 full-time equivalents
Budget:	 £15l.597 million (revenue)
Functions: the Department is responsible for ensuring the provision of
variety of home-based, community and residential services
for: children and families; elderly people; people with
learning and physical disabilities; people with mental health
problems.
Highways and Transportation Department (excluding Direct Services)
Size:	 approximately 873 full-time equivalents
Budget	 £85.3 million (revenue)
Functions: the Department is responsible for ensuring the provision of
services which include: planning for future transport needs;
design, construction and maintenance of roads arid footways;
traffic management and road safety; public transport support;
waste management and regulation.
Commercial Services Department
Size:	 approximately 2,716 full-time equivalents (the number
fluctuates considerably)
Budget:	 the Department has no budget; it generates its own income
from product/service sales
Functions: the services provided by the Department's nine business units
include: the supply of gas, oil, electricity, office
equipment, furniture; idase cars; printing; school meals;
cleaning; vehicle maintenance.
Finance Sections
Size:	 approximately 235 staff in the Corporate Finance sections,
and about 400 staff devolved to Service Departments
Budget:	 4.417 million (revenue)
Functions: the Corporate Finance sections provide a range of corporate
services including: corporate financial advice; management
and review of corporate financial processes; ensuring
corporate financial control through setting standards for
financial activity, and monitoring compliance; supporting the
Departmental financial services. Departmental Finance
sections have similar responsibilities for Departmental
finance, and they also assist budget-holder line managers.




Barset's Local Pay and Grading Scales, 1990 (still operating in
1992/3)
Notes
This shows Barset's own local grading structure which operated until
March 1990, and the new grading structure (with the overlapping grades
to ensure greater functional flexibility) which operated from April 1990
up to the time of this research.
The National Joint Council Scales (approximate equivalents) are shown on





Example (from the Highways Department) of a "new-style" job description
and performance appraisal format used under the County's Staff
Development and Performance Review system
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COUNTY COUNCIL





Project Manager (Major Maintenance)
Design and Construction
Job Purpose	 To direct the design process of new highway and/or major
maintenance schemes throughout the County within agreed
prQgrammes, resources and financial targets to enable the




The postholder is responsible to the Highway Design Manager and
P.A.C.S. (Design & Construction) for the discharge of his/her
duties.
1) Plan, direct and monitor the work of the Team and other
groups to meet the client's design brief and programme.
2) Agree fees with clients, ensure all activities are
accounted for and that the income is fully realised to
achieve profitability of the project team.
3) Ensure the requirements of the Departmental Quality
Assurance Scheme are fully implemented to provide
confidence to the client that products and services meet
appropriate standards and performance.
4) Provide an innovative and effective approach to all
aspects of the work to ensure the most cost effective and
environmentally sensitive solutions.
5) Promote effective liaison with the public, clients and
other parties to achieve positive support in realising the
objectives of the Authonty.
6) Ensure the expertise of the postholder is made available
for positive contribution to the overall management of the
Branch and Department.
Salary and Conditions
Salary Career Band 4, Grade H.
Essential User Car Allowance/Lease Car.
Subject to all Conditions of Service as contained in the Kent County Council
Scheme of Conditions of Service for Pay Plus, Administrative, Professional,
Technical and Clerical Staff.
Ouplifications
Degree in Civil Engineering or equivalent.
MICE or equivalent.
8 years minunum experience since achieving Chartered status.
• Individual
HIGHWAYS &
	 •	 •. ppraisa
TRANSPORTATION
YEARI9 119





THIS APPRAISAL SHOULD COVER:— :
1)- AN EVALUATION bF THE WHOLE JOB
2) A DISOUSS ION OF INDIVIDUAL CAREER PLANS
•3) APERSONALDEVELOPMENTPLAN -
4) COMMENTS ABOUT THE APPRAISAL
. Where necessarfädditional heets should'be attached to the-
Original
Completed forms to be retained by line managers with a copy
to appraisee. -
. • Personal Development Plans should be completed and
forwarded to the Personnel Group.

PERFORMANCE
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Barset County Council Departmental structure, 1993
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2. denotes the corporate Purchaser functions
2 denotes the corporate Pro'ider functions (including the Commercial
Services Department
3 denotes the Finance Director's corporate function, which is neither
a Purchaser nor a Provider function
EXHIBIT 6.6.
Title:






















































Social Services Department organisational chart (simplified), 1992/3
Notes
The symbol @ denotes middle managerial grades/locations
The dotted line running vertically down the page denotes the
Purchaser/Provider split (operating under each of the 5 Area
Directors).
The dotted line running from the Assistant Directors of Finance,
Personnel etc. (top left-hand side of the chart) denotes the Ndotted
line" relationship operating between these Social Service Departmental
specialist staff and the "Head of Profession" role located within the
Central Corporate Specialist Departments.
The dotted line running from the asterisked AREA Finance, Personnel etc.
officers (middle right-hand side of the chart) denotes the dotted line"
relationship operating between these specialist staff and the
Departmental Assistant Directors of these specialist functions - and
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EXHIBIT 6.10.
Title:
Highways	 and Transportation	 Department organisational 	 chart
(simplified), 1993.
Notes
The symbol @ denotes middle managerial grades/locations
The dotted line running vertically down the page denoteø the
Purchaser/Provider split (operating under the Director, except for the
Assistant Director Strategic Support, where the division occurs
immediately under this position).
The dotted line running from the asterisked specialist Finance,
Personnel etc. staff (middle of the chart) denotes the "dotted line"
relationship operating between these Departmental specialist staff and











































H1hways and Transportalion (1993) Organisation Chart (Simplified
PURCHJSER FUNCTIONS t Director of Hlpjiwsys and Transportation PROVIDER FUNCTIONS
Docted line n relationship to
Central Departments of Finance,
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Public	 Transport Traffic	 Waste
Transport Policy	 Planning	 Disposal
Planning Manager & Safety 	 Manager
Manager	 Manager
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Information	 Personal	 Finance	 Services
















Finance Highways	 Head of	 Waste	 Contract
Admits	 Maintenance	 Laboratory Regulation Services
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Manager	 I
II	 II	 j	 [1	 II
'Project	 Project	 Business	 'Project Managers
	







— — — Denotes division between Purchaser & Provider Functions
Denotes loion of Middle Managers
Dcnoccs dotted tine refationsip to central Head of Profession Roles County Hall
EXHIBIT 6.11.
Title:
Commercial Services Department organisational chart (simplified),
1992/3
Notes
This Department did not exist in the mid 1980s. There is no
Purchaser/Provider division within the Department; all business units
were Providers at the time of the research.

























































Central Finance organisational chart (simplified), 1993
Notes
The symbol ® denotes middle managerial grades/locations
The two dotted lines running down the page denote the Purchaser/Provider
split, which operated under the Chief Executive, except for:
(1) the Finance Director (formerly the Treasurer) who was located
outside the Purchaser/Provider division, to enable him to
concentrate on the "Head of Profession Role", and on reviewing the
overall "financial health" and performance of the Council;
(2) The Service Departmental Chief Officers (Social Services, Highways
etc.) who were "twin-hatted", with the Purchaser/Provider division
operating under them within their departments - see exhibits 6.8.
and 6.10.
The dotted line (on the top left-hand side of the chart) running between
the asterisked specialist Finance staff located within the service
Departments and the Finance Director denotes the "dotted lineN
relationship operating between these Departmental specialist staff and
the "Head of Profession" role of the Finance Director (see exhibits 6.8.
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